

Filippo Ursitti

Adorno,  
Anders,  
and Heidegger  
entangled

PADOVA  
**UP**

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## Abstract

The aim of the following text is to address the gap in the scholarship that characterises Günther Anders' work, and, in particular, the link between his musicology and later philosophical works. This study will provide a new interpretation of Anders' corpus based on his early musicological works and the impact they had for his overall thinking. In doing so, this research will depict Anders as more than a mere philosopher of technology as well as provide a crucial interpretive key to the works of his major interlocutors, Adorno and Heidegger. Moreover, this book aims at exposing the link that connects Anders' musicology with the themes of his later philosophy of technology which also offers a novel stance on Adorno's and Heidegger's analyses of Hölderlin's late hymns. Thus, rather than concentrating on musicology itself, the present book will employ it as a prism through which the polemics between Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger, with particular focus on the development of Anders' thinking, can be better reinterpreted.

This book is structured in the following manner: in the first chapter, I present the intricate evolution of Anders' philosophy from phenomenology to musicology. Then it juxtaposes Adorno's and Anders' pre-war musicological works in order to describe the emergence, through both, of a call for a paradigmatic shift centred on the ear and infused with an anti-Husserlian attitude. In the second chapter, I extrapolate Heidegger's cryptic musicology from his essay on *The Origin of the Work of Art* and proceeds to compare it with Anders' musicology. This leads to an examination of the notion of 'Stimmung' that, I argue, is crucial for understanding Heidegger's idea of music and his shift from a Husserlian ocular-centrism to a new 'acousticism'. The third chapter bridges the pre- and post-war philosophical debate among Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger and, moreover, proposes a way of re-reading the philosophical 'turn' attributed to each of them after WWII. This



new reading recovers the notion of 'Stimmung' already described and uses it to showcase the existence of a parallel discussion between Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger. It thereby unveils how Adorno contested the utility of a theory of emotionality while Anders and Heidegger aimed at promoting it. In the fourth chapter, I discuss how Anders questioned Heidegger's post-Kehre philosophy, and in the process offered two different interpretations of poetry and Hölderlin. Here it will emerge how Anders, in a direct opposition with Heidegger, recovers from Hölderlin a practical morality based on the present rather than retreating into a defeatist self-centrism. In chapter five, a juxtaposition of Anders to Adorno's readings of Hölderlin and Beckett exhibits how their two differing perspectives were not only linked in their opposition to Heidegger but also can be seen through this lens as presenting an insightful evaluation of the disastrous effect of alienation. Finally, the conclusion answers the question: what can be learnt from re-discovering Anders' musicological works? It thereby attempts to demonstrate the significance as well as the innovativeness of Anders' thought via a focus on its stances toward music, anthropology, and technology and its effectiveness in proposing new paradigms.

## Introduction: Two rejections from Frankfurt

In the 1920s, Frankfurt was emerging as an attractive modern metropolis as well as a global capital hub, with its stock exchange, university, and airport. The modernist public project known as 'New Frankfurt' [*Neues Frankfurt*] showcased the city's rising industrial might and demonstrated new utopian ways of living. The sudden economic and demographic growth of the city created an ideal environment for young intellectuals who established an eccentric milieu that was perceived as socially, culturally, and philosophically experimental to the recently (1914) instituted University of Frankfurt. In 1924, the originality of Frankfurt University was embodied in the foundation of the Marxist Institute of Social Research, which aimed to investigate topics usually neglected in the typical curriculum of German higher education. In this experimental and innovative context, the University of Frankfurt attracted new young intellectuals, such as Leo Lowenthal, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Günther Anders – a German-Jewish philosopher known for his later philosophy of technology and his antinuclear activism, and the subject of this book.

The experimentalism, innovation, and eccentricity of the University of Frankfurt did not translate into less friction or antagonism among its scholars, as the cases of Benjamin and Anders clearly demonstrate. Both attempted to obtain their *venia legendi* in Frankfurt but failed, and their rejections had a profound impact on their future lives, leaving scars that lasted for decades and marked their interactions with other members of the Institute. However, there is a significant difference between Benjamin's and Anders' rejections. While Benjamin's rejection did not prevent a rediscovery of his *Origin of the German Trauerspiel* and his other works, making him one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, Anders' rejection kept his philosophical contribution mostly unknown,

with the exception of his later philosophy of technology, thereby precluding any revival or resurgence of his philosophy. This fundamental difference between Benjamin and Anders raises the following question: what can be discovered in Anders' rejected *Habilitationschrift Philosophische Untersuchungen über Musikalische Situationen* with reference to his major interlocutors, Adorno and Martin Heidegger? This research does not aim to compare or claim that Anders' work bears the same significance as Benjamin's inspiring philosophy, but rather argues that a new interpretation of Anders' corpus, based on his early musicological work, can reveal the trajectory connecting his musicology with the themes of his later philosophy of technology. Furthermore, it offers a novel perspective on Adorno's and Heidegger's pre- and post-war analyses, demonstrating the significance and innovativeness of Anders' thought in proposing new paradigms for anthropology, philosophy of technology, and musicology.

As already mentioned, both rejections were characterised by a friction which informed Benjamin's and Anders' later interactions with the other affiliates of the Institute, particularly with Horkheimer and Adorno. In both Benjamin's and Anders' cases, the tension arose due to their idiosyncratic philosophical understanding. Benjamin's use of a 'crude' (undialectical) Marxism and theological elements in his work created tension, while for Anders, the clear Heideggerian influence and lack of dialectical materialism in his interpretation of music led to antipathy. A closer examination of the circumstances that led to the rejections of Benjamin and Anders, along with other conflicts they had with the Institute, will demonstrate the depth of the friction that separated them from the other members of the Frankfurt School. Despite this intense tension, Benjamin was eventually reinstated and associated with the Institute, whereas Anders was excluded from any relationship or influence he might have had with the Institute and its members.

### **First rejection: Walter Benjamin - rejected but not forgotten**

In 1925, a thirty-three years old Walter Benjamin attempted to become a *Privatdozent* in Frankfurt after two endeavours plagued by mis-

fortune in Bern (1919)<sup>1</sup> and Heidelberg (1920-1922)<sup>2</sup>. “Benjamin’s sole hope for an academic career rested in Frankfurt”<sup>3</sup>, where he could still count on his “connections to several scholars working in other fields. His great-uncle Arthur Moritz Schoenflies emeritus professor of mathematics [...] and Gottfried Salomon-Delatour, a sociologist and adjunct faculty member in Frankfurt”<sup>4</sup> and student of Georg Simmel. The help of Solomon-Delatour proved to be plagued by misunderstanding and general confusion: in fact, Solomon-Delatour gave a sample of Benjamin’s work on Goethe to Franz Schultz, professor of German Literary History, who, after initially sponsoring Benjamin’s candidacy in 1923, told his supervisee “that he intended to withdraw himself as advisor, and he recommended [...] to seek *Habilitation* in aesthetics under the sponsorship of Hans Cornelius”<sup>5</sup>. Cornelius was not simply a philosopher but a true eclectic intellectual<sup>6</sup> who published works in applied aesthetics [*Elementargesetze der Bildenden Kunst*], artistic pedagogy [*Kunstpädagogik*] and politics [*Völkerbund und Dauerfriede*]. Fundamental would be his role in the development of Horkheimer<sup>7</sup> who learnt from Cornelius the critical attitude regarding the structure of the German university and the interdisciplinarity of philosophy<sup>8</sup>.

Thus, Benjamin presented a *Habilitationschrift* on the “*Origin of the German Trauerspiel*” under the supervision of his new advisor Cornelius. Cornelius wrote that he “was unable to derive a comprehensible meaning from these [historical observations] ... Under these circumstances” – he wrote – “I am not in a position to recommend to the faculty that the work of Dr. Walter Benjamin be accepted as a *Habilitation* thesis for art history”<sup>9</sup>. The records on Benjamin’s candidacy revealed that Cornelius, before

<sup>1</sup> H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, *Walter Benjamin. A Critical Life* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 177

<sup>4</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 222.

<sup>5</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 223.

<sup>6</sup> He graduated in chemistry in 1886 and became professor in philosophy in 1894. He was also a sculptor, painter, and a collector of renaissance furniture.

<sup>7</sup> C. Petazzi, ‘La fase trascendentale del pensiero di Adorno: Hans Cornelius’, *Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*, 32.4 (1977), p. 447.

<sup>8</sup> See, M. Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie gestern und heute*, in *Gesellschaft im Übergang*, (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1972).

<sup>9</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 231.

rejecting the thesis, asked two of his assistant professors for their evaluation of the dissertation<sup>10</sup>. One of them was Max Horkheimer<sup>11</sup> who, in the same year and under the same advisor, successfully submitted his *Habilitation* thesis on Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. Throughout the years and particularly in the 1930s, when Benjamin published many of his works on the *Zeitschrift*, a mutual intellectual respect began to make itself felt in the exchanges between Horkheimer and Benjamin<sup>12</sup>, and yet "there was always a certain reserve on Horkheimer's part<sup>13</sup>, which had something to do with his undivulged auxiliary role in the rejection of Benjamin's thesis on the *Trauerspiel* of 1925"<sup>14</sup>.

Not becoming a lecturer at the university of Frankfurt did not prevent Benjamin from writing and publishing in the *Zeitschrift* or engaging in discussions with the Frankfurters. Exemplar of the latter were the 'Königstein conversations', in which Benjamin "left an imprint on the thinking of all the participants and helped shape what became known as the Frankfurt School of cultural theory"<sup>15</sup>. The orbiting around the Institute became a necessity, though an unpleasant one, for Benjamin, especially after his emigration to France. It offered him a suitable platform to publish his works – even if only according to the editors' injunctions – as well as a stipend which, unfortunately, was not enough to cover his living expenses<sup>16</sup>. Benjamin's cooperation with "the Institute's program of social research never for long prevented him from pursuing research that *did not fit* into what he called the 'new system of coordinates'"<sup>17</sup>. This was the case of Benjamin's work on Baudelaire, which shows how its author struggled to find himself within the boundaries of the Institute's

<sup>10</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 698n37.

<sup>11</sup> "Horkheimer reported, according to Cornelius recommendation, that he was incapable of understanding Benjamin's study". See, Eiland and Jennings, p. 698.

<sup>12</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 553.

<sup>13</sup> This was immediately evident even to Scholem when he met Horkheimer in USA in the late 1930s. "Scholem's impression was that Horkheimer's admiration for Benjamin was at best brittle. [...] Horkheimer's increasingly generous support of Benjamin was accompanied by a consistently reserved attitude toward his work and by an apparent reluctance to bring Benjamin to New York". Tillich confirmed Scholem's impression by noting that "Horkheimer holds [Benjamin] in the highest regard, *but that he is entirely clear that, where [Benjamin is] concerned, one is dealing with a mystic*". See, Eiland and Jennings, pp. 585-586.

<sup>14</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 553.

<sup>15</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 333.

<sup>16</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 446.

<sup>17</sup> Emphasis added by author, Eiland and Jennings, p. 388.

publishing programme. In a letter dated 10th November 1938, Adorno responded to Benjamin's essay *The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire* "that Benjamin's inattention to the dialectical relationship between history and nature in his account of Baudelaire and the nineteenth century has reified history into something akin to objective fate that remains utterly distinct from subjective experience, and the relationship between subject and object unquestioned"<sup>18</sup>. Such unmediated dialectic between object and subject of Adorno's critique was undoubtedly fuelled by the suspicions that Bertolt Brecht had extended amalign influence on the essay. Adorno "considered Brecht's influence more destructive than beneficial"<sup>19</sup> for it produced in his friend a vulgar, crude materialism and an overly optimistic attitude towards the revolutionary potential of popular art and technological innovation<sup>20</sup>.

Moreover, the letter is characterised by Adorno's repetition of the term 'pragmatic' in relation to Benjamin's analysis<sup>21</sup>, which must be linked to Horkheimer's usage of it during the same period. In *Eclipse of Reason* Horkheimer "provides an account of the hegemony of subjective or instrumental reason. Here Horkheimer indirectly linked Baudelaire to the French Symbolists who embraced the absurdity of subjective reason"<sup>22</sup>. For him, the Symbolists "saw themselves as alienated subjects among a world of objects devoid of mediation, without a hierarchical, objective moral and ontological order that would permit them to make sense of themselves in terms of these objects"<sup>23</sup>. The unmediated combination of elements, together with the pragmatism of the essay, led to Horkheimer's

<sup>18</sup> C. McCall and N. Ross, *Benjamin, Adorno, and the Experience of Literature* (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 28.

<sup>19</sup> M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-50* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1973), p. 201.

<sup>20</sup> Jay, p.201.

<sup>21</sup> McCall and Ross, p. 28.

<sup>22</sup> "The French Symbolists had a special term to express their love for the things which had lost their objective significance, namely, 'spleen.' The conscious, challenging arbitrariness in the choice of objects, its 'absurdity,' 'perverseness,' as if by a silent gesture discloses the irrationality of utilitarian logic, which it then slaps in the face to demonstrate its inadequacy with regard to human experience. And while making it conscious, by this shock, that it forgets the subject, the gesture simultaneously expresses the subject's sorrow over his inability to achieve an objective order". See, Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (London: Continuum, 1974), p. 26.

<sup>23</sup> This is where Hegel speaks about the 'Beautiful Soul'. See, G.W.F Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 126-138.

decision to reject Benjamin's *The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire* which "was probably the most crushing rejection of [Benjamin's] career"<sup>24</sup> given his precarious economic and political circumstances by the end of 1938<sup>25</sup>.

Benjamin's independent thought, which at times was not in line with the Frankfurters, was a crucial source of friction with the Institute. The radicality of Benjamin's Marxism became inappropriate for the American public of the *Zeitschrift*, which led the Institute to occasionally<sup>26</sup> alter Benjamin's wording. For example, in Benjamin's essay on *Eduard Fuchs: an art-historical perspective*<sup>27</sup> and the *Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction* the words 'Communism' and 'imperialistic warfare' were later changed to 'constructive forces of mankind' and 'modern warfare'<sup>28</sup>. Even though the text was censored, it was in here that Benjamin developed his notion of 'aura' which was then highly used by all the members of the Institute in their future cultural analyses<sup>29</sup>. They also accepted the conclusion he drew from the loss of the aura: "the criterion of authenticity ceased to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice – politics"<sup>30</sup>. The Frankfurters disagreed with Benjamin, in particular Adorno, on the repercussions of the loss of the aura. They saw that art carried a political function: "the presentation of a foretaste of the 'other' society denied by the present condition"<sup>31</sup>; while the art in the age of mechanical reproduction served only to reconcile the mass to the status quo. Benjamin, influenced by Brecht, bore a sense of optimism

<sup>24</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 622

<sup>25</sup> In 1938, Hitler's Germany demanded the Sudetenland and enacted the most ferocious political action against the Jewish community in the so-called 'Night of Broken Glass' [*Kristallnacht*].

<sup>26</sup> In some circumstances, Adorno and Horkheimer turned down entire sections. For instance, Benjamin's

*passagenarbeit* was altered primarily because of Adorno's reservations. This was usually done in agreement with Benjamin and not after he had submitted his work's final version. See Jay, p. 206.

<sup>27</sup> In this particular case, Horkheimer censored the text without the consent of Benjamin. Horkheimer considered the essay's opening paragraphs too enmeshed in Marxist theory. See, Eiland and Jennings, p. 550.

<sup>28</sup> Jay, p. 205.

<sup>29</sup> Jay, p. 210.

<sup>30</sup> W. Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York: Schockenbooks, 1968), p. 224.

<sup>31</sup> Jay, p. 211.

about the revolutionary function of technically produced art with which the subsequent works of the Institute on mass culture did not agree<sup>32</sup>.

Walter Benjamin's philosophical contribution was deeply reevaluated after his death by those whose names at that time were still unknown, such as Gershom Scholem, the friend of his youth, Adorno, his first and only disciple<sup>33</sup>, and Hannah Arendt, his later friend, who together were responsible for the posthumous edition of his works and letters<sup>34</sup>. Adorno's academic career was strongly indebted to Benjamin's work. His thesis, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, shows how Adorno in the process of finding his own voice continuously relied on the intellectual principles of his friend<sup>35</sup>. Nonetheless, some of the most serious difficulties emerged through the development of this reevaluation done by the Institute for Social Research. Adorno and Horkheimer "were 'dialectical materialists' and in their opinion, Benjamin's thinking was 'undialectical', moved in 'materialistic categories', which by no means coincided with Marxist ones"<sup>36</sup> to the extent that it related some elements of the superstructure to corresponding elements of the substructure without mediation<sup>37</sup>. Adorno himself wrote that Benjamin "never integrated the idea of universal mediation, which in Hegel, as in Marx, produces the totality"<sup>38</sup>. Concerning the theory of the superstructure, which assumed a central role in the investigations of the Frankfurters, Benjamin used it only as heuristic-methodological incentive, he was barely interested in its historical or philosophical background"<sup>39</sup>. The perceived crude Marxism together with the theological elements of Benjamin's works, which the Institute did not appreciate and sought to remove via a more secular

<sup>32</sup> Jay, p. 211.

<sup>33</sup> Benjamin, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> Scholem published *Walter Benjamin: the story of a friendship*, (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1981), tracing the friendship between him and Benjamin from the early childhood until Benjamin's suicide; Adorno published *Walter Benjamin, Schriften*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955) and *Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe Band I 1910-1918*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), Arendt wrote the introduction of *Illuminations*. See, Benjamin, pp. 1-55.

<sup>35</sup> Eiland and Jennings, p. 359.

<sup>36</sup> Benjamin, p. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Benjamin, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Prisms* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 236.

<sup>39</sup> Benjamin, p. 11.



influence<sup>40</sup>, led the Frankfurters to a scrupulous selection of Benjamin's texts emphasising only those that were more in line with their Critical Theory – i.e., the works in the 1930s rather than those in the early 1920s<sup>41</sup>. The final figure emerging from this idiosyncratic reevaluation of Benjamin's works was that of an untraditional philosopher, who opposed the “shopworn themes and jargon of philosophy”<sup>42</sup> and was easily misunderstood for an essayist.

### **Second rejection: Günther Anders - the almost unknown intellectual**

A few years after Benjamin's withdrawal of his *Habilitation* attempt, another, lesser-known Jewish student also pursued the idea of becoming *Privatdozent* in Frankfurt. Günther Stern (in 1933 changed to Günther Anders) was born in 1902 in Breslau in a Jewish house; his father, William Stern was a well-known personalist psychologist. Distant cousin of Benjamin, Anders began his philosophical studies in Hamburg with Ernst Cassirer and Albert Görland, but then moved to Freiburg for studying under Edmund Husserl and Heidegger. He graduated in 1924 with Husserl thanks to his dissertation *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den 'Logischen Sätzen'*<sup>43</sup>, then he attended Heidegger's seminars in Marburg in 1925/26<sup>44</sup> where he met Arendt, his future wife. In 1926 he was assistant of Max Scheler in Cologne and in 1928 published his first philosophical work titled *Über das Haben*<sup>45</sup>. This brief biography is important for introducing the philosophical background wherein Anders took his first steps. Of evident phenomenological background<sup>46</sup>, Anders' ‘novitiate’ was im-

<sup>40</sup> Jay, p. 201.

<sup>41</sup> An exception was the abovementioned essay on Goethe's *Elective Affinities*.

<sup>42</sup> Adorno, *Prisms*, p. 232.

<sup>43</sup> Then published in his first work *Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis*, (Bonn: F.Cohen Verlag 1928), pp. 1-153.

<sup>44</sup> These lectures took place in the Fall semester 1925/26. These lectures displayed both a detachment from Husserl's phenomenology and a re-discovery and the critique of Kant. The seminars were published under the title *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976).

<sup>45</sup> See, G. Stern, *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der Erkenntnis*.

<sup>46</sup> “I graduated with him (Husserl) in 1924 therefore I was a young boy of twenty-two years old. We got along since the beginning. Once a week before the graduation we had a walk together. [...] We did together, *à la* peripatetic, phenomenological analyses of the

mediately orientated toward phenomenology – influenced by a strong anthropological character – of the human where the dualism man-world was developed through questioning the dichotomy of being-in versus not-being-in the world of man following a ‘Heideggerian fascination’<sup>47</sup>. Characteristic of this first phase of Anders’ thought is the ontological re-elaboration of the nexus man-world: “back then, man seemed to me, in a purely ontological perspective, to be ‘without a world’. During an interval of my life – between 1920 and 1927 – marked by a total political disinterestedness, today not possible anymore, I meant with the notion of ‘man without a world’ an exclusive anthropological-philosophical fact, namely, that we humans are not predisposed to *a world or a specific way of living*, but rather that we are forced [...] to procure and create a world and a lifestyle”<sup>48</sup>. Here Anders refers to his works *Une interpretation de l’aposteriori* and *Patologie de la libert e*<sup>49</sup> both published in France, to where Anders fled because of Hitler’s rise to power. The first work was the re-edition of Anders’ contribution to a conference of 1929 in the *Kant-gesellschaft* of Frankfurt titled *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen*<sup>50</sup>. During this conference – *via* a personal re-elaboration of the themes dear to the philosophical debate of the twentieth century concerning the human place in the cosmos<sup>51</sup> – Anders impressed the members of the Institute of Social Research who participated (Paul Tillich, Mannheim, Kurt Riezler, Max Wertheimer, Horkheimer, and Adorno<sup>52</sup>), who suggested that

senses, thing that he ignored, since he unconsciously attributed to the sight the model of ‘absolute perception’: analyses of the non-optical senses, hence, hearing, smell, body perceptions, which made him feel greatly ashamed because this made ambiguous his distinction between ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’. In our philosophising we were very close, he even proposed me to become his assistant, an offer that I politely declined”. G. Anders, *Il Mondo dopo l’uomo*, (Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis, 2008), p. 57.

<sup>47</sup> M. Latini, ‘Dialettica Negativa e Antropologia Negativa. Adorno-Anders’, in *La Dialettica Negativa Di Adorno Categorie e Contesti* (Roma: Manifestolibri, 2008), p. 143.

<sup>48</sup> G. Anders, *Eccesso Di Mondo* (Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis, 2000), p. 11.

<sup>49</sup> Both works were published in the journal *Recherches philosophiques*. The first one in 1935, the second one in 1936.

<sup>50</sup> K.P. Liessmann, *G nther Anders* (M nchen: C. H. Beck, 2002), p. 30.

<sup>51</sup> An example appears in Heidegger’s *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, where he writes: “anthropology [...] makes sense and is only justifiable insofar as it leads man back beyond himself and into the totality of beings”. M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). On the same issue see, M. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009).

<sup>52</sup> E. Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt for Love of the World* (New Haven: Yale University

he apply for a *Habilitation* there. Tillich, supervisor of Anders between 1930-1931<sup>53</sup>, recommended, for the topic of the study, a research on Philosophy of Music<sup>54</sup>, that Anders titled *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen*<sup>55</sup> in which he tried to produce a notion of philosophy of music which was not grounded either on the formal objective language of music or on its subjective emotionality, but rather to adopt a phenomenological approach to the ‘musical situation’, that is, to the moment in which music is played or heard<sup>56</sup>.

Like what happened to his cousin Benjamin, the study was rejected and led to a controversy between Anders and Adorno which lasted for more than thirty years<sup>57</sup>. As in Benjamin’s case, Anders shared his supervisor with Adorno and the latter had a certain role in the rejection of the former *Habilitation*. The reasons behind this rejection were multiple: Tillich’s dependence on Adorno’s expertise<sup>58</sup>, Anders’ modest understanding in philosophy of music compared to Adorno’s<sup>59</sup>, Anders’ philosophical proximity with Heidegger’s thought<sup>60</sup>, to which Anders would later on declare to agree 100%<sup>61</sup>, Anders’ competition with Adorno’s field of study<sup>62</sup>, which Adorno refuted in his letters<sup>63</sup>, and, lastly, the ascending political influence of *Nationalsozialismus*<sup>64</sup>. A proof for the first reason is a letter sent by Arendt to Karl Jaspers in 1931<sup>65</sup> where she told her friend that Tillich was ‘unreliable’ because he knew nothing of musicology and,

Press, 1982), p. 111.

<sup>53</sup> G. Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, ed. by R. Ellensohn, (München: C. H. Beck, 2018), pp. 353-354.

<sup>54</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 171.

<sup>55</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 15-141.

<sup>56</sup> Liessmann, p. 20.

<sup>57</sup> Resembling Horkheimer’s and Benjamin’s relationship, Adorno and Anders maintained a certain distance.

<sup>58</sup> It was not until 1963, through an epistolary exchange, that they finally discussed the matter of the *Habilitation*. See, Liessmann, p. 20, Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 171, and Latini, p. 143.

<sup>59</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 356-359.

<sup>60</sup> Young-Bruehl, p. 80.

<sup>61</sup> Liessmann, pp. 139-140.

<sup>62</sup> Latini, p. 143.

<sup>63</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 339.

<sup>64</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>65</sup> G. Stern, *La Battaglia Delle Ciliegie* (Roma: Donizelli Editore, 2012), p. xx.

<sup>66</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 355.

therefore, had to depend on the ‘expertise in the philosophy of music’ of his supervisee Adorno<sup>66</sup>. This situation became extremely ‘embarrassing’ for everybody when Tillich confessed his faults<sup>67</sup>. Concerning the second, third and fourth reasons, the letters exchanged by Adorno and Anders in 1963<sup>68</sup> bring some insight on the matter in question. In 1963, Anders agreed<sup>69</sup> with Adorno’s argument that his study did not possess a wide musical basis [*musikalische Basis als zu schmal empfunden habe*]<sup>70</sup>, that its text, its words, and its general structure seemed Heideggerian [*daß mir der Text, nach Sprache und Gesamtverhalten, überaus Heideggerisch dünkte*]<sup>71</sup>. But when Anders spoke of an intrusion in Adorno’s personal domain [*ein Einbruch in Ihre persönlichste Domäne*]<sup>72</sup>, Adorno disagreed, saying that he did not take Anders’ work as an interference into his own field, not even for one second. Moreover, Adorno added that there was no such a thing in ‘intellectual matters’, and that he was not suited to be a monopolist<sup>73</sup>. Considering the last reason, during the meeting in which Tillich suggested to Anders to withdraw his *Habilitation*, he also recommended Anders to wait for one year or so for Nazism to ebb [*die Nazis dran für ein Jahr oder so*]<sup>74</sup>, a suggestion which proved to be plagued by misfortune.

Despite his *Habilitation* being rejected, Anders, like Benjamin, did not interrupt his relationship with the Frankfurters in his flight from Hitler’s Germany. In fact, in 1942<sup>75</sup> he lived in Herbert Marcuse’s house in Santa Monica and participated in symposiums, together with Hans Reichenbach, Brecht, Marcuse, Hanns Eisler, and Horkheimer in Adorno’s house<sup>76</sup>. In this new context characterised by the common exile in the USA Anders attempted a second time to ‘join’ the Institute. Yet, even

<sup>66</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 356-359.

<sup>67</sup> Arendt speaks of a ‘Sündenbekenntnis’ showing Tillich’s ‘*voluptas contritionis*’. See, Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 356.

<sup>68</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>69</sup> Anders wrote that he was “100% d’accord”. Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>70</sup> Liessmann, p. 20.

<sup>71</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>72</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>73</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 358.

<sup>74</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 356.

<sup>75</sup> Liessmann, p. 140.

<sup>76</sup> On the symposiums and meetings in California see, S. Muller-Doohm, *Adorno A Biography*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 299.

though they all were émigrés, Anders remained a stranger; he was neither famous nor economically supported like his ‘colleagues’ were<sup>77</sup>. Significant in this context is Anders’ discussion of his ‘theory of needs’ in Adorno’s house in 1942<sup>78</sup>, where Anders presented a revisited version of what he already discussed in his *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen*, namely, the idea that human nature is an *in fieri* production of worlds and cultures with precise aims and values. Anders offered a critique of cultural transformation operated by capitalism which covertly reduced cultural values into commodities producing their ideologisation, which made them suitable for (ideological) political purposes<sup>79</sup>. He also referred to Marx’s idea of how production creates consumption<sup>80</sup>, even in relation to cultural products, which subjugates individuals to the needs of the economic system. In the discussion following Anders’ presentation<sup>81</sup>, a constant lack of understanding between Anders and the other interlocutors was perceivable, notably, from Reichenbach, Horkheimer, Eisler and Adorno, who preferred to focus on what they regarded as more practical issues – “between more milk, and less milk but more music, you have to decide for more milk”<sup>82</sup> [*beaucoup de lait, ou moins de lait mais des disques en plus, il faut se décider pour le lait*]<sup>83</sup>. Whenever Anders asked how cultural values can form in a context free from domination (in the classless society), Horkheimer changed the topic of the conversation and led the group to

<sup>77</sup> In this same year Anders wrote the poem *Vor dem Spiegel* (before the mirror), where he commemorated the death of his father in 1938. Two main themes emerge from it: 1) the critique of his father’s blind fate (you

blindly trusted culture [*Du trauest blinlings der Kultur*]) in the state that gave him an academic career; 2) the fact that Anders could not follow his father’s academic path (Yes, father, that is over/ such life I have missed now [*Ja, Vater, das ist ausgeträumt/ Solch Leben hab ich nun versäumt*]). Konrad P. Liessmann, ‘Moralist Und Ketzer. Zu Günther Anders Und Seiner Philosophie Des Monströsen’, *Text+Kritik*, 115, 1992, 3–19 (pp. 4–5).

<sup>78</sup> For Anders’ discussion with the Frankfurters in 1942, see M. Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften: Nachgelassene Schriften 1931-1949*, (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1985).

<sup>79</sup> Horkheimer, pp. 589-596.

<sup>80</sup> Thus, production produces consumption (1) by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner of consumption; and (3) by creating the products.

<sup>81</sup> Horkheimer, pp. 590-596.

<sup>82</sup> I am using a French translation of Horkheimer’s ‘*Thèses Sur La Théorie Des Besoins*’, *Les Amis de Némésis*, 2003 <<http://www.lesamisdenemesis.com/?p=145/>> [accessed 21 May 2019].

<sup>83</sup> They are referring to the promise of the Minister of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace to procure half a litre of milk for every infant as the exemplification of the necessity of primary needs (milk) before cultural needs (disks).

discuss the importance of practical actions to face the growing barbarism (National Socialism/Fascism)<sup>84</sup>.

The fracture caused by this second ostracised attempt of Anders led to new tension, especially with Adorno, from whom Anders, throughout his life, would try to intellectually disassociate<sup>85</sup>. This detachment seemed evident even to other philosophers external to this personal matter, such as György Lukács who had a long epistolary exchange with Anders between 1964 and 1971<sup>86</sup>. Lukács, in a letter dated 23rd May 1964, was pleased to see that Anders did not belong to the so-called 'critical thinkers' who lived in the 'Grand Hotel Abyss'<sup>87</sup> and were not interested in the *misera plebs*<sup>88</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> Horkheimer, pp. 590-59.

<sup>85</sup> Liessmann, p. 140.

<sup>86</sup> F. Benseler, *Lukács 1997. Jahrbuch Der Internationalen Georg Lukács-Gesellschaft* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 47-72.

<sup>87</sup> With this pejorative nickname Lukács attacked the members of the Frankfurt School because of their inversion of Marx's theory. He charged that they had taken up residence in a hotel equipped with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss of nothingness and of absurdity where they could amuse themselves in the contemplation of the suffering of the world from a safe distance. See, Jeffries, p. 1.

<sup>88</sup> Benseler, p. 50.



## Re-evaluating Anders

Unlike his cousin Benjamin, Anders was not re-evaluated by the Frankfurters, nor by any other philosophical movement, in a systematic and holistic manner, resulting in a state of affairs wherein individual scholars produced heterogenous works based on selections of the diverse inputs presented by Anders in his vast number of publications. Such heterogeneity of the translations and the critical analyses of Anders' corpus has, nonetheless, led to two identifiable approaches regarding Anders' works. On the one hand, there is a growing interest in the Andersian works, especially in France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, Spain, and Japan, where he undoubtedly reached a certain fame and credit. On the other hand, in the United States of America and Great Britain, there is an opposition towards Anders' work where his texts, apart from his Kafka book, the Eatherly correspondence<sup>89</sup> and the recent works of Babette Babich, Jason Dawsey, and Christopher J. Müller<sup>90</sup>, carry a sad shadowy exist-

<sup>89</sup> G. Anders, *Franz Kafka*, trans. by A. Steer and A.K. Thorlby (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1960), G. Anders, *Burning Conscience* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962).

<sup>90</sup> See, B. Babich, "On Günther Anders, Political Media Theory, and Nuclear Violence", *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 44.10, (2018), pp. 1110-26; B. Babich, "Technik Und Machenschaft Bei Martin Heidegger Und Günther Anders. Mit Einigen Bemerkungen Zu Ray Kurzweils Urknall Technik Und Machenschaft Bei Martin Heidegger Und Günther Anders", 2010; B. Babich, "O, Superman! Or Being Towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, And Media Aesthetics", *Divinatio*, 36, (2013), pp. 40-100; J.C. Muller, "Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture and Human Obsolescence", *Thesis Eleven*, 2016; J.C. Müller, 'Desert Ethics: Technology and the Question of Evil in Günther Anders and Jacques Derrida', (2015); J. Dawsey, *Ontology and ideology: Günther Anders's philosophical and political confrontation with Heidegger. Critical Historical Studies* 4 (1), 2017, pp. 1-37; J. Dawsey, *After Hiroshima: Günther Anders and the history of anti-nuclear critique*. In M. Grant and B. Ziemann, *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press); J. Dawsey, 'Marxism and Technocracy: "Günther Anders and the Necessity for a Critique of Technology"', *Thesis Eleven*, 153.1 (2019), pp. 39-56.



ence. Moreover, there is a noticeable gap in research on Anders' early musicological studies, although a few scholars such as Reinhard Ellensohn, Thomas Macho and Christoph Khittl<sup>91</sup> dedicated their attention to such theme. The overwhelming majority of the works, which aim at contextualising Anders' philosophical production, mainly focuses on his early philosophical anthropology or his later philosophy of technology. These works, thus, typically compare Anders to Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Jacques Derrida, Arnold Gehlen, Heidegger, Hans Jonas, and Helmut Plessner.

Despite the different perspectives from which Anders' work has been examined, there has been little research critically connecting his works from the different national sets of scholarship. Hence, one aim of this book is to reveal the relevance of each one of them – German, Italian, French, and English – while at the same time underlining their shared problematic, namely, the aforementioned lack of contextualisation of Anders' musicological writings. Although the German and Italian studies are the most influential, for they contribute to the creation of a solid theoretical ground, they are limiting. The German research on Anders' works has primarily focused on his later thought and his analysis on technology, omitting the contextualisation of his musicology and, in part, his early anthropology. Anders' critique of technology epitomises Anders' major philosophical inquiry, but it remains far from exhausting the thematic complexity and philosophical density of Anders' entire thought which also engaged with anthropological, existential and musicological dilemmas. The Italian approach to Anders' corpus is twofold: on the one hand, in what can be called the first receptive phase of his works (1960s), the Italian scholars concentrated on Anders' ethical-social elaborations<sup>92</sup>

<sup>91</sup> See, R. Ellensohn, *Der Andere Anders: Günther Anders Als Musikphilosoph* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008); T. Macho, 'Die Kunst Der Verwandlung', *Merkur*, 45.507, (1991), C. Khittl, "'Gute" Musik? In Musikpädagogischen Kontexten? Phänomenologische Überlegungen Zu Einem Situativen Musikbegriff – Essay Zur Theorie Der Musikalischen Situation Nach Günther Anders', in *Musik: Wissenschaftlich – Pädagogisch – Politisch. Festschrift Für Arnold Werner-Jensen Zum 70. Geburtstag*. (Essen: Die Blaue Eule, 2014), C. Khittl, 'Präsenzforschung Und Musikpädagogik Zur Theorie Der Musikalischen Situation Nach Günther Anders (1902 – 1992)', *Diskussion Musikpädagogik* 61/14, 61 (2014).

<sup>92</sup> In the introduction to Aldo Meccariello e Micaela Latini a *L'uomo e la (sua) fine*, the authors underline the fact that the civic engagement of Anders remains the most notorious and studied aspect of his thought while his philosophical anthropological and literary contributions are yet to be discussed. M. Latini and A. Meccariello, *L'uomo e La (Sua) Fine. Saggi Su Günther Anders* (Trieste: Asterios, 2014), pp. 9–14

and on the stout civic obligations connected to them. On the other hand, it is only in the second phase (mid-1980s), that scholars began to consider the theoretical elements of Anders' philosophy. However, from the 1980s to the 2010s, Italian research on Anders still did not investigate Anders' musicological production, which is yet to be studied comprehensively in the Italian language<sup>93</sup>.

The French works reveal how Anders' corpus was influential in the French intelligentsia in the 1930s as well as how Anders' critique of the atomic bomb and nuclear energy has been, even after the end of the Cold War, a fruitful framework for producing new thought-provoking critiques<sup>94</sup>. In 1933 Anders left Germany for France with his wife Arendt. In Paris, he published two philosophical articles in the journal *Recherches philosophiques* inspired by Heidegger's existential viewpoint, titled *Une interprétation de l'a posteriori* and *Pathologie de la liberté*, respectively<sup>95</sup>. In the 1930s Anders fascinated the French public for his existential approach, while in the early 1990s, thanks to the renovated German interest, his philosophy of technology was the trigger that led a new generation of scholars to study his works. Yet, as in the German and Italian sets of scholarship, the French scholarship is deficient concerning the early works of Anders, particularly of the musicological studies. In fact, even though the *Phenomenology of Listening* has been published in French, the musicological *Habilitation* thesis *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen* is still untranslated and barely known.

The concise English literature displays the comparatively limited extent to which Anders is known in the Anglophone world. The publication of *The Life and Work of Günther Anders: Émigré, Iconoclast, Philosopher, Man of Letters*<sup>96</sup> in 2014 tried to introduce, again thanks to the effort of German

<sup>93</sup> Anders' *Phenomenology of Listening* has been translated in Italian but the *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen* is still untranslated and barely mentioned. See, G. Anders-Stern, 'Sulla Fenomenologia Dell'ascolto', in *La Regressione Dell'Ascolto* (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2002), pp. 187–200.

<sup>94</sup> See, J-P. Dupuy, *The Mark of the Secred* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), J-P. Dupuy, *Petite Métaphysique des Tsunamis*, (Paris: Sueil, 2009), J-P. Dupuy, *Retour de Tchernobyl. Journal d'un homme en colère*, (Seuil: Paris, 2006), J-P. Dupuy, *La guerre qui ne peut pas avoir lieu. Essai de métaphysique nucléaire*, (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 2019).

<sup>95</sup> Y. Tonaki, 'Günther Anders En France Recension de Deux Revues Destinée Au Public Japonais', *Journal of International Philosophy*, 2, 2013, 371–74 (p. 371).

<sup>96</sup> Before that, there were at least three works which dealt with Anders in the Anglophone world: First, in 2000 *Rodopi* published the first general monograph on Anders in English

scholars<sup>97</sup>, Anders in both the UK and USA. In Anglophone scholarship, Anders' philosophy was adopted for questioning new cultural, economic and political issues such as globalisation, big data capitalism, Anthropocene, and ecologism. Furthermore, in the English scholarship, Anders is depicted as a figure in between the Frankfurt School – which, in Babich's estimation, was something that Anders helped to originate together with Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse<sup>98</sup> – and the phenomenological school of Husserl and Heidegger, under whom he studied and worked. Hence, it is not surprising that Babich refers to Fuchs' characterisation of Anders' approach as an 'undiscovered Critical Theory of technology' since he was a theorist of power who philosophised about violence, technology and media theory thus discussing similar issues of the aforementioned philosophical schools. Nonetheless, this limited scholarship suffers in the same manner of all the others: it does not examine nearly enough of the full extent of the Andersian corpus. While focusing on the later and more famous production of Anders as the theorist of technology with elements of Critical Theory, it omits most of Anders' early production, particularly the musicological works, which are still unavailable<sup>99</sup> in the Anglophone world<sup>100</sup>.

As I have illustrated, all four sets of scholarship display the same fault, namely, a lack of a holistic methodical inspection of Anders' mu-

by P. van Dijk, *Anthropology in the Age of Technology: The Philosophical Contribution of Günther Anders*, (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000). Second, Babich published an article in 2010 about Anders for the publisher *Working papers*, see, Babich, "Technik und Mächenschaft bei Martin Heidegger und Günther Anders. Mit einigen Bemerkungen zu Ray Kurzweils Urknall". *Working Papers*. 2, 2010, pp. 1-30, and Z. Bauman, *Consuming Life* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). In 2009, Katharine Wolfe translated Anders' *Pathologie de la liberté* into English. See, "The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification", trans. by Katharine Wolfe. *Deleuze Studies* 3, no. 2 (2009): 278-310

<sup>97</sup> Primarily through the collaboration of Ellensohn and Liessmann to the project.

<sup>98</sup> See, Babich, 'On Günther Anders, Political Media Theory, and Nuclear Violence'.

<sup>99</sup> Babich stresses the attention on the fact that Don Ihde has intervened to block the translation of Anders' works in English because of their pessimism towards technology. See, Babich, 'On Günther Anders, Political Media Theory, and Nuclear Violence', p. 122, Babich, 'O, Superman! Or Being towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, and Media Aesthetics', p. 46, Babich, *Adorno's Radio Phenomenology: Technical Reproduction, Physiognomy and Music, Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 2014, p. 990.

<sup>100</sup> Babich mentions the early *Phenomenology of Listening*, but there is no work on it in English yet. See,

<sup>101</sup> Babich, 'On Günther Anders, Political Media Theory, and Nuclear Violence', p. 1111.

sicological works, which appear to be scarcely acknowledged. Thus, to paraphrase the provocation put forward at the beginning of this introduction – what can be learnt from a re-discovery of Anders’ musicological works? – they let surface an intriguing nexus that links Anders to Adorno, Heidegger, Husserl and other philosophers, though not because of the mere proximity of some of their theories. In this book, I will argue that in the musicological works of Anders we can discover the founding elements for comprehending Anders’ later philosophy of technology which, simultaneously, introduces a new outlook for uncovering and understanding the connection between Adorno’s and Heidegger’s analyses of Friedrich Hölderlin’s late hymns in their respective post-war investigation of alienation, the naiveté of Heidegger’s ontological reading, and Adorno’s notion of reconciliation in the age of technology. Displaying all these hidden connections between the pre- and post-war philosophy of Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger, together with the new perspective that such tight nexus implies will, therefore, be the primary focus of this book.

### **Aims of this book**

This book aims at articulating a re-evaluation of Anders’ philosophy as well as providing a new perspective on Adorno and Heidegger’s works via a tryptic discussion. This will involve an investigation which will address Adorno, Anders and Heidegger’s production before and after the Second World War. Anders’ musicology will be used as a prism for reinterpretation, allowing for gaining more insight on the polemics between Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger. However, before commencing such examination it is important to contextualise the biographical context in which Anders studied and worked for two reasons: first, it is fascinating as much as it is under-appreciated; second, because the examination reveals a blind spot, namely Anders’ musicological works, in the analysis of the four sets of Andersian scholarship, the German, Italian, French and English. This biographical contextualisation started with the comparison between Anders and his cousin Benjamin, for they both attempted to become *Privatdozent* at the University of Frankfurt and failed. Yet, Benjamin became a well-known author thanks to a posthumous rediscovery carried out by Adorno, Arendt and Scholem. Such re-evaluation is absent in Anders’ case, but it is still needed insofar as his work has not yet extin-

guished its philosophical potential.

In terms of methodology, this book proposes a comprehensive procedure which discloses the buried nexus behind the apparent separation between the musicological studies of Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger and their analyses of the late hymns of Hölderlin. To do so, this book is structured in three sections. The first section (composed of the first three chapters) contextualises Anders' musicology through the metaphor of a musicological circle uniting Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger works. It begins with a presentation of a preliminary debate between Adorno and Anders' musicological works. Then, it compares them with Heidegger's work, thus suggesting a deeper connection between Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger. The framework used to uncover this hidden connection is based on acoustic musicological methodology, which Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger opposed to Husserl's visual approach. Husserl unwittingly initiated an attack on the subject-object dualism and led to the replacement of the visual paradigm that had dominated the philosophical discourse until the late 1920s. As such, the present framework also explores the significance of Husserl's contributions while considering the criticisms he faced from Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger. It's worth noting that the discussions involving Husserl are examined primarily to shed light on the evolution of Adorno's, Anders', and Heidegger's thought and not as a means for examining Husserl's philosophy. Therefore, Husserl's own philosophy will not be a central focus of this research.

The second section (comprising the fourth and fifth chapters) focuses on the development of Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger's philosophies and simultaneously questions the validity of a 'break-theory'<sup>101</sup> that interprets the fact of the Second World War as the measure for a philosophical *caesura*. In their engaging with post-war alienation, Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger were intertwined in a new debate which revolved around their analyses of Hölderlin. In this post-war scenario, Heidegger and his philosophy became the central theme of a polemic, for both Adorno and Anders questioned him for his political views and theoretical notions. Thus, the purpose of this section is to reframe the Adorno-Anders-Heidegger debate in the form of a poetical dispute which will lead to a critique of technologically generated alienation. Moreover, this approach

<sup>101</sup> Such as Diner Dan's notion of '*Zivilisationsbruch*'. See, D. Diner, *Zivilisationsbruch Denken nach Auschwitz* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988).

will display how Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger's post-war analyses of alienation were still reminiscent of their pre-war musicological studies.

The final section (the conclusion) will recapitulate the findings of this book, namely, the relevance of Anders' musicology in regard to (1) the shift of paradigm from an optic perspective to an acoustic one which shares Adorno and Heidegger's critical attitude towards Husserl's philosophy; (2) the role played by the analysis of Hölderlin's late hymns for re-contextualising, via Anders' work, how both Adorno and Heidegger dealt with the post-war alienation and technology. The trajectory connecting the pre-war musicological studies to the post-war poetic works will offer the methodological tools for linking the academic knowledge gap characterising the early works of Anders to a new outlook of Anders' late philosophy concerning Adorno's and Heidegger's respective theories.

Therefore, the overall argument of this book revolves around the hypothesis that in the musicological works of Anders lies an original interpretative key which can also be utilised for re-reading Adorno and Heidegger's works before the Second World War as musically inspired philosophies. Furthermore, in Anders' musicology lay the rudiments for the themes of his later philosophy of technology, which also presents a novel stance on Adorno's and Heidegger's analyses of Hölderlin's late hymns in their respective post-war investigations of alienation. The main goal of this book is, therefore, to present all these veiled junctions between the philosophy of Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger, as well as to offer the innovative standpoint that these connections infer.



## **Section 1: Pre-war musicology**





## Chapter 1: Musicology, a historical-materialist or anti-historical tool?

### 1.1 The notion of ‘situation’ and ‘occasionality’ in Anders early works

#### Notes on translations

This research draws from primary sources and untranslated literature in German and Italian. Where reference to the translated edition of the original text is not given, translations are mine.

According to Anders’ own *Curriculum Vitae* – attached to his doctoral thesis – Anders began his philosophical studies in the University of Hamburg under the guidance of his father William Stern, Ernst Cassirer, and Albert Görland in 1920. He would continue his studies under Husserl in Freiburg with whom he would obtain his doctorate in 1924 – with a thesis *against* him<sup>102</sup>. Husserl himself noted, on his final evaluation of Anders’ thesis<sup>103</sup> *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den ‘Logischen Satzen’*, that this work, even though characterised by a certain amount of “youthful haste” and a “not-commendable literary representation”<sup>104</sup>, reveals how

<sup>102</sup> G. Anders, *Günther Anders Antwortet. Interviews Und Erklärungen* (Berlin: Edition Tiamat, 1987), p. 101.

<sup>103</sup> Anders was still using his original family name Stern. On the circumstances that led him to change his name see G. Anders, *Opinioni Di Un Eretico* (Roma: Theoria, 1991), p. 46-48. Thomas Macho has a different opinion about it, in fact he believes that ‘Anders’ is an anagram of ‘Arendt’. See, T. Macho, ‘Die Kunst Der Verwandlung’, *Merkur*, 45.507 (1991), p. 483.

<sup>104</sup> E. Wittulski, *Günther Anders, Treue Nach Vorn. Von Der Phänomenologie Zur Diskrepanzphilosophie*, (University of Hannover, 1992), p. 23. Here Wittulski states that he is in possess of a copy of the aforementioned document containing Husserl’s quotes.

deeply the candidate understood “the method and the problematics of the phenomenological lectures of Freiburg [in] a similar manner as proposed by Heidegger”<sup>105</sup>. The affinity with Heidegger’s thought explains why in 1924 Anders refused Husserl’s offer<sup>106</sup> to become his assistant and decided to follow the lectures of Heidegger in Marienburg. While it is known<sup>107</sup> that between 1923 and 1924 Anders shifts from a Husserlian to a Heideggerian phenomenological approach, much remains unsaid behind Anders’ motives. A closer look to Anders’ dissertation will uncover why and to what extent Anders disagreed with his teacher Husserl. The place of the dispute is chapter II of Anders’ dissertation *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den ‘Logischen Sätzen’, Phänomenologie der situationsgebundenen Urteile* where Anders explicitly mentions Husserl’s *Logical investigations vol. II*<sup>108</sup> and in particular its §26-28, in which Husserl discusses occasional and objective expressions. Anders focuses on these particular sections of the investigations because it is one of the only texts which deals with occasional judgments<sup>109</sup>; however, Anders considers Husserl’s notion of reducibility of occasional expressions into objective ones to be highly problematic and self-contradicting. Even the primary distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘essentially subjective’ or ‘occasional’ expressions, Anders argues, is contradicted a few pages after it is presented. On one hand, Husserl claims that an expression is objective “if it pins down

<sup>105</sup> In §38 of Anders doctoral thesis dedicated to the analysis of the ‘waiting-situation’, Anders explicitly refers to Heidegger’s method as he later explained it in his summer lectures of 1923: “The Heideggerian method which distinguishes between the meaning of relation, content and time” [*Methode Heideggers, der Bezugs-, Gehalts- und Zeitigungs-Sinn unterscheidet*], G. Stern, ‘*Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*’ (Albert-Ludwig University, 1924), p. 94.

<sup>106</sup> “I graduated with him [Husserl] in 1924 therefore I was a young boy of twenty-two years old. We got along since the beginning. In our philosophising we were very close, he even offered me to become his assistant, an offer that I politely declined”. See, G. Anders, *Il Mondo Dopo l’Uomo. Tecnica e Violenza* (Milano: Mimesis, 2008), p. 57.

<sup>107</sup> See, B. Babich, ‘Radio Ghosts: Phenomenology’s Phantoms and Digital Autism’, *Thesis Eleven*, 153.1 (2019), p. 58); J-P. Dupuy, *The Mark of the Secred* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 179; C.J. Müller, ‘Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture and Human Obsolescence’, *Thesis Eleven*, 2016.

<sup>108</sup> *Logical investigations vol. II* to which Anders refers to corresponds to the English translation of vol. I.

<sup>109</sup> “*Gerade aber occasionelle Urteile, die die grösste Rolle spielen, sind so gut wie nie behandelt worden*”. See, Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 14.

(or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one's attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance"<sup>110</sup>. On the other hand, an expression is "essentially subjective and occasional, or, more briefly, essentially occasional, if it belongs to a conceptually unified group of possible meanings, in whose case it is essential to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation"<sup>111</sup>. But this distinction is subjected to an additional consideration, that is, the meanings of expressions cannot be divided into vague or exact. Husserl categorically considers invalid the possibility of meanings changeable on occasion and therefore, admits that the "content meant by the subjective expression, with sense oriented to the occasion, is an ideal unit of meaning in precisely the same sense as the content of a fixed expression. This is shown by the fact that ideally speaking, each subjective expression is replaceable by an objective expression which will preserve the identity of each momentary meaning-intention"<sup>112</sup>.

So, if at first subjective/occasional and objective expression were distinguished, now, they appear almost identical to the point that they can be easily changed from one to another. This shareability of meaning common to both expressions would not constitute a problem for Anders if Husserl did not write, two paragraphs earlier, about the expressions including personal pronouns. Husserl writes that "every expression that includes a personal pronoun lacks an objective sense" and that the word 'I' "names a different person from case to case and does so by way of an ever-altering meaning"<sup>113</sup>. By this Husserl means that the word 'I' has a double meaning: on the one hand, it indicates being oneself; on the other, it suggests that the individual subject itself is indicated by it. In other words, "here the subject of speech and judgment coincide, that both are meant in the 'I'" [*dass hier Rede-und Urteile-Subject zusammen fallen; dass beide im 'ich' gemeint sind*]<sup>114</sup>. This would, in theory, reflect the notion of shareability of meaning such that the expression: 'I am satisfied' could be transformed into 'whoever the speaker is, he is now designating himself

<sup>110</sup> E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations Vol. I*, trans. by J.N. Findlay, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 218.

<sup>111</sup> Husserl, p. 218.

<sup>112</sup> Husserl, p. 223.

<sup>113</sup> Husserl, p. 218.

<sup>114</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 16.

as satisfied', from subjective to objective expression, however, it would inevitably contradict the idea that an expression including 'I' is not translatable into an objective one. Moreover, Anders notices another inconsistency that Husserl does not. By translating 'I' into 'whoever the speaker is' the ideal sense of 'I' – i.e., its self-referentiality – has been eliminated by the fact that the idea that the speaker means himself is now removed from the sentence. Therefore – Anders writes – “There is not only an ideal sense of meaning but also a relational meaning. The relational meaning is that ‘which-itself-means’” [*Es gibt eben nicht nur einen ideaalen ‘Gehaltssinn’, sondern auch [...] einen ideaalen Bezugssinn. Der Bezugssinn ist ‘Das-sich-selbst-Meinen’*]<sup>115</sup>. Hence, relation cannot be reduced to meaning and, in opposition with what Husserl claimed earlier, the ideal sense of occasional judgments is thus bound to their situation such that any change to the ideal relational meaning of the judgment would alter its ideal meaning and ultimately change it into something else.

In addition to this antinomy of the 'I-expression', there is a further problem for the translation from subjective to objective expressions: it does not necessarily mean to change its subject from the first person to the third one. “The judgment: I am 1,7324 mm tall is not a typical 'I-judgment'” – writes Anders – [*Das Urteil: ich bin 1,7324 mm gross ist kein typisches ‘ich-Urteil’*]<sup>116</sup>. By this, Anders refers to the Hegelian distinction between 'judgements' [*Urteile*] and 'mere sentences' [*Sätze*] where judgements explicate a unified subject matter, while mere sentences don't. Hegel characterises judgement as 'the concept in its particularity'<sup>117</sup>. What Hegel denotes under this headline is neither an abstract being nor a mental image. Rather, 'the concept' is for Hegel self-determination. So, judgement or 'the concept in its particularity' entails pure self-determination that Hegel characterises as relational. Accordingly, a judgement is pure relational self-determination and as such, it links distinct objects. However, since the relationship between these objects is theoretically one of determination, then, they cannot be posited one next to the oth-

<sup>115</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 17.

<sup>116</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 18.

<sup>117</sup> The judgement is the concept in its particularity as the “differentiating relation of its moments, which are posited as being for themselves and, at the same time, as identical with themselves, not with one another”. See, G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic*, trans. by K. Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 240–41.

er. Rather, one must determine the other. And since their relationship is, as mentioned above, one of self-determination, one cannot determine the other externally. If a judgement is relational self-determination, then, its elements must carry to each other as ‘guises’ or ‘moments’ of the same. The distinction between ‘judgements’ and ‘mere sentences’<sup>118</sup> is meta-logical insofar as it separates meaningful objects with a primarily logical character – i.e., judgements – from objects intimately marked by a partial non-logical, even psychological, character – that is, mere sentences. While it is crucial for judgements that their logical subjects and predicates are linked to each other as theoretical determinations, the parts of a mere sentence have their theoretical determinacy independently of each other and are, accordingly, simply externally attached: “a sentence can indeed have a subject and predicate in a grammatical sense without however being a judgement for that. The latter requires that the predicate behaves concerning the subject in a relation of conceptual determination, hence as a universal to a particular or singular”<sup>119</sup>.

This means, concerning Anders’ dissertation, that the occasional or subjective expressions of Husserl are indeed identical with what Hegel called judgments and that given their element of self-determination, they are strictly situationally dependent insofar as the situation constitutes their respective field of existence and, without it, it would be impossible to identify their meanings<sup>120</sup>. Besides, this entails that an expression which contains a first-person with its predicate does not necessarily mean that the ‘I’ is pronouncing a judgment on itself for it may be pronouncing a ‘mere sentence’ – e.g., a fact or an action – which has no relation of self-determination with the subject itself, such as in the case of noting the precise height of a person, which depends on an external principle [*fremdem Prinzip*]. As Anders suggests, comprehensibility plays a major role in occasional judgments more than in others.

This becomes clearer in occasional judgments which include the second person [*Du-Rede*] because they are essentially communicative and any consideration other than their communicative element becomes

<sup>118</sup> Hegel, p. 243.

<sup>119</sup> Hegel, p. 553.

<sup>120</sup> By situational dependency Anders means two different forms of dependency: the first means that a sentence emerges from a situation; while the second implies that a sentence is only understandable if posited in a particular situation.

meaningless. This happens because the objects of these judgments is “about ‘you’; not ‘the you’, but ‘You’, which, in a consideration without communication, becomes ‘a you’” [*etwa das ‘Du’; oder nicht ‘das Du’ sondern ‘du’, das in einer communicationslosen Betrachtung zu ‘ein Du’ wird*]<sup>121</sup>. This particular character of the *Du-Rede* constitutes its peculiarity and makes it considerably different from the *Er-Rede* which is the most objective form of speech. Anders presents the following examples: first, the sentence ‘you are ill’; second, the statement ‘Lenin is ill’. What Anders wants to highlight is their respective “the coincidence of the intended and understood” [*Deckung von Interdiziertem und Verstandem*]<sup>122</sup>. Even if they both seem to ascribe a particular state of being to a specific ‘someone’ they are different insofar as the latter is “outlining a fact” [*ein Sachverhalt umrissen*]<sup>123</sup> with which “we can, so to speak, continue to rely on” [*wir sozusagen weiter rechnen können*]<sup>124</sup>. This sentence merely speaks about a fact and does not say anything about the sentence as a form of speech, in fact, “the words were but symbols for the meaning” [*die Worte brauchten nichts als Symbole für die Bedeutung zu sein*]<sup>125</sup> and it is not necessary to talk about them since the fact would remain the same. However, the former sentence requires a different analysis because: first, “do we know ... the ‘still unfixed state of affairs’ that someone is ill?” [*Wissen wir ... den ‘noch unfixierten Sachverhalt’, dass irgendwer krank ist*]<sup>126</sup>; and second, “do we know the fact that an A said to B that B is ill?” [*Wissen wir den Sachverhalt, dass ein A zum B sagte, dass B krank sei*]<sup>127</sup>. According to Anders, both questions must be answered in the negative for what can be inferred from the sentence ‘you are ill’ does not mean what the speaker has said, that is, neither that ‘someone’ is ill, or that the speaker is telling this fact to ‘someone’. The reason behind such difference is grounded in the fact that in the first example the word ‘you’ “is not a sign for a meaning, but the indication of meaning itself” [*ist kein Zeichen für eine Bedeutung, sondern der Hinweis auf das Bedeutende selbst*]<sup>128</sup>. Thus, the *Du-Rede*

<sup>121</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>122</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>123</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>124</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>125</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>126</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>127</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 19.

<sup>128</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 20.

is strictly situationally dependent. Nonetheless, one might object that the sentence ‘he is un-musical’ offers as little to be understood in its isolation as the sentence ‘you are musical’<sup>129</sup>.

This is why Anders introduces a further example, that of a relatively situation-specific speech such as a newspaper article on Strauss. In this new example when the sentence ‘he is un-musical’ would appear, then, the ‘he’ will be simply a linguistic reference to the previously mentioned name of Strauss which will not cause any damage to the significance of the overall speech. Moreover, the ‘he’ could be straightforwardly changed again into ‘Strauss’ which could not be done in case of the ‘you’ of the sentence “you are musical”. This ‘you’ is addressing someone that does not refer back to what can be understood from the speech – i.e., Strauss – or even learnt from it, “the perhaps unknown name of the perhaps unknown person” [*den vielleicht unbekanntem Namen des vielleicht unbekanntem Menschen*]<sup>130</sup> since it points “ahead to’ or ‘at’ the (perhaps not even noted) person addressed” [‘vor’ oder ‘hin’ auf den (vielleicht nicht einmal benannten) Angeredeten selbst]<sup>131</sup>. Thus, the *Du-Rede* proves to be the genuine [*echte*] form of *Situationsgebundenheit*<sup>132</sup> while the *Er-Rede* is the non-genuine [*unechte*] form since it is fundamentally objective and therefore not situationally dependent. The purpose of this entire analysis of the judgments, mere sentences, and objective/situational expressions revolves around Anders’ accusation of Husserl’s will to reduce factual expressions to their logical form, that is, ‘S is p’. If, on the one hand, this attempt to reduce expressions to their logical structures is attacked by Anders, on the other hand, it is exactly from this *Negativität* – i.e., the impossibility to accomplish such reduction – that Anders identifies the criterion for actually distinguishing between judgments. For Anders, as seen above, judgments of the first and second person are different from judgments of the third one because when they speak of an ‘I’ or a ‘you’ they do not mean an ‘object’; rather they are forms of understanding [*Verstandesformen*] which are enunciated in the factual speech and therefore cannot be separated from it<sup>133</sup>. While, for Anders, it is possible to

<sup>129</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 20.

<sup>130</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 21.

<sup>131</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 21.

<sup>132</sup> ‘The situational-dependence’.

<sup>133</sup> This resembles the Hegelian idea seen above of the relational self-determination typical of judgments.



reduce forms of the *Er-Rede* such as ‘Gaius is a mortal’ into ‘S is p’ because it refers to a particular form of ‘he’, the *Ich-Rede* or the *Du-Rede* do not ‘speak’ of the ‘I’ or of the ‘you’ as the word ‘he’ does for Gaius: they can only be said. The ‘you’ cannot be changed into the corresponding name of the person because this would damage its indicative character [*hinweisende Charakter*]. Reducing ‘*Du bist müde*’ in ‘you are p’ is wrong insofar as the reduced ‘you’ of the sentence does not mean the ‘actual you’ but ‘a you’, thus losing the *Bezugssinn* with which the sentence has emerged from a concrete situation. Anders is accusing Husserl of having stopped short in his analysis of the identity between subjective and objective judgments insofar as he has failed to extend his discussion to contingent and factual experience. This is the case of psychology which, if seen subjectively as not interested in the objectively verifiable effects of physical stimuli, is not based on anything objective, but it is kept together through the continuous reference to ‘a consciousness’ – i.e., ‘one’s consciousness’ – which cannot be examined via the predicates of speech. In other words, there are subjective elements [*egologisch Daten*] which escape the Husserlian solipsism and “nonetheless they are the first evident” [*dennoch sind ... die ersten evident*]<sup>134</sup>.

Circa a decade after the appearance of Anders’ *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den ‘Logischen Sätzen’* Theodor W. Adorno publishes his *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism* in *The Journal of Philosophy*. Adorno, like Anders, focuses his attention on Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and their inherent antagonism, for they attempt to present “a philosophy which tries to base such notions as reality and truth on an analysis of the consciousness [which] starts with the general assumption that in the last instance there can be established an identity between the object and the subject”<sup>135</sup>. Husserl is, for Adorno, trying to turn himself against “the idealist presupposition of the ultimate identity of subject and object”<sup>136</sup>, while at the same time assuming “that the ultimate source of truth is

<sup>134</sup> Stern, *Die Rolle Der Situationskategorie Bei Den Logischen Sätzen*, p. 22.

<sup>135</sup> T. W. Adorno, ‘Husserl and the Problem of Idealism’, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 37.1 (1940), p. 5.

<sup>136</sup> Adorno, ‘*Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*’, p. 6. For a more detailed analysis of Adorno’s critique of Husserl see, J. Hodge, ‘*Poietic Epistemology: Reading Husserl Through Adorno and Heidegger*’, in *Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 64-86.

the unity of consciousness<sup>137</sup>, thus preventing himself from achieving his task and falling back into idealism itself. Thus, according to Adorno, Husserl's 'facts' are not the facts themselves but mathematical truths as ideal unities unrelated to any factual existence which are regarded as facts nonetheless and cannot be modified by any explanatory hypothesis. The impossibility of a psychological reduction of logical truths leads Husserl's research to a separation of the real from the ideal, for Husserl deems impossible to link them without making assumptions that have no basis within the meaning of logical/mathematical principles themselves. Just as Anders developed his critique from the impossibility of reducing subjective propositions into objective ones to reveal the logical basis on which Husserl's philosophy is built, namely, logical truths, so Adorno moves from the identity of subject-object to the inner antinomic character of Husserl's *Investigations*. The separation real-ideal, fundamental for freeing philosophy from psychologism and the "uncritical religion of facts"<sup>138</sup>, has, nonetheless, a dichotomic consequence. It produces a *Χωρισμός* (separation)<sup>139</sup> which, on the one hand, presupposes that ideal truths are truths of thinking and thinking only, while, on the other hand, cannot but admit that thinking means human thinking and that is impossible to speak about thinking without presupposing the actual physical acts of thinking. This paradox can be summarised as follows: Husserl "rebels against idealist thinking while attempting to break through the walls of idealism with purely idealist instruments [...] by an exclusive analysis of the structure of thought and consciousness"<sup>140</sup>. For Adorno, Husserl's struggle to formulate a philosophical breakthrough out of modes of thought and experience that perceive objects exclusively as instances of pre-existing schemes and paradigms contradicts the historical singularity

<sup>137</sup> Adorno, 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism', p. 6.

<sup>138</sup> Adorno, 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism', p. 9.

<sup>139</sup> *Χωρισμός* is here understood in its Adornian sense, meaning the separation between sets of opposite terms such as 'real' and 'ideal' or 'within' and 'without'. It should be noticed that Adorno uses '*Χωρισμός*' to address the Husserlian attempt to separate real and ideal due to the impossibility of a psychological reduction of logical truth "because according to his [Husserl] view it is impossible to link them up without making assumptions which have no possible basis with the meanings of logical and mathematical principles themselves". Adorno,

'*Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*', p. 10 and T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 163.

<sup>140</sup> Adorno, 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism', p. 17.

of the objects<sup>141</sup>. Consciousness thinks it grasps the object itself while remaining bound within its historical determinants – i.e., remaining purely mind. Hence, despite the years between Adorno's essay and Anders' dissertation, it is clear that for both, the motto 'back to the thing itself' [*Zu den Sachen*] implies, in Husserl's philosophy, insurmountable difficulties which require the necessity to follow it *strictu sensu* and overcome the limitations of epistemology as *Erkenntniskritik*<sup>142</sup>.

What does this mean for Anders' overall philosophical approach? It means that Anders is slowly but progressively moving from a Husserlian logical analysis to a more 'human centred' philosophical method which will evolve into a full-fledged decentralised humanism in his musicological writings.

## 1.2 Plessner's influence and the notion of the ear

If in his critique of Husserl's (too) logical approach Anders saw the possibility to go back to man itself, then, Anders' working experience with Plessner was the opportunity to develop the rudiments of an anthropological study of music. Moreover, in his encounter with Plessner Anders realises the deeper importance of the notion of 'history' as a means for authentically understanding entities which will be crucial for developing both his phenomenological anthropology and his musicology. The influence of Plessner's *Die Einheit der Sinne Grundlinien einer Ästhesiologie des Geistes* on Anders during their collaboration in the journal *Philosophischer Anzeiger* is as important as Husserl's. The notion of the ear as both receptive and productive tool, together with the anthropological analysis of music culminated in the statement that "when we produce sounds, we are sounds"<sup>143</sup>, had a clear impact on Anders' further development of an anthropological phenomenology of music. The outcome of such contact

<sup>141</sup> For an Adornian critique of phenomenology see S. Decatur Smith, 'Awakening Dead Time: Adorno on Husserl, Benjamin, and the Temporality of Music', *Contemporary Music Review*, 31.5–6 (2012), pp. 389–409.

<sup>142</sup> As Hodge puts it: "for Husserl there can be no split between thinking what there is, and analysing the contents of consciousness, whereas, for Adorno, it is these gaps between thinking and what there is that generate antinomy, political delusions, and social catastrophes, the genesis of which he seeks to trace out". See, Hodge, p.76. This same unresolved negativity will be pivotal in Anders' further philosophical development prior to the Second World War.

<sup>143</sup> H. Plessner, *Antropologia Dei Sensi* (Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2008), p. 45.

between Anders and Plessner would be Anders' *Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens* where Anders aims at overcoming Husserl's optical paradigm with an acoustical one while suggesting the necessity for a new musicological framework which is not grounded in the Augustinian distinction between *cantus* and '*res qua canitur*', but a third alternative, namely, the '*status, ex quo canitur*', which means that the musical situation is not linked to either the subjective sphere or to the objective one.

The relationship between Anders and Plessner constitutes an essential element of Anders' philosophical development of the notion of 'situationality or situational-bound-hood' as well as the acoustic paradigm shift crucial to his phenomenological analysis of music. Such a relationship was certainly due to a similar understanding of what philosophy needed to be, which matured during Anders and Plessner's collaboration at the journal *Philosophischer Anzeiger*. Both agreed on distancing philosophy from the transcendental idealism of Husserl and phenomenological schema based on rigid dichotomies such as subject/object, through the formulation of a theory which would operate a substantial transformation of the relationship between the particular sciences and philosophical research. The backbone of this project was initiated by Plessner's re-elaboration of the field of knowledge that precedes science, which led him to investigate the fundamental laws behind scientific-natural objects as well as the pre-scientific knowledge of nature. Anders, who already shared the interest in overcoming Husserl's philosophy, published, in the *Anzeiger*, one article entitled *Über Gegenstandstypen* in which he aimed at discussing the experience that men have with the *Umwelt* and with the objects contained in it. Here Anders refuted the classical distinction between "the original essay and the critical review" [*Originalaufsatz und kritischer Rezension*]<sup>144</sup> by analysing the phenomenological consideration of the book *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* by Arnold Metzger<sup>145</sup>. The critique against the general object [*Gegenstand überhaupt*] detailed by Metzger, characterised by the refutation of all the characterisation of the objects together with the regional differentiation of the objects<sup>146</sup>, is conducted by Anders through the examination of 'some types of objects' which

<sup>144</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 363.

<sup>145</sup> At the time, Metzger was one of Husserl's assistants. See, D. Colombo, *Patologie Dell'Esperienza* (Milano: Mimesis, 2019), p. 19.

<sup>146</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 363, n. 1.

are meant as guidelines – such as ‘opposite-object’, ‘object-before’, and ‘surrounding-object’ [*Widerstand, Gegenstand und Umstand*]. Anders’ investigation covered the theory of knowledge not in an epistemological sense [*erkenntnistheoretisch*]<sup>147</sup> but rather in a pragmatic sense [*kenntnistheoretisch*] thanks to which it could be possible to achieve a knowledge of the *Umwelt*, not as an entity among others, but as place and space of the *Dasein* of man. This is because, according to Anders, the *Umwelt* is always our *Umwelt*<sup>148</sup> of which we make experience through pure acts of thinking and feelings, as suggested by Scheler in *The Nature of Sympathy* (1923)<sup>149</sup>, and the senses, as described by Plessner in *Die Einheit der Sinne. Grundlinien einer Ästhesiologie des Geistes* (1923). Thus, *Kenntnis* represents the “*die Verhaltung der Vertrautheit*”<sup>150</sup> within the *Umwelt*, the manner of experiencing a real subjectivity rather than the transcendental one suggested by Husserl and Metzger.

Anders, by directly referencing to Plessner’s work, suggests a connection between himself and *Die Einheit der Sinne*. In this work, Plessner wants to question, and then refute, the prejudice of a wide portion of the modern thought that attributes to the senses a mere function of biological unity as a mechanism for gathering and delivering data to the intellect, or simply reduces them to a symptom of relativity, subjectivism and error. Such a position finds its climax in Descartes’ *Meditations*, in

<sup>147</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 363.

<sup>148</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 361.

<sup>149</sup> According to some bibliographical indications – J. Strümpel, ‘Vita Günther Anders. Bibliographie Günther

Anders’, *Text+Kritik*, 115, 1992, 86–101 (p. 86); E. Wittuski, *Günther Anders. Treue nach vorn. Von der Phänomenologie zur Diskrepanzphilosophie*, dissertation, University of Hannover, (1992), p. 27; Konrad P.

hiesmann, *Günther Anders* (München: C. H. Beck, 2002), p. 19 – Anders was Scheler’s assistant in 1926, fact that according to C. Dries, *Die Welt Als Vernichtungslager. Eine Kritische Theorie Der Moderne Im Anschluss*

an Günther Anders, *Hannah Arendt Und Hans Jonas* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012), p. 30 could not be verified.

Nonetheless, Anders’ hypothesis of contact with Scheler is supported by an interview with F. J. Raddatz in

1985, where Anders, answering the question concerning his teachers says: “my father, Cassirer, Husserl, and Heidegger; with Scheler it was not a teacher-student relationship since we discussed much together, even if it

was not a peer to peer relation since I was too young”. G. Anders, *G. Anders Antwortet. Interviews Und Erklärungen* (Berlin: Edition Tiamat, 1987), p. 101.

<sup>150</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 363.

which is written that “the qualities (of the senses) are products of the soul” [*die Qualitäten ... Produkte der Seele sind*]<sup>151</sup>. On the contrary, Plessner admits that: “according to our theory, on the other hand, the sensory qualities, precisely because of their total relativity to the unity of the person as ways of connecting body and soul, belong to the objective being of things, although of course not to their absolute being, because the sensory qualities are the possible modes of matter. The unity of the person in its multiplicity is thus an index for the objectivity of the basic sensory properties of the appearing world”<sup>152</sup>.

First, this attempt to construct a systematic doctrine of the person, which is developed from the close relationship that the human structure has with the sensuous manifestations of the *Umwelt*, aims to become a doctrine which presents itself as interdisciplinary because it considers the results of all individual sciences which contribute to the construction of a science of the human person<sup>153</sup>. Second, Plessner wants to establish an aesthesiology of the spirit, understood as a discipline which, through the re-elaboration of the Kantian schematism, finds a correspondence between sensuous qualities and the different modes of being of the objects, thus proving the objectivity of the senses. Therefore, Plessner attempts to integrate the Kantian critique of reason with an analogous critique of the senses [*Kritik der Sinne*] by explicitly referencing it to the schematism while asking himself if “an essential, i.e. a priori necessity of certain ways of thinking about certain kinds of meaning or, as one can also express it, seek a priori reasons for the application of certain categories of expression to matter” [*eine wesensgesetzliche, das heißt apriorische Notwendigkeit gewisser Anschauungsweisen für gewisse Arten der Sinnggebung behaupten oder, wie man es auch ausdrücken kann, apriorische Gründe für die Anwendung gewisser Kategorien des Ausdrucks auf die Materie suchen*]<sup>154</sup>. In this case, the a priori are not situated in the intellect but are materials

<sup>151</sup> H. Plessner, *Gesammelte Schriften III Anthropologie Der Sinne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 21.

<sup>152</sup> Plessner, p. 21.

<sup>153</sup> This disciplinary opening to the senses as a form of objective knowledge was one of the founding themes of the *Philosophischer Anzeiger*. The importance of the particular sciences is underlined by the subheading of the journal which says “journal for the collaboration between philosophy and individual sciences [*Einzelwissenschaft*]. See, Colombo, p. 30.

<sup>154</sup> Plessner, p. 283.

in the diverse mode of sensorial experiences themselves as demonstrated by the case of music<sup>155</sup>. According to Plessner, it is exclusively through the sensorial modality of hearing that a symphony can gain a sense. This happens because of an accordance, or a similarity of the structure, between the possible qualities of the acoustic material (accords, sounds, melodies) and the specific mode of bestowing them a sense (arsis and thesis) of which is granted our spirit and the corresponding behaviour assumed by our own body, namely, how the body responds to what it hears. The attempts of expressionistic music to ‘give a colour to sounds’ are for Plessner a sign of a ‘confusion of the senses’. Expressionistic music ignores, for Plessner, the sense’s normative function and in particular the idea that colours have a schematic sense which belongs to the sciences and aims at reproducing a content with exactness which is completely different from the thematic, and non-interchangeable, sense of sounds<sup>156</sup>.

It is from this precise Plessnerian gnoseological presupposition that Anders’ *Über Gegenstandstypen* derives several sensorial experiences (seeing, touching, walking, etc.) for advocating the refutation of the idea of a world implicitly exhausted by what can be visually perceived – typical of Husserl’s examples of his doctrine of imagination<sup>157</sup>. Moreover, the senses are not evaluated separately but according to the Plessnerian principle of the “unity of the senses in their mutual representability” [*Einheit der Sinne in ihrer gegenseitigen Vertretbarkeit*]<sup>158</sup> which, after having ascribed them irreducible and specific characteristics, gives them the unitary function of keeping and enriching the close relationship be-

<sup>155</sup> Plessner, p. 289.

<sup>156</sup> In Plessner’s schematism there are three types of meaning, the *thematisch*, *syntagmatisch*, and *schematisch*. See, Plessner, p. 276. For the ‘confusion of the senses’, see, H. Plessner, p. 254-255.

<sup>157</sup> In an interview Anders remembers that: “we [Husserl and Anders] did together, *à la* peripatetic, phenomenological analyses of the senses, thing that he ignored, since he unconsciously attributed to the sight the model of ‘absolute perception’: analyses of the non-optical senses, hence, hearing, smell, body perceptions, which made him feel greatly ashamed because this made ambiguous his distinction between ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’”. See, G. Anders, *Il Mondo dopo l’uomo*, (Milano: Mimesis, 2008), p. 57. Also in *Materiales Apriori und der sogenannte Instinkt. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Wissens*, in *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen. Schriften zur philosophischen Anthropologie*, (München: C.H. Beck, 2018), p. 94. Anders affirms that “in the phenomenology the experience is almost exclusively created *ad imaginem* of the optical experience”. Ruco points out how Plessner saw Husserl’s philosophy as a philosophy of sight, A. Ruco, ‘Estetica.

<sup>158</sup> Plessner, p. 276.

tween body and soul, that is, “that genuine synthesis of the different, which maintains and truly establishes diversity, the organic cooperation of the individual sensual modalities in the sense of a whole” [*jener echten Synthesis des Verschiedenen, welche die Verschiedenheit aufrecht erhält und wahrhaft begründet, der organischen Kooperation der einzelnen sinnlichen Modalitäten im Sinne eines Ganzen*]<sup>159</sup>. Similarly, Anders decides to not “characterising all the types of objects which correspond to the individual senses” [*alle Gegenstandstypen zu charakterisieren, die den einzelnen Sinnen entsprechen*]<sup>160</sup>, because when taken singularly, they are isolated from the structure of body-spirit, “(they) are, so to speak, abstract” [*sind sozusagen abstrakte*]<sup>161</sup>, but to underline their reciprocal relation, “since the world is actually experienced by the whole person in the totality of the senses dependent by herself – and not only in the totality of her senses” [*da eigentlich Welt erfahren wird von der ganzen Person in der Gesamtheit ihrer an sich unselbständigen – und nicht nur in der Gesamtheit ihrer Sinne*]<sup>162</sup>.

In addition to the differentiation of *Gegenstand*<sup>163</sup> into ‘object-before’ [*Gegenstand*] and ‘opposite-object’ [*Widerstand*] that Anders opposes to Metzger’s ‘general-object’, Anders identifies two other types of objects, the ‘condition-object’ [*Zustand*] and the ‘surrounding-object’ [*Umstand*] to refute the idea that in the object the moment of existence and that one of essence were fused a priori in each other. This distinction between *Gegenstand* and *Widerstand* shows that the existence and essence of the objects are two different moments which are presented in a constitutive

<sup>159</sup> Plessner, p. 276.

<sup>160</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 366

<sup>161</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 366. This attempt of Anders follows Plessner’s intention to resolve the problem of the objectivity through an aesthesiological unity of the senses. Such unity aims at guaranteeing the qualitative character of the world and preserving the human understanding of it while avoiding any ontologising and conceptual theorisation of the human experience. In other words, the sensuous life is analysed in its qualitative structure in order to thematise the pre-theoretical dimension investigated by Husserl in his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy II*. See, Ruco, p. 24.

<sup>162</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 366.

<sup>163</sup> In German the term ‘*Gegenstand*’ generally indicates the object. We will use this translation when Anders refers to it in its normal usage, but we decide to translate it as ‘object-before’ when Anders wants to connote it philosophically, putting it, for such reason, in quotation marks. This translation is due to the fact that the word ‘*Gegen-*’, of which the compound word ‘*Gegenstand*’ is made of, means ‘before’.



‘before’ and ‘after’, that is, in something that reveals itself in ‘resisting’, as an ‘empty object’, as something that only now can and wants to be determined<sup>164</sup>. In this way, Anders can identify the moment of separation between the initial manifestation of the existence of the object from the subsequent manifestation of its essence. Similarly, the *Zustand* and the *Umstand* perform an equal foundational role: the first one appears in the ordinary situation in which an object is ‘out of me’ and is still indistinguishable from the surrounding world in which it is placed, as in the case of a room in which one lives for a long time where nothing of what it contains is isolated from the rest<sup>165</sup>. The second one appears in the extraordinary circumstance in which the object is ‘with me’, as in the particular case of the tactile condition of tickling, where the surface of support on which such object manifests is not an external place, but it coincides with a field known ‘a priori’, in other words, the here of one’s body-hood [*eigene Leiblichkeit*]<sup>166</sup>. “At first there is the *Umstand*. Within the *Umstand* one can differentiate between the *Gegenstand* as separated ‘object-before’. However, an additional requirement for the separation of the *Gegenstand* from the *Umstand* is the *Widerstand*. The *Umstand* is the field of condition [*Bedingungsfeld*] while the *Widerstand* is the condition’s factor [*Bedingungsfaktor*] of the *Gegenstand*”<sup>167</sup>. At this point it is possible to grasp what Anders meant at the beginning of this text when he referred to it as an investigation about practical knowledge and not about epistemology. While the latter refers exclusively to isolated objects as understood by the perceptive structure, that is, distinguishable as elements *sui generis* as detached from their surroundings, the former is occupied with re-constructing the moment in which the *Umstand* is still ‘invisible’ and that in which it becomes ‘visible’.

An additional trace of the strong connection between Anders and Plessner can be found in Anders’ essay *Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens* written in 1927 where Anders explicitly refers to the interpretation of listening to impressionistic music done by Plessner but achieves a different conclusion<sup>168</sup>. Here Anders immediately questions the validity of

<sup>164</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 364.

<sup>165</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 368.

<sup>166</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, p. 365.

<sup>167</sup> Anders, *Über Gegenstandstypen*, pp. 367-8.

<sup>168</sup> In *Über das Haben* Anders briefly comments his phenomenological analysis saying that if Plessner’s *Unity of the senses* claimed that music was “between logical meaning and lack

the idea that different forms of music require different forms of authentic listening to be understood. Anders' objection to this idea is structured as follows: First, it is unlikely, both historically and ontologically speaking, that an object has only one way of being authentically understood. The historical significance of an object is determined by its continued existence as a historical reality in different periods of history, which is the basis for its analysis and examination<sup>169</sup>. Second, is there an adequate way of authentically approaching an object after its production without incurring into historico-epistemological difficulties? In other words, if, for the first argument, it is problematic to interrogate oneself on the authentic approaches to an object, then, for the second one, it is doubtful that these very authentic approaches can be reproduced in another historical period. Thus, Anders writes, in a musical context it becomes highly problematic to engage in a debate on authentic or inauthentic manners of listening for the simple reason that "musical listening essentially exists in 'co-performances' [*Mitvollzug*] of musical forms of motion (and not, for instance, in a stance of passive or active reception)"<sup>170</sup>. Therefore, Anders asks, how is one supposed to listen to the paradigmatic case of impressionistic music? Impressionistic music is regarded as a non-active form of music itself, as a music which 'realises' the conditions for action<sup>171</sup>. Its situationality [*Zuständlichkeit*] is the reason why it is called impressionistic, that is, representing objects not as such but in their 'situationality'. But how can one listen and understand in the *modus intentionale* of the attentive-listening [*Hinhörens*] to something which is purely passive and situational such as impressionistic music?<sup>172</sup> This question requires a phenomenological approach to the sense of listening which immediately forces Anders to distinguish the 'attentiveness' of listening from the one

of meaning" [*zwischen 'logischem Sinn' und Sinnlosigkeit*], then, his *Zur Phanomenologie Des Hörens* advocated the hypothesis that the impressionistic music, highly denigrated by Plessner, represented the "the determination of indeterminacy" [*Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*] which constituted its specific quality. See G. Stern, *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der Erkenntnis*, (Bonn: F.Cohen Verlag, 1928), p. 42.

<sup>169</sup> G. Stern, 'Zur Phanomenologie Des Zuhörens', *Zeitschrift Für Musikwissenschaft*, 9 (1927), p. 610.

<sup>170</sup> Stern, *Zur Phanomenologie Des Zuhörens*, p. 610.

<sup>171</sup> G. Anders-Stern, *Sulla Fenomenologia dell'Ascolto*, in *La Regressione dell'Ascolto*, (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2002), p. 188.

<sup>172</sup> Such question is linked to the more general question: how does the world give itself to listening?

of seeing: in fact, in seeing, it is possible – from a pure optical perspective – to ignore [*absehen*] all the other things that one is not currently looking at. The acoustic scenario is completely different because the *Hinhören* necessitates an additional requirement, that is, the relation to the unity of meaning<sup>173</sup>. Therefore, it appears paradoxical to put together forms of situational and non-directional music and impressionistic music, as the listener of this music would face both structural and inherent difficulties in creating a framework for understanding it. This will be due to the fact that the listener's attention is not only focused on what is presented, but also towards something yet to occur<sup>174</sup>. Similarly, Plessner saw the *telos* of a musical piece in its openness, in its disclosure to the listener, meaning that its meaning can never be detached from its act: “nobody can say what it ‘means’ other than the work itself”<sup>175</sup>. Once again, this underlines the difficulty of listening to impressionistic music given its lack of directionality which, nonetheless, should theoretically have an attentive character.

Anders explores the possibility of applying Augustine's distinction of *cantus* and *res qua canitur* to resolve this impasse. Unfortunately, this is another problematic alternative which produces additional dichotomies that cannot but separate the subjective from the objective element of music. Impressionistic music is neither understandable as the *cantatum* nor as a *canere*. On the one hand, it is not the *cantatum*, namely, the situational dependency of the music to its melodic structure. On the other hand, it is not the *canere* because it is not clear if it points to a specific meaning. Nonetheless, Anders finds, in the impossibility to attribute a clear definition to the impressionistic music, a valuable means for the interpretation of its content, consequently distancing himself from Plessner's views on impressionistic art as “mere decoration of the painted carpet”<sup>176</sup>. The dis-

<sup>173</sup> Anders means that only when we understand what we hear we can admit of being attentively listening to something.

<sup>174</sup> Plessner too, in his *Aesthesiology of the Senses*, affirms that musical tones have nothing to do with meanings themselves, but with structures of meaning which make tones a process *in fieri*. See, Ruco, p. 37.

<sup>175</sup> H. Plessner, *Die Einheit Der Sinne. Grundlinien Einer Ästhesiologie Des Geistes* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), p. 149.

<sup>176</sup> Plessner, *Die Einheit der Sinne. Grundlinien einer Ästhesiologie des Geistes*, p. 232. Plessner criticises

Kandinsky's idea of the ‘musicality of colour’ because, according to Plessner, colour's quality is flatness while music's quality is voluminosity. Hence, impressionistic art has

continuities, the inconsistencies, and the lack of connection of this form of music appear only when one expects a unity of meaning of the *canere* or a structural continuity in the sense of a *res qua canitur*<sup>177</sup> from them. It is not the musical expression that grants unity to the piece but its ‘moving reason’ which does not always become expressible<sup>178</sup>. This act of opening towards pure passivity might seem counterproductive and even naïve but it allows Anders to explore a significant element of the ‘active attention’ that allows him to solve the issue of impressionistic music. Active attention, insofar as it is a disposition towards ‘something’ and precisely of ‘something’ determined, is present only in the case in which this ‘something’ was already disclosed and characterised as such<sup>179</sup>. Otherwise, it would be impossible to establish what kind of attention could describe this ‘something’. Then, according to Anders, is possible to assume that to understand the pure passivity of the impressionistic music there is a form of situational attention [*zuständliche Aufmerksamkeit*] which can be expressed with the term ‘being-with’ [*Mit-sein*]. It is a *status* of ‘ordinary living’ in which one is neither always attentive nor inattentive; a status including both possibilities<sup>180</sup>. This is due to the fact, noted by Plessner, that even though hearing is a sense of distance, sound has the peculiar ability to penetrate the listener and remove the distance between external and internal which is caused by the impossibility to ‘close’ the ears to acoustic perceptions<sup>181</sup>.

If Anders began his discussion on the situationality of impressionistic

failed to distinguish the optical qualities from the acoustical ones.

<sup>177</sup> Anders-Stern, *Sulla Fenomenologia dell’Ascolto*, p. 194.

<sup>178</sup> It was Plessner to define music as the art of movement, *μουσική*. Plessner notes that *μουσική* “was originally meaning a unity of sound, words, and movement”. See, H. Plessner, *Zur Anthropologie Der Musik*, in *Gesammelte Schriften VII*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1951); See, Ruco, p. 37; G. Matteucci; A.

<sup>Ruco</sup>, ‘Accordanze e Suono Nell’estesiologia Di Plessner’, *Intersezioni*, XXV.2 (2005), 349–73, and R. Ellensohn, *Der Andere Anders: Günther Anders Als Musikphilosoph* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008), p. 76 n 263.

<sup>179</sup> Ander-Stern, *Sulla Fenomenologia dell’Ascolto*, p. 198.

<sup>180</sup> Plessner writes: “the simple circumstance that we, from an acoustical standpoint, are *simultaneously* active and passive constitutes the starting point of the investigation of the acoustic material”. Anders also says that “by producing sounds we are sounds”. H. Plessner, *Antropologia Dei Sensi*, (Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2008), pp. 44, 45.

<sup>181</sup> Plessner follows Schutz who claimed, in his phenomenology of music, that “I cannot interrupt the act of hearing”. See, A. Schutz, *Frammenti Di Fenomenologia Della Musica* (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 1996), p. 46.

music and referred to it as pure passivity, then, with the addition of the *Mit-sein*, he can gradually abandon the passivity and introduce the possibility of focusing on a particular object without having to shift the focus of his analysis. The movement of 'being-there-with-me' [*Mitdabeisein*], which constitutes the entire moving character of the impressionistic situation, is 'translated' and 'communicated' to realise the event in which composer and listener have taken part and are a part. Through this process, what once has been situational, and the composer objectified in a musical piece identical to the object itself, is now re-proposed to the listener in its original situationality. Once again Anders reveals his debt to Plessner who, concerning the notion of musicality, says: "[the musicality] is nothing more than being in power of the rapture produced by sounds. The meaning of the sounds derives from their internal connections with a 'veiled' end that the composer predisposes and that the listener 'comprehends'"<sup>182</sup>. Thus, the openness of music, its structural incompleteness, is a generic connotative complex which is determined in each case *via* the singular experience of listening which is directly arranged with the factual life of the listener himself that reveals the implicit human character of music.

The attack on positivist reductionism, transcendental experience, the positive meaning of negativity against the generalized claims of the intellect, the acoustical shift, the philosophical interest for music, and the search of a language capable of describing factual reality are some of the themes that relate Anders and Plessner to Adorno's philosophy. It is not a coincidence that Plessner himself in his *Die Anthropologie der Sinne* decides to explicitly investigate Adorno's later philosophical production. In his *Philosophie der neuen Musik* Adorno finds, in the irreducible tension between Schönberg and Stravinsky's music, the impossibility of resolving the singular under the generalisation of the universal that allows him to find in the musical material the key to understanding modernity. Music reveals the contradictions of the world that modernity, grounded on the optical notion of intuitive evidence, wanted to tame. Adorno's examination of modernity, which draws on both Schoenberg's dodecaphonic composition and Stravinsky's irreconcilability, is not a metaphorical interpretation. Instead, it aims to confront the genuine complexity of

<sup>182</sup> Plessner, *Die Einheit der Sinne. Grundlinien einer Ästhesiologie des Geistes*, p. 152.

the world. As Adorno writes, “it is nothing more than music. How can a world be in a situation in which the counterpoint’s problem already attests to irreconcilable conflicts?”<sup>183</sup>. The musical experience, in its structural and adequate form of listening<sup>184</sup>, constitutes Adorno’s model for approaching the concept of experience *tout court*. In a similar manner to Plessner and Anders, Adorno’s eccentric<sup>185</sup> reflections on Schönberg and Stravinsky’s music imply the necessity of overcoming the principle of identity on which the logico-ontological *ratio* is based and therefore, refute the dichotomic distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, on which both modern philosophy and science are still holding on to. In their works, they all suggest the obligation to “think with the ears”<sup>186</sup> in order to understand the relation between the irreducible phenomenic material and the composing/listening subject that escapes consciousness. Plessner willingly overlooks Adorno’s critique of philosophical anthropology<sup>187</sup>, due to Adorno’s focus on the non-identity relationship between the particular and the universal. This stance opposes the phenomenological approach, as it goes beyond merely examining the grammatical meaning and instead carefully examines the methods through which this meaning is conveyed. There is no pre-theoretical state in which the real can be analysed apart from reality itself and, as Anders would write a few years later, “no gramophone record gives the image of the moonlight sonata,

<sup>183</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Filosofia Della Musica Moderna*, trans. by G. Manzoni (Torino: Einaudi, 2012), p. 5.

<sup>184</sup> This represents a first distinction with Anders’ refusal to speak of adequate modes of listening which, nonetheless, discloses how both deemed the acoustical perspective fundamental.

<sup>185</sup> See, A. Ruco, ‘*Critica Dei Sensi e Dialettica Musicale. Plessner Lettore Di Adorno*’, *Iride, Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica*, 2010, p. 516. In a letter to Thomas Mann, Adorno highlights the relation between music and philosophy in his own philosophical development and defines the *Philosophy of Modern Music* as the example of such relationship. Furthermore, in the last section of the letter, Adorno thanks Mann for having understood the meaning of Adorno’s ‘eccentric manners’. See, T.W. Adorno and T. Mann, *Il Metodo Del Montaggio. Lettere 1943-1955*, trans. by C. Mainoldi (Milano: Archinto, 2003), pp. 43–46.

<sup>186</sup> In his *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, Adorno explicitly associates Husserl’s philosophy with the lack of dynamism saying that: “[Husserl] used to interpret thinking not as action but as *looking* at things, that is, quietly facing them like pictures in a gallery”. See, Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, p. 6 and Ruco, *Critica Dei Sensi e Dialettica Musicale. Plessner Lettore Di Adorno*, p. 517.

<sup>187</sup> “The more concrete the form in which anthropology appears, the more deceptive will it come to be”. T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 124.

but the sonata itself”<sup>188</sup>.

Through music, Adorno, Anders, and Plessner find a way to engage with the paradox that music represents. From this paradoxicality, they all try to extrapolate an anthropological meaning and suggest a new paradigm. Elements of such dialectical thought are evident in Adorno’s statement: “interpreting language means understanding language, interpreting music means producing music”<sup>189</sup>. Thus, music is ‘speaking’ about itself, which resembles what Anders called the ‘determination of indeterminacy’ [*Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*]<sup>190</sup> of the non-identical through which, by neutralising the empirical time in an aesthetical, one portrays the impossible, the paradoxicality of the *aisthesis*, namely, “its medium is the self-evidentness of the incomprehensible” [*Ihr Medium ist die Selbstverständlichkeit des Unverständlichen*]<sup>191</sup>. This ‘sediment of the absurd’ [*Bodensatz des Absurden*]<sup>192</sup> has for Plessner, for his part, a crucial anthropological meaning which can lead to concrete human behavioural consequences, just as for Adorno Schönberg’s *Serenata* displays ‘bad infinity’ and therefore a possible way of proceeding in a different direction.

Musical language is separated from the relational meanings of the discursive *ratio*; by embodying the objectivity of the musical material, the musical language takes upon itself the contradictions of the world. The dichotomy between the two *res* is surpassed, the sensible material is now meaningful in itself through the absurdity of its particularity which emerges in the contradictions of its artistic production. For Adorno, Anders, and Plessner, this is the specificity of listening that resides in the fact that the sounds, insofar as they are sensible materials, can express more than what they say. Sounds proclaim the intrinsically theoretical nature of the aesthetic experience which aims to portray the sensible without altering it. Art, and in particular music, indicates [*andeuten*] the possibility of a level of comprehension which exceeds that of the consciousness, for

<sup>188</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 54. Plessner seems to echo such motto when he writes that “one learns to swim only in water”. See, H. Plessner, *Politik - Anthropologie - Philosophie Aufsätze Und Vorträge* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2001), p. 270.

<sup>189</sup> Plessner seems to see such statement as a slogan. See, Ruco, *Critica Dei Sensi e Dialettica Musicale. Plessner Lettore Di Adorno*, p. 520.

<sup>190</sup> Stern, *Über Das Haben*, p. 42.

<sup>191</sup> H. Plessner, *Politik - Anthropologie - Philosophie Aufsätze Und Vorträge*, p. 294 and T.W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), p. 490.

<sup>192</sup> Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, p. 158.

sounds can display a precise aesthetical temporality which goes beyond empirical temporality but relates to factual experience.

From this comparison of Plessner, Adorno and Anders' intuitions of music there emerges an important and elusive idea, namely, the human being's inability to access the inner meaningfulness of music. This implies the idea that music can defy human understanding by aesthetically pointing beyond empirical time, allowing individuals to experience something beyond factual reality. This anthropological defect in the comprehension of music will re-appear in Anders' later musicology but can be fully understood only after examining two additional Andersian essays: *Patologie de la Liberté* and *Une Interpretation de l'a Posteriori* which, even though are not on music, they remain essential for understanding Anders' later work<sup>193</sup>.

### 1.3 Further development of the theory of 'situatedness'

A decentralised humanism needs an anthropological theory for grounding itself and *Patologie de la Liberté* and *Une Interpretation de l'a Posteriori* are the *loci* for such a theory. Both texts discuss and problematise the idea of humankind as a stable entity throughout history, giving Anders the anthropological substratum needed for combining a decentralised humanism and his previous musicological intuitions. During the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, Anders commenced his work on what he, in due course, defined as "systematic philosoph-

<sup>193</sup> From these two essays emerge two fundamental ideas which will shape Anders' musicological *Habilitation*, namely the 'shock of contingency' and a new manner of perceiving humanity's relationship with the world. The shock of contingency means that a person experiences herself as someone, as a particular 'I', while knowing that she could also be any other way; her particular 'I' is thus contingent. The other idea is the manner in which Anders redefines humanity's relationship with the world. Because the only *a priori* is the absence of any *a priori*, the forms in which humanity creates the world can only arise *après coup*, and not *a priori*. What Anders calls experience is part of a prior distanced inherence, an ontological dilemma. Because of these two main ideas, Anders did not investigate music in order to grant it the status of an object of experience by means of a formal analysis of musical works or by attending to the histories or motives of the subjects producing it. This would be completely pointless. Anders moved his investigations on music beyond the realm of objective knowledge and subjective choice, beyond music theory and music psychology. See, V. Erlmann, *Reason and Resonance A History of Modern Aurality* (New York: Zone Books, 2010), p. 322.



ical anthropology"<sup>194</sup>. After 1928, the year in which both Plessner's *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* and Scheler's *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* were published, Anders confronts the philosophical anthropology outlined by these authors in his *Über das Naturtreffen*. This work constitutes the first sign of a new research interest in Anders' inquiry<sup>195</sup> which, although it remained unfinished, would reach its theoretical culmination in the works *An Interpretation of the A Posteriori* (1934) and *Pathology of Freedom* (1936)<sup>196</sup>. In both works there re-appear some of the previously discussed themes of Anders' philosophical investigations such as the notion of 'situation', the attack on false dichotomies, the importance of a practical approach, and the *Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*. Anders' *An Interpretation of the a Posteriori* begins by focusing on the specific situation of a man inhabiting a world in order to demonstrate that for the former there is a possibility of having an experience of the latter<sup>197</sup>. This experience is the index of man's situationality for it is what allows the relationship between man and world because it means that man is in the world but only retroactively 'reaches' it. In other words, the world is an a priori that man can only engage with a posteriori. Because of this anthropological situation, man experiences two states: first, he is always within the world and constitutes one of its parts. Second, he is specifically dependent on it. Nonetheless, man can bridge this insufficiency *après coup* for man is 'suited' for a world that does not exist but which he can 'create'. As An-

<sup>194</sup> G. Anders, *Il Mondo Dopo l'uomo. Tecnica e Violenza* (Milano: Mimesis, 2008), p. 60.

<sup>195</sup>

<sup>R.</sup> Russo, G. Anders 1925-1945. *Dall'antropologia Filosofica Alla Critica Tecnica*, in Anders, *Patologia Della Libertá* (Bari: Palomar, 1993), p. 100. A similar view is shared by Lohmann who indicates Anders' work *Über das Haben* – text in which is contained *Über das Naturtreffen* – as the first place where slowly emerges an incorporation of anthropological problematics. See, M. Lohmann, *Philosophieren in Der Endzeit* (Bonn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996), p. 140.

<sup>196</sup> Both these essays were developed from a conference titled *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen* held both in Frankfurt and Hamburg in 1930. The original texts were considered lost by Anders himself after the emigration to the USA, but, as Colombo observes, one of the texts was then found by Oberschlick after the death of Anders and published posthumously in G. Anders, *Die Weltfremdheit Des Menschen* (München: C. H. Beck, 2018). Of the two essays exist two French versions published respectively in 1935 and 1936 which is why is common for scholars researching Anders to quote from such versions of the texts. See, Colombo, p. 11.

<sup>197</sup> Anders, *Patologia Della Libertá*, Un' Interpretazione dell'a posteriori, p. 39.

Anders notes: “the world of man is not only always absent, but always needs to be created and administered; this is why it is impossible to foresee a determined world for man. Man does not only transform the given world in a world that belongs to him; he continues to re-transform the world as soon as he has finished designing one. Man is not ‘suited’ for this or that world, the only thing he cares is to live in a world that he has created. And this un-fixed situation of man is the *conditio sine qua non* of his freedom”<sup>198</sup>. Hence, in this *Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*, that is, the fact that man has no fixed position in the world, there can be found man’s history which depicts humanity in its lack of fixity.

From this first philosophical-anthropological text of Anders emerged the idea that the essence of man is not something fixed or pre-determined, but was a process of constant creation in contrast with the natural world. In *Pathology of Freedom* Anders proceeded to investigate another anthropological issue, the “double aspect”<sup>199</sup> of the I. When a man directs his attention to his particular position in the world, he will eventually acknowledge his ‘double worldliness’ of the double metaphysical structure that he finds himself in. On the one hand, he is associated with the assimilation with the natural world, from which he comes, while on the other hand, he aims for that utopic place that he is creating. In this sense, Anders’ man faces the “deepening paradox”<sup>200</sup> of his existence: being stranger to the world means being constantly exposed to the uncertainty, nonetheless, this same unknown is the presupposition for becoming something different. However, this form of contingency is not related to any religious eschatological meaning that there is no God capable of establishing a meaningful justification for this contingency<sup>201</sup>. Anders’ secularised man must face a radical form of contingency since this is not only related to his presence on Earth but is an absolute contingency inserted on a ‘beheaded ontology’ that is fully rooted in the immanence of his position lacking any subordination to any *prima philosophia*<sup>202</sup>. Hence,

<sup>198</sup> Anders, *Patologia Della Libertá*, Un’ Interpretazione dell’a posteriori, pp. 58-9.

<sup>199</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 280.

<sup>200</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 280.

<sup>201</sup> Anders is talking about Troeltsch’s *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* which defined the contingency as the factuality and the causality opposed to the necessity and the adherence to the laws which was always related to the divine. See, E. Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung der Begriff der Kontingenz* (Aalen: Scientia, 1962), p. 772.

<sup>202</sup> L. Lütkehaus, *Schwarze Ontologie. Über Gunther Anders* (Lüneburg: Klampen, 2002),

contingent means, for Anders, two different things: 1) the lack of an ultimate meaning; and 2) the paradoxical situation according to which humankind, precisely because it is capable of exerting its freedom, discovers that it has impassable limits, that is, even if manifesting itself as free humanity it is not determined by itself which means that humanity is ultimately un-free. The limits of humanity's freedom emerge when it realises that it is bound to the natural world since humanity is not a product of its freedom. After becoming aware of this, humanity is forced to comprehend that its capacity to abstract does not make it capable of freely disposing of itself and its surroundings<sup>203</sup>. Even if humanity's metaphysical structure is nomadic, this cannot cut humanity's *a priori* root, and even if humanity has an elastic capacity to produce and transform worlds, this will never alter its belonging to the world. Suddenly every individual has to discover himself as an 'I' – that “however unhappily, [is] nevertheless [him]self”<sup>204</sup> – even though he could have been radically different – as coming from an origin to which he does not correspond and which he must, nonetheless. Facing this discovery, every person feels what Anders calls the ‘shock of contingency’, which is expressed through the anacoluthon proposition “that I am precisely myself”<sup>205</sup>. If people do not succeed in reconciling with the paradox of their existence and begin to identify themselves with their newly discovered condition then, the shock will eventually transform into actual ‘terror’ in the grip of which they try to “escape from contingency”<sup>206</sup>. By discovering their being ‘exactly-like-they-are’, people perceive themselves at the peak of their weakness and become resentful of the dominion that the external world perpetuates on them. The nihil-

p. 63. For Lütkehaus the concept of contingency presented in *Pathology of Freedom* represents an indispensable step for the later formulation of the ‘philosophy of occasion’, which is a form of thinking that expresses itself only through the contingent, refuting the ‘general’, the ‘true’, ‘the fundament’, and the ‘eternal’. Lütkehaus attacks Anders’ claim of originality of his theory of contingency as the first attempt to describe it in this way. Lütkehaus notes how strange is the fact that Anders does not quote the “relation between contingency of the I and of the world” expressed by Scheler in his work *Man's Place in Nature*. See, Lütkehaus, p. 127. However, as Colombo remarks, Lütkehaus forgets the influence of this work on Anders’ *Über das Haben*. See, Colombo, p. 89.

<sup>203</sup> W. Reimann, *Verweigerte Versöhnung. Zur Philosophie von Gunther Anders* (Wien: Passagen, 1990), p.49.

<sup>204</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 281.

<sup>205</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 281.

<sup>206</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 305.

ist, a first Andersian ideal-type of responder to the shock, reacts against it with “protests and insults”<sup>207</sup> which, even if meant for overcoming his existential paradox, eventually exacerbate it and keep him from resolving this antinomy. The anthropological forerunner of the nihilist can be seen in Hölderlin’s *The Death of Empedocles: A Mourning-Play*, where the protagonist feels unsatisfied, inconstant, and suffers simply because there are only particular relations<sup>208</sup> of which he represents the embodiment. Empedocles lives what Anders would call *Versaumnispänik*<sup>209</sup> with which he indicates the panic of knowing that one must be himself while at the same time knowing that he cannot be any of the infinite other accidental instances, which represents the loss of all the other beings of which he could assume the form. This leads Anders’ nihilist to disown “each being [as] the loss of all the beings whose form [he] could take”<sup>210</sup>. Thus, the nihilist directs his *odium fati* against himself and his surroundings, since he realises that both the ‘I’ and the world are formed through what they possess of the accidental<sup>211</sup>. Nonetheless, the nihilist shows a yearning for a full existence which, on the one hand, preserves him from committing suicide – Empedocles’ choice – while on the other hand, pushes him to create new *modi vivendi* with which to unburden the paradox of which he is a victim and cohabitate with it.

Since in the end, even the nihilist wants to live, he must find new strategies to cope with the unbearable condition of contingency. The first attempt consists of escaping from the world and isolating himself. In this manner, the very shame that pushed him to escape becomes a secret to

<sup>207</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 295.

<sup>208</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 283. Anders mentions this work in his *L’uomo e Antiquato Vol 1* (p. 295).

<sup>209</sup> G. Anders, *Uomo Senza Mondo. Scritti Sull’arte e Sulla Letteratura* (Ferrara: Spazio Libri, 1991), p. 178. As Reimann notes, (W. Reimann, *Verweigerte Versöhnung. Zur Philosophie von Gunther Anders*, p. 57), even before this term was used for the first time, Anders, in 1931, already engaged with this theme in his essay *The Devastated Man. On the absence of World and Word in “Berliner Alexanderplatz”*, where he writes: “the simultaneity, the adjacency of all things is the metaphysical panic of Döblin. What produces such panic? The fact that in a same moment it exists this and that [...] that each individual, in which the world is embodied, is alive in passing and passes through [...] that the totality of being, to which the omni-comprehensive word ‘now’ seems to refer, remains imaginary”. Anders, *Uomo Senza Mondo. Scritti Sull’arte e Sulla Letteratura*, p. 80.

<sup>210</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 283.

<sup>211</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 284.

keep, a unicity not to reveal to anybody. What once was the most “common thing in the world”<sup>212</sup>, is turned, by the nihilist, into the most private element of his existence which strengthens his ‘I’ and encourages him with a “positive pride”<sup>213</sup>. The accidental ontological constitution which indelibly stains him, equipping him with a peculiarity that he must share with all the other beings and with the world, is repudiated by the nihilist through the ascetic act of disowning the fact of having come contingently into the world<sup>214</sup>. But this hermetic behaviour cannot keep the shame of contingency at bay for long, as it only leads to an addiction to one’s self, a hypocritical form of disguise from which emerges only a sense of self-disgust for one’s existence<sup>215</sup>. At this point, Anders describes the last possibility for the nihilist to overcome the humiliation of the contingency which is represented by that revitalisation of the ‘thirst for power’ which brings Anders’ nihilist near Nietzsche’s. After having tried to dissolve the contingency that the nihilist feels before the other beings, he concludes that he is ultimately facing other accidental beings, who bring him to the realisation that if his identity remains irrefutably particular – i.e., his ‘I’ cannot become everything – then he has “to force the world to become [his] I”<sup>216</sup> through seizure and conquest. The nihilist aims at immortalising himself in time *via* the conquest of fame and glory until the world is filled with the indelible traces of his ‘contingent-I’. Since the nihilist could not find a solution to his condition, he thought that by subjugating all the other beings around him he could acquire the status of the non-contingent inspired by the rhetorical affirmation of Zarathustra: “If there were gods, how could I endure it to be no God!”<sup>217</sup>. The existence of the nihilist, unravelled by the rhythm of the repetition and nourished by the incessant paradox of freedom, which does not emerge from “an imaginary point of departure situated ‘before’ life. It is rather in the middle of life itself”<sup>218</sup>, forces him to re-start every time a new search for an identity. The nihilist arrives to individuate in the primary cause of his involution the salvific element that preserves him from dying; he confuses the repe-

<sup>212</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 289.

<sup>213</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 289.

<sup>214</sup> Colombo, p. 96.

<sup>215</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 289.

<sup>216</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 293.

<sup>217</sup> F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, (Morrisville: Lulu, 2017), p. 48.

<sup>218</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 295.

tion for the most adequate form of living.

To the nihilistic state of mind, Anders opposed those of the second ideal-type, namely the historical man<sup>219</sup>. While the nihilist configured his life as non-historical, or more exactly as anti-historical<sup>220</sup>, for he confuses the repetition of life with life itself, the historical man finds in the path signalled by history a force opposing the paradox<sup>221</sup>. The historical man keeps himself 'healthy' through a Cartesian argument – as Anders calls it – which is: "I remember, therefore, I am myself"<sup>222</sup>. Via his memories, the historical man discovers two forms of simultaneous identification with himself: 1) today's 'I' recognises yesterday's 'I', which means realising that the shock of contingency is that changeless *quid* that unites us all<sup>223</sup>; and 2) he discovers that yesterday's contingent 'I' is not an isolated fragment suspended in the temporal gap of repetition, but the constitutive element of life<sup>224</sup>. However, this double identification that leads the historical man to gain consciousness of something as 'his own life' is ultimately an equivocation, for he can only possess things, including his life, insofar as his ancestors possessed them. In other words, the historical man does not own things, his ancestors do.

The original *Weltfremdheit des Menschen*<sup>225</sup> ended with no suggestion on how to deal with or resolve contingency. However, Anders continued to revise this early work and later added a new ideal-type, that of the 'man of action'<sup>226</sup>. This addition coincided with the necessity to address a new practical issue that was unavoidable at the time, namely the political instability produced by the rise of Fascism and National Socialism. In the original text of the *Weltfremdheit des Menschen*, there were only

<sup>219</sup> G. Anders, *Amare Ieri. Appunti Sulla Sensibilità* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2004), p. 69. In 1948, Anders, while commenting this passage, seemed to detach himself from these ideal-types saying that: "it is not very encouraging that the philosophical representations of man reveal itself as the representation of the philosophical man".

<sup>220</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 302.

<sup>221</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 305.

<sup>222</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 298.

<sup>223</sup> Anders writes: "or the same reason, the very man who is astonished today by his contingency has the possibility of remembering his being astonished yesterday.". See, Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 298.

<sup>224</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 298.

<sup>225</sup> M. Müller, *Von Der Weltfremdheit Zur Antiquarheit. Philosophische Anthropologie Bei Günther Anders* (Marburg: Tectum, 1992), p. 34.

<sup>226</sup> Lohmann, p. 154.

the nihilist and the historical man with no mentioning of this third type. Therefore, it can be claimed that the importance of this new formulation resides in Anders' aim to shift the focus of the conversation from a discussion concerning ideal-types to the conditions of existence of anthropology as well as humanity itself. This same shifting of perspective is the main reason for the many inconsistencies of the essays published in the *Recherches Philosophiques*, which represent the expression of a 'troubled meditation'. These works must be judged in consideration of the reasons that moved Anders to critically re-analyse his previous writings<sup>227</sup>. Anders, in referring to the "the state of incertitude and of crisis" of the 'European situation'<sup>228</sup>, makes clear that he did not want to be considered as a mere theoretical thinker who was guilty of apology and resignation and who ultimately justified the *status quo*<sup>229</sup>. By engaging in the definition of man and the question concerning his authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*], Anders did not want to fall into the incongruities of anthropology; rather, he wanted to investigate the question around the "real transformation"<sup>230</sup> of humanity without forsaking the subject that declined in the socio-historical context. Here, Anders recalls Kant's thought, declaring his full membership in the "specific sense of his idealism"<sup>231</sup> which consisted in that critical operation through which reason was formed which leads to both a theoretical and practical dimension: reason through *Aufklärung* destroys its auto-illusions and arrives thereby at understanding itself in the practical dimension<sup>232</sup>. Anders, in pledging alliance with Kantian philosophy, refers to Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, where a firm distinction is established between a philosophy of man defined as 'physiologic', which aims to investigate what man's nature does to him,

<sup>227</sup> Colombo, p. 122. Colombo suggests this reading basing himself on the fact that the man of action's section is not adequately introduced and does not fit with the previous ideal-types.

<sup>228</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 307.

<sup>229</sup> In the conclusive paragraphs of the essay, is perceivable the echo of Anders' voluminous essay *Heidegger und Geschichte des Nihilismus. Zu Heidegger und Philosophische Anthropologie* criticising Heidegger's philosophy. See, G. Anders, *Über Heidegger* (München: C. H. Beck, 2001) – that the author realised after a two decades long meditation concluded in 1950 which means that Anders was reflecting about it during the re-vision of the essay *Pathology of Freedom*.

<sup>230</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 307.

<sup>231</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 307.

<sup>232</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 16.

and a 'pragmatic' one, which studies what man does and can do insofar as he is a free-living being. Hence, if the last addition to the essay is considered as a fundamental attachment for the interpretation of the entire work, then, what Anders considers pathological is not the abstractions and the ontological freedom<sup>233</sup> of humanity as such, but the persistence in a theoretical dimension which defects any practical outcome<sup>234</sup>. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to consider the 'man of action' as suddenly relieved from the traumatic process of identification. He will still have to answer to the need for a juridical and moral identity<sup>235</sup> which the social world would ask him to prove by relying on acts of responsibility. However, Anders' addition of this last ideal type expresses the philosophical necessity of addressing issues that arise from actual historical events.

The philosophical 'experiments' of *Patologie de la Liberté* and *Une Interpretation de l'a Posteriori* provide a twofold insight: first, anthropology must deal with practical issues since the notion of authenticity cannot but fail to define what a human is. Second, humans are not in control of their history, their surroundings, and even their creations – cultures and societies are destined to fall and create unforeseeable outcomes. On the back of this new anthropological insight gained throughout the years, Anders ultimately synthesises his musicological and anthropological vision in a single text, namely, the *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen*.

<sup>233</sup> W. Reimann, 'Nihilismus Und Scham', in *Gunther Anders Kontrovers* (München: C. H. Beck, 1992), p. 62. As noted by Colombo, (Colombo, p. 124), in *L'uomo e Antiquato Vol 1*, Anders, referring to *Pathology of Freedom*, defines as 'exorbitant' and 'pathological' the claim of the nihilist to be absolutely free and nothing more than himself. In a more circumstantial manner, Müller speaks of "the pathological aspect of freedom" insofar as man is unable to auto-determining his own origin, Müller, p. 29. Similarly to Müller, Lolli, in the introduction to the Italian translation of the text, claims that freedom is pathological because it is not the product of a choice but rather the traumatic outcome of a shocking experience, namely, the experience of one's one contingency, Anders, *Patologia Della Libertá, Un' Interpretazione dell'a posteriori*, p. 18.

<sup>234</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 284. Anders hints to the 'pathological forms of freedom' of both the nihilist and the historical man. Anders points out that both arrive to the extreme limits of their pathologies because they remain on a purely theoretic dimension and do not realise their freedom in the *praxis* – i.e., in the creation of their own world. Thus, it appears misleading the affirmation made by Liessmann that only the nihilistic perspective contains pathological elements, K.P. Liessmann, p. 40.

<sup>235</sup> Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 304.



### 1.4 Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen

As uncompromising as Anders's axiom of the *Patologie de la Liberté* is, the *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen* strikes a much more conciliatory and even metaphysical discussion which is still terminologically indebted to the former text<sup>236</sup>. In 1929-30 Anders saw 'listening' as the decisive release from the pathological state of being detached from the world. Accordingly, to grant music the status of an object of experience through a formal analysis of musical works or by attending to the histories or motives of the subjects producing it is, for Anders, utterly futile. Music's secret lies elsewhere<sup>237</sup>, in a realm beyond objective knowledge and subjective choice, beyond music theory and music psychology. As such, it is accessible only through a form of *gnosis*, one that captures the simultaneity of being-in-the-world and being-in-music as part of one's existence. For Anders, the musical situation<sup>238</sup> is initially characterised by a certain ambiguity which produces an inarticulate restlessness [*unartikulierte Unruhe*] which for Anders is the pivotal feature of the incompatibility between the empirical world and music: "that one (in music) falls out of the world, that one is still somewhere; that one is always torn out of the continuum of one's own life; that one, even in this hiatus, still remains in the medium of time; that one's own (personal history) life becomes before the other; that one has to return to oneself; that music in every tone says something and yet – in the sense of the sentence – says nothing; that it seems to be revealing; that it still conceals what it reveals, that one understands something – and yet"<sup>239</sup> says nothing. If the ideal-type of the historical man was characterised as an individual who continuously determined himself through memories – picturing himself through his history – then, in the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, such life has no musical existence<sup>240</sup>. Music, contrary to the other forms of art,

<sup>236</sup> As Khittl suggests, the theoretical debt of this work traces back to Anders' *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den 'Logischen Sätzen'* and to *Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens*. See C. Khittl, pp. 219-20.

<sup>237</sup> Khittl clearly states that Anders wanted to achieve nothing less than a music ontology which does not investigate the musical works but music itself. See, C. Khittl, p. 212.

<sup>238</sup> Which can be defined as the moment in which the listener and/or the composer has an experience of a musical product.

<sup>239</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 18.

<sup>240</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 37.

has its own ‘musical time’ [*musikalische Zeit*] which is ‘closed off’ [*abgesperrt*]<sup>241</sup>. Being ‘in-music’ simply means ‘being-out-of-the-world’; in other words, a-cosmicity. For Anders, music is an ‘existential’, not a mere *modus* of ‘being-in-the-world’, a *sui generis* ‘not-in-the-world’. Music’s distinct temporality in respect to historical time leads Anders to typify the musical situation as an ‘enclave situation’ because it is “an enclave in the historical continuum of the human life” [*Enklave im geschichtlichen Kontinuum des menschlichen Lebens*]<sup>242</sup>. Through this formulation, Anders wants to distinguish the musical enclave from other *abgesperrte* situations such as fear, playing, and sleeping, which seem to share music’s a-cosmicity. Fear, he writes, is a ‘gap’ [*Lücke*] deprived of any content, which makes it similar to a space which has ‘no time’ [*keine Zeit*]<sup>243</sup>. Sleeping is a form of ‘falling/sinking’ [*Absinken*] which leads to its realisation, the dream<sup>244</sup>. Lastly, playing is different from music because it is not merely a “a misuse of imagination” [*Missbrauch der Einbildungskraft*]<sup>245</sup> which has no meaning other than itself. Music is, by contrast for Anders, “insightful, it says something” [*aufschlusshaft, sie besagt etwas*]<sup>246</sup>. In its temporality, music deprives one’s life of its medium and movement, but, at the same time, music preserves one’s expressivity which it uses for its purposes. The ‘being-in-the-music’ lives, to a certain extent, ‘over itself’, exists in temporal structures and not in historical ones, that is, in ‘musical time’. ‘Musical time’ is not a continuum that is consistent with history or one’s individual life story; in it, there is no actual beginning and no actual end, no birth and no death. Anders is extremely clear about distinguishing ‘musical time’ from historical time; he says: “in time, music strips life of its actual medium and its power of movement, keeps it outside its historical context and outside the continuum of its motifs, nevertheless keeps it alive in its product, yes, it does so as if it were unrecorded, parasitic to

<sup>241</sup> As Ellensohn notes, other authors such as Eggbrecht and Ingarden formulate similar statements in regard to the particularity of music. R. Ellensohn, *Der Andere Anders: Günther Anders Als Musikphilosoph* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008), p. 66.

<sup>242</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 44.

<sup>243</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 45.

<sup>244</sup> This is a sign of how Anders goes beyond previous musical analysis such as that on of Schopenhauer who saw music as the immediate expression of the will *qua* thing in itself. See, A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation Vol I*, trans. by R. Welchman, C. Janaway, and J. Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 285.

<sup>245</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 46.

<sup>246</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 47.

its own medium, and to the power of movement of the product, and now lives a spooky side-life at the expense of the life realized in time"<sup>247</sup>.

That is, music's inconceivability and unimaginability are directly linked to its anti-historicism, which is revealed in its repeatability [*Wiederholbarkeit*]<sup>248</sup>. By juxtaposing *Pathology of Freedom to the Philosophische Untersuchungen*, one can therefore see that, if historical man lived by accepting the irreversible that happened yesterday, which he keeps pictured in his memory, then music escapes such representability since "no gramophone record gives the image of the Moonlight Sonata, but this itself [...] no musical figure gives the image of someone who appeared earlier, but, albeit changed, [...] this itself. [...] Irrepresentability, however, is closely related to un-historicity. What is not remembered, but can only be realized again and again, is unhistorical"<sup>249</sup>.

Music repetitively realises itself in its sounds; it requires "a reproduction continuously repeated" [*einer stets wiederholten Reproduktion*]<sup>250</sup>. By this Anders understands that music is meaningful only in the repetition of its chronological sequences which makes it ambiguous since it is not in time, but is nonetheless based on temporal structures. As Anders writes: "the piece is not repeated in the medium of time, but time itself, or, since the piece and its time must not be distinguished here, its time is repeated with the piece which is presented again"<sup>251</sup>.

For Anders, the musical situation is ἐνέργειᾶ, both structure and process, for in it the dichotomic distinction between subject and object is resolved in the idea that the product is already contained in the activity. In music, the possibility of repetition is not simply contained but must be achieved, otherwise music would not exist. With the association of music and ἐνέργειᾶ, Anders aims to overcome all the musical ontologies that classified the musical product as an intentional object and its execution as an inferior or poorer realisation of the 'pure' musical work. which is refuted by the peculiar dialectic of the ἐνέργειᾶ which "goes forwards ...

<sup>247</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 48-9.

<sup>248</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, §6

<sup>249</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 54.

<sup>250</sup> Ellensohn notes how Anders' musicological work is not only indebted to Plessner and Heidegger but also to Hegel. See, G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 158.

<sup>251</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 55.

and comes back” [zugleich vorwärts geht und zuruckkehrt]<sup>252</sup>. Music’s content is contained in its being produced, in its being cyclical, and therefore in its being opposed to the linearity of historical time.

Related to the idea of music as ἐνέργεια is the notion of ‘co-participation’ [Mitvollzuges mit]<sup>253</sup>, which presents, for Anders, another possibility of overcoming the subjective-objective dichotomy. ‘Co-participation’ is a specifically neutral form of the relation subject-object and understood as an ‘active-passive-neutral’ situation [aktiv-passiv-neutral]<sup>254</sup> that Anders explains as the “the unity of act and mood” [Einheit von Akt und Stimmung]<sup>255</sup> and “following the Kantian imagination as ‘receptive-spontaneous-neutral’” [Anlehnung die Kantsche Einbildungskraft als ‘rezeptiv-spontan-neutral’]<sup>256</sup>. Anders challenges hereby the ocular-centrism of Husserl’s phenomenology, which separated actions – always intentional due to being directed towards an object – from *Stimmung*, by arguing that hearing is in between sight (intentionality) and smell (impersonality)<sup>257</sup>. For Anders, hearing is not intentional like sight but not impersonal either like smell; rather, it is ‘expressive’ [ausdruckhaft] and requires a bearer of expressivity, thus differentiating it from smell. In this manner, Anders can oppose music’s objectivity and expressivity with the above-mentioned neutrality which previous dichotomic systems (subject-object, act-mood, form-content, rationalism-empiricism) did not account for. The objectivity and expressivity of music belong together to a wider dialectical notion of expressivity. Music is neither a mere symbol (an objective reality) nor an expression but something other where the *Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*, the objective musical structures, and the subjective mood cannot be separated but must be simultaneously in the same thing. The uniqueness of music lies prior to the distinction between subjects and objects. Thus, a philosophy of music that focuses solely on an objective or ideal realm of tones or their forms and denies or avoids subjectivism is just as incorrect as philosophical subjectivism itself.

As mentioned above, co-performance [Mittvollzug] is not only a unity of act and *Stimmung*, it also shares a resemblance to Kant’s imagination.

<sup>252</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 55.

<sup>253</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 20.

<sup>254</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 128.

<sup>255</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, §7.

<sup>256</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, §8.

<sup>257</sup> The sense of smell, for Anders, has no object to which direct an act.

As the Kantian imagination, which functioned as the medium-term between the senses and reason by being receptive-spontaneous-neutral<sup>258</sup>, Anders' co-performance is neutral but in some circumstances is oriented towards action/creativity and in other occasions to passivity/receptivity<sup>259</sup>. This means that there are different forms of co-performances which imply different forms of movement [*Bewegungsformen*]. Co-performance means, on one hand, the reproduction of a musical piece, on the other hand, being influenced by it. "The character of the co-performance depends on the objectifying character of the musical production, which is quite different according to different kinds of music"<sup>260</sup>.

For Anders music is an art of movement insofar as "the meaning of time is a variation of the meaning of movement" [*der Zeitsinn sei eine Variante des Bewegungssinnes*]<sup>261</sup> because the movements are not the result of a previous temporal structure but rather "they create their own time" [*schaffen sie sich ihre Zeit*]<sup>262</sup>. Thus, the co-performance displays the identity of external and internal time insofar as the experience of time can be seen as the coordination of movements according to its *Bewegungssinn*. There have been many attempts to describe music's *Bewegungssinn* by, for instance, Hugo Riemann, Ernst Kurth, Heinrich Schenker, Eduard Hanslick and Ernst Bloch<sup>263</sup>, but Anders' approach is different for it aims at being philosophical and not metaphorical since Anders believes that the *Bewegungsformen* are 'factually realised' [*eigentlich mitvollzogen*]<sup>264</sup> are cognitive processes<sup>265</sup>. Thus, the "the musical *Bewegungsformen* become mankind's *Bewegungsformen*" [*die musikalischen Bewegungsformen*]

<sup>258</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 61.

<sup>259</sup> Khittl notices that such 'rezeptiv-produktiven Zweiseitigkeit' (receptive-productive doubleness) is present in Plessner's *Anthropologie der Sinne*. See, Khittl, p. 225.

<sup>260</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 63.

<sup>261</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 65.

<sup>262</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 65.

<sup>263</sup> See, Ellensohn, p. 77.

<sup>264</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 65.

<sup>265</sup> See, C. Khittl, pp. 226, 244 and Ellensohn, pp. 84-8. Anders describes three situations: 1) *Aufgelöstseins-in Musik* (being-dissolved-in music) where one experiences music in an unconscious manner; 2) *Gelöstseins* (being-carried) in which one is carried by music's melodies; 3) *Abgelöstseins-von* (being-removed-from) where one surrenders to the objective structures of music, thus experiencing himself in his subjectivity while at the same time recognising his musical objectivity. Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 138.

men werden zu Bewegungsformen des Menschen]<sup>266</sup>. This transformation is as arbitrary as music is a game of melodies and tones; nonetheless, its unpredictability entails an opening towards forms of movements that would have been impossible to experience without it. In the musical situation, a person is identical to the musical object, she is that form of movement and because of this inescapable condition the analysis of the *Bewegungsformen* must be non-metaphorical<sup>267</sup>. “The individuals are completely re-tuned and transformed in the musical situation” [*Der Mensch ist in der musikalischen Situation völlig umgestimmt und verwandelt*]<sup>268</sup>, making music a ‘transformative art’ [*Verwandlungskunst*]<sup>269</sup> of man – it is “always anthropology of music” [*immer Anthropologie der Musik*]<sup>270</sup>. It is only in such a unity that music acquires epiphanic qualities<sup>271</sup>, as a ‘revealing’ which “*etwas besage und dennoch nichts aussage*”<sup>272</sup>. In this sense listening to music becomes a metaphysical symptom insofar as it is heralded by an foresight [*Ahnen*] of the indication of humanity’s precise dwelling in the world as its ‘Not-being-only-in-this world’: the fact that a person, as someone with *Ahnen*, “can mean something other than this

<sup>266</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 64.

<sup>267</sup> An example of non-metaphoric transformation is that of an actor who ‘becomes’ a character of a play while remaining him/herself.

<sup>268</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 68.

<sup>269</sup> As Ellensohn notes, the idea of a ‘transformation’ via music is not new and it already lies in the aforementioned idea of the connection between music and *ethos*, with which Anders explicitly deals. See, R. Ellensohn, p. 77. In Aristotle it is said: “for listening to such strains our souls undergo a change”. See, Aristotle, *Politics* (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), p. 187. As mentioned in footnote 62, it was Plessner to define music as the art of movement.

<sup>270</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 75.

<sup>271</sup> This revelatory character of listening is not new to Anders who, in his discussion of Rilke’s *Duineser Elegien* (1930) with his wife Arendt, described the hopeless situation of a man that has lost his world. This condition is epitomised by the loss of echo [*Echolosigkeit*], meaning that this man is doomed to not being heard at all. Thus, the task of poetry is, according to Anders and Arendt, to *invoke* the urgency of being-in-listening [*Im-Hor-en-sein*] as the only possible attempt to reach the stronger form of existence [*stärkere Dasein*]. See, V. Erlmann, *Reason and Resonance A History of Modern Aurality* (New York: Zone Books, 2010), p. 315 and S. Maletta, *Arendt e Anders: ipotesi per un’etica post-nichilista* in H. Arendt and G. Stern, *Le Elegie Duinesi* (Trieste: Asterios, 2014), pp. 10-22.

<sup>272</sup> The epiphanic character of music discloses the manifold dimensions of man. However, it cannot bridge them or enact them. As Erlmann puts it: “Anders deplores the growing gulf between a culture of things and a culture of humans [and] he refuses to bridge this gulf with a ‘happy rhythm’”. See, Erlmann, p. 227.

world that she experiences and that is available to her or something other than herself [...], that she is free to *vorbeimeinen* [mean past] her world is evidence of her lack of fixation on this world<sup>273</sup>. This anthropological turn in Anders' musicological work should not come as a surprise, since *Philosophische Untersuchungen* is a development of the negative anthropology of 1929-1930 with which it has some analogies (*Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*, pluri-dimensionality of man, and unresolved contingency)<sup>274</sup> and leads Anders to elaborate the following problem. If the transformative art called music is a man-made product, then, in the situation of musical transformation, humanity cannot be transformed into something other than itself, something 'non-human', but rather into "a dimension of itself" [*einer Dimension seiner selbst*]<sup>275</sup>: "being-in-music can at times mean becoming identical with one dimension of oneself, and at other times a different dimension of oneself, or becoming these dimensions themselves" [*In-Musik-Sein heisst dann das eine Mal: identisch werden mit dieser und das andere Mal mit jener Dimension seiner selbst bzw. diese Dimension selbst werden*]<sup>276</sup>. The *conditio sine qua non* of this transformation is humanity's 'ontological ambiguity', according to which there does not exist only one kind of human being definable in a precise and univocal manner. Anders is here implying that human existence can be known only in its ambiguity and contingency. In music, a person is not only in a particular dimension, but she lives it, and this dynamic resembles what the historical man used to do with his memories which were at the same time the medium and the constitutive element of his life.

Anders' *Philosophische Untersuchungen* can be defined as a dialectic of objectification which does not entail the objectification of subjectivity but rather "the retrieval of the separated into subjectivity" [*das Zurückholen des Abgetrennten in die Subjektivität*]<sup>277</sup>. Its entire philosophical project is

<sup>273</sup> G. Bischof, with J. Dawsey and others *The Life and Work of Günther Anders: Émigré, Iconoclast, Philosopher, Man of Letters* (Norderstedt: BoD – Books on Demand, 2014), p. 111. Macho correctly reminds the reader that Anders' musical philosophy is bound to be formulated as a negative-theology. See, T. Macho, p. 481.

<sup>274</sup> On the shared elements between *Patology of Freedom* and *Philosophische Untersuchungen* see, Ellensohn, p. 81 and Reimann, p. 20.

<sup>275</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 78.

<sup>276</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 75.

<sup>277</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 20. As Ellensohn says: "become different" [*Anders-werden*]. See, Ellensohn, p. 111.

an attempt to overcome the ancient dichotomy subject-object<sup>278</sup> through the interpretation of music as subject-object-neutral, determined indeterminacy, and identity of identity and non-identity. This constitutes the climax of Anders' philosophical development before the Second World War built around the critique of Husserl's philosophy (subject-object dichotomy), a paradigmatic shift of perspective (Plessner's *Die Einheit der Sinne*), man's lack of an *a priori*, and his contingency (*Pathology of Freedom*), which together produced a negative anthropological philosophy of music inscribed in an anti-idealist approach.

### 1.5 Adorno and the anti-historical debate

Having explored the development of the Andersian notion of 'musical situatedness', it can be compared with the musicological works of Adorno, in particular the *Schubert* (1928) and the *Franz Schubert: Grand Rondo in A Major for Piano Four-Hands, op. 107* (1934)<sup>279</sup> as they were written approximately around the same time as those of Anders (1927 and 1930). This comparison re-affirms how Anders' musicological project is built and revolves around the above mentioned idea of decentralised humanism. Adorno's *Schubert* slipped, as Adorno remarks years later<sup>280</sup>, into 'bad abstraction' for it was not modelled on the 'musical base-superstructure' dialectic that he adopted in his *On the Social Situation in Music* (1932)<sup>281</sup>, which was based on a Marxist sociological approach of reading objectivity and which remained a constant in Adorno's further work of philosophy of music. Adorno discussed Schubert not for elaborating a critique of the political economy of capitalism but rather for displaying the *Stimmung* created by Schubert's music that made Adorno wander towards unexpected and surprising landscapes beyond life in general<sup>282</sup>.

<sup>278</sup> Both Ellensohn and Khittl agree on this, and they rightfully link it to Anders' *On Phenomenology of listening*. See, Khittl, p. 227 and Ellensohn, p. 111.

<sup>279</sup> For a better description of Adorno's relationship with the works of Schubert see, E. Buch, 'Adorno's "Schubert": From the Critique of the Garden Gnome to the Defense of Atonalism', *19th-Century Music*, 29.1 (2005), pp. 25–30 and D.J. Molnar and A. Molnar, 'Adorno, Schubert, and Mimesis', *19th-Century Music*, 38.1 (2014), pp. 53–78.

<sup>280</sup> Adorno explicitly perceives them as 'poorly abstract'. See, T.W. Adorno, *Moments Musicaux: Neu Gedruckte Aufsätze 1928–1962* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964), p. 8.

<sup>281</sup> See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 57.

<sup>282</sup> The idea that Adorno was, at the time, considering himself more a musician than a mu-



It should be noted here that the notion of ‘landscape’ contains two anti-thetical meanings: first, by suspending time as development one halts his future for looking at the scene; and second, by holding the scene in one’s mind, he transforms it in an after-image. Landscape, therefore, is similar to Anders’ musical situation because it is both historical and anti-historical. Neither can be seized and both are equally beyond one’s grasp<sup>283</sup>. In these terms, the optical perspective of the landscape appears closer to Anders’ acoustical (musical) situation than it may seem at a first glance, for both are expressions of ‘being-in-music’ and ‘not-being-in-music’.

Adorno interprets Schubert’s music as a landscape in which one might wander and where such wandering is linked to death. Adorno sees in Schubert’s static and motionless music a lack of history since it is inclined to repeat itself<sup>284</sup>, such as in Schubert’s *Piano Sonata in A Minor* (D. 537, 1817) where the first movement consists of two inventions [*Einfälle*], which are not in the mutual dialectic-developmental relationship of a primary and secondary theme, but instead follow the principle of the ‘return of the same’. In this sense, it is the landscape itself that passes through the wanderer rather than the opposite since “Schubert’s themes wander just like the miller does, or he whose beloved abandoned him to the winter. Those themes know of no history, but only shifts in perspective: the only way they change is through a change of light”<sup>285</sup>. Given the lack of movement, the only means of perception for the wanderer becomes the illu-

sic critic is also supported by a letter he sent to Berg in which Adorno expresses the intention to establish himself as a composer rather than relegate himself “among music writers for good, to hell with them”. See, T.W. Adorno and A. Berg, *Briefwechsel 1925–1935*, ed. by H. Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), p. 183.

<sup>283</sup> “Images of the objective world appear in music only in scattered, eccentric flashes, vanishing at once; but they are, in their transience, of music’s essence”. See, T.W. Adorno, *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, trans. by E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8. As Leppert notes: “what matters is the instant of their realisation, which can be retained (by repeating the gaze, by replaying the piece, or in memory) but never more than fleetingly. See, R. Leppert, ‘On Reading Adorno Hearing Schubert’, 29.1 (2005), p. 58.

<sup>284</sup> In Schubert Adorno notices a certain “inclination to use the same theme two or three times in different works”. See, T.W. Adorno, ‘Schubert’, *19th-Century Music*, 29.1 (2005), pp. 9, 11, Molnar and Molnar, p. 60, and R. Brinkmann, ‘Musikalische Lyric, Politische Allegorie Und Die “Heilige Kunst”’: Zur Landschaft von Schuberts Winterreise’, *Archiv Für Musikwissenschaft*, 62.2 (2005), pp. 75–97 (p. 78). Thus, Adorno seems to accept Anders’ idea that what repeats itself cannot be historical.

<sup>285</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 10.

mination which induces changes in the *Stimmung*. The *Stimmung* is for Adorno something which “changes around things that remain timelessly the same, and this change makes no difference to them”<sup>286</sup>, therefore, the only entity that sustains them is their correlation to the parts of the landscape as something ‘repeatable’ but “in itself unique, and never what has been created subjectively and thus over the course of time”<sup>287</sup>. The wanderer, the *Stimmung*, and the landscape can be kept together only by an external objective force, that of death. Schubert’s musical landscapes are, for Adorno, timeless, interminable, fragmented, and impervious. Hence, the wanderer who via those themes goes through sections of the landscape cannot make any progress: “All development is anti-matter, the first step is as close to death as the last, and the scattered features of the landscape are scanned in rotation by the wanderer, who cannot let go of them”<sup>288</sup>. Seen in this light any reconciliation or optimism seems futile, but, in *Schubert*, Adorno puts side by side a model of personality with that of a motionless landscape, concluding that, in his opinion, Schubert’s works do not depict the ‘organic’ unity of personality but the ‘crystallized’<sup>289</sup> form of the landscape of death which is moulded by objectivity<sup>290</sup>. Adorno’s *Schubert* aims at separating Schubert’s personality from the objective intention of his music that emerges above “the fragments of that deceptive totality of men”<sup>291</sup> named, in this instance, Schubert. As with Anders’ *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Adorno’s *Schubert* deals here with the nineteenth century’s outrageous misconception of art as either something human or as a transcendent reality<sup>292</sup>; according to Adorno, music is not something manufactured, but rather consists of “the minutest imaginable cells of factual objectivity of which an im-

<sup>286</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 11.

<sup>287</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 11.

<sup>288</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 10. As Molnar and Molnar write: “some works of Schubert are void of innate potential for development and have no logical ending; they simply abate in one’s ear”. See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 60.

<sup>289</sup> “The crystallized is linked to the notion of art’s ‘truth content’ which is not poured from without but instead emerges from the technical manipulation of the artist to dominate the artistical materials. Therefore, the ‘crystalline’ truth of Schubert’s music emerges from the extreme degree to which the materials — Schubert’s melodies-qua-themes, for example — ‘resist’ him every inch of the way”. See, Leppert, p. 60.

<sup>290</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 12.

<sup>291</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 7.

<sup>292</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 7.

age persists even once the large structures of such objectivity no longer hold sway<sup>293</sup>. These images, nevertheless, do not strike at the soul of the musically receptive subjectivity; they rather function as targets: “hit the bull’s eye, everything changes, and reality shines through”<sup>294</sup>. Thus, the emotions representing the subjective character of the artist’ experience of creating music are only means for re-arranging the truth of the objective into the work of art<sup>295</sup>. In this, Adorno hears the sound of an alternative, a momentary hint of reconciliation between subject and object<sup>296</sup>. Adorno does not mention what embodies the link between death and the wanderer, but this might be found in the tension between an objective feeling of not-belonging and the wish to belong, or between the inaccessibility of home and homesickness for what in the past used to be home<sup>297</sup>. While the abovementioned link is not stated, the connection between the chthonic and Schubert’s music is declared in *Schubert*: “Although Schubert’s music may not always have the power of active will [...] its endemic shafts and fissures lead to the chthonic depth where that will have its source, and these lay bare its demonic image, which active practical reason managed to master again and again; yet the stars that burn for Schubert’s music are the same as those towards whose unattainable light Beethoven’s clenched fist reached out”<sup>298</sup>. Adorno designates Schubert’s music as a landscape surrounding an abyss, a landscape that itself consists of ‘shafts and fissures’ leading to a ‘chthonic depth’, where there is only hell. The ‘effect of death’ and ‘sorrow about the hu-

<sup>293</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 7

<sup>294</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 7. In *Schubert*, as Leppert writes, “Adorno hears the reciprocity that emerges when the subject recognizes in the object not difference but, however disconcertingly, sameness”. See, Leppert, p. 58.

<sup>295</sup> Molnar and Molnar, p. 66.

<sup>296</sup> As Adorno would write in his *Aesthetic theory*: “as indeterminate, as antithetical to definitions, natural beauty is indefinable, and in this it is related to music, which drew the deepest effects in Schubert from such non-objective similarity with nature. Just as in music what is beautiful flashes up in nature only to disappear in the instant one tries to grasp it. Art does not imitate nature, not even individual instances of natural beauty, but natural beauty as such”. See, T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. by R. Hullot-Kentor (London: Continuum, 2002).

<sup>297</sup> As Molnar and Molnar put it: “the reign of the chthonic”. Molnar and Molnar, p. 66.

<sup>298</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 7. “Schubert provides a shortcut to ‘a gateway to the underworld’. Or, as Adorno polemically expressed it elsewhere, “the positive element of kitsch lies in the fact that it sets free for a moment the glimmering realization that you have wasted your life”. Leppert, p. 63.

man condition' follow the path to "the underworld into which Schubert is escorting us"<sup>299</sup>. Yet Adorno struggles to elucidate his mythical image of Schubert's musical landscapes, to equate wandering with dying, and to find a demonstration of such wandering in Schubert's perception and manipulation of musical themes. Despite Adorno's prolonged account on the landscapes of death, he did highlight, already in his 1928 essay and then even more so in his 1934 essay, the existence of the hope of fleeing from these odd musical spheres and of discovering prospects for a newly reconciled society: "No matter how much Schubert's mourning drags us down and even if the despairing wanderer himself is smothered at birth, consolation will always be there for him, and it gives us hope that he does not have to go on forever in this entangled, magical spinning of nature. This is where time comes alive in Schubert's music, and the successful finale comes from a very different place than that of death"<sup>300</sup>. On the one hand, a landscape musically embodied in the 'crystalline form' through which the wanderer moves aimlessly represent the landscape of death. On the other hand, it leads to the archaic joys of life that open up the prospect of regeneration. What Schubert's music gives, Adorno maintains, is contained not in what it accomplishes but in what it fails to do<sup>301</sup>. According to Adorno, Schubert's failure is his success because displays the truths that a false modernity attempts to hide; in other words, the Schubertian music has an epiphanic power, that one of reminding both Schubert and his listeners that there is 'something' beyond their grasp<sup>302</sup>.

However, this positive-negativity according to which Adorno, like Anders, reads music is not the only way in which a transcendental reading goes back to a historical one. Adorno writes: "In the great Rondo in A Major for four hands we hear the song of rounded well-being, only as lasting in reality as good food is lasting and different from the immortality promised by practical reason"<sup>303</sup>. In this manner, according to Adorno,

<sup>299</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 12.

<sup>300</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 13.

<sup>301</sup> "The truth of Schubert's music lies in the actual absence of what it 'glimpses': happiness. Put differently, the happiness (however sad) of Schubert is boxed in by history, and Schubert knows it. The would-be reality of happiness can manage not more than its acoustic trace—an aural moment, a present absence". See, Leppert, p.60.

<sup>302</sup> "The real point for Adorno is that Schubert's music incorporates both what was and what might be. He doesn't 'work it out'". See, Leppert, pp. 61, 62.

<sup>303</sup> Adorno, *Schubert*, p. 13.

the wanderer discovers a new ground inscribed by happiness and the joy of life. The acceptance and joy found by Adorno in the Schubertian landscape promises, to those who dare to wander in it, the potential to become real. Such hopeful scene, that Adorno exposed in Schubert's Rondo in A Major as early as 1928, is the reason for the publication six years later of the second essay on Schubert. In 1934, Adorno writes that Schubert has achieved "a true wandering fantasy; a broad musical landscape, accessible from varying perspectives, at different heights and depths" relegating the landscape of death to a thing of the past. In this 1934 version of the essay, the wanderer can roam through the landscape of regeneration "as long as he wishes because everything in it is truly con-current; as deep as he wishes, because there is no ground; but without being afraid that he will get lost in the infinite, because nature, which comes to the fore here, is reconciled and blissful"<sup>304</sup>. In this sense, Schubert's music embodies the irrational hope that one day the moment of regeneration would come and overcome death. *The Rondo in A Major* thus combined two important notions: a strong utopian element based on the re-discovery of joyful memories, together with the idea of 'the citadel of the piano' through which Adorno defended bourgeois culture from the 'alienated collectivist invaders'<sup>305</sup>. The more death's shadow lingered over Germany through the increasing power of National Socialism, the more Adorno surrounded himself in the unreal 'citadel of the piano' where he could remember the blissful memories of his past childhood<sup>306</sup>. This autobiographical turn is

<sup>304</sup> Adorno, 'Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, Für Klavier Zu Vier Händen, Op. 107', in *Gesammelte Schriften 18* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), pp. 189–94 (p. 190). As Molnar and Molnar put it:

"even though the landscapes of regeneration are as infinite as those of death, the wanderer is not afraid of them, because all he can see around him is reconciled nature and an all-pervading bliss". See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 74.

<sup>305</sup> See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 76.

<sup>306</sup> Adorno had a fascination with his childhood and the bourgeois world of Frankfurt. As Jürgen Habermas notes, Adorno explained his determination to spend the rest of his life in the city where he spent his childhood by saying that "everything one achieves in life is little else than trying to regain their childhood". See, J. Habermas, 'Einleitung Zum Vortrag von Martin Jay', in *Adorno-Konferenz 1983* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), pp. 351–53 (p. 352). "At no moment during my emigration did I relinquish the hope of coming back [to Germany] I simply wanted to go back to the place where I spent my childhood, where what is specifically mine was imparted to the very core. Perhaps I sensed that whatever one accomplishes in life is little other than the attempt to regain childhood". See, T.W. Adorno, 'On the Question: "What is German?"', in *Critical Models*:

not strange since the *Rondo in A Major* has been recognised<sup>307</sup> as bearing a stronger personal mark than the *Schubert*, which displays the costs of aesthetically intensifying the demand for happiness: childishness, as the endpoint of insisting on the greatest possible happiness, leading to both a lack of reflexivity toward reality and several irrational forms of adaptation to that reality itself<sup>308</sup>.

Following what Anders writes about the historical man in *Pathology of Freedom*, what Adorno refutes in Husserl, and what both musicological philosophies offer, it is possible to interpret Anders' account as a rejoinder to Adorno's reading of Schubert. While both Adorno and Anders describe musical experience, they are also refuting the opposition subject/object and concluding that such a dichotomy is itself a misconception inscribed in a deeper and fundamentally human problem<sup>309</sup>, that of contingency/alienation which music discloses via its transcendental character. However, at this point Adorno and Anders arrive at different conclusions. Anders cannot accept what Erlmann called 'happy rhythm', that is, a positive synthesis between the contingency of man and its resolution, because that is possible only with the introduction of a *deus ex machina* which both the nihilist and the historical man attempted and failed to do. This is why Anders' musical situation cannot induce any historical changes in the life of man even though it 'suggests' him something. Whereas Anders uses the *Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit*, which emerges from the musical situation, as a means for extrapolating a neutral form of knowledge, Adorno, by contrast and like Anders' historical man<sup>310</sup>, would rather look back into his memories claiming that in this way he has resolved the anthropological shock of his contingency. But with this approach Adorno, from the perspective of Anders, is merely delaying the shock of today for

*Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. by H.W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 209–10.

<sup>307</sup> See, H.-J. Hinrichsen, 'Zwischen Terminologie Und Metaphorik. Zu Theodor W. Adornos Frühen Essays Über Franz Schubert', in *Musikgeschichten, Vermittlungsformen. Festschrift Für Beatrix Borchard* (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag Köln, 2010), p. 226.

<sup>308</sup> See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 76.

<sup>309</sup> "Adorno hears in Schubert's music something profound: the self-reflexivity of a composer whose music all too well recognizes the condition of the modern subject, subjected and not least subject to his own damaged subjectivity". See, Leppert, p. 62.

<sup>310</sup> Anders remarks on the ideal-types in 1948 (footnote 113), seem to find a confirmation in the fact that Adorno, i.e., 'a philosophical man', is epitomised by 'a philosophical representation' – the ideal-type – of a man.

that of tomorrow.

From the Andersian point of view, Husserl's philosophy was a failed breakout of idealism via idealistic means and Adorno's *Schubert* is a failed materialistic dialectic<sup>311</sup> between happiness and history<sup>312</sup>. It is not surprising that Adorno would later write that "the author would have no other *captatio benevolentiae* to bring forward than that his later effort was centred in the correction of such deficiencies" [*keine andere captatio benevolentiae hätte der Autor vorzubringen, als daß seine spätere Anstrengung zentriert war in der Korrektur solcher Mängel*]<sup>313</sup>. Anders' refusal of a theory of 'backward-looking'<sup>314</sup> is evident in his sketches of a Marxist history of music which is by comparison 'forward-looking' since it attempts to describe the musical situation following the historical momentum from which it was ejected into historical time until its full development<sup>315</sup>. In other words, while Adorno's musicology strives to appear historical, it is nonetheless trespassing into a utopian fantasy that Anders, in his anti-historical reading of music, would never reach because of the triptych structure of the co-performance.

What this juxtaposition with Adorno tells us about Anders' pre-war philosophy is that it is structured around decentralised humanism. Anders' entire method revolves around the idea that music is ultimately incomprehensible for humankind and yet means something. Music leads somewhere, but humans cannot get there; music generates anthropolog-

<sup>311</sup> As Molnar and Molnar state, it is on this same impasse that Adorno would later construct his *Negative Dialectic*. "The construction of 'negative dialectics' was an expression of both Adorno's disillusionment and his resistance to the realization that achieving infantile happiness is impossible: a continuation of wandering between the inevitable Tartarus and unreachable utopia, between dissatisfaction with the profundity of the reality principle and nostalgia for the boundlessness of the pleasure principle in early childhood". See, Molnar and Molnar, p. 77.

<sup>312</sup> "Schubert's heavily mediated joy, as Adorno envisioned it, emerged in the surroundings of death's Everywhere: death, to be sure, as an ontological ('natural') fact, but even more as the product of subjectivity drained of happiness, wherein the loss of happiness is at once historical and social". See, Leppert, p. 63.

<sup>313</sup> Adorno, *Moments Musicaux: Neu Gedruckte Aufsätze 1928–1962*, p. 10.

<sup>314</sup> According to Adorno music's temporality is structured differently. In music, events held in memory do not necessarily keep a rigid identity. Thus, Adorno writes that, in music, "an event or situation is able retroactively to shape a preceding development into something awesome even when it was not that in the first place". See, Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 184 and Smith, p. 404.

<sup>315</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 201-02.

ical moods, but they can barely be defined; music speaks to humanity but only through silence. All these examples point to the fact that even if music is a human creation, humanity does not have the ability to grasp its inner meaningfulness. Therefore, even if humanity is the focal point of Anders' early philosophy it is not its keystone, but rather one of the many stones composing and supporting the musicological and (negative) anthropological arc that outlines Anders' philosophical project.





## Chapter 2: A shared shift of Paradigm

### 2.1 Heidegger and music

Decentralised humanism is what emerged through a comparison of Anders' musicology with Adorno's early philosophy of music: humanism, insofar as humanity must be the object of philosophical analysis; decentralisation, because the erroneous misconception of believing that humanity occupies a central role in the understanding and organisation of the *cosmos*, should be avoided. Parallel insights emerge when comparing Anders' musicology to Heidegger's pre-war philosophy. However, before doing so, it should be noted that Heidegger did not write about music as Anders (or Adorno) did; therefore, the comparison between the two can be carried out only after methodically re-constructing Heidegger's cryptic musicology.

The observations of Heidegger on music are limited and scant at best. When Heidegger does discuss music, it is usually done to convey the meaning of what he is inferring in that particular instance and, therefore, has no particular impact on his overall thinking<sup>316</sup>. The significance of such a tactic is that Heidegger's connection to music has been labelled in broad and negative terms: Heidegger prefers to be silent, repressive, or even to censure music in his writings<sup>317</sup>. Given the lack of an organic

<sup>316</sup> A possible exception is his investigation of the aesthetical opposition between Wagner and Nietzsche. See, M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, trans. by D. Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991).

<sup>317</sup> See, G. Pöltner, 'Mozart Und Heidegger: Die Musik Und Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerkes', *Heidegger Studies*, 8 (1992), 123–44 (p. 123); A. Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 76; C. Molzino, 'Logos et Rhythmos: Le Sens de La Terre Ou l'oublie de La Musique Dans La Pensée de Martin Heidegger' (Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis, 1998), p. 27; E. Wallrup, *Being Musically Attuned the*

and detailed discussion of music, the only way of beginning a theoretical examination of the link between Heidegger and music revolves around a reading of the pages of *The Origin of the Work of Art*<sup>318</sup>. In this essay, music is not the primary topic of Heidegger's discussion and appears only briefly in some examples, but since the essay examines the nature of art, it describes the key features of all artistic genres, music included.

At the beginning of the essay, Heidegger immediately declares the purpose of the analysis by explaining its title: "origin means here that from where and through which a thing is what it is and how it is. That which something is, as it is, we call its nature [*Wesen*]. The question of the origin of the artwork asks about the source of its nature"<sup>319</sup>. The question is: what is that *quid* which grants to the artwork its essence and where does it come from? A first option could be the artist, it is her activity that produces the artwork. But, as Heidegger notes, the same can be said about the artwork itself, that is, it is the artwork that makes the artist. Artwork and artist are the reciprocal origin of one another. At this point, Heidegger introduces a third case, that of art, suggesting that in it what creates both artwork and artist can be recognised. There is an objection, though: while both artwork and artist appear as something tangible and real, the same cannot be said about art. Art is solely a unitary representation in which artwork and artist are reconciled in their respective realities. So, if at first art could 'contain' both artwork and artist, then Heidegger proposes the opposite statement in which art exists because of the artist and the artwork. Which one should be the prominent option then? Artwork or artist?

Heidegger refrains from following a circular method according to which, by bringing back the question on the essence of both the artwork and art, one would still imply the need to question the artwork in order to find what art is. "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of Understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge: may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of *Dasein* itself. It is not to be reduced to

*Act of Listening to Music* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015), p. 69.

<sup>318</sup> See, A. Mazzoni, *Il Dono Delle Muse Heidegger e La Musica* (Genova: Il Melangolo, 2009), p. 29.

<sup>319</sup> M. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 1.

the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing<sup>320</sup>. To find the essence of the artwork one should begin from the artwork in its concrete existence<sup>321</sup>. What does this mean? A naïve approach would revolve around sheer materiality. “A painting – for example, van Gogh’s portrayal of a pair of peasant shoes – travels from one exhibition to another. Works are shipped like coal from the Ruhr or logs from the Black Forest. During the war Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the soldier’s knapsack along with cleaning equipment. Beethoven’s quartets lie in the publisher’s storeroom like potatoes in a cellar<sup>322</sup>. As Heidegger emphasises, this understanding of the artwork is patently unrefined. Moreover, insofar as Heidegger speaks about poetry and music, he refers to their explicit materiality of paper and not their acoustic reality. If this method appears erroneous, then a perspective based on something other than arts’ materiality would be equally problematic. “Allegory and symbol provide the conceptual framework from within whose perspective the artwork has long been characterized<sup>323</sup>. According to this point of view, the materiality of an artwork is only a simulacrum which imply hidden meanings through allegories and metaphors. In this way, the crucial element of the artwork becomes what is ‘beyond’ or ‘below’ the actual artwork. But Heidegger does not believe that materiality could play such an insignificant role in the understanding of an artwork. The ‘thingly’ character of an artwork seems a feature that cannot be left aside. “The stony is in the work of architecture, the wooden in the woodcarving, the coloured in the painting, the vocal in the linguistic work, the sounding in the work of music. The thingly is so salient in the artwork that we

<sup>320</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Stambaugh, (New York: Suny Press, 2010), p. 195.

<sup>321</sup> As Kittl points out, Heidegger turned ‘human existence’ into ‘existence’ in all its factuality and made it an object of philosophy. “Heidegger uses the expression ‘existence’ for this, which clearly distances him from Husserl, who is not concerned with the mode of being of consciousness, but with the objective reality of knowledge” [*Heidegger gebraucht dafür den Ausdruck ‚Existenz‘, was ihn deutlich von Husserl distanziert, dem es nicht um die Seinsweise des Bewusstseins geht, sondern um die objektive Realität der Erkenntnis*]. See, Khittl, “Gute” Musik? In Musikpädagogischen Kontexten? Phänomenologische Überlegungen Zu Einem Situativen Musikbegriff – Essay Zur Theorie Der Musikalischen Situation Nach Günther Anders’, p. 218.

<sup>322</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 3.

<sup>323</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 3.

ought rather to say the opposite: the architectural work is in the stone, the woodcarving in the wood, the painting in the colour, the linguistic work in the sound, the work of music in the note<sup>324</sup>.

It is important to notice that here Heidegger has described music and poetry differently than before: he does not speak anymore of the ‘written’ aspect of the hymns or the quartets; instead, he mentions the vocalicity of the words and the sonority of the notes. If the ‘thingly’ character of the artwork is essential for formulating the question concerning the essence of the artwork, then, what is the essence of the thing in general? There are three options: first, the thing should be understood as the substratum of its properties: “The thing, as everyone thinks he knows, is that around which the properties have gathered<sup>325</sup>. According to this interpretation, the ‘thingness’ is nothing more than the *locus* in which the diverse characteristics of a thing unite. The second interpretation sees the thing as a unity of sensations. “The thing is the *aistheton*, that which, in the senses belonging to sensibility, is perceptible by means of sensations. Hence, the concept later became commonplace according to which the thing is nothing but the unity of a sensory manifold. Whether this unity is conceived as sum, totality, or as form changes nothing with respect to the standard-setting character of this concept of the thing<sup>326</sup>.

The third option is grounded on the idea that “[t]he permanence of a thing, its constancy, consists in matter remaining together with form. The thing is formed matter. This interpretation of the thing invokes the immediate sight with which the thing concerns us through its appearance<sup>327</sup> as in a piece of equipment which tells its function by its look. Heidegger, in order to disprove the idea that the thing should be understood as the unity of sensations, explicitly refers to the acoustic sphere<sup>328</sup>. As he highlights, “in immediate perception, we never really perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones and noises. Rather, we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, the three-motored plane, the *Mercedes* which is immediately different from the *Adler*. Much closer to us than any sensation are the

<sup>324</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 3.

<sup>325</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 5.

<sup>326</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* pp. 7–8.

<sup>327</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 8.

<sup>328</sup> Mazzoni discerns in Heidegger’s attempt to refute the notion that perception of something is solely confined to the unity of sense through acoustic perception, evidence of a Heideggerian discourse on music. See, Mazzoni, p. 34.

things themselves. In the house, we hear the door slam – never acoustic sensations or mere noises. To hear a bare sound, we must listen away from the things, direct our ears from them, listen abstractly<sup>329</sup>.

Similar observations were made in *Sein und Zeit* where the first thing to meet *Dasein* in its everyday existence was not bare sound, that is what is perceived by a mere acoustic sensation, but rather *Dasein* itself. “What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready at hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside ‘sensations’; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a ‘world’<sup>330</sup>. Any attempt to see the thingness as a unitary complex of sensations would be impractical and naïve.

After this deconstruction of the relationship between the thingness of the artwork and art Heidegger realises that all the three approaches mentioned above are inadequate for understanding the thingness of a thing and the precise being of things that are used as tools or pieces of equipment. For opposing these methodologically insufficient manners of analysing the artworks, Heidegger puts forward the thesis that the reality of an artwork must not be deduced “by anything other than by that which is at work in the work”<sup>331</sup>. Using the example of Van Gogh’s pair of peasant boots, Heidegger claims that “from out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the shoes the toil of the worker’s tread stares forth. In the crudely solid heaviness of the shoes accumulates the tenacity of the slow trudge through the far-stretching and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. The shoes vibrate with the silent call of the earth, its silent gift of the ripening grain, its unexplained self-refusal in the wintry field.

<sup>329</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 8.

<sup>330</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 207.

<sup>331</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 18.

This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, wordless joy at having once more withstood want, trembling before the impending birth, and shivering at the surrounding menace of death”<sup>332</sup>.

From the painted worn-out shoes, the farmworker’s world and the rural nature in their complex and inter-relational linkage become manifest. Heidegger discovers that the reality of the artwork consists of an occurrence of truth which refers not to the characteristic of a judgment but to “the opening up of a being in its being”<sup>333</sup>. Therefore, “in the work of art, the truth of the being has set itself to work. In the work, a being, a pair of peasant shoes, comes to stand in the light of its being. The being of the being comes into the constancy of its shining”<sup>334</sup>. The first constitutive character of the artwork here is the emergence of a world (the farmer’s world), which is not a mere representation or a simple exhibiting something so that somebody can see it. The artwork holds the mode of being of an object that exists as a ‘standing in itself’ [*sichstehen*]<sup>335</sup> as opposed to a ‘standing against’ [*gegenstehen*]. This ‘standing in itself’ leads to “the erecting [*aufstellen*] of a world and the producing [*herstellen*] of the earth”<sup>336</sup>. *Aufstellen* and *herstellen* are the technical terms for the occurrence of truth in the artwork. Heidegger calls the “opposition of world and earth their ‘struggle’ [*Streit*]<sup>337</sup>. In the artwork, a world is ‘erected’ and the earth ‘produced’ and, where a world is produced, the peculiarity of the materiality of the artwork emerges. The artwork discloses a world of its own, that is, in an incomparable manner. The various artistic genres differ from each other in the way the unity of world and earth is carried out in the works. World, according to Heidegger, does not mean what is ready at hand or the product of subjective imagination, but rather a qualitatively determined space of presence, the historically changing and history-founding openness of being. The world as the historically determined form of the address of being allows beings to appear; therefore, it is not itself being-that-is-appearing. A world appears as that which is

<sup>332</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 14.

<sup>333</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 18.

<sup>334</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 16.

<sup>335</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 26.

<sup>336</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 26.

<sup>337</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 26.

not, an object [*das Ungegenständliche*]<sup>338</sup>. When the world loses its power to determine human life and to make history, it comes to the “withdrawal and collapse of the world” [*Weltentzug und Weltzerfall*]<sup>339</sup>, that is, the artwork misses its ‘standing in itself’ and becomes a simple object. The meaning of ‘*herstellen*’ becomes clear when it is compared with other forms of dealing with materiality. In the bringing forth of an object of common use the earth is consumed in its immediate usage. In the artistic production this same consuming appears but, in this second case, this usage of the material is not exhausted; rather, it is brought forth to its innermost possibility. Colours are understood through painting, tones via music, words through spoken or written language. Heidegger speaks of a ‘withdrawing [*sich-Zurückstellen*] of the work into the earth’<sup>340</sup>. Through this process of the self-sheltering of the artwork, the earth is revealed as earth. “The work moves and holds earth itself in the openness of a world. The work lets the earth be an earth”<sup>341</sup>. Earth constantly attempts to dodge explanation, for instance, when the heaviness of a stone is calculated through its weight the former vanishes since is replaced by the latter. The earth shows itself as what self-shelters itself [*das Sich-Verschliessende*] and this central character is exposed in the artwork: “to produce the earth means: to bring it into the open as that which closes itself off”<sup>342</sup>.

In linking music to the notion of ‘world’ it is possible to eliminate all the remaining doubts regarding the process that begins with the artwork and leads to the production of the earth. If in the case of the painting of Van Gogh it is still possible to consider the symbolic functionality of the artwork as an essential feature of the production of the earth, then, in the case of non-functional art, such as music, the doubt disappears entirely. Even if Heidegger does not directly mention music in this regard, it is clear that the world manifested through music is not the kind of world that emerges through allegories or symbols. Even the appeal to functionality would become completely irrelevant in the case of music since the musically produced world would not acquire any meaningful character

<sup>338</sup> “World is that which is always not objective, to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse hold us entranced [*entrückt*] into being”. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 23.

<sup>339</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 19.

<sup>340</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 23.

<sup>341</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 24.

<sup>342</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art* p. 25.



from mere relations of functionality.

From Heidegger's perspective, a major function of artworks is to reflect the world – and beings in it – in a non-discursive way, allowing them to “span the being-in-the world [...] as historical”<sup>343</sup>. Put differently, artworks provide a way to indirectly observe how people understand their being in a pre-reflexive manner. However, the role of this function of artworks can only be assessed in the context of available means for the world to be opened up to human beings. Indeed, if some fundamental cultural mood is already being shared through other means without significant obstacles, it is possible that the importance of artworks in condensing and manifesting this shared background would be diminished. It can therefore be argued that Heidegger's view on artworks is a reflection of his view on the obstructions to understanding the world in a holistic way – highlighting an inherently dialectical perspective.

The way that Heidegger links the poetical dimension of art with shaping the lenses through which human beings perceive the world can be illustrated by considering Heidegger's exploration of the Greek temple example. Heidegger focuses on a Greek temple as an example of a work that is not a work of representational art<sup>344</sup>, allowing him to make the happening of truth in the work more visible. However, the temple does not work as an artwork in the modern world. Indeed, Heidegger distinguishes between the object-being of artworks and their work-being, and it is the work-being that opens up the world through the happening of truth.<sup>345</sup> While, as a building, a Greek temple does not portray anything, it nevertheless allows for the presence of the god. Heidegger writes<sup>346</sup>: “The work is not a portrait intended to make it easier to recognise what the god looks like. It is, rather, a work which allows the god himself to presence and is, therefore, the god himself.” Heidegger then extends this reasoning to linguistics, but it can similarly be applied to all artworks,

<sup>343</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger. Arts Education and the Mall as a ‘Debased’ (Dreyfus) Work of Art.” *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations: Music, Education and Personal Development* (2015), p. 18.

<sup>344</sup> Wallrup, Erik. “Music, truth and belonging: Listening with Heidegger.” *Philosophy of music education challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations: Music, Education and Personal Development* (2015), p. 136.

<sup>345</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. by J. Young and K. Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 20.

<sup>346</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 22.

insofar as being a work is understood as “setting up”<sup>347</sup>, or opening up, a world. Indeed, Pio draws a parallel between Heidegger’s Greek temple and Bach’s *Johannes-Passion*<sup>348</sup>: as a musical artwork, the latter no longer works as it no longer reflects the world where it was created. Bach’s *Passion* is rooted in the religiosity of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and without that environment it loses its work-being. A musical artwork therefore becomes merely a reflection of a *Dasein* that is no longer relevant in today’s world.

To better understand Heidegger’s view on artworks as a prism through which a world is brought forth<sup>349</sup>, it is important to first follow Heidegger in distinguishing between a world and a collection of things, or an imaginary framework representing these things. From *Sein und Zeit* one understands the world as the relational context for *Dasein* to dwell<sup>350</sup>. For Heidegger, the world *worlds*<sup>351</sup>, it is in being, rather than an object that is present at hand and can be simply looked at. As Rentmeester points out, there is a shift from using the noun “world” in *Sein und Zeit* to using the verb “worlding” in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, emphasising the inherently relational nature of the concept of world<sup>352</sup>. The world worlds when we make essential decisions, revisiting them, abandoning them, or neglecting them. In contrast, a stone or an animal has no world, since only human beings are able to stay in the openness of beings.<sup>353</sup> It is this openness that Heidegger uses to characterise artworks: works “make free the free of the open” and “install this free place in its structure”<sup>354</sup>. This line of thinking can be equally applied to musical artworks, providing more insight on how “opening the open of a world” may be viewed as an essential trait of music’s work-being.

In addition to the “setting up”, or opening up, of a world, Heidegger identifies another essential trait of an artwork’s work-being, namely the “setting forth [*Herstellen*] of earth”<sup>355</sup>. By “earth”, Heidegger understands that which the work allows to come forth. This is meant to be an effort-

<sup>347</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 22.

<sup>348</sup> Pio, “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 20.

<sup>349</sup> Pio, Frederik, “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 18.

<sup>350</sup> Rentmeester, “Somewhere between Plato and Pinker”, p. 239.

<sup>351</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 23.

<sup>352</sup> Rentmeester, “Somewhere between Plato and Pinker”, p. 239.

<sup>353</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 23.

<sup>354</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 23.

<sup>355</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 24.

less movement of the earth that is untiring and allows the earth to reach the unconcealed. The earth is thus moved by the artwork into the open of a world. In essence, Heidegger links the world and the earth through dialectical opposition, which he describes as essential strife. He writes: “World and earth are essentially different and yet never separated from one another.”<sup>356</sup> Heidegger views the world as the self-opening openness of paths and decisions, which is inherently grounded on earth, understood as the unforced, self-closing, self-sheltering. It is this sheltering and concealing that leads to the earth drawing the world into itself – and it is the artwork that instigates the dialectical strife between the earth and the world. However, Heidegger emphasises that the work is not supposed to settle the strife – rather, it accomplishes it<sup>357</sup>. It could be argued that the dynamism of this dialectical framework all but implies Heidegger’s being-as-temporal [*Seinsgeschichte*] in the context of art, setting the ground for the conflict between aesthetics and art as that in which truth is brought forth<sup>358</sup>.

How are these essential traits of an artwork’s *work-being* relevant to music? The way that Heidegger links the essentials of a dialectical strife between the opening up of world and the setting forth of earth to a work of art potentially allows us to apply this framework to any concepts that are characterised by these essential traits, not just linguistic work or even artworks in general. However, what is more important is why we are interested in describing the work-being of artworks, including music, in the first place. According to Heidegger, what the work-being of the work achieves is allowing for the truth to happen: “Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is the fighting of that fight in which the disclosure of beings as a whole - truth - is won.”<sup>359</sup> Going back to the Greek temple example, truth happens not because something present is being correctly portrayed or represented, but rather because something whole achieves unconcealment<sup>360</sup>, or un-hiddenness<sup>361</sup>, through the temple’s standing there. Similarly, in Pio’s example of Bach’s *Johannes-Pas-*

<sup>356</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 26.

<sup>357</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 27.

<sup>358</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 28.

<sup>359</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 32.

<sup>360</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 24.

<sup>361</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 28.

sion<sup>362</sup>, music allows for unconcealment which involves more than an isolated being – instead, it brings forth further un-hiddenness of beings as a whole. For Heidegger, this is a process where beings become more in being through the illumination of the self-concealing. It is this light that corresponds to beauty in artworks: “beauty is one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to presence.”<sup>363</sup> While Heidegger notes that the work-being of the work is only one of the few ways that truth can happen, it is nevertheless understood as one of the essential ways for it to happen. This setting-itself-into-work of truth<sup>364</sup> is understood by Heidegger as the essence of art. He notes that the artwork’s effecting [*Wirkung*] is not in actually taking effect [*wirken*], but rather in the unconcealment of beings, and the associated transformation of being<sup>365</sup>.

Heidegger notes that linguistic work “has a privileged position among the arts as a whole”<sup>366</sup>, but nevertheless notes that all art, including music, have poesy as its essence. Poesy is understood as “a mode of the illuminating projection of truth”<sup>367</sup>, linking the dialectical strife between world and earth to the essential nature of music. Following Heidegger, music is viewed as a work as long as we bring our essence into the unconcealment opened up by the work, and therefore closer to the truth of beings. But if this unconcealment, or un-hiddenness, is at least in part defined by the environment through being-as-temporal, it is not surprising that an artwork’s eternal value may fail to be a relevant notion. Aesthetics and its contemplating of art as beautiful may be insufficient to reveal the ontological quality of musical art, and this is further exacerbated by the modern tendency toward ‘scientificization’<sup>368</sup>.

For Pio, “the mall” is the modern replacement for Heidegger’s Greek temple. The mall is the “new ritualized place of worship”<sup>369</sup>, reflecting the essential features of the modern world. The life of human beings as consumers is viewed as an aesthetical project, with increasing consumption leading to more aesthetical inputs. Pio goes further and illustrates how

<sup>362</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 20.

<sup>363</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 32.

<sup>364</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 44.

<sup>365</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 45.

<sup>366</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 45.

<sup>367</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 45.

<sup>368</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 28.

<sup>369</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 27.

the concept of 'the Mall' elucidates the place of music as experience. This links back to Heidegger, who viewed experience as an aesthetical enjoyment: "The way in which man experiences art is supposed to inform us about its essential nature. Experience is the standard-giving source not only for the appreciation and enjoyment of art but also for its creation."<sup>370</sup> However, for Heidegger experience is also the element "in which art dies"<sup>371</sup>, and Pio translates this directly to the context of technical rationalisation and 'the Mall' as its centrepiece. In the context of music, Pio argues that individuals in the modern world have "private, emotional experience of music as an aesthetically objectivized on-line product"<sup>372</sup>. The subjective dimension is becoming increasingly objectivised by natural science, which leads to the aestheticalisation of music. It is this process of aestheticalisation that leads to the dismantling of Heidegger's Greek temple but is embraced by Pio's mall. Such distanced, aesthetics-driven enjoyment of music erases ontological dimension, leaving us with music that has no Heidegger's work-being, and thus is unable to bring truth forth into being. At the same time, Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen argued that experience of being may not necessarily be equivalent to an experience of Art<sup>373</sup>. Shifting the focus to music as something that provides experience of being allows for considering musical experience as an existential experience, in line with Pio's framing of modern subjectivism<sup>374</sup>.

The interpretations of Heidegger's origin of art provided by Pio<sup>375</sup> as well as Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen<sup>376</sup> bring forth another point of discussion when it comes to music, namely whether some musical work can change history and serve as an example of a true musical artwork for future generations. From a purely Heideggerian perspective, the answer is no. If a musical work changes history, then the world also changes. It then follows that this work is no longer representative of the being that

<sup>370</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 50.

<sup>371</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 50.

<sup>372</sup> Pio, Frederik. "Musings of Heidegger", p. 29.

<sup>373</sup> Leijonhufvud, Susanna, and Cecilia Ferm Thorgersen. "Music as Art—Art as Being—Being as Music. A Philosophical Investigation into How Music Education Can Embrace a Work of Art Based on Heidegger's Thinking." *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations: Music, Education and Personal Development* (2015), p. 120.

<sup>374</sup> Pio, Frederik. "Musings of Heidegger", p. 30.

<sup>375</sup> Pio, Frederik. "Musings of Heidegger", p. 29.

<sup>376</sup> Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen, "Music as Art", p. 121.

once was, and as such it is no longer capable of performing the same transformative function as it did to change history in the first place. Heidegger's world-earth strife and the consequent unconcealment with illuminating truth have already changed the canon for the individual and for the community as a whole. The very notion of seeking eternal artworks, including pieces of music, is therefore antithetic to the very nature of the origin of art, and symptomatic of the "fear of thinking".

Should a musical artwork, or art in general, have eternal value at all? For Heidegger, the mere notion of a work having eternal value is a symptom of the modern world forgetting what the essence of art actually is<sup>377</sup>. Heidegger asks whether experience – understood here as sensory apprehension of artworks as objects – “is the element in which art dies”<sup>378</sup>. He goes further and argues that this is a reflection of a more general problem, namely the fear of thinking: “[...] one fears that dealing with things precisely calls, in the end, for - thinking. What fear is today greater than the fear of thinking?”<sup>379</sup> The notion of art as aesthetic fails to capture its key function of being a “seismograph”<sup>380</sup> of the current epoch. To understand what, according to Heidegger, the purely aesthetic approach conceals, it can be helpful to dive deeper into how Heidegger links art with truth.

From a Heideggerian perspective, it is not the art itself that is beautiful, but rather what it brings forth. Indeed, Heidegger writes: “The essential nature of art would then be this: the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings.”<sup>381</sup> This refers only to the essential traits of a work, with implicit strife and “un-hiddenness” leading to revealed truth, and can therefore be applied to any kind of artworks, including music. However, Heidegger does not explicitly state how exactly music may open up a world, and instead focuses on linguistic works which have more “privileged position”<sup>382</sup> among artworks. Wallrup describes Heidegger's relation to music as “ambiguous” and “sometimes even hostile”<sup>383</sup>. This perspective seems to be reinforced by Heidegger's own *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, which, despite being his major treatise on art, avoids discussing ex-

<sup>377</sup> Pio, “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 21.

<sup>378</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 50.

<sup>379</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 50.

<sup>380</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 21

<sup>381</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 16.

<sup>382</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 45.

<sup>383</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 131.

amples from music. Instead, Heidegger focuses on illustrating his ideas based on works from other major arts, such as van Gogh's portrayal of a pair of peasant shoes, *Aegina* sculptures in the Munich collection, an ancient Greek temple, Hölderlin's hymn *The Rhine*, Sophocles' *Antigone*, and C. F. Meyer's poem *The Roman Fountain*. It is as if Heidegger silences, or even represses, music<sup>384</sup>.

The link between artwork and truth is reiterated in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin. The reading is embedded into Heidegger's contest with Hegel<sup>385</sup>, and is thus ultimately serving the purpose of illustrating whether the significance of art is bound up with the significance of truth – and, by extension, our future. Harries explicitly frames the question as the choice between Hegel and Hölderlin<sup>386</sup>. Heidegger chooses the latter, with Hölderlin's hymns revealing the puzzle of the modern world, where the poet is “able to say the holy”, but is “unable to name gods or God”<sup>387</sup>. And if Heidegger views Hölderlin's work as a test to be stood, Harries asks whether one should stand it, or is willing to, at all. And just like the ancient Greek temple is evocative of the divine, Hölderlin's work is similarly revolving around the notions of the holy. However, De Vries argued that Heidegger may be too focused on a specific direction in which Hölderlin sends us in his hymns with regards to God. De Vries writes: “Hölderlin's poetry, in ways all too often overlooked by many of its most insightful readers, in the first place Heidegger, liberates the question ‘What is God?’ (quid est deus) from the dilemmas of linguistic ineffability, of the sayable and the unsayable, and reorients our thought – our gaze, to be precise – in more than one direction at once”<sup>388</sup>. One possible explanation is that Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin occurs within a rigorous context of fundamental ontology, allowing for “out of context” metaphysical interpretation<sup>389</sup>. However, as long as this truth is brought forth through the work's work-being, all art with

<sup>384</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 132.

<sup>385</sup> Harries, Karsten. *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's “The Origin of the Work of Art”*. Vol. 57. Springer Science and Business Media, 2009, p. 187.

<sup>386</sup> Harries, *Art Matters*, p. 188.

<sup>387</sup> Harries, *Art Matters*, p. 188.

<sup>388</sup> De Vries, Hent. “Winke: Divine Topoi in Hölderlin, Heidegger, Nancy.” *The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin* (1999), p. 95.

<sup>389</sup> Warminski, Andrzej. “Monstrous History: Heidegger Reading Hölderlin.” *The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin* (1999), p. 207.

world-setting capability, including music, is inherently linked to truth.

In the Heideggerian sense, finding art is equivalent to finding the origin of art. Heidegger writes: “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other”<sup>390</sup>. This perspective is echoed in Pio’s ‘the Mall’ as the modern, aestheticised Greek temple, where experience of music, and by extension the origin of art, is objectivised through technology. While Pio focused on modern consumption of music as the reflection of the loss of Heidegger’s work-being, Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen explored implications of Heideggerian thinking for music education<sup>391</sup>. If both the artist and the work of art constitute the origin of the work, then music educators should not be solely focusing on the artist in order for the artist to produce music. Indeed, the artwork itself has the ability to form the artist, and educators may need to reconsider how they interfere with the artist and with the artwork<sup>392</sup>. More generally, this can be linked to Adorno’s critique of seeking ‘false clarity’, especially in the context of the analytical approach to understanding music and seeking definitions in the musical sphere. As Goehr points out, even if “revealing the underlying logic (grammar) of our language reveals the perhaps hidden ontological stricture of that practice”<sup>393</sup>, the appropriateness of such analyses may depend on whether the analysts actually hold these beliefs.

Even if Heidegger does not dedicate any monographic work to music, it is very clear how Heidegger and Anders had similar intuitions about the impact of music: that is, they both believed in the possibility that music could disclose meaningfulness where there was none. This disclosing power of music has fundamental consequences for the role played by the *Dasein* with regard to the question of listening that Heidegger, like Anders, deeply engaged with. At the same time, these musicological repercussions showcase the differences between Heidegger’s and Anders’ respective understandings of humanity’s position in the *cosmos*.

<sup>390</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 1.

<sup>391</sup> Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen, “Music as Art”, p. 113.

<sup>392</sup> Leijonhufvud and Thorgersen, “Music as Art”, p. 117.

<sup>393</sup> Goehr, Lydia. *The imaginary museum of musical works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 74.



## 2.2 Listening in Heidegger

In the question concerning listening there emerges the preponderant role played by *Dasein* for comprehending the transcendental and epiphany character of music. Although similar to Anders' musicological remarks on the potentiality of music, Heidegger's remarks are based on a substratum that is still anchored on a philosophical anthropocentrism that Anders would rather leave behind in the same vein as he opted to leave behind the optical paradigm of Husserl and what Anders regards as its fallacious dichotomies. The question concerning listening is a theme that appears several times throughout Heidegger's philosophy. Already in §34 of *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger writes about listening, where he analyses discourse [*Rede*] as a constitutive element of Being-there<sup>394</sup>. "Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind [*Stimmung*] and understanding"<sup>395</sup>. Here there are two things to note, one about the notion of '*Stimmung*' and the other about the nature of discourse.

Heidegger extensively discusses the notion of *Stimmung* in *Sein und Zeit* while examining the affective sphere: he writes that "[t]he fact that moods can be spoiled and change only means that *Dasein* is always already in a mood"<sup>396</sup>. This sentence is fundamental not only because it emphasises the idea that Heidegger assumes that *Stimmung* is something familiar, but also because it implicitly leads to the idea that mood emerges without any precise cause. It bursts into one's life in a way that opens up new possibilities. Thus, *Stimmung* should be understood as a somewhat familiar mood that presents itself in an unfamiliar manner – i.e., ontologically – because it is not merely a feeling but a constitutive element of *Dasein*<sup>397</sup>. Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of *Stimmung* because it allows him to disclose the idea of being-in-the-world as a whole and,

<sup>394</sup> It should be noted that this section follows Heidegger's discussion on the *Stimmung* and Understanding.

<sup>395</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Stambaugh, (New York: Suny Press, 2010), p. 203.

<sup>396</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 134.

<sup>397</sup> "Moods are different ways in which we are oriented to this or that, ways that disclose our situation holistically (albeit not completely). They affect how the world and entities within the world appear to us, e.g., as inviting or irritating, enthralling or threatening. Moods are pre-reflective, and they are matters neither of our choice nor our making. Instead, they come over us as part of our thrownness into the world". See, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *The Heideggerian Dictionary* (londo: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 133.

therefore, provides the background for asking the question on being itself. Such a world must not be understood as the totality of objects that a subject can find outside itself but, rather, as a referential totality [*Verweisungsganzheit*], an exposed scheme of meaningful relations. Through this simple observation, Heidegger intends to overcome the habitual manner of comprehending the structure of the world, thus leading to a fracture with the subject-object relation typical of Western philosophy<sup>398</sup>. “A mood is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way [*Weise*] – in the sense of a melody<sup>399</sup> that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way of his being”<sup>400</sup>. The *Stimmung* is not simply something ready at hand (like a tool), it is a way of attuning being<sup>401</sup>. As Heidegger writes, “mood is a fundamental manner [*Grundweise*], the fundamental way in which *Dasein* is as *Dasein*”<sup>402</sup>.

The relation of *Stimmung* with both *Dasein* and Being-in-the-world is equally crucial for describing the nature of discourse<sup>403</sup>. Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility of *Dasein*, as Heidegger states, and as such “is a primordial *existentiale* of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically *worldly*”<sup>404</sup>. Listening, in this sense, becomes a listening to something said since the connection of

<sup>398</sup> As Andrew Bowie writes: “Moods are not something we choose, they are what we find ourselves in, and they determine much of how we are. By suggesting that there is an inherent connectedness of inner and outer which is beyond the exercise of our will, he seeks to get away from the notion of the subject as an intending ‘inside’ which relates to an objective ‘outside’”. See, Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*, p. 69.

<sup>399</sup> As Gregory Fried notes, “Heidegger explicitly discusses *Stimmung* as musical”. See, G. Fried, *Heidegger’s Polemos* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 156.

<sup>400</sup> M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. by W. McNeill and N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 101.

<sup>401</sup> The fact that ‘*Weise*’ means both ‘way’, as in manner, and ‘melody’, should not be dismissed as a mere pun, as the verb ‘to attune’ clearly carries a musical connotation.

<sup>402</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, p. 101

<sup>403</sup> The relation of *Stimmung* and discourse revolves around a double exigency. As David Nowell Smith notes, “on the one hand, *Stimmung* is falsified both when its disclosure is ‘measur[ed]’ against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something” and when it is “banished to the sanctuary of the irrational. “On the other, to say that language is ‘equiprimordial’ with and inflected by *Stimmung* does not reduce it to subjective expression”. See, D.N. Smith, *Sounding / Silence* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 81.

<sup>404</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 204.

discourse with understanding and intelligibility becomes clear through the existential possibility belonging to discourse called hearing<sup>405</sup>. It is not a mere coincidence that when one does not hear something one says, 'I did not understand'. In listening, as in listening to the voice of the friend whom every *Dasein* carries with it<sup>406</sup>, lies the link between discourse and comprehension which is expressed through the possible ways of 'following', 'going along with', and even 'defying', 'opposing', and 'turning away'. Based on this existentially primordial potentiality of hearing Heidegger unveils the phenomenon of *hearkening*. "Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands"<sup>407</sup>. In this perspective the sensible aspect of acoustic perception becomes secondary since all the attention relies on the 'understanding' behind it. This shift becomes even clearer when Heidegger writes: "when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we proximally understand what is said, or – to put it more exactly – we are already with him, in advance, alongside the entity which the discourse is about. On the other hand, what we proximally hear is not what is expressed in the utterance"<sup>408</sup>. When one is hearing, the primary aspect is the comprehension of what is heard rather than its acoustic perception, the understanding rather than the mere hearing. The question concerning hearing, so important in Heideggerian philosophy, seems to point towards a dimension in which sounds diffuse but simultaneously dissolve into the quietude of silence. What is heard is an original sound that reveals itself in a perspective of sound withdrawal as a quiet call to gathering, that is, as the silent voice of being. The same perspective applies to music which can be seen as a *musica mundana*: a piece of music that indeed embroils humans in their inner nature but only insofar as they are referring back to being itself. This music would then be a piece of music that is not understood conventionally, that is, a music that in its essence is profound and original and that reveals itself as something much more than what is usually understood by the term 'music'.

When Heidegger speaks about the question of hearing he pursues the idea of a poetizing-thinking hearing and not of a mere musical hearing. So, following this perspective, what is the role reserved to musicians?

<sup>405</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 206.

<sup>406</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 206.

<sup>407</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 207.

<sup>408</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 207.

While Heidegger associates poets and thinkers with the faculty of hearing, he also does not exclude musicians from those who can and know how to listen. The reason for this is very simple: musicians as such are full fledged artists since they practise music which, for the fact that is a form of art, partakes of the original call and therefore configures itself as a poetic project. Therefore, the musicians are themselves poets, and by being poets they are called to adequately hear being. This is the nexus that consequently links music as a form of art and art as poetry that determines that musicians are, as artists-poets, assiduously dedicating to hearing. Moreover, in this link between hearing, poetising, and thinking Heidegger underlines the connection between hearing and thinking which becomes even more important if thought in conjunction with musicians and their ability to hear. Heidegger insists on the idea that the act of thinking could also be seen as hearing because in thinking a person is inevitably hearing her voice of reason. With this concept, which must not be seen metaphorically, Heidegger intends to qualify 'thinking' as 'hearing' while avoiding any reference to the division between the sensible and the nonsensible.

It is from the denunciation of the groundlessness of such division that, according to Heidegger, hearing has been debased to mere acoustic faculty. Thus, musicians can be reassigned to the same eminent position occupied by poets and thinkers. "Because our hearing and seeing is never a mere sensible registering, it is therefore also off the mark to insist that thinking as listening and bringing-into-view are only meant as a transposition of meaning, namely as transposing the supposedly sensible into the nonsensible. The idea of 'transposing' and of metaphor is based upon the distinction, if not complete separation, between the sensible and the nonsensible as two realms that subsist on their own. The setting up of this partition between the sensible and nonsensible, between the physical and nonphysical is a basic trait of what is called metaphysics and which non-natively determines Western thinking"<sup>409</sup>.

It is only because of the fallacious distinction of sensible and nonsensible that thinking could not have been understood as an act of hearing. For grasping how thinking is, in its authentic terms, a form of hearing and listening is necessary to go beyond any metaphorical framework

<sup>409</sup> M. Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Six*, trans. by W. McNeill and N. Walker, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 48.

supporting said distinction. The fundamental step is, according to Heidegger, to avoid reducing the act of hearing to a mere physio-acoustical phenomenon. “Whatever is heard by us never exhausts itself in what our ears, which from a certain point of view can be seen as separate sense organs, can pick up. More precisely, if we hear, something is not simply added to what the ear picks up; rather, what the ear perceives and how it perceives will already be attuned and determined by what we hear, be this only that we hear the titmouse and the robin and the lark. Of course, our hearing organs are in a certain regard necessary, but they are never the sufficient condition for our hearing, for that hearing which accords and affords us whatever there really is to hear”<sup>410</sup>.

When one person hears something, the receptive action of the ear is fundamental, but this same action does not fulfil the entirety of the acoustic act. This is never composed of mere sensorial perception, that is, a mechanical sum of acoustic stimuli. At the same time, Heidegger does not imply that in the act of hearing there is no intellectual moment that transmutes a brute sensible physio-acoustic material into a determined configuration. What is heard are the things themselves as they are in the horizon of the world and not acoustic sensations about them from which the entities heard can be reconstructed. Therefore, Heidegger can say that it is humans that hear and not their ears or their acoustic apparatuses. The acoustic sphere shows how it is erroneous to believe in the existence of two separate moments, that is, the sensible and the nonsensible (intellectual) one, a material and a formal one, a real and an ideal one. In hearing, both moments are always intertwined; they are revealed in their fundamental indistinguishability. In this sense, it can be understood how the act of thinking is a form of authentic listening and hearing is *vice versa* a form of thinking. In music, this indistinguishability is even more explicit, since hearing a musical work means much more than a simple acoustic experience. “Of course we hear a Bach fugue with our ears, but if we leave what is heard only at this, with what strikes the tympanum as sound waves, then we can never hear a Bach fugue”<sup>411</sup>. Heidegger here does not want to merely underline the fact that during the hearing of a Bach fugue the listener needs to combine with the acoustic perception intricate intellectual acts meant to capture the counterpoint musical

<sup>410</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Six*, p. 47.

<sup>411</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Six*, p. 47.

structure designed by Bach, but rather that the listener needs to be open to a Bach fugue.

Necessary for listening to music is not a pair of ears that merely function like an acoustic apparatus similar to those of animals but a certain cognitive disposition. “We hear, not the ear. Of course, we hear through the ear, but not with the ear if ‘with’ here means the ear is a sense organ that conveys to us what is heard. If at some later time the human ear becomes dull, that is, deaf, then it can be, as is clear in the case of Beethoven, that a person nevertheless still hears, perhaps hears even more and something greater than before”<sup>412</sup>. Heidegger focuses the attention on the fact that acoustic perception is a necessary condition but, at the same time, it is not sufficient for hearing. The example of Beethoven’s deafness shows even that the full functionality of the acoustic apparatus is not indispensable for authentic hearing. Beethoven, even after becoming deaf, remained a marvellous composer capable of creating his best masterpieces. In this sense, Beethoven continued to hear more sublimely, better than he had ever heard, because his capacity to hear what is most fundamental did not depend on the efficiency of his ears. The reference to Beethoven<sup>413</sup> is an additional confirmation of the fact that hearing is not limited to the physical perception of physio-acoustic perception, but also refers to the act of thinking. Musical geniuses throughout history did not owe their talent to a specific acuity of hearing, as the musical ear pertains more to cognitive disposition than to the functionality of the auditory system. For this reason, Beethoven, even if deaf, remained a supreme musician. In the process of making music a form of thinking-hearing comes to play and not merely a hearing-that-understands since ‘understanding’ is already included in the act of hearing.

As showed thus far, music was not one of Heidegger’s main topics of study or discussion in his writings or lectures. In his work, music appears, if it appears at all, only briefly and seldomly. The musical works mentioned by Heidegger seem even fewer: a fugue or a concerto by Bach<sup>414</sup>, a sonata or a quartet by Beethoven<sup>415</sup>, the *Gesamtkunstwerk* of Wagner<sup>416</sup>,

<sup>412</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Six*, p. 47.

<sup>413</sup> In this regard Heidegger mentions Mozart as well. See, Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Nine*, p. 67.

<sup>414</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, chapter. *Lesson Six*, p. 47.

<sup>415</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, p. 3

<sup>416</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, pp. 85, 87,89,91,132.

and one of Stravinsky's neo-classical pieces<sup>417</sup>. In the face of such a meagre list it is undoubtedly hard to say that Heidegger 'discussed' musicians, especially when these are compared with the list of artists he often wrote about: poets such as Rilke, Trakl, George, and Hölderlin; painters such as Van Gogh, Cezanne, and Klee. Nonetheless, even if there is a lack of actual dialogue with musicians, Heidegger did not exclude music altogether from his philosophical horizon. In questioning the artwork's capacity for reaching its essence, Heidegger implicitly questions the musical artwork, and such questioning is indeed a form of thought that deeply studies music<sup>418</sup>. In Heidegger, therefore, there exists a philosophy of art broadly construed that tacitly contains musicological implications<sup>419</sup>. Hence, it can be argued that the musical artwork enjoys the same status as any other artistic work and, as such, discloses the unconcealment of being as it reveals itself. From this point of view, music can be found not only with other forms of art but also with the act of thinking and political action because all of them are expressions of various forms of truth. The musician occupies the same position given to the poet<sup>420</sup>, the painter, the sculptor, and also he who thinks or founds a State<sup>421</sup>. As an artwork, the musical work carries and composes in its unity the 'struggle' between world and earth. Music rehearses a world, that is, arranges and orders it as a total structure of meanings and relations to which the human existence – and

<sup>417</sup> M. Heidegger, *Über Igor Strawinsky*, chapter. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), p. 181.

<sup>418</sup> As Wallrup suggests, there are scholars who attempted "to bring Heidegger's thinking into music whilst being true to him but at the same time bracketing his own view of music" such as Augusto Mazzoni (*Il Dono delle Muse: Heidegger e la Musica*) and Eduardo Marx (*Heidegger und der Ort der Musik*). See, Wallrup, p. 71.

<sup>419</sup> The fact that Heidegger does not express himself on music does not imply, as Pöltner advocates, that Heidegger separates music from art or from the essence of art. See, G. Pöltner, *Heidegger*, in Stefan L. Sorgner, *Music in German Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 194. Babich, Bowie, Mazzoni, Safranski, and Wallrup all observed that Heidegger thought music to be important for himself even though he never wrote about it. See, B. Babich, *Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022); Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*; Mazzoni; Wallrup; R. Safranski, *Ein Meister Aus Deutschland* (Berlin: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998).

<sup>420</sup> "All art [...] is, in essence, poetry", "poetry allows beings [...] to shine and sound", and "if the essence of all art is poetry, then architecture, the visual arts, and music must all be referred back to poetry". Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>421</sup> From such perspective Heidegger excludes only those who practice science or deal with *techné*. See, Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, p. 35.

the destiny of a people – is ‘projectually’ determined. At the same time, music produces an earth; it posits the material of which it is itself made and firmly roots in it. What musical characteristics are more suggestive than its immanence of meaning in the musical material? It is this aspect that is elevated to a general essence of art when Heidegger affirms that the exposition of a world has nothing to do with anything representative while maintaining that the artwork is self-sheltering into the earth or that art is fixed as a trait of a gestaltic form in the struggle between world and earth. In music, this means that for every opening to meaningfulness that is inscribed within the acoustic form of music there is no link whatsoever towards something beyond it. The musical work does not play an allegoric or metaphoric role. Moreover, it is not a mere acoustic means, an acoustic signal in which its resonance is dismissed for its practical functionality. In music, the dimension of meaning, other than simply defining the overall horizon, is rooted in the dimension of the acoustic material of which it is made. Henceforth, it is possible to declare together with Heidegger that in the musical artwork sound becomes resonance in its highest form.

As an artwork, the musical work has to provoke a fracture. In this case the material sturdiness of the musical instrument is not in question, in the sense that a violin must break apart after every performance. On the contrary, here ‘fracture’ means that in music something extraordinary, something unexpected, must shake the listener due to its unpredicted novelty. This novelty is not related to the personal originality of the artist, for instance, to the artistic genius of a musician that inaugurates a new style or a new compositional technique. In question is the fact that in the artwork truth is displayed insofar as the artistic process of creation is an inventive producing with which the being within the artwork is displayed. Art, including music, is outlined as an original and founding moment in which the world’s meaning is radically reconfigured, thus producing history, specifically the history of a people. The truth of music, following Heidegger’s idea of truth as a revelation, is its coming into presence by going beyond the mere simplification of sound as music as well as its resounding of a nonconceptual world. Music resounds in totally new and unfamiliar ways through its idiosyncratic nonconceptual temporality. Musical tones bring forth the dissipation of all distinctions between subject and object, sensible and nonsensible, and reason and senses in tears of joy.



It is with regard to the question of hearing that the ontological scope of the Heideggerian discourse vehemently re-emerges. Hearing, in Heidegger's works, does not ever concern only the sensible sphere of the ear because the sensible is always intertwined with the essential dimension of language, that is, of original Saying. In other words, hearing means corresponding to the call that being directs to humanity with a silent voice. What is there of musicological in all of this? Nothing if one thinks of music in its ordinary meaning. But Heidegger means a different form of music, a music which is not embodied in the earthliness of sounds, but rather, with a form of hearing which links humanity with the original Saying. Hearing implies a re-saying of what is uttered in the original Saying through language itself. Only at this point does sound go back into the earth and become a resonating sound. The first to resonate is the sound of the word of poetry and of thought, but music and musicians are not excluded from the essence of hearing. Music, as a form of art, displays truth; therefore, the artistic producing of musicians is itself a projective poetising, an inventive creating thanks to which truth is displayed in the artwork and history occurs. If this happens it is because musicians, as poetising artists, know how to hear the sound of stillness and the soundless voice of being. Even though in Heidegger music occupies a miniscule place, it is located in the same *locus* of poetry and thought which, according to Heidegger, holds a central position.

While Heidegger's attitude towards music suggests that there is no explicit link between his ontology and musicology, some of the aspects of Heidegger's framework are more open to such connection. Heidegger's *Stimmung* is crucial in his *Sein und Zeit*, but it is only occasionally referring to music, which mostly occurs in his later works<sup>422</sup>. Wallrup highlighted that Heidegger tends to distance himself from associating *Stimmung* with music, sometimes even directly emphasising that the tuning of thought is not related to music<sup>423</sup>. Heidegger's *Stimmung* is not to be understood in terms of accidentally emerging feelings – and it is exactly those feelings that Heidegger associates with music. His negative discussion of music and the implied pure state of feeling is best illustrated in his *Nietzsche*, specifically in the passage about Wagner's works and *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Heidegger's opposition to Wagner is framed in the more

<sup>422</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 132.

<sup>423</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 133.

general problem of the loss of great art<sup>424</sup>. Here, Heidegger echoes his thoughts from *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, implicitly referring to the lack of *work-being* in contemporary art. In this context, great art is to be understood as art that achieves the strife between world and earth and brings forth truth through unconcealment of being<sup>425</sup>.

Heidegger argues that great art is no longer possible, and he seems to be particularly emboldened to defend this view insofar as music remains the privileged art in Wagner's concept of a "total artwork". The key obstacle for Heidegger is the implied equivalence of music's domination of art with "total dissolution into sheer feeling". He writes: "What is wanted is the domination of art as music, and thereby the domination of the pure state of feeling—the tumult and delirium of the senses, tremendous contraction, the felicitous distress that swoons in enjoyment, absorption in "the bottomless sea of harmonies," the plunge into frenzy and the disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive"<sup>426</sup>. The feeling that Heidegger uses to describe the "delirium"<sup>427</sup> of music is exactly what he wants to distance from the concept of *Stimmung*. Heidegger chooses to associate pre-eminence of music as an art form with the "increasingly aesthetic posture taken towards art as a whole"<sup>428</sup> – providing more context for the understanding of "aestheticalised"<sup>429</sup> experience as the element "in which art dies"<sup>430</sup>. While Heidegger remains convinced that art is poetic, and not musical, in its essence, it is the musical form that he views as the reflection of the "conception and estimation of art in terms of the unalloyed state of feeling and the growing barbarization of the very state to the point where it becomes the sheer bubbling and boiling of feeling abandoned to itself"<sup>431</sup>. It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger, in choosing a non-representational work in his *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, would rather discuss an ancient Greek temple rather than music, despite

<sup>424</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 134.

<sup>425</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 24.

<sup>426</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I*, trans. by D. Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), p.86.

<sup>427</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 134.

<sup>428</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p. 88.

<sup>429</sup> Pio, Frederik. "Musings of Heidegger", p. 29.

<sup>430</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 50.

<sup>431</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p. 88.

music being even more in opposition to language and representation<sup>432</sup>. Furthermore, Heidegger's temple is inherently communal, and in essence this was later echoed by Anders in his focus on the "sociality" of the complex of music<sup>433</sup>.

Heidegger's seemingly depreciative judgement on music can be traced back to some of the common perspectives on the aesthetics of music. Most notably, Kant viewed music as the language of affects, implying that music cannot have anything to reflect upon<sup>434</sup>. While Heidegger's understanding of music may not be as reductive, his scepticism towards music restricts him from expanding on the concept of *Stimmung* in the context of musical art forms. As pointed out by Wallrup<sup>435</sup>, Heidegger does not acknowledge that *Stimmung* played a key role in the first interpretations of instrumental music; or that there may be separate, "musical" attunements (*musikalische Stimmungen*)<sup>436</sup> that are, in line with Heidegger's insistence on distancing himself from the notions of affects and emotions, separate from feelings and identifiable moods. This gap is further illustrated by Wallrup, who used Beethoven's *Eroica* symphony as an example. It is possible to investigate its unusual structure, link Beethoven to Napoleon and the French Revolution, or explore whether the finale served as the thematic origin of the symphony<sup>437</sup>. But such discussions are ultimately rooted in what other texts and sources say, there is no attunement. It is listening to Beethoven's *Eroica* that will allow us to discover what the symphony actually says, and interpretation does not have to be linguistic – on the contrary, musical hermeneutics have little to say about being, or about the impact of music on our belonging to being. Similarly, Phillips points out that Heidegger "employs an idea of music that is not informed by an experience of music"<sup>438</sup>. As Wallrup notes, *Stimmung* can be understood as listening to being's voice (*Stimme*) in an attunement, and Heidegger's association of music with feelings results in a dismissal of deeper, ontological links through musical attunement. It is unclear why

<sup>432</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 136.

<sup>433</sup> Babich, Babette. *Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology: From Phenomenology to Critical Theory*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021, p. 152.

<sup>434</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 135.

<sup>435</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 136.

<sup>436</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 136.

<sup>437</sup> Wallrup, "Music, truth and belonging", p. 144.

<sup>438</sup> Phillips, Wesley. *Metaphysics and music in Adorno and Heidegger*. Springer, 2015, p. 72.

music could not constitute being's voice – indeed, as Agamben puts it, “*Stimmung* is the condition through which man is able [...] to proffer his own voice, to find his own words”<sup>439</sup>.

In elaborating his theory of listening, Heidegger's study shares intuitions with Anders' musicology, namely, the revelatory character of music, the paradigmatic role of the ear in overcoming subject-object dichotomies, and the intertwining of listeners and musicians. And yet, Heidegger's musicological understanding does not imagine music in a non-anthropocentric framework of historical projectuality as his is one in which humanity is the only producer of its own destiny. Heidegger's interpretation thus essentially collides with Anders' decentralised humanism where music surpasses humanity's potentiality to enact a particular future over the many possible ones.

### 2.3 Revealing Anders' fundamental change through Heidegger

The themes examined by both Anders and Heidegger are several: the anti-Husserlian approach to philosophy, the foresight of music, the centrality of the ear, and the hearkening to silence. In contrast to the Adorno-Anders debate, however, Heidegger and Anders never discussed anymusicological implications of their respective philosophies<sup>440</sup>. For this reason, the following pages will resemble more a speculative discussion between the two rather than an actual dialogue. Nonetheless, Heidegger's understanding of music will help disclose how Anders opts for a substantial re-configuration of the notion of anthropocentrism.

Concerning the critique of Husserl, Heidegger, already in his early works of the 1913 and 1920s, disapproved of Husserl's methodological approach: the main question for Heidegger is how one is to understand the 'object' without following the classical subject-object (psychological laws or objective standards) separation. If knowledge of the object is possible, then the logical object must be the thing itself. Already in 1913 Heidegger investigates the problems of 'impersonal judgments' [*impersonalen Urteils*]<sup>441</sup>. The reason behind this analysis, which is similar to

<sup>439</sup> Agamben, Giorgio, and Jeff Fort. “Vocation and voice.” *Qui Parle* (1997), p. 98.

<sup>440</sup> The reason is quite simple. At the time Anders wrote his *Philosophische Untersuchungen* Heidegger and Anders were already philosophically and personally far from each other.

<sup>441</sup> M. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, chapter. *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*. Ein

that one carried out by Anders in *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den logischen Sätzen*<sup>442</sup>, is that Heidegger aims to show that under certain circumstances, neither the psychological investigations nor the unequivocal determination and clarification of the meaning of the words of a sentence can bring forward the content of a judgment. In such instances only the situation in which the action takes place can make understandable the sentence containing the judgment<sup>443</sup>. Heidegger, just like Anders 11 years later, seeks the meaning of impersonal judgments in the actual scenario in which they ‘take place’. Heidegger gives two examples, the first one being: ‘it flashes’ [*Es blitzt*]. Heidegger asks: “what flashes? Do I want to state a property, a momentary state, of a mysterious ‘it’, or does the judgment have a completely different meaning? [*Wer blitzt? Will ich denn von einem mysteriösen ‘es’ eine Eigenschaft, einen momentanen Zustand aussagen, oder hat das Urteil einen ganz anderen Sinn?*]<sup>444</sup>. The second one is: “when, for example, my friend and I are manoeuvring and hurrying after a cannon that is positioned to fire – and I say the moment we hear the thunder of the guns: ‘Hurry up, it is about to shoot’ – then it is completely determined what is ‘shooting’; the meaning of the judgment lies in the shooting that is (already) taking place” [*Wenn ich z.B. mit meinem Freund im Manöver einer schnell voraus- und in Feuerstellung aufgefahrenen Batterie nacheile und ich im Moment, wo wir den Geschützdonner hören, sage: ‘eile, es kracht schon’ – dann ist völlig bestimmt, was kracht; der Sinn des Urteils liegt in dem Krachen, in dem jetzt (schon) Stattfinden*]<sup>445</sup>. In both sentences the ‘it’ [*es*], is intelligible only because of the situation in which it appears. This means that subject-less sentences such as ‘*Es blitzt*’ or ‘*es kracht*’ cannot be understood solely through a logico-cognitive procedure because, given their lack of a subject, it would be impossible to refer their ‘*es*’ to a specific entity. It is not a coincidence that this return to factual

*kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (1913)*, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 186.

<sup>442</sup> The previous chapter discussed Anders’ analysis of occasional judgments that questioned the possibility, postulated by Husserl, of ‘translating’ every sentence into a precise logical structure (S is p).

<sup>443</sup> Safranski, *Ein Meister Aus Deutschland*, p. 61.

<sup>444</sup> Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, chapter. *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (1913)*, p. 186.

<sup>445</sup> Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, chapter. *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (1913)*, p. 186.

existence will lead Heidegger to the *Seinsfrage*<sup>446</sup>.

Oberhaus explored the radicalisation of ontology going from Husserl to Heidegger when it comes to understanding music as bodily being<sup>447</sup>. Husserl's approach is rooted in Descartes' apodictic methodic doubt (*Ego cogito*). With searching for evidence being viewed as the key aim, there is no place for ontology insofar as perceptions have no real existence<sup>448</sup>. Husserl's "bracketing" of the ontological has direct implications for understanding music, as his transcendental-phenomenological reduction applies to sensory perceptions such as hearing. However, Husserl avoids solipsism by viewing the body as a medium between the external world and the internal *Ego*<sup>449</sup>, leading to inter-subjectivity. Husserl's "double sensation" [*Doppelempfindung*] allows to capture the body's ability to both perceive and be perceived. In this context, Oberhaus considers the case of music lessons where there is little freedom to express music in an individual way, leading to solipsism<sup>450</sup>. However, when others demonstrate individual experiences, "double sensation" allows for intersubjective musical experience, as it transforms a solipsism into a process that is simultaneously receptive and productive. Heidegger moves away from Husserl and the apodictic *Ego cogito*, instead starting with *Mit-Sein*, which comprises the factual world and other subjects in it. This makes music as more than simply sum of sounds, as being-with implies that music involves keeping in touch with the world<sup>451</sup>. In particular, being-with-instruments leads to viewing instruments as extensions of the expression of human body, rather than simply efficient machines.

At this point, it should not come as a surprise that Heidegger decides to study the work of art<sup>452</sup> since in it he can go beyond any metaphysically conceived theory of the object resulting in dogmatism as well as

<sup>446</sup> Safranski writes: "a few years later, Heidegger will make precisely this pragmatism of our everyday life the scene of his *Seinsfrage*". See, Safranski, *Ein Meister Aus Deutschland*, p. 61.

<sup>447</sup> Oberhaus, Lars. „Body–Music–Being. Making music as bodily being in the world." *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations: Music, Education and Personal Development* (2015), p. 101.

<sup>448</sup> Oberhaus, "Body–Music–Being", p. 103

<sup>449</sup> Oberhaus, "Body–Music–Being", p. 104.

<sup>450</sup> Oberhaus, "Body–Music–Being", p. 105

<sup>451</sup> Oberhaus, "Body–Music–Being", p. 107.

<sup>452</sup> See, Smith, p. 81.

avoid subjective representations leading towards scepticism<sup>453</sup>. The notion of *Stimmung* becomes fundamental here: in his lecture course from 1929 to 1930 Heidegger embarked on a journey to discover the fundamental mood of boredom. Like music, boredom should not be objectified or turned into an object of the mind for these approaches would inevitably destroy its intelligibility. Even a process of bracketing theories of consciousness *à la* Husserl, according to Heidegger, will still result in the impossibility of opening up philosophical discourse to the everyday perspective<sup>454</sup>. Heidegger identifies three distinct ways to surpass Husserl and incorporate philosophy into everyday life. First, to be bored by something [*gelangweilt werden von*], as in the case of a man waiting for hours at a train station. Second, to become bored of something [*sich langweilen bei etwas*], like a person who feels bored at/during a party not because the party is boring, but because the party has become a mere distraction for avoiding boredom itself. Third, boredom, he argues, is something unrelated to any particular situation, and is described as being boring ‘for one’ [*wenn es einem langweilig ist*]. The example given for this case is of a walk through an empty city on a Sunday afternoon where passing the time becomes impossible. The particularity of this third form of boredom relies upon the fact that in it “we see, albeit only roughly, that [...] this unity of being left empty and being held in limbo in the third form of boredom is determined through and through by the essence of time”<sup>455</sup>. Therefore, in the *Stimmung* of boredom, *Dasein* is attuned in a peculiar *Weise*. The temporality of *Dasein* is altered, not by boredom in itself, but rather by a specific boredom in which time can either drag and bring to a standstill or even show itself as a fascinating horizon that goes beyond any kind of movement. Thus, *Stimmung* is something ordinary which, if linked to the attuning of *Dasein*, becomes more than a psychological state or an object of thought; it becomes something richer, more perplexing, more telling. This form of *Stimmung* is harder to grasp because it implies that one person does not have a mood but is in a mood. *Stimmung* is “an embodying attunement, but it is not at hand in the body or the psyche: instead, it is a mode of the embodying, attuned stance toward

<sup>453</sup> T. Kisiel, *Reading Heidegger from the Start Essays in His Earliest Thought* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 59.

<sup>454</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, p. 137.

<sup>455</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, p. 224.

beings as a whole, a stance which for its part determines the pitch of the attunement” [*als Gefühlszustand wurde aber mehrfach eigens betont, daß wir den Zustand nicht als ein Vorhandenes ‘im’ Leib und ‘in’ der Seele nehmen dürfen, sondern als eine Weise des leibenden, gestimmten Stehens zum Seienden im Ganzen, das seinerseits das Gestimmtsein bestimmt*]<sup>456</sup>. Heidegger, like Anders, utilises the notion of *Stimmung* to introduce a new framework, evidently based on the sense of hearing, that overcomes the previous dichotomic systems (subject-object, act-mood, form-content, rationalism-empiricism) in favour of the idea of ‘always being attuned’ to a *Weise*. In this sense, Heidegger utilises a twofold reductionist approach to the phenomenological Husserlian framework. First, Heidegger emphasises the intentional correlation between understanding and thing. Second, still within a phenomenological perspective, Heidegger focuses on one’s transcendence of meaning, that is, the a priori correlation linking a person to meaning itself. In neither of these two reductions does Heidegger follow Husserl’s approach: Heidegger does not trace back to a transcendental ego *à la* Husserl, but instead always leads his analysis towards the sense-making structures of concrete human existence understood as ineluctably engaged with meaning<sup>457</sup>. In this sense, Heidegger re-writes the phenomenologically understanding of subject and object insofar as the subject is not a consciousness but *Dasein*, the hermeneutical essence of the human being<sup>458</sup>.

The link between the possibility of gaining an understanding between the object and art is, as already mentioned, a direct consequence of Heidegger’s attempt to distance himself from Husserl. From this standpoint it becomes clear that both he and Anders seem to understand music as possessing the key to a deeper form of knowledge which reveals something in a soundless voice. However, the implications of this musical foresight are drastically different in purpose for each. Heidegger wrote on the

<sup>456</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, p. 106.

<sup>457</sup> As Dahlstrom points out, Heidegger focuses on “(a) the meaningful within the context that gives it meaning, (b) the correlation with the human engagement with meaning-giving”. See, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Interpreting Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 45.

<sup>458</sup> “Human being harbors within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution [...] Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the existence of the factual self”. See, E. Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by R.E. Palmer and T. Sheehan (New York: Springer, 1997), p. 138.



concept of 'situation' saying that "the Situation is the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness – the 'there' as which the existent entity is there. It is not a framework present-at-hand in which *Dasein* occurs, or into which it might even just bring itself [...] the Situation is something that has been closed off"<sup>459</sup>. In this sense is clear that Heidegger, like Anders, perceives that the situation has something belonging to the factual existence of *Dasein* but simultaneously is an entity going beyond it. But while Anders could, in theory, agree<sup>460</sup> with Heidegger concerning the 'epiphanic qualities' of music, he would deny Heidegger's understanding of the founding character of music insofar as that would imply that music is an historically productive phenomenon; thus implying the connection between musical and historical time which, as seen in the previous chapter, is categorically refuted by Anders. For Anders, as opposed to Heidegger, the musical situation is an anti-historical phenomenon that cannot be juxtaposed with the destiny of a people. In this particular regard, Anders explicitly writes that Heidegger's notion of history "is a very intricate one. On the one hand, History is being re-transformed into a possibility of *Dasein*, in such a way as to enable man, being equally *Dasein*, to re-experience it as his own 'Möglichkeit'. On the other hand, man, being history, but only his history, recognizes only his own pre-history as history"<sup>461</sup>. By this Anders means that even the idea of producing a destiny, or a history, sounds questionable given the fact that history is a man-made product only insofar as humans take part in it but often are incapable of directing it since in the process objective factors take part which are beyond the scope of human action. As Anders writes: "Mostly '*Dasein*' does not know how to master this world, although it is man-made, and if there is a '*Dasein*' corresponding to it, this type of '*Dasein*' is not a '*mögliches Dasein*' properly speaking, but often *Dasein*'s forced response to its own

<sup>459</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 346. As C. Khittl notes, "Nur in der Entschlossenheit bietet sich daher die Welt jeweilig als Situation dar, in der es bestimmte Möglichkeiten zu ergreifen gilt" [Only in the resoluteness does the world present itself as a situation in which certain possibilities have to be grasped]. See, Khittl, "Gute" Musik? In Musikpädagogischen Kontexten? Phänomenologische Überlegungen Zu Einem Situativen Musikbegriff – Essay Zur Theorie Der Musikalischen Situation Nach Günther Anders', p. 235.

<sup>460</sup> The same attitude displayed by Anders was also evident in his debate with Adorno.

<sup>461</sup> Stern, 'On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8.3 (1948), p. 359.

product which has become bigger than its producer"<sup>462</sup>. By introducing the 'human' as an aprioristic modality of *Dasein*, Heidegger saves himself the trouble of "exploring the historical causes responsible for this strange phenomenon of an *éivai* without an identifiable *öv*. Nor does he ask whether the relations that in other societies or civilizations may exist between the collective '*Dasein*' and the individual one comply with his schema of 'man' and 'Self'. Finally, he does not even touch upon the capital question of whether the '*Dasein*' called 'man' could be abolished or changed. It does not enter his mind that what he calls 'man' might be a deteriorated remnant of genuine '*mores*', genuine sociality; or whether it could be just a by-product of mass production"<sup>463</sup>.

Even if the effect of music on its listeners is interpreted differently, though, Anders and Heidegger agree on the centrality of the ear as the organ of thought. They both understand that the ear is not a mere human acoustical apparatus for receiving sounds. The ear is the place where the 'co-participation' [*Mitvollzug mit*] of both objective perception and intellectual cognition occurs<sup>464</sup>. This means that when a person is hearing she is already in a *Stimmung*, she is being-in-music, she finds herself in and within sound, she is the sound. Nonetheless, Anders and Heidegger would again disagree on the consequences of this realisation as Anders would dispute Heidegger's acoustic view, insofar as the act of hearing, while indeed linking humanity to something deeper or original, remains for Anders inaccessible. While for Heidegger the peal of stillness speaks a language that can be perceived by humanity, for Anders listening is a metaphysical symptom indicating humanity's dwelling in the world as its Not-being-only-in-this world. The foresight of hearing is its revealing that humanity is ultimately free and forced to re-invent its essence. Thus, Anders can ask: where is freedom in Heidegger's work? As in the case of history, freedom, according to Anders, proves to be a problematic notion for Heidegger<sup>465</sup>. For instance, the notions of 'language' and 'dialogue' represent, for Heidegger, one of the *Existenzialien* of *Dasein*, as *Dasein* has to listen to its words to know something about itself. Thus, *Dasein* is the

<sup>462</sup> Stern, 'On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy', p. 360.

<sup>463</sup> Stern, 'On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy', p. 343.

<sup>464</sup> This phenomenon is, for both Anders and Heidegger, not understood metaphorically.

<sup>465</sup> Anders calls it "a philosophy of freedom which does not understand itself any longer, namely a philosophy of freedom without freedom". See, Stern, 'On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy', p. 366.

producer and recipient of its actions, a self-made *Dasein*<sup>466</sup>. Anders can therefore hypothesise that *Dasein* uses the momentum of its *Geworfenheit* to throw itself into shaping and directing the world. The conclusion of Anders' hypothesis would then be that Heidegger presupposes that “*Dasein* comes to the world as a nobody, and that, what happens to it, is up to none but to itself – in short: it applies to the historical type of the self-made man, not to man in general – to a self-made man who has no longer the opportunity to rise in the world, thus to an acosmistic self-made man”<sup>467</sup>.

Music, as hearing, listening, and hearkening is for Heidegger a self-referential artifice with which *Dasein* reaffirms itself and simultaneously posits the possibility, already included in itself, of its destiny and history. What does this say about Anders' philosophy? It tells about a fundamental change where humanity is not metaphorically occupying the central position of the sun around which all the other entities (including nature, meaning, art, and *techne*) revolve. Rather, the unreachable notion of meaning is its centre, while humanity is just one of the many celestial bodies revolving around this centre, conscious of the fact that it will only grasp a part of the luminous magnitude radiating from this sun of meaningfulness. Anders does not merely show the decentralised position occupied by humanity in the *cosmos*, he also depicts a more inclusive perspective for all things co-existing with humanity itself.

One passage in Heidegger's *Nietzsche* is particularly relevant to framing Anders' musicology as something that is rooted in but noticeably deviates from the Heideggerian thought. To begin with, when discussing the world-earth strife and “unconcealment” in his *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Heidegger does not differentiate between art forms. On the surface, his arguments do not require works to possess any characteristics that are specific to certain art forms such as poetry, suggesting that music is similarly capable of “setting up a world”, “setting forth the earth”, and “disclosure of beings as a whole”<sup>468</sup>, although at a first glance

<sup>466</sup> Anders writes that “*Dasein* is ancestor-less, the Self supplants his ancestry and becomes his own maker”. See, Stern, ‘*On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy*’, p. 353. In this sense, Heidegger initially appears as one of Anders' historical men. However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that he is a nihilistic man disguised as a historical man.

<sup>467</sup> Stern, ‘*On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy*’, p. 353.

<sup>468</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 32.

it may not be obvious how music can set up a world at all<sup>469</sup>. Nevertheless, in *Nietzsche* Heidegger insists that only great poetry and thought are able to manifest “a solidly grounded and articulated position in the midst of beings”<sup>470</sup>, which implicitly refers to bringing forth the truth through the world-end strife. However, in pointing out the inability of feelings – in particular, the “pure state of feeling”<sup>471</sup> implicit in music’s domination of art – to manifest the *work-being*<sup>472</sup> of art, Heidegger notes its potential substitution role in the modern world. He writes: “And yet such arousal of frenzied feeling and unchaining of “affects” could be taken as a rescue of ‘life’, especially in view of the growing impoverishment and deterioration of existence occasioned by industry, technology, and finance, in connection with the enervation and depletion of the constructive forces of knowledge and tradition, to say nothing of the lack of every establishment of goals for human existence”<sup>473</sup>. Heidegger acknowledges that the changing environment also changes the demand for “aestheticalised” art, but does not sufficiently explore it beyond using it as an argument for the inability of music to dominate art.

However, as noted by Wallrup<sup>474</sup>, it is at this time that Heidegger was developing his notion of *Seinsgeschichte*, or a history of being, where access to being varies at different times throughout history. In this context, aesthetics can be viewed as a part of a more general, nihilistic movement in history, especially in the context of Anders’ discussion of freedom<sup>475</sup> and his prognostic interpretations of overcoming the Promethean gap<sup>476</sup>. This can also be linked to Heidegger viewing *die Technik* as both a threat to remembering the Dasein we are, but also as something that shapes our understanding of being in the modern age<sup>477</sup>. In the context of the

<sup>469</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 137.

<sup>470</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p. 88.

<sup>471</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p. 86.

<sup>472</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 20.

<sup>473</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p. 88.

<sup>474</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 135.

<sup>475</sup> Anders, Günther, translated by Katharine Wolfe. “The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification.” *Deleuze Studies* 3, no. 2 (2009), p. 278.

<sup>476</sup> Schraube, Ernst. “‘Torturing things until they confess’: Günther Anders’ critique of technology.” *Science as Culture* 14, no. 1 (2005), p. 81.

<sup>477</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Rocking Heidegger: Musical Experience between Technology and Ontology.” *Heidegger and Music* (2022), p. 11.

modern world, Gritten interprets it as a “distracted” world<sup>478</sup>, extrapolating *techne* to better understand its relationship with music and hearing. It has been noted, in particular by Gritten<sup>479</sup> and Babich<sup>480</sup>, that Heidegger views hearing as hearing-in-the-world, which seemingly precludes us from discussing hearing music in the conventional sense. However, this distinction becomes less relevant when considering the possibility of musical *Stimmung*<sup>481</sup>, which Heidegger appears to dismiss, in part due to associating music with affects and feelings<sup>482</sup>. The need to understand in order to listen is restricting Heidegger’s perspective on music, insofar as music is thought of as “arousal of frenzied feeling” in the “bottomless sea of harmonies” of Wagner’s ‘total artwork’, as Heidegger discussed in *Nietzsche*<sup>483</sup>. In contrast, the same requirement is fully embraced by Anders, as ‘being-in-music’ can potentially *be* the world<sup>484</sup>, although Anders acknowledges that participating in this world is a privilege that is denied to some<sup>485</sup>.

The notion of nature is, in both its floristic and faunistic sense, defined by Anders not according to the manner in which humanity utilises it, but rather according to the presupposition that through practical experience humanity discovers the existence of something as nature in its independent character. Moreover, through nature’s simultaneity in both its proximity and distance, humanity can represent the ‘specific insecurity’ of its own practice with nature and with itself<sup>486</sup>. This entire understanding is shown by Anders through two examples: fruits and animals. In the first case, Anders used the spontaneous growth of fruits which were not created for humanity, but nonetheless appear to be somehow related to humans *qua* natural objects and not merely as instruments. Through the practice of eating, fruits manifest themselves as natural objects because, through taste, humans experience an irreducible phenomenological pro-

<sup>478</sup> Gritten, Anthony. “Distracted Dasein?” *Heidegger and Music* (2022), p. 38.

<sup>479</sup> Gritten, “Distracted Dasein?”, p. 38.

<sup>480</sup> Babich, Babette. “Rilke and the “Tone of Death”: Music and Word in Heidegger?” *Heidegger and Music* (2022), p. 60.

<sup>481</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 136.

<sup>482</sup> Wallrup, “Music, truth and belonging”, p. 134.

<sup>483</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p.86.

<sup>484</sup> Babich, “Rilke and the “Tone of Death””, p. 60.

<sup>485</sup> Babich, Babette. “Günther Anders’s Epitaph for Aikichi Kuboyama.” *Journal of Continental Philosophy* (2021), p. 144.

<sup>486</sup> See, Colombo, pp. 55–56.

fundity which refers to fruit's own 'naturalness': its taste resembles its own being [*es schmeckt, wie es ist*]<sup>487</sup>. The difference between a fruit and a food product is that the former has a taste 'in itself', while the latter has a taste 'resembling something else'. In the second scenario, Anders analyses the question from a hermeneutical point of view, where he extrapolates the concept of 'understanding' in order to explain the reason for which a domestic animal – which can be reduced to a mere instrument (e.g., horses and bulls) – is not always something at humanity's full disposal as in the case of a piece of equipment. This absolute irreducibility reveals the animal's wild characteristics which determine a certain amount of extraneity from human understanding. According to Anders, there exists a reciprocal form of 'basic understanding' [*Vorwissen*]<sup>488</sup> between humans and animals which is not a mere 'understanding something' [*etwas verstehen*]<sup>489</sup> but an examination of oneself through scrutinising simultaneously one's own being-in-the-world and being-with-the-other in order to disclose the mode of being of one's own possibilities, according to which a person can change herself to become what she is.

The examples of fruits and animals are analogous to that of music: like music, they represent Anders' new manner of experiencing one's surroundings grounded on the idea that nature, like art, has its own fundamental qualities that are un-related to human practices. However, this decentralised humanism should not be equated with a philosophical and humanistic defeatism where humanity is left alone and neglected, but rather with the conviction of ideological resilience against one-dimensional definitions of humanity and, most notably, with freedom from determinism.

<sup>487</sup> Stern, *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der Erkenntnis*, p. 45.

<sup>488</sup> Stern, *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der Erkenntnis*, p. 52.

<sup>489</sup> Stern, *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der Erkenntnis*, p. 52.



## Chapter 3 Pre-and Post-war Debates

### 3.1 The musicological Husserlian dispute

Adorno's, Anders', and Heidegger's musicologically-inspired pre-war analyses are commonly set apart from their post-war counterparts. Yet it can be argued that, thematically and philosophically, such a caesura does not present itself absolutely. One bridging element may be articulated with the help of Dan Diner's conception of 'Rupture of Civilisation' [*Zivilisationsbruch*]<sup>490</sup>, which he understands as a shattering of ontological certainty due to the historical and conceptual engagement of the Second World War. This notion of rupture provides the ground on which I will juxtapose the critique of Husserl's optical philosophy<sup>491</sup> of the late 1920s and early 1930s with the analysis of the technologically-induced post-war alienation that encapsulates the profound shift of perspective that Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger showcase in their post-WWII philosophical approaches. Such a juxtaposition throws into relief Anders' works *The Molussian Catacomb* and *Homeless Sculptures* in respect to the fundamental roles they play in depicting the contextualisation of the meaning of 'rupture' and 'prolongation' in Andersian thought in all its epistemic

<sup>490</sup> On the term 'Rupture of Civilisation' and the epistemic consequences of the phenomenon see: Diner, D., *Beyond the Conceivable. Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Diner, D., *Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1988), Diner, D., *Interpretationsleitende Begriffe zum Thema Holocaust*, in: Erler, H., Ehrlich, E.L., Heid, L., *Meinetwegen ist die Welt erschaffen. Das intellektuelle Vermächtnis des deutschsprachigen Judentums* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1997), pp. 513–520.

<sup>491</sup> On Husserl's optical philosophy see, M.S. Muldoon, 'Silence Revisited: Taking the Sight out of Auditory Qualities', 50.2 (1996), pp. 275–98 (p. 285); D. Ihde, *Listening and Voice Phenomenologies of Sound* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 205.



significance.

The aim of the first two chapters was that of presenting the emergence of a new anti-Husserlian and anti-optical perspective through the works of Adorno, Anders and Heidegger, which led to the elaboration of a triptych analysis beginning with Anders' *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den 'Logischen Sätzen'*. The reason for this choice was manifold: first, Anders was among the earliest critics of Husserl; second, Anders openly addresses the problems of an optical-centred perspective while concurrently presenting the advantages of an acoustic one. Third, Anders' philosophy is the

keystone that displays how Adorno's musical landscapes of Schubert and Heidegger's cryptic musicology can be seen as another attack on Husserl's ocular-centric method. Anders' critique of Husserl was at first a logical confrontation with his teacher; he accused Husserl of reducing factual expressions to their logical form, that is, to sentences of the 'S is p' type. Anders saw in the impossibility of 'translating' expressions to their logical structures the criterion for actually distinguishing subjective from objective judgments which Husserl could not identify without falling victim to his own critique. Judgments concerning the first and second person were different from judgments of the third one because, when they enunciated something concerning an 'I' or a 'you', they did not mean an 'object' but rather the *Verstandesformen* (the actual 'I' or 'you') which were voiced in factual speech and could not be separated from it. The reason, according to Anders, that allowed for translating instances of the *Er-Rede* into 'S is p' was that 'he', 'she', or 'it' could be effectively changed with the name of the thing or person corresponding to them without damaging the *hinweisende Charakter* of the sentence to which they belonged. The same could not be attained with forms of the *Ich-Rede* or *Du-Rede* insofar as the reduction of the 'I' or 'you' of such sentences meant the loss of the *Bezugssinn*<sup>492</sup> from which the sentences

<sup>492</sup> As John Van Buren notes, "Husserl had worked out the 'relational meaning' (*Bezugssinn*) of intentionality, i.e., the 'how' of the relation to the intentional object". Van Buren, J., in M. Wrathall and H. Dreyfus, *Heidegger Reexamined* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 14. Moreover, as Van Buren points out, "relational sense (*Bezugssinn*) encompasses the modal senses of intending the world, which include understanding, mood, and language". See, Van Buren, J., in Kisiel, p. 161. Husserl's mode of 'intending' the world was fundamentally ocular centric as Levin David Michael claims in several occasions. He writes: "The truth that Husserl will not admit is that he is engaged in the discursive con-

had originally and concretely emerged. Thus, Anders accused Husserl of having stopped short in his analysis of the identity between subjective and objective judgments insofar as he had failed to extend his discussion to contingent and tangible experience. Anders is very clear about the essentially optical perspective of the Husserlian method; he writes that “the notion of the idea, the idea and the divorce of *Noema* and *Noesis* in Husserl’s (as well as the basic definition of mood) was read off the optical model and transferred to all acts without any special examination of the structure of the other senses”<sup>493</sup>. This separation of mood and act is itself problematic. For Anders, every act is embedded in a mood, even actions taking place in a completely de-subjectivised situation (for example, that of a mathematical calculation). “What matters to us here is that the alleged general distinction between act and mood is based on the model

struction of an intellectual vision—a rational intuition—and that the way this vision functions is never really immediate, as Husserl claims, but is always itself merely a transitory moment in the arduous discursive process whereby a philosophically certified gaze and, correspondingly, philosophically admissible evidence are to be achieved. ‘Achieved’: that means, said in language—said in a language that can never be reduced to the immanence of transcendental experience. The transcendental purity of Husserl’s language is threatened by his surprisingly free use of figurative discourse and a rich vocabulary drawn from, and inseparable from, mundane experience in the ‘natural attitude’: terms such as ‘secure foundation’, ‘founding stratum’, ‘copy’; phrases such as ‘shine forth’ and ‘reflecting back as from a mirror’”. Husserl is aware of the potential problems that such statements might bring and that is why he reassures his readers by saying that his language is metaphorical, that he is talking about a ‘mental glance’ or a ‘glancing ray’. “Indeed, ‘all these figures of speech which have here thrust themselves upon us, those of mirroring and copying, must be adopted with caution, as the imaginativeness which colours their application might easily mislead us’. But such warnings and demonstrations of caution are far from sufficient: as long as any mundanity at all clings to the words on which he depends, and as long as there are words the meanings of which cannot be limited to their explicitly meant determination, the transcendental authority of his phenomenological claims is hopelessly defended”. See, D. M. Levin, *The Philosopher’s Gaze Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 69. For other instances of Husserl’s ocular centrism see also D. M. Levin, *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); D. M. Levin, *Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). As Erlman remarks, Anders has a wholly different understanding of the notion of *Stimmung*. “Anders rejects the notion of *Stimmung* being such a passive affective state, because the implied contrast between it and a more active listening stance is modeled on visual perception. Seeing is an ‘act’ that confronts its object. Listening, by contrast, is a form of *Bifindlichkeit*, a state situated somewhere between ‘act’ and condition, between object-directedness and objectless disposition”. See, Erlmann, p. 327.

<sup>493</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 103.

of the optical, in the case of listening we should not question which of the two categories [act and mood] belong to it. Seeing is in fact fully emancipated from every mood; this represents only the time-neutral, unstructured background, which influences the conception of the object, but nevertheless remains 'behind' it while the act itself begins with the object and its structure. The relationship between mood and act is now completely different in the acoustic, at least in the musical-acoustic"<sup>494</sup>. Here, Anders seeks to present the fundamental difference that an acoustic perspective has in comparison with an optical one. In seeing, a person supposedly separates herself from the action she is performing without realising that the objective representation she is giving to the object she is seeing is already influenced by her mood. This 'error' cannot be made in an acoustic scenario, insofar as a person hearing a noise cannot emancipate herself from the act of hearing and she cannot claim to have a pure and unbiased representation of the noise she heard.

Anders' overall critique is that Husserl could not, given his ocular-centrism, distinguish between an intentional act and its object<sup>495</sup> which, combined with the logical framework of his approach, allowed Husserl to 'translate' every perception into an optical one. "Husserl's phenomenology could exert such a fascination upon his philosophical contemporaries [because] he opened a province beyond metaphysics as well as beyond empirical research: the 'life' or 'stream' of consciousness that he described in his analyses of the 'acts meaning or having their objects' was so neutral that he believed he could methodically consolidate his descriptions by means of the proxy, thus, by the suspension of the question as to whether his objects are or are not"<sup>496</sup>. This ocular-centric vision of Husserl is evident in his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, where Husserl writes that the "process of having in focus, of having the mind's eye on something [...] coincides with attending-to-something, noticing it [...] and so it is for objects of any kind that 'can be presented simply'. That is to say, turning toward something in the visual sense (even if it be in fiction) is *eo ipso* 'apprehension', 'noticing'"<sup>497</sup>. Another instance of the predominant preponderance of the

<sup>494</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 57.

<sup>495</sup> Anders, *Il Mondo Dopo l'Uomo. Tecnica e Violenza*.

<sup>496</sup> Stern, 'On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy', p. 338.

<sup>497</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Indianap-

optical perspective can be seen in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, in which Husserl literally tries to ‘translate’ the perception of music into an optical perception while sticking to a pure logico-theoretical framework<sup>498</sup>. Husserl maintained that any sound could be understood as a plainly sensorial and unintentional constituent of an experience that he calls *hyle*. As such, music “begins and stops, and the whole unity of its duration, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, ‘proceeds’ to the end in the ever more distant past”<sup>499</sup>. In the ‘sinking back’ that occurs afterwards, the listener of such music can be held fast and “can be arrested and in a fixating regard [*fixierenden Blick*] be fixed and abiding”<sup>500</sup>. The outcome of this interpretation is that music, as with any other motionless object kept in space, withdraws

olis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), pp. 64–65. As Muldoon notes, the “Husserlian analysis plunges us into an exclusionary space in order to understand how any sensation appears primordially, that is, to account for the given in a manner that is prior to even language itself. To preserve a level of impenetrable ideality, the metaphorical tenor of phenomenological description is decidedly visual. From the very etymology of the word *phainomenon* as ‘that which appears’, to such key terms as ‘*Vorstellung*’, ‘*Representation*’, ‘*Darstellung*’,

‘*Anschauung*’, ‘*schauend*’, ‘*Erscheinung*’, ‘*Wesenschau*’, ‘*Veranschaulichung*’, ‘*geistiger Blick*’, ‘*Ichstrahl*’, ‘*Ichblick*’, ‘*Hintergrund schauungen*’, ‘*Wahrnehmungsfeld*’, and ‘*Einsicht*’, we are confronted with the search for a transcendental subjectivity that aims at certainty and apodictic truths through the auspices, once again, of the ‘mind’s eye’ (*im geistigen Auge*)”. See, Muldoon, p. 288. Another analysis of Husserl’s ocular centrism is carried out by Mary C. Rawlinson, she writes that only “the credibility of vision, then, the perceiver’s inability to disbelieve what is before his eyes, supplies the model for the phenomenological method in general and for the apodicticity of its evidence. To proceed phenomenologically, one need only say what one sees”. See, M.C. Rawlinson, in Levin, *Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy*, p. 280. Jay defines Husserl’s philosophy as ocular centric, he writes: “That Husserl chose to call the eidetic intuition a *Wesenschau* (literally a look into essences) suggests the persistence of ocular centric premises in his thought”. See, M. Jay, *Downcast Eyes The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 266.

<sup>498</sup> E. Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2019), pp. 44–45. See also §31 and Part A of Appendix 6. As Muldoon remarks, “in the same passage, Husserl goes on to say that ‘the same duration is present, actual, self-generating duration then is past, ‘expired’ duration, still known or produced in recollection as if it were new’”. See, Muldoon, p. 290.

<sup>499</sup> Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, pp. 44–45.

<sup>500</sup> Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, pp. 44–45.

from its temporal duration. The “temporal point of the sound remains unmoved while the sound vanishes into the remoteness of consciousness; the sound itself is the same, but ‘in the way that’ it appears, the sound is continually different”<sup>501</sup>. Since Husserl wants to construct a sound from an intentional analysis, he has to translate the entire acoustic perception into a phenomenological language that speaks an optical language<sup>502</sup>.

For Anders, this entire procedure is unimaginable since it would assume the possibility of separating duration from sound. Furthermore, this hypothesis of Husserl transgresses all the rules defining what an auditory quality is. As seen in the musicological works of Anders, while a spatial movement can be planned, acoustic duration has no dimension or even location<sup>503</sup>. But why does Husserl assume that the qualities of aural perception are analogous or univocal with those of visual perception? As seen in the first chapter, Husserl already did something similar with the distinction between subjective and objective judgments. In that case, he first proposed an essential distinction between the two types of judgments, and yet, immediately after this distinction, he showcased the fluctuation of meaning that happens when one ‘translates’ an objective judgment into a subjective one. This allowed him to conclude, against his former demonstration, that there was no difference between the two types of judgments. Husserl uses the same strategy here: he first assumes that the optical perspective is the sole point of view of his phenomenology, while at the same time, he also assumes that all the other senses work in the same manner as the sense of sight such that phenomenology can investigate all sorts of experience solely through the optical perspec-

<sup>501</sup> Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, pp. 44–45.

<sup>502</sup> Ihde confirms this Husserlian attitude when he writes: “even a cursory glance at Husserl’s terminology reveals an equally strong visualist terminology. Within intentionality there is the ‘ray of attention’; the ‘intuition of essences’ is also visual; his adaptation of Greek terms such as *eidos* continues the Husserlian visualism”. See, Ihde, *Listening and Voice Phenomenologies of Sound*, p. 21. Also Levin writes something similar when he states that “Husserl turned this conviction into a boldly new phenomenological method and an extremely ambitious phenomenological program rigorously committed to the disciplined exercise of the ‘mental eye’”. See, Levin, *Sites of Vision The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy*, p.40.

<sup>503</sup> Anders’ term ‘Being-in-Music’ emphasises this lack of spatiality even further, as it is characterised by an anti-spatial and purely auditory lexicon.

tive<sup>504</sup>. Anders argues that Husserl's intention to 'translate'<sup>505</sup> one set of sensory qualities (acoustic) into another set (optic) only produces aporias. An example of such inconsistency is the model given by Husserl of the repetition of the same two tones (A and B) *ad infinitum*. According to Husserl, this continuous repetition can be expressed by the following law:

$$(A-B) - (A-B)' - (A-B)'' \dots^{506}$$

The problem emerging from this model, which shows the spatial perspective from which Husserl begins his analysis, is that acoustically speaking there is no possible way of distinguishing the tones A and B in A', B', A'', and B'' because they are exactly the same tones. The new model should rather be:

$$(A-B), (A-B), (A-B) \dots$$

Therefore, even though Husserl himself states that the sounds are the same he produces a model which is aimed at emphasising temporal difference<sup>507</sup>, which is not noticeable acoustically speaking, within these tones.

Around a decade after Anders' *Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den 'Logischen Sätzen'* Adorno published his *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*. Adorno directed his attention towards Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and its inherent antagonism which aimed at representing a philosophy that believed itself capable of establishing the identity between object and subject because it based its notions of 'reality' and 'truth' on the analysis of consciousness. Adorno and Anders found themselves agree-

<sup>504</sup> Derrida too shows how the Husserlian passage from objective to subjective judgments is characterised by an essential aporia: "*de facto* and *realiter* they are never respected, and Husserl recognises this. *De jure* and *idealiter* they vanish, since, as distinctions, they live only from the difference between fact and right, reality and ideality. Their possibility is their impossibility". See, J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 101.

<sup>505</sup> In *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Husserl speaks about music in his ocular centric perspective which leaves no doubt of the counterintuitive approach he designed. See, Husserl, *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, p. 79.

<sup>506</sup> Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917), p. 45.

<sup>507</sup> Represented by both the Em dash (-) and the apostrophe (').

ing on the fact that Husserl's *Investigations* required a different approach, one that was not confined to logical categories. Adorno saw in Husserl an attempt to overcome "the idealist presupposition of the ultimate identity of subject and object"<sup>508</sup>, while assuming "that the ultimate source of truth was the unity of consciousness"<sup>509</sup>, thus falling back into idealism itself. Husserl's 'facts' were not the facts themselves but mathematical truths understood as ideal unities unrelated to any factual existence. The impossibility of a psychological reduction of logical truths led Husserl's research to a separation of the real from the ideal, for Husserl deemed it impossible to link them without making assumptions that had no basis within the meaning of logical/mathematical principles themselves. Just as Anders developed his critique from the impossibility of reducing subjective propositions into objective ones in order to reveal the logical basis on which Husserl's philosophy was built, namely, logical truths, Adorno moved from the identity of subject-object to the inner antinomic character of Husserl's *Investigations*. The separation of real-ideal, fundamental for freeing philosophy from psychologism and the "uncritical religion of facts"<sup>510</sup>, had, nonetheless, a dichotomic consequence for Adorno. It produces a *Χωρισμός* (separation)<sup>511</sup> which, on the one hand, presupposed that ideal truths are truths of thinking and thinking only, while, on the other hand, could only admit that thinking meant human thinking and that it was impossible to speak about thinking without presupposing the actual physical acts of thinking. This paradox could be summarised as follows: Husserl "rebelled against idealist thinking while attempting to break through the walls of idealism with purely idealist instruments [...] by an exclusive analysis of the structure of thought and consciousness"<sup>512</sup>. For Adorno, Husserl's struggle to formulate a philosophical breakthrough<sup>513</sup>

<sup>508</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 37.1 (1940), p. 6.

<sup>509</sup> Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, p. 6.

<sup>510</sup> Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, p. 9.

<sup>511</sup> For Adorno's usage of the term '*Χωρισμός*' see footnote 139. Adorno firmly believes that "whoever tries to reduce the world to either the factual or the essence, comes in some way or other into the position of Münchhausen, who tried to drag himself out of the swamps by his own pigtail". See, T.W. Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, p. 11.

<sup>512</sup> Adorno, *Husserl and the Problem of Idealism*, p. 17.

<sup>513</sup> The usage that Adorno does of term 'breakthrough', as opposed to 'breakout' or 'failed breakout', is directly linked to his manner of understanding phenomenology and bears crucial musicological implications. As Smith notes, the "difference between the use of

out of modes of thought and experience that perceive objects exclusively as instances of pre-existing schemes and paradigms contradicted the historical singularity of the objects. Consciousness thought it could grasp the object itself while it remained bound within its historical determinants – i.e., remaining purely mind. Anders, too, claimed that Husserl's approach was detached from the actual things it referred to. When Anders investigated the consequences of reducing the statement '*Du bist müde*' to 'you are p', he stressed that, after such reduction, the statement would not mean the 'actual you' but 'a you', thus separating itself from the concrete situation that led to the utterance of the original statement 'you are tired'.

As already mentioned, Adorno and Anders were not the only ones criticising Husserl on this point. Heidegger, too, condemned Husserl's methodological approach. The Gordian knot for Heidegger was how one should have understood the 'object' without falling into oversimplistic subject-object reductionism. If the object was knowable, then the logical object should have been the thing itself. It was for this reason that Heidegger's study of the work of art and the analysis of the notion of *Stimmung* were fundamental. They showed how to overcome Husserlian 'bracketing' and open philosophical discussion up to factual reality. Thus, *Stimmung*<sup>514</sup> was something ordinary which, if linked to the attuning of

the words breakout (*Ausbruch*) and breakthrough (*Durchbruch*) runs throughout Adorno's texts as a sort of partially submerged technical distinction. When Adorno writes of philosophers whose work he critiques (e.g., Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger), he often writes of failed breakouts. However, [...] when he writes of composers and philosophers whose work he affirms (e.g., Hegel, Mahler, and, indeed, himself), he often writes of the possibility of the breakthrough. The breakout is nearly always a failed breakout; only the breakthrough is possible". See, Stephen D. Smith, 'Awakening Dead Time: Adorno on Husserl, Benjamin, and the Temporality of Music', *Contemporary Music Review*, 31.5–6 (2012), p. 400.

<sup>514</sup> The term '*Stimmung*' does not necessarily have acoustic or musicological implications. According to Dahlstrom's definition, '*Stimmung*' means: "moods [...] which we are oriented to this or that, ways that disclose our situation holistically (albeit not completely). They affect how the world and entities within the world appear to us, e.g., as inviting or irritating, enthralling or threatening. Moods are pre-reflective, and they are matters neither of our choice nor our making". Dahlstrom, *The Heideggerian Dictionary*, p. 133. However, there are several scholars who believe that Heidegger's '*Stimmung*', by most translated as 'attunement', has fundamental musicological implications. See, G. Pöltner, *Heidegger*, in Stefan L. Sorgner, *Music in German Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 190; "Heidegger explicitly discusses *Stimmung* as musical, as that which grants the tone to *Dasein's* Being (GA 29/30, 101). Attunement establishes the tem-



poral rhythm in which Being and beings are disclosed to *Dasein*. “In attunement, precisely beings as a whole and we ourselves within this whole are revealed dispositionally (GA 29/30, 410). The ‘music’ of attunement reveals to *Dasein* a particular articulation (*Fug*) of beings in their Being as having an interweaving, interdependent harmony of significance (*Fuge*)”. G. Fried, *Heidegger’s Polemos* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 156; “Heidegger talks of *Dasein*’s speaking, walking and understanding, such that ‘My being in the world is nothing but this already understanding moving myself in these ways (*Weisen*) of being’ (ibid.: 146). These forms of moving in the world, which go along with the idea that *Dasein* is always already ‘attuned’, all relate to what we associate with the function or significance of ‘the musical’”. A. Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 291; “‘A mood is a style [*Weile*], not merely a form or a mode, but a style in the sense of a melody, which does not float over the so-called authentic being-present-at-hand of man, but instead provides the tone for this being, i.e., attunes and determines the kind and how of this being’”. M. Zimmerman, *Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity Technology, Politics, and Art* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 141; “Heidegger thinks of the *Stimmung* as music complete by itself, like the tonality, the chord that defines the deep cohesion of being-in-the-world” [*Heidegger pense la Stimmung comme une musique complète par elle-même, comme la tonalité, l’accord qui définit la cohésion profonde de l’être-au-mond*]. M. Haar, ‘Le Primat de La ‘*Stimmung*’ Sur La Corporéité Du “*Dasein*”’, *Heidegger Studies*, 2 (1986), 67–80 (p. 73); “I therefore intend to investigate the possibilities of transferring Heidegger’s concept of *Stimmung*, in all its complexity, to a musical context. In my view, his conceptualization has great potential in music even if it is not grounded in musical thinking”; “in Heidegger’s later works [...] *Stimmung* and attunement are connected with music in a congruent way”; “Attunement is not a specific kind of emotion or a sort of vague expressiveness; instead, it constitutes the interrelation between listener and sounding musical world”; “We need Heidegger’s thought to open our ears for such attunements. In fact, whereas Heidegger at the end of the 1920s reconceptualised *Stimmung* thoroughly, the aesthetics of music took another direction”; “Heidegger’s new formulation of *Stimmung* has repercussions on the musical understanding”; “What are Heidegger’s main contributions to the understanding of *Stimmung* in music? First of all, the importance of everyday life in his investigations of *Stimmung* leads to the assumption that we should take into account an everyday way of listening to music. Secondly, even if there is nothing in Heidegger that describes that common mode of musical listening, we can use his thinking about the work of art to see what consequences it has for music. The opening of a world in the work of art, central in Heidegger’s thought, should be found in music, too.”; “However, this should not overshadow the fact that Heidegger’s conception of *Stimmung* is founded on its temporal character, and that it is an open question whether music has the capacity to be structured in the same way. Music unfolds in time. The act of listening follows this unfolding from the start, when the listener is thrown into the musical work and is, accordingly, disposed by its having-been. The advanced listener might know the most probable development of the piece; the average listener is less focused upon what will take place – nevertheless, understanding projects into the future. These two dimensions are founding the present, when the listener is busied with that which happens in the music. Temporality is, then, in *Sein und Zeit* understood as ‘the future that makes present in the process of having-been’, and this counts for the act of listening, too. Accordingly, the elucidation of the temporal

*Dasein*, became more than a psychological state or an object of thought, it became something richer and more telling. The notion of *Stimmung* as described by Heidegger was harder to grasp because it implied that one person does not have a 'mood' but is in a 'mood'. Thus, according to Heidegger, *Stimmung* was an embodying attunement which was neither in the body nor the mind. Instead, it was a *Weise* of the embodying, an attuning stance toward being as a whole which determined the magnitude of its own attunement<sup>515</sup>. Heidegger utilised the notion of *Stimmung* for introducing a new framework which was manifestly grounded on hearing. Through this new approach, he could overcome the previous dichotomic systems (subject-object, act-mood, form-content, rationalism-empiricism) via the idea of 'always being attuned' to *Stimmung*. In this sense, Heidegger applied a twofold reductionist approach to the phenomenological Husserlian framework. On the one hand, Heidegger emphasised the intentional correlation between understanding and the thing. On the other hand, Heidegger focused on the a priori correlation linking a person to meaning itself without departing from a phenomenological perspective. In neither of these two reductions, did Heidegger follow Husserl's approach. Heidegger did not trace back to a transcendental ego *à la* Husserl because he led his analysis towards the sense-making structures of concrete human existence which were ineluctably engaged with meaning. Heidegger re-wrote the phenomenological *modus* of defining subject and object because he understood the subject not as a consciousness but as a *Dasein*, that is, the central possibility of the existence of the factual self<sup>516</sup>.

The reason behind Heidegger's interest in the phenomenon of *Stim-*

structure of the *Stimmung* may also be an elucidation of music"; "[temporality, spatiality and corporeality] are of the greatest importance for the understanding of the fundamental phenomenon of *Stimmung* in music"; "*Stimmung* is central. The emergence of a world is that opening in Heidegger's philosophy: in music, too, a world is opened up. Heidegger never says how, but there is no doubt that such an opening must happen according to the particularities of music – not according to the world in poetic language or in pictorial art. This musical world is opened up in a *Stimmung*; its temporality, mobility and spatiality are attuned, bringing forth materiality, and the attunement is exactly the *Stimmung* of music". Wallrup, pp. 5, 5–6, 6, 10, 68, 70, 71, 72, 95, 108, 113.

<sup>515</sup> M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche Volumes I and II*, trans. by D. Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), p. 106.

<sup>516</sup> See, E. Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by R.E. Palmer and T. Sheehan (New York: Springer, 1997), p. 3.

*mung* is that this notion allows the disclosure of a non-optic perspective of the world, as being-in-the-world. Through being-in-the-world Heidegger moves away from the customary idea of a world as the totality of objects that can be found by the observing subject; instead, he perceives it as a 'referential totality' [*Verweisungsganzheit*], an open system of meaningful relations. In this sense, Heidegger can claim that a useful thing such as a hammer is not simply a tool but an expansion of the human body that turns it from a mere object (utilised by a subject) to almost a part of the human body. This moving away from the traditional structure of the world of the Western philosophical tradition is represented by the elimination of space and distance which is linked to Heidegger's acoustical paradigm rather than the classical optical stance<sup>517</sup>. According to Heidegger, the world is primordial not space, this means that the latter is founded in the former. Thus, *Dasein* finds itself in (acoustically), rather than against (optically), a field of relations between useful things. 'Being-in' epitomises a new form of spatiality understood as 'de-distancing'<sup>518</sup> and through this de-distancing *Dasein* brings near the things at hand and deletes distance<sup>519</sup>. As Heidegger writes, this new approach is characterised by a specific tendency: "an essential tendency toward nearness"<sup>520</sup>. This way of relating to the world, on which space is founded, stands in sheer contrast to the optical notion of 'space' understood as something to be measured, objectified, and as something seen.

Adorno's, Anders', and Heidegger's respective critiques of Husserl did not end with a mere logical refutation of his method; they all tried to find solutions to the Husserlian *impasse* via musicological strategies. Drawing from the phenomenology of Husserl they wanted to re-problematise the sensory (acoustic) entanglement that the subject had with the world while pointing toward the epiphanic character of music. In de-

<sup>517</sup> This shift is also implicitly expressed by the title of Heidegger major work *Sein und Zeit* which emphasises time rather than space.

<sup>518</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 104–5.

<sup>519</sup> Both Wallrup and T. Clifton suggest how this notion of 'de-distancing' has influences for musicology and specifically in Heidegger's. "De-distancing and directionality answer to an orientation in the actual space into which the listener is thrown, where 'high' and 'low', 'far' and 'near', 'behind' and 'in front of' have a musical significance even if they cannot be given any exact position comparable to a point in physical space". See, Wallrup, p. 74 and T. Clifton, *Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 140–42.

<sup>520</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105.

scribing the 'musical experience', Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger refuted the opposition subject/object, concluding that such a dichotomy was itself a misconception inscribed in the deeper and fundamentally human problem of contingency which music disclosed via its transcendental character. But what was music for Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger? According to Adorno, music was not something manufactured, it consisted in the minutest imaginable cells of factual objectivity which persists in an image even once the large structures of such objectivity no longer hold sway. These images are not only meaningful for the subjective receptive souls but rather function as targets that, once hit, allow reality to shine through them. Thus, the emotions representing the subjective character of the artist's experience of creating music are the only means for re-arranging the truth of the objective into the work of art. In this, Adorno heard the sound of an alternative, a passing indication of reconciliation between subject and object.

In Adorno's prolonged account of Schubert's musical landscapes there emerged a hope of fleeing from objective and subjective representations of music and of discovering prospects for a new, reconciled society: "no matter how much Schubert's mourning drags us down and even if the despairing wanderer himself is smothered at birth, consolation will always be there for him, and it gives us hope that he does not have to go on forever in this entangled, magical spinning of nature. This is where time comes alive in Schubert's music, and the successful finale comes from a very different place than that of death"<sup>521</sup>. What Schubert's music provided was contained not in what it accomplished but in what it failed to do. For Adorno, Schubert's failure was his greatest success because it displayed the truths that a false modernity attempted to hide. Schubert's music had the epiphanic power of reminding his listeners that there was 'something' beyond their grasp. The musical insight that Adorno gains from his early work on Schubert, together with his later works

<sup>521</sup> Adorno, '*Schubert*', p. 13.

on Stravinsky<sup>522</sup>, Mahler<sup>523</sup>, and Beethoven<sup>524</sup>, would be paramount for his critique of Husserl<sup>525</sup>.

<sup>522</sup> In *Philosophy of New Music*, Adorno finds a striking similarity between Stravinsky and the phenomenological method, i.e., Husserl's. "In Adorno's eyes, Husserl, like Stravinsky, tries and fails to break out of modes of thought and experience that treat objects solely as examples of pre-existing concepts, categories, or forms of life, and that, in so doing, negate or deny objects' historical singularity. A consciousness that is thus constrained thinks it reaches to the object itself ('Being itself') even as it remains bound within its own historical determinants (thus remaining 'merely reflection, merely mind')." See, Stephen D. Smith, p. 392.

<sup>523</sup> In *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, Adorno argues that Mahler's music differs from the contemplative attitude of phenomenology insofar as the former does not forget the movement of history that the latter leaves behind due to its fascination for images. Adorno, as Smith suggests, "implicitly charges Husserl with failing to account for the historical nature of the consciousness he describes. The essence of consciousness, Adorno argues, cannot be timeless and ahistorical; rather, it must be something that has come to be what it is, emerging and transforming across long histories of human life". See, Stephen D. Smith, pp. 392–93.

<sup>524</sup> In *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno also employs musicological categories to critique Husserl's anti-historical philosophy. Through Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 32, Op. 111, Adorno can claim that a certain type of music "retrospectively conjures up as accomplished facts details which were never actually there". See, Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 22. Thus, the Arietta variations of Op. 111, with its retrospective character, and Beethoven's 'Archduke trio' clearly tell, according to Adorno, how "music's dead time is not embalmed in mythic identity; rather, it is subject to essential transformation". See, Stephen D. Smith, p. 404. Here Adorno is attacking Husserl's understanding of music as he described it in his *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time*. While for Husserl a certain musical piece remains the same because of its mnemonic self-identity in the human consciousness, Adorno, due to his appropriation of Benjamin, believes that a consciousness can interact with a piece of the world (in this case a melody or a musical piece) only through certain historically determined categories which this consciousness misrecognises as absolute. Related to this natural history motif of Adorno's critique, Foster involuntarily shows both Husserl's ocular centrism and Adorno's opposition to such stance. Foster writes that in Adorno's remarks on Husserl's Panopticon example: "Husserl does not succeed in twisting free of the theoretisations that constrict genuine experience. Instead, the phenomenologist 'rests content with the world of things, in association not with women, but rather with mannequins". The example is itself a metaphor for the failure of phenomenology's outbreak attempt: it satisfies itself with the semblance of the real, the fabricated world that passes before the phenomenological gaze". See, R. Foster, *Adorno The Recovery of Experience* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 111. On the anti-historical approach of Husserl and on how Adorno refutes it also see, M. Jay, *Songs of Experience Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 346–47.

<sup>525</sup> "Adorno's philosophy of music and the critique of phenomenology that he developed in his early writings and returned to consistently for the rest of his life converge in a broader critique of historical experience, which Adorno inherits from the work of Benjamin". In

For Anders, by comparison, music was an art of movement insofar as music is capable of creating its own temporal structures which go beyond the coercion of historical time. The musical *Mitvollzug* portrayed by Anders exhibited the identity of external and internal time insofar as the experience of time could be understood as the coordination of movements according to their *Bewegungssinn*. Thus, musical *Bewegungsformen* became humanity's *Bewegungsformen*. This transformation was as arbitrary as music could have been. Music's erratic melodies and tones involved an opening towards forms of movement that would have been impossible to experience without them. In the musical situation, people become identical to the musical object because they are entirely re-tuned and altered through the musical experience of which they are a part. It was through the union of artist/listener and musical instrument that music attained the epiphanic quality of 'revealing' that which speaks of something other. Listening to music became the metaphysical symptom of those who pre-figured the *Ahnen* of the indication of humanity's precise dwelling in the world as its *Nicht-nur-in-der-Welt-sein*. In this sense, a person with *Ahnen* was someone capable of meaning something other than this world that she experienced and that was accessible to her even though she could not identify what this 'something other' was.

Heidegger does not explicitly produce a philosophy of music but he did accord to music the same status as any other artistic work<sup>526</sup>. As a

phenomenology, "Adorno sees 'the right appearance of the wrong world,' or a faithful description of ossified forms of experience that have come to seem falsely eternal, their history shorn away, their potentiality suppressed. In music, however, he sees a script of possible experience that can either reinforce these forms of experience, or brush them against the grain, igniting untimely experiences of recollection and possibility". See, Stephen D. Smith, p. 391. As seen above, throughout his life Adorno keeps criticising Husserl's phenomenology via musicological categories, however the current research only focusses on Adorno early musicological studies. The methodological rationale for this decision was that of trying to classify Adorno's early works, together with Anders and Heidegger's, as a philosophical reaction against Husserl's optical phenomenological approach rather than a critique of Husserl's corpus *tout court*.

<sup>526</sup> Babich, Bowie, Mazzoni, and Wallrup all remark that although Heidegger never wrote about music itself, it was important for him. Babich says: "the tuning or attunement, *Stimmung* of music, not unlike Anders' own reflections on *Zuhören*, [...] derive from Heidegger". See, Babich, *Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology*, p. 265. Bowie notes that "On the other hand, Heidegger, for many the epitome of a 'European' philosopher, wrote virtually nothing about music, although he did think that it was important. Despite Heidegger's lack of attention to music, we have already seen that music plays a role in his

form of art, music conveyed the ‘strife’ between world and earth<sup>527</sup>. Music prescribed and ordered the world under a framework of meaningful relations to which the human existence was projectually determined. Thus, music produced an earth, it posited the material of which was itself made and firmly rooted in it<sup>528</sup>. But this, according to Heidegger, did not mean that music possessed allegoric or metaphoric implications. Music was not a mere acoustic means because in it the dimension of meaning is rooted in the dimension of the acoustic material from which it emerges. In this way, Heidegger could claim that the musical sound was a form of resonance in its highest manifestation since it was meant to produce fractures and ultimately the unexpected. This non-metaphoric potentiality of music was not due to the personal originality of the artist but to music’s ability to go beyond the mere simplification of sound and to aim towards a nonconceptual world. Such a definition of music required, for Heidegger, a new form of ‘hearing’ as well. From this new musicological perspective, ‘hearing’ meant the repetition of what was uttered in the original Saying through language itself. Hearing was not a mere listening to a sound; it embodied the journey that the sound undertook to go back into the earth in order to become a resonating sound. Only at this point does the sound go back into the earth and become a resonating sound. Even if musical sound was not as

work”. See, Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*, p. 261. Mazzoni believes that “in Heidegger does not exist an explicit philosophy of music. However, exists [in the Heideggerian corpus] an extensive philosophy of art which tacitly encompasses the musical sphere too. The musical work deserves the same treatment given by Heidegger to all the other artistic forms”. See, Mazzoni, p. 113. Wallrup writes: “Even if there is not much in Heidegger on musical listening, his thinking about the work of art may give some indications. The opening of a world in the work of art, central in Heidegger’s thought, should be found in music, too” and “even if Heidegger’s discussion is said to be relevant for all the arts, music plays a diminutive role. Yet, in this treatise [*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*] we find keys to the understanding of *Stimmung* in music”. See, Wallrup, pp. 10, 86. The importance that Heidegger gave to music even led a Swiss musician to compose “an Heideggerian march with the motif h-e-d-e-g-g-e, which the *Stadtkapelle* of Messkirch had included in its repertoire for festive occasions”. See, Safranski, *Ein Meister Aus Deutschland*, p. 472.

<sup>527</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, pp. 26-27. “The work [of art] consists in fighting the fight between world and earth” and “the opposition of world and earth is strife”.

<sup>528</sup> “The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential traits belonging to the work [of art]” and the work of art “[sets] up a world and [sets] forth the earth”. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, pp. 26-27.

resonating as its poetic counterpart, Heidegger did not exclude it from his study concerning the essence of hearing<sup>529</sup>. Therefore, music, like poetry, heard the sound of stillness and the soundless voice of being allowing the displaying of that inventive producing thanks to which history occurs and truth is revealed<sup>530</sup>.

Even though Adorno, Anders and Heidegger could theoretically agree on the fact that music had an epiphanic nature, however, that did not mean that music led them to similar conclusions. Adorno and Anders read in the musical experience a form of positive negativity which produced a form of epiphanic knowledge that resulted in the refutation of the opposition subject/object. And yet, Anders could not accept the so-called 'happy rhythm' that presupposed a positive resolution of human contingency via music. Anders' musical situation could not induce any historical changes in the human life even though music 'pointed at' something. So, while Adorno claimed that he could resolve the anthropological shock of contingency, forgetting that by doing so he had merely postponed the shock of today to tomorrow, Anders used the *Bestimmtheit der Unbestimmtheit* emerging from the musical situation as a means for extrapolating a neutral form of knowledge.

<sup>529</sup> "All art [...] is, in essence, poetry" and "poetry allows beings [...] to shine and sound" and "if the essence of all art is poetry, then architecture, the visual arts, and music must all be referred back to poetry". Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, p. 44-45. In *What is Philosophy?* Heidegger writes: "the tuning understood in this sense is not music of accidentally emerging feelings which only accompany the correspondence" which is similar to what he wrote in his *Heraclitus* when he forbids to associate the concept of 'harmony' with its too simplistic understanding of the joining of sounds. See, M. Heidegger, *What Is Philosophy?* (Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield, 1956), pp. 77-78; M. Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, trans. by Julia G. Assaiante (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), p. 107. Even if Heidegger is worried about linking music to attunement in such a direct way this is not because of music, as Wallrup notes "the problem here is not music itself: again, it is an understanding of music as being the language of feeling; or, from Heidegger's point of view, the attunements as being able only to accompany primary qualities. There are no formal obstacles for transposing Heidegger's hidden system of attunement to music, even if Heidegger himself is totally uninterested in, or even hostile to, such a manoeuvre". Wallrup, p. 90. Moreover, the fact that Heidegger himself has to explicitly say that he does not mean to link music to attunement shows how his philosophy can deal with music even without the agreement of its author.

<sup>530</sup> "The poeticizing projection of truth, which sets itself into the work as figure, is never carried out in the direction of emptiness and indeterminacy. In the work, rather, truth is cast toward the coming preservers, that is to say, a historical humanity". Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *The Origin of the Work of Art*, p. 47.



In respect to Heidegger's understanding of music, Anders could accept the stance that Heidegger portrayed in his study of the ear/hearing. They both understand that the ear is not a mere human acoustical apparatus for receiving sounds. The ear is the place where the non-metaphorical *Mitvollzug* of both objective perception and intellectual cognition occurs. This means that when a person is hearing she is already in a *Stimmung*, she is being-in-music, she finds herself in and within sound, she is the sound. But this concurring perspective on the role played by the ear was ultimately outweighed by their profound disagreement on the founding character of music. For Heidegger, music was a historical productive phenomenon, and musical and historical times were connected. This would have been axiomatically contested by Anders. For Anders, the musical situation was an anti-historical occurrence that could not be placed side by side with the destiny of a people. From this musicological comparison of Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger one thing can be seen: the logical critique of Husserl is a propaedeutic for the elaboration of a new approach to music that tries to focus on the importance of the ear rather than on the eye.

The musicological debate between Adorno, Anders and Heidegger also introduces a parallel controversy which revolves around the notion of *Stimmung* that also persists well after the Second World War. This second debate between Adorno, Anders and Heidegger displays how Adorno opposed a re-emergence of a *Stimmung* theory while Heidegger and Anders advocated the importance of having one; moreover, it suggests that while Adorno's theory of truth as residue [*Residualtheorie*] might work 'against' Heidegger's philosophy it might not necessarily do the same 'against' Anders'. As mentioned above, the notion of *Stimmung* was central for both Anders and Heidegger; it was through *Stimmung* that they could propose a new methodological approach that investigated reality via an acoustic paradigm<sup>531</sup>. In contrast, Adorno had a radically different opinion about it. To an extent, it was Adorno who signed the

<sup>531</sup> Khittl suggests that the Heideggerian interpretation of the *Stimmung* according to the different mood is directly connected to Anders' notion of situation. Indeed, he claims that, thanks to Heidegger, Anders can associate the *Stimmung* and the moods to analyse the musical situation. See, C. Khittl, '“Gute” Musik? In Musikpädagogischen Kontexten? Phänomenologische Überlegungen Zu Einem Situativen Musikbegriff – Essay Zur Theorie Der Musikalischen Situation Nach Günther Anders', in *Musik: Wissenschaftlich – Pädagogisch – Politisch. Festschrift Für Arnold Werner-Jensen Zum 70. Geburtstag*, p. 219.

‘death warrant’ of the notion of *Stimmung*<sup>532</sup> when he wrote that it was an outdated term which should have been replaced with that of ‘atmosphere or aura’<sup>533</sup> [*Atmosphäre*]<sup>534</sup>. Adorno’s depreciation of *Stimmung* as a musical phenomenon was not based on its musicological ambiguity or its irrelevance but rather on Adorno’s own ideological ground. Adorno found *Stimmung* to be a regressive term for at least two reasons. First, Adorno associated *Stimmung* with light modern music<sup>535</sup> of the kind that could be found in cafés, restaurants, or in the concert halls where Sibelius was applauded<sup>536</sup>. The reference to cafés and restaurant implies that *Stimmung* was associated with the Culture Industry and its commodification of music<sup>537</sup> and thus entails the subordination of the artwork to a social function or, more generally, to the subjective mood of the listener. In this connection Adorno writes: “functions such as warming people up and drowning out silence recast music as something defined as mood, the commodified negation of the boredom produced by the grey-on-grey commodity world. The sphere of entertainment, which has long been integrated into production, amounts to the domination of this element of art over all the rest of its phenomena. These elements are antagonistic. The subordination of autonomous artworks to the element of social function buried within each work and from which art originated in the course

<sup>532</sup> “The death blow comes [...] with Theodor W. Adorno”. See, Wallrup, p. 66.

<sup>533</sup> This new terminology is adopted by Adorno since his first works on Schubert. However, while in the later aesthetic and musicological studies he condemns it as outdated and fruitless, in the 1920s Adorno is less critical of his usage of this terminology. It can be argued that Adorno adopts a general strategy of avoidance in regard of the *Stimmung*. “In the monograph on Alban Berg, speaking of how the composer uses the orchestra in *Wozzeck*, Adorno suggests that it has nothing to do with the enchantment of moods but, again, with atmosphere. Not only in the book on Alban Berg but also in Mahler, Adorno deliberately dedicates a chapter to the ‘tone’ of the composer and focuses on the character (*Charakter*) of the music, and when *Stimmung* is used it has to do with something trivial or negligible”. See, Wallrup, p. 66.

<sup>534</sup> With this notion Adorno proves, once again, his dependency from Benjamin’s own philosophical terminology. See, Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 274.

<sup>535</sup> “For Adorno, emotional listening was nothing less than an abdication of reason”. See, T. DeNora, *After Adorno Rethinking Music Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 87.

<sup>536</sup> “He [Adorno] is [...] relentlessly critical of the music of Sibelius”. See, A. Bowie, *Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 138; Wallrup, p. 66.

<sup>537</sup> “It [*Stimmung*] is an ingredient of the commodification of music and of the culture industry in general”. See. Wallrup, p. 67.

of a protracted struggle, wounds art at its most vulnerable point<sup>538</sup>. Second, Adorno linked *Stimmung* to the regressive form of listening represented by emotional listening which was aimed at exciting the listener as the music became more exciting. This manner of understanding the phenomenon of listening is grounded on “the assumption of an equivalence between the content of experience [...] and the subjective experience of the recipient. A listener is, in other words, to become excited when the music seems to do so, whereas to the extent that one understands anything, one should become emotionally all the more disinterested the pushier the work’s gesticulations become”<sup>539</sup>.

How is Adorno’s critique of *Stimmung* related to Heidegger’s or Anders’ understanding of the notion? As already seen, for Heidegger *Stimmungen* are not something *Dasein* chooses, they are what *Dasein* finds itself in and they determine how *Dasein* is. In this way, Heidegger could postulate an intrinsic link between the inner (subjective) and the outer (objective) which went beyond the will of the *Dasein*<sup>540</sup>. The encounter with Hölderlin seemed to broaden and even increase the importance of *Stimmung* for Heidegger<sup>541</sup>. While describing how to read Hölderlin’s hymns Heidegger mentioned an overarching resonance which had to do with what the poem has to say. He writes: “the overarching resonance of the telling is the initial, creative resonance that first intimates the language; it is the origin not only for the arranging and positioning of the words but also for the choice of words, an origin whose resonance constantly anticipates the use of words. This overarching resonance of the telling, however, is from the outset determined by the fundamental attunement of the poetry, which takes form within the inner outline of the whole. The fundamental attunement for its part grows out of the particular metaphysical locale of the poetry in question”<sup>542</sup>.

<sup>538</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 253.

<sup>539</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 244. “Artistic experience accordingly demands a comprehending rather than an emotional relation to the works; the subject inheres in them and in their movement as one of their elements; when the subject encounters them from an external perspective and refuses to obey their discipline, it is alien to art and becomes the legitimate object of sociology”. See, Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 355.

<sup>540</sup> “He [Heidegger] seeks to get away from the notion of the subject as an intending ‘inside’ which relates to an objective ‘outside’”. See, Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*, p. 69.

<sup>541</sup> See, Wallrup, p. 85.

<sup>542</sup> M. Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”*, trans. by W. McNeill and

This means that the reader of Hölderlin must situate herself and must attune to the text to grasp the fundamental attunement and thus ‘feel’ the poetic saying<sup>543</sup>. Adorno contested this Heideggerian *adaequatio* to *Stimmung* because for him this ‘attunement’ was a distorted attempt of the spectator to project himself in “the artwork in order to find himself confirmed, uplifted, and satisfied in it”<sup>544</sup>. In other words, according to Adorno, one can appreciate the emotional content of any artistic representation without being in an emotional state that is attuned to that of the content<sup>545</sup>. Moreover, this refutation of the *adaequatio* involves a refutation of the notion of truth understood as a reaching back into the fundamental attunement and to the residual objectivity left after the subtraction of subjectivity. “They use their subjectivity to subtract the subject from truth and their idea of objectivity is as a residue. All *prima philosophia*<sup>546</sup> up to Heidegger’s [...] was essentially a theory of residue. Truth is supposed to be the leftover, the dregs, the most thoroughly insipid”<sup>547</sup>. Both the refutation of a residue theory and of *Stimmung* indicate Adorno’s intention to counter the resurgence of theories of emotionality on the basis that they rested on the undialectical assumption of the aesthetic of genius which leads to the fetishisation of the individual<sup>548</sup>.

J. Ireland, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), p. 18.

<sup>543</sup> “Therefore, one cannot speak about any conventional hermeneutics, but something closer to an obedient reliance on an Urtext. Heidegger seems to imply a kind of intimate say-along or even sing-along, but what has been said or sung by the poet cannot be wholly reiterated”. See, Wallrup, p. 85.

<sup>544</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 275.

<sup>545</sup> Bowie, *Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy*, p. 147.

<sup>546</sup> “*Prima philosophia* came to awareness of this in the doctrine of the antinomies [...] The search for the utterly first, the absolute cause, results in infinite regress. Infinity cannot be posited as given with a conclusion, even though this positing seems unavoidable to total spirit. The concept of the given, the last refuge of the irreducible in idealism, collides with the concept of spirit as complete reducibility”. See, T.W. Adorno, *Against Epistemology a Metacritique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 29.

<sup>547</sup> Adorno, *Against Epistemology a Metacritique*, p. 15.

<sup>548</sup> “The concept of Genius is false because works are not creations and humans are not creators. This defines the untruth of any genius aesthetics that suppresses the element of finite making, the ‘*techné*’ in artworks, in favor of their absolute originality, virtually their *natura naturans*; it thus spawns the ideology of the organic and unconscious artwork, which flows into the murky current of irrationalism”. See, Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 170. Bowie rightly associates Adorno’s *Residualtheorie* to the question of Nature that Adorno investigates after the Second World War. See, Bowie, *Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy* and Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*.

By comparison, Anders' conception of *Stimmung* was inspired by Heidegger's<sup>549</sup> insofar as Anders found in it the key to interpreting the musical situation as a co-performance [*Mitvollzug*]; a mediation between sensuality and intellect, a 'going along' and a 'being carried away' by music. This attunement to the musical situation allowed Anders to postulate the idea of being-in-music as the creation, through music, of a non-historical but equally telling world. This creative ability of music was reaffirmed by Anders and directly linked with prominent themes of his later philosophy after the Second World War, namely the need for action and the significance of emotionality<sup>550</sup>. Even though indebted to Heidegger, Anders' *Stimmung* in music does not imply a reference to a *Grund-Stimmung* but rather suggests that the work of art produces *Stimmungen sui generis* which are not related to any prior 'mood' of the listener. As Anders writes: "the situation in which a work of art leads us is artificial, that is, is a work of art too"<sup>551</sup>.

While in his work on the musical situation Anders openly admitted that art did not have any actual historical consequences<sup>552</sup>, the same did not apply to emotions. *Contra Sartre*<sup>553</sup>, Anders wrote that "emotion changes the aspect of the world; yet this aspect-transformation is a *positive* step taken in order to handle the world *successfully*. Emotions are motors of real action. Anger, for instance, is not just (as it appears in Sartre's book) an existential condition, 'meaningful', because by choos-

<sup>549</sup> See, Macho, p. 479.

<sup>550</sup> Anders mentions music and his interpretation in both volumes of the *Antiquiertheit des Menschen* and also in his *Emotion and Reality*. In these texts, he directly connects music to either action or the need of emotions to counter the effect caused by the *techne* on the human ability to 'feel'. See, G. Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003), pp. 292–95; G. Anders, *L'Uomo Antiquato Vol. II* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007), pp. 407–08; G. Anders, *Emotion and Reality, Phenomenological Research*, 1950, X, p. 558.

<sup>551</sup> By this, Anders means that people do not merely adapt themselves to the *Stimmungen* felt while listening to music, but rather, that in listening to music, people experience a unique form of *Stimmung* that can only be felt through that particular musical piece. "In other words, the works of art produce *Stimmungen*, namely, *Stimmungen sui generis*". See, G. Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, p. 294.

<sup>552</sup> "Actual 'constitution' of a 'second world' takes place only in Art; e.g., in Music which is able to make the emotion itself an articulated process, and which 'creates' objects whose 'mood' coincides with their structure". See, Anders, *Emotion and Reality*, p. 558.

<sup>553</sup> Anders' *Emotion and Reality* critiques the Sartrean understanding of emotions. In this article, Anders strongly supports the idea that emotions are necessary to investigate reality.

ing it, man satisfies himself with the futile image of a 'simpler world'; *its meaning is far more concrete: It represents a preparatory step for real action, for instance, for real attack*"<sup>554</sup>. Anders believed that emotions are functional tools for engaging in specific situations in which people find themselves and that they showcased the human freedom before action and the root of human morality. "Anger often remains just anger, yet such anger is the positive result of the act of stalling the attack. In such cases, emotions are the results of self-mastery, thus of freedom. [...] Yet the fact that man shouts instead of killing already represents the first stage of self-control. Seen thus, emotion is even renunciation, the first stage of morality"<sup>555</sup>.

Furthermore, since these emotions or moods represent a way of dealing with the real, they are necessarily social. Through the social character of emotions, Anders developed the idea that to study them one should not fall into solipsistic approaches (*à la Sartre*)<sup>556</sup> but rather one should look at how the diverse people interacting in each 'emotional situation' get affected by them. Anders compares such emotional encounters to tennis matches: "A's fit of anger actually frightens B who is meant as target; frightened by it, B now undergoes an emotion on his part, for instance, that of anxiety. This effect has again an effect on A: B's look of anxiety may how fill A with disgust or scorn. The emotions are flying to and fro. Thus, we can often observe continuous tennis matches of emotions. If such actions and inter-actions are not 'effective', I really do not know what the word 'effective' means"<sup>557</sup>.

However, the truth of a statement concerning such situations equally depends on how and to what extent it affects the other. Anders, too, encountered truth from a process of *adaequatio*, but unlike Heidegger he introduced a different notion of '*adaequatio*'. The truth, for Anders, "does not depend only on the speaker, or on how closely the statement 'corresponds to' the circumstances and facts it brings to word (the classical notion of *adaequatio*); it also depends on whether it actually affects 'the person it concerns'; it is contingent on the correspondence between the actual recipient and who the statement envisages as its

<sup>554</sup> Anders, *Emotion and Reality*, p. 558.

<sup>555</sup> Anders, *Emotion and Reality*, p. 559.

<sup>556</sup> Anders, *Emotion and Reality*, p. 560.

<sup>557</sup> Anders, '*Emotion and Reality*', p. 560.

‘recipient’. This is the ‘*adaequatio*’ that is required today. The word ‘truth’ therefore also describes a moral, more precisely, a ‘pedagogic’ effect<sup>558</sup>. Anders’ *adaequatio* of truth does not only imply a correspondence between an A and a B, it also implies the correlation between the internal state of A and B in relation to what A and B say or feel. It is a two-layered *adaequatio* of truth: truth must ‘correspond’ to both the circumstances brought by the uttered fact and to whether or not such fact affects the person concerned by it. Thus, Anders positioned himself in between Heidegger and Adorno<sup>559</sup>: he still found emotions essential both in art and in social interactions, but he simultaneously detached himself from a residue theory for understanding truth. Anders even argued, implicitly against Adorno, that “to use the term ‘emotional’ as a term of ridicule is to evince coldness and stupidity. It is obvious that we will react ‘emotionally’ [...] and we shall not be ashamed to do so. Indeed, we should be ashamed to react any other way. Anyone who does not react in this way and calls our emotion irrational, reveals not only his coldness, but also his stupidity”<sup>560</sup>.

The continuation of this covert controversy from the early 1920s well into the decades after the Second World War<sup>561</sup> demonstrates how theories of *Stimmung* are not only possible in aesthetic contexts but also in analyses of social and political phenomena, even after and in spite of Adorno’s critique of the concept. Moreover, it demonstrates the presence of a deep continuity within the philosophies of Anders, Adorno and Heidegger that was uninterrupted by the fact of the war<sup>562</sup>.

<sup>558</sup> G. Anders, ‘Language and End Time (Sections I, IV, and V of “*Sprache Und Endzeit*”’, 153.I *Thesis Eleven*, (2019), p. 138.

<sup>559</sup> In this attempt to categorise Adorno’s, Anders’, and Heidegger’s philosophies in relation to their understanding of the *Stimmung*, one can already see how Adorno prefers an aesthetic approach, Anders adopts a moral active stance, and Heidegger opts for a past-centric attitude.

<sup>560</sup> Anders, ‘Ten Theses on Chernobyl’, *Ecologie & Politique*, 2006, p. 170.

<sup>561</sup> The texts cited above span from the 1920s to the late 1980s.

<sup>562</sup> *Contra* David Christophe this continuity refutes the thesis according to which there are two Adornos and two Anders (and we can add two Heideggers) due to the break caused by the Second World War in their philosophies. The war does not imply a rapture or a complete fracture between an Ur-Adorno and an Adorno and an Ur-Anders and an Anders as Christophe claims. See, D. Christophe, ‘*Nous formons une équipe triste. Notes sur Günther Anders et Theodor W. Adorno*’, *Tumultes*, 1.28/29 (2007), p. 174.

### 3.2 Rupture or prolongation of a debate?

The revelations concerning the events of the Second World War and the atrocities perpetuated in its name have often been seen as a turning point<sup>563</sup>, as a breach in human and intellectual history after which nothing remained the same. This fissure that was caused by the Second World War and the Holocaust indicated for many a need to rethink the concept of progress as well as the denial of the promise of felicitous expectations. It is from this perspective that Adorno, Heidegger and Anders alike have been understood to have drastically switched the objects of their respective philosophical analyses after the war: Adorno moved from a musicological focus to alienation and the culture industry, Anders turned towards an investigation of technology, and Heidegger shifted from *Da-sein* to the de-humanisation of the world and humanity alike caused by technology. Thus terms such as ‘*Kehre*’, ‘turn’ or ‘*caesura*’ are frequently utilised to distinguish between their pre- and post-war corpora<sup>564</sup>. Yet it is important to question the usefulness of such a theory of a ‘break’ or ‘rupture’ because though Anders, Adorno and Heidegger *prima facie* address different themes post-WWII, the notion that an epistemic break occurred does not account for the trajectory linking all three. Indeed, the musicological debate that they began before the war was not entirely disrupted by the Second World War because its conclusions influenced and converged into a new set of conversations between Adorno, Anders, and

<sup>563</sup> “With the mass annihilation, the particular fate of the Jews had become a universal historical event, with a standing all its own in the realm of theory. Horkheimer and Adorno rightly spoke of a ‘turning point in history’ (DA, 5:230 [200]), but only in retrospect. Few minds equipped with Western reason could have ventured to formulate that *caesura* before its occurrence”. D. Diner, *Beyond the Conceivable Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 99. On the idea of the Second World War as turning point see also J-P. Dupuy, *The Mark of the Sacred* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 181; E. Wallrup, *Being Musically Attuned the Act of Listening to Music* (Burlington: ashgate publishing limited, 2015), p. 1; B. Latour, *Facing Gaia* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), p. 2; D. Kleinberg-Levin, *Beckett’s Words The Promise of Happiness in a Time of Mourning* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 5; C. Müller, ‘Desert Ethics: Technology and the Question of Evil in Günther Anders and Jacques Derrida’, *Parallax*, 21.1 (2015), p. 44; A. Feenberg, *The Philosophy of Praxis* (London: Verso, 2014), p. 1.

<sup>564</sup> Fried, p. 16. M. Latini, ‘L’Antropologia Eretica Di Günther Anders Contingenza Dell’umano Ed Eclissi Del Senso’, *B@belonline* (Roma, 2008), p. 100. S. Velotti, ‘Yugoslav Wars: Another Face of European Civilisation? Lessons Learnt and Enduring Challenges View Project’, *Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 18 (2011), p. 172.



Heidegger<sup>565</sup>. The theory that there was a philosophical rupture mirroring the historical produces an a posteriori reading of the philosophical history of Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger which pretends to bracket their post-war investigations from the continuum of their concerns. Such a perspective fails to contextualise these unexpected convergences within the preconditions that were indeed already present and led to their emergence. Postulating a 'break' can help emphasise the emergence of new themes and demonstrate their new interpretative power, but simultaneously lose sight of their emergence as a development from previous problems and concerns.

A notable example of how 'breaks' have been theorised can be seen in Dan Diner's account of '*Zivilisationsbruch*'. Diner's notion of *Zivilisationsbruch* was introduced in the wake of the German *Historikerstreit* about the singularity of the Holocaust in the mid-1980s and articulates the notion that a profound caesura was created by the Nazi politics of extermination of the European Jews. The term represents Diner's attempt to epistemically reconcile the two divergent questions of 'Why?' and 'How?'. *Zivilisationsbruch* equally symbolises the chasm between factual knowledge and modes of human conduct which could not be bridged after the war. As Diner puts it, there was "nothing more to be judged, nothing more to be decided. The foundations of reason and rationality demolished by the Holocaust become visible in the context of the Enlightenment. For instance, the Holocaust denies the certainty and the expectation offered by the Enlightenment that action can be governed by reason. Because of this, the Holocaust becomes an emblem of the refutation of the Occidental expectation of Enlightenment, an emblem of the denial of civilised

<sup>565</sup> In Adorno's case, one can easily see how the post-war themes of reconciliation, the anti-phenomenological (Husserlian and Heideggerian) perspective, and the domination of both internal and external nature were already present before the Second World War. Anders too exhibits such characteristic; his early philosophical anthropology provided him with the anthropological substratum for his post-war philosophy of technology. Moreover, a continuous link between the early- and later-Anders is provided by the unbroken and incessant quotations that Anders distributes in his post-war writings of his 1930s *Molussian Catacomb*. Concerning Heidegger, the proof of the continuity of his thought is present in *Letter on Humanism* where he writes "this turning is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being". M. Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, trans. by D. Farrell Krell, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 208.

basic assumptions. This may, incidentally, be the profound meaning of the responsibility this culture has to itself; a responsibility embedded in its memory by the trauma of experiencing its very refutation, and which consists of remembering this negative core event as the sign that Western civilisation's foundations had been annulled"<sup>566</sup>.

There are at least two reasons why the notion of '*Zivilisationsbruch*' is useful in the present discussion: first, Adorno, Anders<sup>567</sup>, and Heidegger all directly or indirectly debated the significance of the war and the Holocaust. Second, all three grappled philosophically with the very idea of an event that disrupted everything and created a *caesura*. That is, rather than being defined by 'rupture', thematising such a 'break' or, indeed, *Zivilisationsbruch* was a trait shared by Anders', Adorno's and Heidegger's explicit philosophical work. Moreover, the methodologies with which they addressed this theme were inspired by their respective pre-war analyses. Thus, a first task would be to identify how this theme of a *caesura* was addressed philosophically by all three.

It turns out that the philosophical *locus* where all three meet after the war is an interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry that leads each of them to the question of technology. Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger provide three different interpretations of Hölderlin which in turn drastically shape their understandings of technology and their responses to the threat that they believe technology poses to humanity. Thus, who is Hölderlin and what does his poetry mean to each of them? And what kind of tool does Hölderlin's poetry provide for interpreting *techné*? The first to approach these questions was Heidegger. For Heidegger, Hölderlin<sup>568</sup> was the 'po-

<sup>566</sup> D. Diner, 'Epistemics of the Holocaust Considering the Question of "Why?" And of "How?"', *Naharaim -Zeitschrift Für Deutsch-jüdische Literatur Und Kulturgeschichte*, 1 (2007), 195–213 (pp. 204–5).

<sup>567</sup> Moreover, Diner's book *Zivilisationsbruch Denken nach Auschwitz* contains an essay on Anders' philosophy. See, M. Brumlick, *Günther Anders Zur Existentialontologie der Emigration*, in D. Diner, *Zivilisationsbruch Denken nach Auschwitz* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), pp. 111–52. The importance of this essay is underlined by Liessmann too. See, Liessmann, *Günther Anders*, pp. 197–98.

<sup>568</sup> Heidegger interests in Hölderlin after the war means a new interest in history, metaphysics, and their post war alienation. Heidegger realised that Hegel's notion of history as development of the Spirit was unsustainable and needed to be changed since it was grounded on a metaphysical understanding. See, M. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, edited by W. McNeil, *Letter on 'Humanism'*, chapter. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 256. Hölderlin gives Heidegger the tools for speaking of a new non-metaphysical history

et's poet' because he foresaw the 'time of need', that time characterised by "a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming"<sup>569</sup>. Hölderlin was the first one to perceive the time of need because he grasped the moment in which humanity no longer hears the calling of being. He could perceive the coming of the time of need because he first understood its origin, that is, Greek ancient thought. Moreover, according to Heidegger, Hölderlin was capable of singing the essence of poetry, which is why Heidegger is compelled to call him the 'poet's poet'. Through poetry, humanity is brought back to its being, to that quiet origin from which everything else originates. Poetry founds by naming, that is, in the process of naming things poetry discloses the origin and gifts it to humanity. But this freedom of the poet to name everything is bound to a supreme necessity, that of the founding of being. In this sense, poetry is 'bound in a twofold sense' because, on the one hand, poetry has to name and speak about the origin when the gods command it to do so through hints which foretell what is not yet fulfilled. On the other hand, poetry is nothing more than the interpretation of the 'voice of the people' which testifies to one's belongingness to this world. The poet "is the one who has been cast out—out into that between, between gods and men"<sup>570</sup>, but it is only in this kingdom in between, in poetry, that humanity can dwell.

What Heidegger sees in Hölderlin's poetry is a way of returning to the earth, of instituting a different relation to it, one whereby the earth will again become the site of an ordinary dwelling. Hölderlin's poetry is entirely driven by this event to come, an event which is already coming, already approaching, Hölderlin is the most promising of all poets, the poet in which the promise of a new historical beginning is sheltered. In the face of the futile and nervous agitation of the statesmen and the serv-

of the West grounded on the disclosure and advent of being itself. In this sense, Hölderlin's poetry represents the possibility of "restoring meaning and order to a technological powerful but nihilistic world". See, Zimmerman, p. 131. As Safranski writes: "Heidegger [...] returns to a solitary philosophy that, on Hölderlin's model, hopes to fend off the 'darkening of the world' in single combat". See, R. Safranski, *Martin Heidegger Between Good and Evil* (London: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 290.

<sup>569</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 64.

<sup>570</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 64.

ants of technology, in the face of what, in the *Beiträge*, Heidegger begins to call the ‘machination’ [*Machenschaft*]<sup>571</sup> that has taken possession of the earth, poetry appears as the site of a different encounter with the earth and with history. The machination against which Heidegger so passionately engages is that of technology. Via technology the true essence of science, its vocation for control and dominion of the real is realised. As a form of *ποίησις* it is not merely a means, but “it is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth”<sup>572</sup>. And yet “the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of *poiesis*. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [*herausfordern*], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such”<sup>573</sup>. For modern technology, nature is no longer the ancient Greek *φύσις* but a mere energy container, a *Bestand*<sup>574</sup>, where energy is mined and stockpiled for being always at hand. The soil becomes a mere metal deposit or a coalfield, rivers become providers of hydric energy, and air is used for producing fuels.

In a direct debate against Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölderlin’s poetry<sup>575</sup>, Adorno argued that the poet Hölderlin is the antithesis of the Hegelian synthesis which represented an act of violence against nature by spirit. Adorno, for his part, appropriates Hölderlin’s poetry to find a form in language that would remain outside the grasp of the spirit’s own synthesising principle. As a ventriloquist, Adorno’s Hölderlin uses language to resist the grasp of synthetic and subjectivising closure of

<sup>571</sup> M. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 32.

<sup>572</sup> M. Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), p. 12.

<sup>573</sup> Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 14.

<sup>574</sup> The word ‘*Bestand*’ “expresses here something more than mere ‘stock’. The name ‘standing-reserve’ assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object”. See, Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 17.

<sup>575</sup> In *Parataxis*, as proven by the notes on the chapter, Adorno directly attacks and quotes from Heidegger’s

*Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*. See, T.W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 338–41.

language itself<sup>576</sup>. If Heidegger used Hölderlin to return to an originary dwelling, then Adorno interprets him for reflecting on the arbitrary distinction between Nature and History. Hölderlin, for Adorno, disapproves of the modern disillusioned perception of Nature which has been reduced to an external object entirely devoid of inherent value and completely explicable by means of the natural sciences<sup>577</sup>. This separation of humanity from Nature is carried out via a metaphysical conception of Nature which sees it as a thing to be mastered and has led to a situation of increasing destruction of the environment, which in turn represents the actual condition of possibility for humanity's existence. And yet, the separation between Nature and History is not total. For Adorno's Hölderlin aesthetics can be utilised for re-thinking such a relationship by developing a new conception of Nature which is not degraded to something to be used, dominated or subjected to the general laws of value or science. In Hölderlin's poetry, nature therefore appears as historical, transitory, and fleeting. In *The Idea of Natural History* Adorno similarly claims that "[n]ature itself is transitory. Thus, it includes the element of history. Whenever a historical element appears, it refers back to the natural element that passes away within it"<sup>578</sup>. History and Nature are intertwined and therefore it is inaccurate to classify or see Nature as a resource for humanity to use or as the opposite of humanity's making of History. It is only because of the aforementioned metaphysical approach<sup>579</sup> that Nature appears as some-

<sup>576</sup> See, T.M. Kelly, *Adorno-Nature-Hegel* in G. Richter, *Language without Soil* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 104.

<sup>577</sup> For Hölderlin's conception of Nature, see S. Büttner, 'Natur—Ein Grundwort Hölderlins', *Hölderlin Jahrbuch*, 26 (1989), 224–47; F.C. Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781–1801* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 397–401; Y-K. Lee, *Friedrich Hölderlins Mythopoesie Als Neue Mythologie* (München: Martin Meidenbauer, 2007), pp. 113–36; A. Stone, 'Hölderlin and Human–Nature Relations', in *Human–Environment Relations: Transformative Values in Theory and Practice*, ed. by E. Brady and P. Phemister (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 55–67. For Adorno's understanding of Nature, see J.M. Bernstein, *Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 188–234; A. Stone, 'Adorno and the Disenchantment of Nature', *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 32, 2006, 231–53 (pp. 231–53); D. Cook, *Adorno on Nature* (Durham: Acumen, 2011); Bowie, *Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy*.

<sup>578</sup> T.W. Adorno, *The Idea of Natural-History*, trans. by R. Hullot-Kentor, in R. Hullot-Kentor, *Things Beyond Resemblance: Collected Essays on Theodor W. Adorno* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 264.

<sup>579</sup> That Adorno calls 'an allegorical history of nature'. See, D. Farrell Krell, *Twelve Anacolutic Theses on*

thing stiff, immobile, and unchangeable insofar as what remains static is predictable and suitable for endless manipulation.

Adorno's interpretation of Hölderlin and the extrapolation of the concept Nature-History is intimately linked to the question of technology. Adorno sees technology primarily as a mode of domination<sup>580</sup>: technology is but a means by which the subject can more efficiently dominate nature. But technology is, for Adorno, not problematic *per se* but only because it is so intertwined with bourgeois societal values, in particular, with capitalism and its ideal of perpetual growth. The implications of technology pervade humanity's relationship with Nature and human-to-human relations, too. Technology frees individuals to be self-determining, self-sufficient, and self-regulating of all external standards only by compelling them to fit in. Where technology does not disrupt and detain them directly, it leaves individuals no choice but to disrupt and detain themselves, to embody an identity completely based on the apparatus which detains them. In the age of technology, "freedom reveals itself in all social sectors as freedom to be eversame"<sup>581</sup>; everyone must show that "he identifies without remainder with the power which beats him down"<sup>582</sup>. Humanity turns itself into a proficiently operative apparatus in order to live up to models of humanity endorsed and provided by the apparatus of the Culture Industry. Every gesture, every word, "testifies to this attempt"<sup>583</sup>. Technology enlightens individuals only when they blind themselves and put themselves firmly under its spell. It frees individuals only on the condition that they enslave themselves and sacrifice their individuality, turning themselves into a technological apparatus at the disposal of technological rationality. In *Trying to Understand Endgame*,

<sup>A</sup>Adorno's 'Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry' in Richter, p. 196.

<sup>580</sup> For Adorno's conception of technology, see T. DeNora, *After Adorno Rethinking Music Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 126; F. Freyenhagen, *Adorno's Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 32; J. Hollingsworth, 'Adorno and Reconciliation', *Student Research Submissions*, 2018, p. 31; N. Leeder, 'Freedom and Negativity in the Works of Samuel Beckett and Theodor Adorno', p. 145; E.L. Krakauer, *The Disposition of the Subject*, (Evanstone: Northwestern University Press, 1998); H. Mörchen, *Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1981), pp. 15-68 .

<sup>581</sup> M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 167.

<sup>582</sup> Horkheimer and Adorno, p. 153.

<sup>583</sup> Horkheimer and Adorno, p. 167.

Adorno combines his Hölderlin-inspired insight about Nature and History together with his understanding of technology and derives from this the ultimate consequences when he analyses Beckett's post-catastrophic play in which "there's no more nature"<sup>584</sup>. Here, Adorno describes what the final stage of alienation would look like: one in which "there is nothing left that has not been made by human beings, is indistinguishable from an additional catastrophic event caused by human beings, in which nature has been wiped out and after which nothing grows any more"<sup>585</sup>. In this sense, Beckett demonstrates what an eternal re-occurrence of the hubris described by Adorno would inflict upon planet Earth, which is the complete domination of Nature to the point that Nature has been completely destroyed.

While the link to Hölderlin less apparent in Anders, nevertheless there is sufficient evidence of an interpretation that also places Anders within the Hölderlinian debate between Adorno and Heidegger<sup>586</sup>. According to Anders, Hölderlin is the poet of happiness understood as satisfaction or the releasement from needs. He writes, in *Über Heidegger*, of "the satisfaction (of needs) or the relieving (from the needs), which the Greeks and later Hölderlin had associated with happiness" [*die Befriedigung oder die Stillung, die die Griechen und später noch Hölderlin mit der Glückseligkeit in eins gesetzt hatten*]<sup>587</sup>. The association of Hölderlin with happiness is indeed not new, since Heidegger already speaks of him as the poet of the 'joyful'<sup>588</sup>. Such an interpretation might have emerged from Hölderlin's poem *Diotima*, in which it is written: "where we forget need and

<sup>584</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 245.

<sup>585</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 245.

<sup>586</sup> There are at least two different sets of reason for adding Anders to this debate: first, biographical reasons. Second, content aspects. In criticising Heidegger Adorno cites Anders in several instances: in *Parataxis*, in *Negative Dialectic*, in *Trying to Understand the Endgame*, and in *Aesthetic Theory*. In the first two Adorno refers to Anders' *Pseudo Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy*, in the last two Adorno comments on Anders' analysis of *Waiting for Godot* in *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen I*. Adorno knew both works of Anders. For the letter in which Adorno asks Anders for a copy of his *Pseudo Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy* see, *Österreichische Literaturarchiv der österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, Wien, (237/04). Anders himself criticises Heidegger's 'all too literal use' of Hölderlin's poetry in his *Frömmigkeitsphilosophie* (Philosophy of piety) contained within *Über Heidegger*. See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*.

<sup>587</sup> See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 171.

<sup>588</sup> See, Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Homecoming / To Kindred Ones*, p. 32.

time,/ and the meagre profit/ never measured with the margin,/ *that, that I know, I am there*" [Wo wir Not und Zeit vergessen,/ Und den kärglichen Gewinn/ Nimmer mit der Spanne messen,/ Da, da weiß ich, daß ich bin]<sup>589</sup>. The words 'wir Not und Zeit vergessen' identify what Anders himself described in the chapter 'Time and Need' in *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen II*<sup>590</sup> while speaking about his theory of the satisfaction of needs. There, Anders defines the ideal existence of humanity as "the ability to achieve all the goals of its actions as if by magic, that is, immediately, without any loss of time. The dream of our time is the elimination of time. The timeless society is the hope of tomorrow"<sup>591</sup>. This ideal is based on the reduction of the time between desire and satisfaction, between yearning and pleasure<sup>592</sup>. Anders aims at postulating the notion of 'time' from that of 'need'; he says that "time is the road that leads to having. There is time only because we are needy beings; because we do not have what we must have; because we need to procure for ourselves what is necessary. Time is as empty as we are, as empty as an empty stomach; and time is only 'filled' whenever the stomach is full. In other words: it is existence in the mode of not having, that is, in the mode of the act of procuring the *desideratum*"<sup>593</sup>. Furthermore, Anders adds a social characteristic to his theory of the satisfaction of need when he claims that when a person is 'hounded by necessity' she is also hounded by the needs of others<sup>594</sup>.

Reminiscent of his early musicological work, Anders utilises Hölderlin to re-introduce a notion of anti-historicity which this time is due to happiness. The 'untimely' is now part of a particularly excellent life, the conditions of which have moved into the social dimension. In other words, Hölderlin becomes the link between Anders' considerations about time and a-temporality and the tangible reflections concerning the satisfaction of needs. These considerations on happiness and a-temporality by Anders are directly connected for him to the role played by *techne*. According to Anders, the suspension of time is also the goal of *techne* insofar as it aims at mediating all sorts of interactions between

<sup>589</sup> F. Hölderlin, trans. by E. Mandruzzato, *Le Liriche*, (Milano: Adelphi, 2014), poem. *Diotima*, p. 180.

<sup>590</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 317-22.

<sup>591</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 317.

<sup>592</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 318.

<sup>593</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 319.

<sup>594</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 320-21.



humanity's desires and their satisfaction with "a jungle of mediations which seek to reduce to a minimum those same mediations that do exist, that is, the intermediate time between desire and its satisfaction"<sup>595</sup>. For Anders, *techne* wants to annihilate time itself. But there is a fundamental difference between the suspension of time that humanity wants and the one carried out by *techne*. While the former wishes to achieve a situation of indefinite peace and tranquillity the second can only produce a bad conscience of ἐνέργεια and enjoyment, where humanity finds itself in a totally new and paradoxical situation. On the one hand, humanity becomes impatient because it takes too much time to satisfy its needs. On the other hand, however, humanity cannot achieve happiness because by the time it moves toward ἐνέργεια, humanity is already getting frustrated by the fact that it could have been using its time to reach other goals. This paradoxicality constitutes humanity's new condition. Through the ellipsis of time humanity saves so much time that it is bothered by the fact that it is not already achieving other objectives, and it is driven to utilise this newly created free time in as many activities as possible. The existence of a humanity that is alienated in such a way becomes a pointillist existence from which all continuity is banished and in which at each passing moment there corresponds a new action that lasts no longer than an instant. The new curse of humanity is not the eternity of time but its inescapable punctuality<sup>596</sup>.

The analysis of Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger's interpretations of Hölderlin's poetry and *techne* unveils how deeply intertwined they were both before and after the Second World War. This new debate is a prolongation of their earlier musicological debates for it still displays the influence of these earlier concerns on their respective understandings of both poetry and technology. With respect to Heidegger's and Anders' interpretations of Hölderlin and *techne*, Heidegger's post-war philosophy represents an attempt to redeem humanity from the horrors of the calculating consciousness of the *techne*. The main issue that Anders has with Heidegger's approach consists in his diagnosis of the latter's fear of acting upon the present technologically-induced alienation and his decision to deflect into a paracleral conception of time characterised by the idea of waiting for the arrival of the new gods while looking back at the source

<sup>595</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. II, p. 321.

<sup>596</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. II, p. 325.

from which this alienation came. Anders' attitude towards the problems emerging from his reading of Hölderlin and *techne* proposes instead a prognostic hermeneutics based upon the idea that when one philosophises, one must look at empirical facts and at things that are happening. By this Anders means that what matters is the present with its technical products and how humanity should interact with them so that it can foresee the consequences of the usage of technology. In this context, an analysis of Anders' notion of the 'Promethean gap' will indicate the discrepancy between the productive ability of humanity and its capacity to imagine the consequences of its own producing.

The innovative element of Anders' critique is that of exposing how *techne* operates on its own terms, which do not converge with humanity's not because of a 'metaphysical concept' of the 'human' but rather because of an inhuman standardisation of humanity. While Heidegger distrusts *techne* because it retroactively produces a false sense of security and therefore alienates and distances humanity from its relations to its origin, Anders has doubts about *techne* because, fuelled by humanity's will to will, it aims at manufacturing a new φύσις in which humanity will have no role. So, whereas Heidegger keeps his reflections on a purely theoretic-ontological approach that looks at the past of the origin as a means for forwarding his thinking, Anders sees humankind's only possibility in the adoption of a practical-moral behaviour that focuses on the present and its consequences for the future. "Technology has actually become the subject of history, alongside which we are merely 'co-historical'"<sup>597</sup>.

In respect to Anders and Adorno, Hölderlin plays a crucial role for both within the framework of the issue of *Naturgeschichte*. The conversation between Adorno and Anders also extends to Beckett and his contribution to the definition of the notion of catastrophe. As in the musical situation, Anders focuses on a methodological approach based on the idea of 'looking forward' and 'foreseeing' the arrival of the technological catastrophe similar to how he listens to the sound of silence to grasp music's ultimately inaccessible meaning. The reoccurrence of this method also means the re-presentation of his foundational idea, that of decentralised humanism. In the post-war period, *techne* merely steps in as the new historical agent capable of causing the overall decentralisation

<sup>597</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. II, p. 3.

of humanity into a mere co-historical agent. Even Adorno's approach is a continuation of concerns that mark his early musicology: his historically-based description of humanity's post-war alienation still trespasses into a utopian fantasy that collides with Anders' a-historical perspective. As before, the opposition between the two underlines a difference in their understandings of the role played by the human action and its consequences for the future. Adorno is undoubtedly not guilty of the same faults of Heidegger's defeatist position, yet from the Andersian perspective he fails to see that the final moments of the Genius' arc that he describes might merely mean that a new historical subject has emerged to dominate Nature. While Adorno believes that the alienation produced by *techne*, powered by humanity's will to will, can only end with the disappearance of the Genius, Anders claims that *techne* will appropriate everything, leading to the destruction of History as well.

The rationale, the proximity, and the biographical elements of this post-war debate between Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger uncover both open and covert discussions between the three well into the 60s. Heidegger's philosophy will be characterised by a defeatist perspective prohibiting humanity from acting upon its condition in any practical manner. Adorno's attempt to speak of a reconciliation between Nature, History, and humanity will still be inscribed within an aesthetic and theoretical framework that exposes the role played by Nature and History but not that of *techne*. In comparison, Anders' post-war exhortation to moral action aims at taking into account the impact played by Nature and *techne* alike while avoiding a relapse into a fatalistic and purely theoretical approach.

### 3.3 The Molussian Catacomb, a case study of bridging ruptures

*Prima facie*, it may appear that Anders is a philosopher of the rupture, since his entire corpus might easily be divided into several different moments each drastically different from the other: phenomenology, musicology, philosophical anthropology, and philosophy of technology. And yet, there is an undeniable<sup>598</sup> thread that links all of these together.

<sup>598</sup> As Mosshammer notes, the novel *The Molussian Catacomb* "can be described as the secret central book of [Anders'] work, since he regularly points to Molussia in his other books". See, Philippe-Armand R. Mosshammer, 'Der Begriff der Geschichte bei Günther

Two works, *The Molussian Catacomb* and *Homeless Sculptures*, particularly demonstrate how Anders played with the idea of rupture and with the possibility of bridging it in his own idiosyncratic manner. *The Molussian Catacomb* is a dystopian novel that Anders wrote in the early 1930s and kept revising until 1938, and which was published only after Anders died in 1992. In it, Anders tells the story of two prisoners living in solitary confinement in the imaginary country of Molussia which is run by a totalitarian regime. In the silence of this dark prison, the jailers write down the dialogue between the two main characters Olo and Yegussa, the only holders of the secret truth which counters the falsifying propaganda of the world above them. For generations, the older prisoner has taken the name of Olo and with the younger prisoner, called Yegussa, has thought up the story of Molussia in the form of apologues and parables.

Olo and Yegussa forsake their names and their own identity and survive only through talking and hearing each other, since in the pitch black of the catacomb the only semblance of life is given through hearing the voice of the other. The focus of Anders' novel is not that of conveying the repressive and ideological system that dominates Molussia, but rather the vain strategies adopted by the prisoners to find meaning. Through their continuous dialogue, Olo and Yegussa exhibit the loss of autonomy of the individual, the perplexity over acting against the regime, the inadequacy of the intellectuals that guide the revolution, and the contingency of the world<sup>599</sup>. In the darkness of the catacomb the real story of Molussia is constructed through a diverse and complicated interplay of the voices of the prisoners, for which reason Anders' writing seems to be an endless experiment. Olo and Yegussa are not men, they have no memory or body; they are not real humans but ghosts, outdated bodies that in order to survive are forced to suck the vital essence from the stories they tell each other. In this work the roots of Anders' fundamental anthropological category of his post-war corpus, that is, 'Promethean shame' [*prometeischer Scham*], can be seen. The outdatedness and the homelessness of humanity together with its shame before its objects are all themes that Anders re-

Anders' (University of Vienna, 2012), pp. 13, 162, 189.

<sup>599</sup> Pier P. Portinaro, 'La Prigione Della Storia: Günther Anders e La Catacomba Molussica', in *George Orwell: Antistalinismo e Critica Del Totalitarismo: L'utopia Negativa: Atti Del Convegno, Torino, 24-25 Febbraio 2005* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2005), pp. 181-98 (p. 189).

turns to in his 1943 essay *Homeless Sculptures*<sup>600</sup>. Here, Anders draws on Rainer Maria Rilke<sup>601</sup> for his incisive analysis of Rodin's sculptures. The sculptures of Rodin give a representation of the homelessness of humanity in its social sense. The feeling of not having a home in the modern world, that is, of losing one's *Heimat*, became an issue for Anders' exile in France and USA<sup>602</sup>. The direct correlation between the two works, and the influence on his later philosophy of technology, is evident from the incipit of the 1943 essay: "‘Things’ - *Dinge*. It is with this sober word that Rilke opened his famous speech on his master, about forty years ago - that gospel that made a whole generation see, understand and misunderstand Rodin. When Rilke pronounced this word, he expected, and truly provoked a sort of holy silence concerning the noisy world of objects surrounding us. [...] Mankind around 1900 was living in a world which had made everything: man, man's time, man's relation to man, an exchangeable element in a system of commodities. Exchangeability means: no thing is identical with itself any longer; but determined and defined by its universal commodity relation, by the market. It is, as sociology calls it, 'alienated'"<sup>603</sup>. The sculptures of Rodin speak of the grandiose failure of things that, in order to survive, no longer have a dwelling, no longer have a home. Rilke, and thus Anders in his reinterpretation of Rodin, denounces the sign of an era that does not have (anymore) an architecture or a space for the sculptor, so that he is forced to create 'isolated things'. The Andersian interpretation of Rilke's essay on Rodin uses the categories of 'being-without-a-home' and 'being-without-a-world' to depict the lack of a suitable social place to contain humanity just as there is no suitable place to showcase the sculptures of Rodin.

The *Molussian Catacomb* and *Homeless Sculptures* are connected by

<sup>600</sup> For the unbroken link between Anders' two essays see, J. Dawsey, 'Marxism and Technocracy: Günther Anders and the Necessity for a Critique of Technology', *Thesis Eleven*, 153.1 (2019), p. 43, A. Meccariello, 'Corpi Scaduti. Note a Margine Di Alcuni Scritti Di Günther Anders', in *Corpi Teorie Pratiche e Arti Dei Corpi Nel Novecento* (Roma: Kainos, 2012), p. 96, Velotti, p. 167.

<sup>601</sup> As mentioned before, Anders wrote about Rilke's *Duino Elegies* with his first wife Arendt in 1930. In this work they discussed, among other things, the acoustical implications of Rilke's poetry.

<sup>602</sup> It is not a coincidence that the whole time spent in exile roughly coincides with the period during which Anders also wrote the *Molussian Catacomb*.

<sup>603</sup> G. Stern, 'Homeless Sculpture', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 5.2 (1944), p. 293.

their thematisation of major concepts that eventually lead Anders to write his two volumes on the *Die Antiquirtheit des Menschen*<sup>604</sup>. This very passage from the earlier to the later phase of Anders' research is an embodiment of several subthemes that track his trajectory from music to poetry and the evolution of the former into the latter in Anders' philosophy. While music/hearing and poetry enjoy just a subtle presence in *The Molussian Catacomb* and *Homeless Sculptures* and are not as central as the alienation these works try to describe, they are still fundamental. In *The Molussian Catacomb*, which makes constant reference to Anders' earlier work throughout, Olo and Yegussa are blind in the pitch-black catacomb and can only interact with each other via their sense of hearing<sup>605</sup>. The role of music and poetry is also apparent in the numerous short poems and songs that describe and depict the cultural world of Molussia as well as its abundant contradictions. Moreover, the word 'Molussia' itself has a profound musical-poetic connotation since it evokes the trisyllabic monotactic poetic foot of the molossus<sup>606</sup>. Music and poetry serve as reminders to Olo and Yegussa of a world they cannot reach or interact with.

<sup>604</sup> F. Cozzi, 'Günther Anders. Dall'Uomo Senza Mondo Al Mondo Senza Uomo' (Università degli Studi di Pisa, 2010), pp. 34–5 and Meccariello, p. 95.

<sup>605</sup> Ellensohn and Putz write: "there is no light source in the dungeon, the prisoners cannot see each other, cannot recognise each other's facial expressions or gestures, and are dependent solely on voice and hearing" [*Im Kerker gibt es keine Lichtquelle, die Gefangenen sehen einander nicht, können weder Mimik noch Gestik des anderen erkennen, sind angewiesen allein auf Stimme und Gehör*]. See, R. Ellensohn and K. Putz, 'Übermorgen Streifzüge Durchs Zeitgelände', *Günther Anders-Journal*, 1 (2017), p. 2.

<sup>606</sup> Babich mentions this musical-poetic element of *The Molussian Catacomb* in several of her works. She writes: "several commentators have expressed perplexity but the origination is patent enough, especially where Anders himself was, like Adorno, a student of music and musical sociology no less as well having been, in this like Nietzsche, a student of rhythm, and thus in accord with a particular and trisyllabic monotactic version of the more well-known dactyl or anapest, there is also the molossus – – – which also has the monotonic musical illustration: | | |". "Anders's fairy-tale collection, *The Molussian Catacomb*, mystifies readers with its mythic resonances between Athens and Jerusalem, in addition to metric musical associations that can, perhaps, illuminate the machine imagery articulating the novel's constellation of transformation and concealment, echoing the molossus (---), itself a metrical foot, like the dactyl (- ^^) or anapest (^^ -)". See, B. Babich, 'Radio Ghosts: Phenomenology's Phantoms and Digital Autism', *Thesis Eleven*, 153.1 (2019), p. 59; B. Babich, *Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022), p. 30; B. Babich, 'O, Superman! Or Being towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, And Media Aesthetics', *Divinatio*, 36.40–100 (2013), p. 96. For a musical representation of the molussian foot see, A. Reicha, *Vollständiges Lehrbuch Der Musikalischen Composition* (Vienna: Diabelli, 1834), p. 472.

Yet, the existence of this ‘ghostly’ world fulfils the mission of depicting a reality that no longer exists, and perhaps never did. This teaches not only Olo and Yegussa, but also all those who listen to their music, poetry, and stories, that there is an alternative for those who care to listen. *Homeless Sculptures*, too, tracks a distinctly musical-poetic path in Anders’ thinking. As already mentioned, Anders had already worked on Rilke with his first wife Hannah Arendt and had discussed the acoustic consequences of Rilke’s *Duino Elegies*<sup>607</sup>. The prominence of the discussion of Rodin and sculpture notwithstanding, Anders uses Rilke’s poetry to express the idea that his poetry, as evidently influenced by Rodin, represents the shortcomings of an epoch in which humanity, poetry, and architecture have lost their own places and become homeless. Rilke embodies the pessimism of Anders’ works on technology, too, since if “Rilke had been a philosopher, he would have said: there are no ‘things’ any longer, but only machines and commodities”. Rilke wants to rescue humanity’s products, *à la* Heidegger, but “to reinstate [them he must] cut off their ties which connect them with the ‘frightful spider web of the world’ and which deprive them of their identity”<sup>608</sup>. Thus, as Anders will later write about Heidegger, Rilke was a nostalgic romantic and in his “harmless and non-committal realm of poetry Rilke too was a machine-smasher”<sup>609</sup>.

This continuous back and forth between poetry and music in Anders’ pre-war writings suggests the weight that the acoustic perspective had on him in his early works but also implies that Anders never renounced the insight that both music and poetry could provide him, since even after the war he continues to refer to Molussia or directly to poetry. By following this musical-poetical trajectory across the decades, it becomes possible to compare Anders with Adorno and Heidegger on a level that is otherwise inconspicuous for, as seen above, the musical-poetical concern is what ultimately leads Anders to study technology and the alienation that it causes in a way comparable to Adorno and Heidegger. In turn, it becomes newly relevant to address how Anders, Adorno and Heidegger alike sought to analyse post-war alienation through the mediation of their investigations of the poetry of Rilke and Hölderlin. Section 2: The post-war dispute

<sup>607</sup> See, Babich, *Günther Anders’ Philosophy of Technology*, p. 72.

<sup>608</sup> Stern, ‘*Homeless Sculpture*’, p. 294.

<sup>609</sup> Stern, ‘*Homeless Sculpture*’, p. 294.

## Chapter 4: But where the danger grows, the responsibility grows immeasurably

### 4.1 Techne and poetry in Heidegger?

The purpose of this chapter is to address the diverse and multifaceted critique that Anders elaborated in his only work on Heidegger's post-*Kehre* philosophy, *Über Heidegger*<sup>610</sup>. In this sense the themes addressed will be the paracletal nature of Heidegger's philosophy, its Plotinian influence, and what Anders refers to as Heidegger's *Genitivtrick*. This analysis will thus move from a mere poetical dispute on the interpretation of Rilke and Hölderlin<sup>611</sup> to a critique of technology-induced alienation which will expose to what extent Heidegger's post-*Kehre* philosophy is

<sup>610</sup> As Dawsey notes in his *Ontology and Ideology: Günther Anders's Philosophical and Political Confrontation with Heidegger*, *Über Heidegger* contains what Anders called the "transition from obstinate philosophy to a pious philosophy" in Heidegger's post-war thinking. Dawsey's text remains paramount for a critical evaluation of the confrontation between Anders and Heidegger's post-war philosophy for it points out at a ninety pages manuscript contained within *Über Heidegger* titled *Frömmigkeitsphilosophie* (Philosophy of piety) which encapsules all the themes that this chapter will analyse. Although this chapter borrows from Dawsey's analysis it does not follow the same methodological approach, for Daswey mainly utilises *Frömmigkeitsphilosophie* to showcase how Heidegger's post-war writings stood against a politics of forgetting and selective remembering of the Nazism during the Adenauer years to which Heidegger contributed and from which he benefited. See, J. Dawsey, 'Ontology and Ideology: Günther Anders's Philosophical and Political Confrontation with Heidegger', *Critical Historical Studies*, December 1975, 2017, p. 26.

<sup>611</sup> As in Anders' case, the reason for this approach resides in the utilisation of a specific secondary source, that is D. Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life Heidegger and Life-Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). The reasons behind the usage of Farrell Krell text are two: First, he showcases the relevance of the notion of 'the Open' in relation to Heidegger's poetic reading of Rilke. Second, he pinpoints the primary sources to investigate the abovementioned themes. See, Farrell Krell, pp. 87, 303-304, 323.



adulterated with the same defeatist self-centrism described in chapter 2. If in his pre-war philosophy Heidegger used music<sup>612</sup>, hearing, and listening as means to reiterate *Dasein*'s and humanity's own centrality in the *cosmos*, then in his post-war philosophy Heidegger similarly elaborates a philosophy framed through an a perspective that aims at redeeming humanity from the horrors of *techne*. The reason behind this approach is grounded on the fact that Heidegger's analysis of Rilke and Hölderlin is not only on poetry *qua* "founding by the word and in the word"<sup>613</sup> but primarily a denunciation of the 'men of this earth' who "are provoked by the absolute domination of the essence of modern technology [...] into developing a final world-formula which would once and for all secure the totality of the world as a uniform sameness, and thus make it available to us as a calculable resource"<sup>614</sup>. But before addressing Anders' evaluation of Heidegger's post-war poetic-technological analysis it will be necessary to outline some key pertinent elements of Heidegger's philosophy. Then, in conjunction with an assessment of *Über Heidegger*, I will demonstrate that even if both authors advocate for a re-configuration of human thought concerning *techne*, they display two opposing perspectives. While Heidegger keeps his reflections within a purely theoretical-ontological approach that looks at the past of the origin as a means for advancing his thinking, Anders sees humankind's only possibility in the adoption of a practical-moral behaviour that focuses on the present and its consequences for the future. In this manner, Anders' critique discloses how both Heidegger's and Anders' post-war philosophies

<sup>612</sup> Wallrup noticed a similarity between the attunement of the Sarabande and Heidegger's *Gelassenheit*. "On the one hand, the whole work can be described as a rationalization of the Aria, where a fundamental structure is extracted from a simple piece of dance music, only to be exploited in a highly systematised way. On the other hand, this is done in a playful manner, affirming the potentialities of a musical material, letting it be what it is without forcing something upon it. We are herewith close to the *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger, where it stands for a mode of existence that makes it possible to endure in the world of technology without getting threatened by it, accepting and letting things be as they are". See, E. Wallrup, *Being Musically Attuned the Act of Listening to Music* (Burlington: Ashgate publishing limited, 2015), p. 155.

<sup>613</sup> M. Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. by K. Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, chapter. p. 58.

<sup>614</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin's Earth and Heaven*, p. 202. See also Dawsey, 'Ontology and Ideology: Günther Anders's Philosophical and Political Confrontation with Heidegger', p. 25.

remained truthful to the original ideas of their musicologically-inspired pre-war investigations.

Heidegger begins his confrontation with Hölderlin in the April of 1936 with a work entitled *Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*. There, Heidegger addresses the link between language and poetry by discussing five expressions by Hölderlin: first, “writing poems is the most innocent of all occupations”<sup>615</sup>; second, poetry “is the most dangerous of goods”<sup>616</sup>; third, “Much has man experienced. Named many of the heavenly ones/ Since we have been a conversation/ And able to hear from one another”<sup>617</sup>; fourth, “But what remains is founded by the poets”<sup>618</sup>; and fifth, “Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth”<sup>619</sup>. Through these lines, Heidegger discloses a tragic<sup>620</sup> dimension of his reflections, according to which humans are on this earth not because of their actions and accomplishments but rather because of poetry, which is considered to be similar to a game, a dream and thus ineffective for dominating and

<sup>615</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 53.

<sup>616</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 54.

<sup>617</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 56.

<sup>618</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *Remembrance*, p. 58.

<sup>619</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *Ister*, p. 60.

<sup>620</sup> Hölderlin himself gives a particular meaning to the word ‘tragic’. According to Veronique M. Foti, Hölderlin situates the tragic in the “context of an epochal transition that exacerbates the conflict between the aorgic and the organic principles. Although the situation of tragedy remains, for him, constant, how the tragic is understood within this situation does not [...] Hölderlin, in an agonized labour of thought, calls into question and subverts aspects of the speculative matrix of tragedy that he had himself elaborated in texts such as ‘Concerning the Tragic’, ‘Ground for Empedocles’, and ‘The Fatherland in Decline’”. See, Veronique M. Foti, *Epochal Discordance: Hölderlin’s Philosophy of Tragedy* (New York: New York Press, 2006), p. 105. According to Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks Hölderlin’s ‘tragedy’ refers to the prospect of bridging the abyss between natural necessity and human freedom, or between pure theoretical and practical reason. See, M. Froment-Meurice, ‘Aphasia’ the Last Word’, in *Philosophy and Tragedy*, ed. by M. De Beistegui and S. Sparks (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 212–29 (p. 223). Françoise Dastur understands ‘tragic’ as “a sacrifice through which the human being helps nature to appear as such, to come out of its original dissimulation, of what Heraclitus named its original *krypthestai* [dissimulation]. But in order to do such a service to nature, the sign has to become equal to zero, which means that the hero has to die”. See, F. Dastur, ‘Tragedy and Evil: From Hölderlin to Heidegger’, in *Law and Evil: Philosophy, Politics, Psychoanalysis*, ed. by A. Hirvonen and J. Porttikivi (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 31–40 (p. 33).

controlling the real. And yet, precisely because poetry is so ineffective it also grants humanity a wider and more profound salvation than the one humanity could have achieved through its actions. Through poetry, humanity is brought back to its being, to that quiet origin from which everything else originates. Poetry founds by naming, and in the process of naming things, poetry discloses the origin and gifts it to humanity. But this freedom of the poet to name everything is bound to a supreme necessity, that of the founding of Being. In this sense, poetry is 'bound in a twofold sense' because, on the one hand, poetry has to name and speak about the origin when the gods command it to do so through hints which foretell what is not yet fulfilled. On the other hand, poetry is nothing more than the interpretation of the 'voice of the people' which testifies to one's belongingness to this world. The poet "is the one who has been cast out—out into that between, between gods and men"<sup>621</sup>, but it is only in this kingdom in between, in poetry, that humanity can dwell.

Heidegger uses Hölderlin not simply because as a poet he is the only human that can receive hints from the gods, but because Hölderlin was able to foresee the 'time of need', that is, the time wherein we are now living and which is not yet ended. This time is characterised by "a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming"<sup>622</sup>. Hölderlin was the first one to perceive the time of need, as he grasped the moment in which humanity no longer hears the calling of being. He could perceive the coming of the time of need because he first understood its origin: ancient Greek thought. In addition to this, Hölderlin was also capable of singing the essence of poetry and it is because of these two merits that Heidegger is compelled to call him the 'poet's poet'.

The *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry* then further develops *Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung* with works that date from 1936 to 1968. In these studies, Heidegger argues that Being 'happens' in poetry in a way that completely overcomes the intentions of the poet. The conversation between thinking and poetry is aimed at revealing what poetry has always kept within itself, that is, Being. The new essays analyse a series of

<sup>621</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 64.

<sup>622</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, p. 64.

poems from Hölderlin, the first of which is *As when on a Holiday*. Here Heidegger notes that “what Hölderlin still calls ‘nature’ here resounds throughout the entire poem up to its last word. Nature ‘educates’ the poets”<sup>623</sup>. With the term ‘nature’, Heidegger argues, Hölderlin does not mean a precise being or the sum of all entities, rather the ‘all-present’ that in a ‘light embrace’ keeps all things in the quietness of its omnipotence. The complexity of this term is synthesised in the Greek notion of ‘φύσις’, which according to Heidegger means “that rising-up which goes-back-into-itself; it names the coming to presence of that which dwells in the rising-up and thus comes to presence as open”<sup>624</sup>. With φύσις, the Greeks could express the conflictual nature of truth which can be illuminated only while remaining obscure. This inner conflict of truth is what allows Hölderlin to reach ἀ-λήθεια<sup>625</sup>, which he also calls the ‘sacred’. With this last expression, Hölderlin alludes to the naming of things which by being named come to the Open, that is, to the truth. In this sense, nature is sacred because it “is prior to all actuality and all action, even prior to

<sup>623</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *As When On Holiday...*, p. 75.

<sup>624</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. *As When On Holiday...*, p. 79.

<sup>625</sup> Zimmerman writes, “he [Heidegger] translated the Greek term *aletheia* (‘truth’) as the event of unconcealment in which an entity manifests itself”. See, Zimmerman, p. 145. While talking about Heidegger’s theory of truth Ihde notes that “truth is *aletheia*, translated as ‘unconcealedness’, brought to presence within some opening that itself has a structure. Beings or entities thus appear only against, from, and within a background or opening, a framework. But the opening or clearing within which they take the shapes they assume, is itself structured. Overall, this structure has as an invariant feature, a concealing-revealing ratio”. See, D. Ihde, *Heidegger’s Technologies* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 30. Anders himself writes about Heidegger’s translation of *aletheia* saying that “Heidegger [...] translates the Greek word ἀλήθεια as ‘un-concealment’. Oddly, Heidegger did not ask the question about what this says about the fact that it is part of the nature of being to be concealed, despite the fact that this would have fit right in with his ontological philosophising. Naturally, the question must be asked, for it is not enough to reveal what was concealed. Philosophically, it is just as necessary to ‘reveal’ the very fact of the concealment. [...] To be concealed is in all likelihood the *conditio sine qua non* of the individual being. The question concerning the thing-in-itself is a question concerning the individual-in-itself. The truth is obstructed by being-individual. If we were to be able to penetrate into (individuated) being, we would de-individualize it, that is, we would annihilate it. Not even Heidegger interprets the fact, which is extremely odd for the unprejudiced philosophical gaze, that we are, at least partially, capable of ‘unconceal’ being. Ability is the answer to necessity: what I mean is that no life that is lived can be lived ‘not even for one instant’ in a world that is completely dark”. See, Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 392.

the gods"<sup>626</sup> and thus allows everything to be what it is. Moreover, given its 'super-temporality' nature disposes of both gods and people's being. Thus, what is sacred – with its omnipresent sacredness – on the one hand, guards and preserves every entity in its reality, in its being. On the other hand, it is before everything, precluding any experience of it. Because the sacred is that from which everything emerges and illuminated, it remains, in itself, "safe and sound"<sup>627</sup> and can guarantee and save every real entity. To do so the sacred must remain un-reachable. So how does humanity perceive the Sacred? Through poetry. Nature educates poets about its coming and through the poetic word reaches humanity. The sacred educates poets on the word that it itself gives them, and it gives itself via poetic words. The poetic word, unlike the common word, does not conceptualise or appropriate things and therefore guards the Sacred while nominating it. Only in this manner is it possible to grasp the Sacred in its conflicting nature. It is the attention of guarding the un-said, the darkness within the Sacred, that allows it to come as that which saves and illuminates. In the second *Erläuterung* Heidegger expands on the role of the poet through the poem *Homecoming / To Kindred Ones*. As mentioned above, the poet must preserve in the inaccessibility of his silence the quietness through which the Sacred gives itself to humanity. From the depths of the *Abgrund* begins the journey that the poet – and all of humanity with him – must walk: the *Heimkunft*. Heidegger faces here a peculiar kind of journey because it excludes a sluggish waiting but at the same time he does not identify this journey with a goal brings the poet further away from where he began his voyage. Heidegger notes several times that "what you seek, it is near, already comes to meet you"<sup>628</sup>. What one seeks does not lead further than where one has started since, as Heidegger notes, what is sought is already near and comes to the person that looks for it. And yet, the thing that one seeks is not at hand and this is why a journey is required in the first place. This thing the poet seeks is called by Hölderlin the 'joyful'<sup>629</sup>. The joyful is what hints at the necessi-

<sup>626</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. As When On Holiday..., p. 81.

<sup>627</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 36.

<sup>628</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 42.

<sup>629</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 32.

ty of the journey and what illuminates and discloses everything for the poet. Again, Heidegger finds himself before the Sacred and immediately links it back to poetry. Hölderlin tells us that this journey is, as the title suggests, a homecoming, not to a physical space, however, but rather to the origin from which humanity itself comes and that cannot be fully grasped and defined. Heidegger writes that the homecoming “is a place of nearness to the hearth and to the origin”<sup>630</sup>. This line is fundamental for clarifying the importance of the poet and of what has been said so far. The one who can go back to the homeland is only the person that has undertaken the journey, who courageously took upon herself the risk of the journey, abandoning what is certain, obvious, and falsely reassuring in order to reach the unknown. This unknown is the *Abgrund*, the lack of foundation that humanity aims at defining so that, via its definition, humanity can dominate what has found. The poet is the first one to walk this path and while walking it he understands that walking is not a matter of conquering but of the simple joyfulness of being near to the source. He does not bind himself to the *techne* that wants to manipulate everything, but to the poetic art that, with its saying, offers a new world that uncovers the non-deducible and unknowable origin. As Heidegger notes, “the nearness that now prevails lets what is near be near, and yet at the same time lets it remain what is sought, and thus not near”<sup>631</sup>. The poet who respects the absence of nearness can keep the source close while remaining distant; he is the only one who can welcome the mystery as a mystery without analysing or unravelling it. This appears as a transgression of the fundamental law of thinking, that is, the principle of non-contradiction, a non-sense, and that is why the poet must agree to speak as a madman. Nonetheless, as Heidegger admits, the poet must talk since his words are the words of the most joyful: “this is why poetic ‘singing’, because it lacks the genuine, naming word, remains a song without words—‘lyre-music’. To be sure, the ‘song’ of the string-player follows the high one everywhere. The ‘soul’ of the singer does indeed glance into gaiety, but the singer does not see the high one himself. The singer is blind”<sup>632</sup>. Even if

<sup>630</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 42.

<sup>631</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 42.

<sup>632</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, pp. 45–46.

blind the poet should not be afraid of the *Abgrund* because only from the darkness can the light shine and thus let arise the word that would name the Sacred. So why is the poem titled also to the ‘*Kindred Ones*’? They are the fellow country people of the poet who are in the homeland but do not recognise the need of the journey with which the poet burdens himself. But they are still encouraged by the poet to witness the importance of the journey and the treasure that this disclosed: the mystery. They, too, must, similarly to the poet, think the mystery without unrevealing it. By being said the poetic word “slips out of the protection of the poet [...] That is why the poet turns to others, so that their remembrance may help in understanding the poetic word, so that in understanding each may have come to pass a homecoming appropriate for him”<sup>633</sup>.

Thus, Heidegger arrives at the opening gambit of his third elucidation, which analyses Hölderlin’s *Andenken*. Here, as in the two previous *Erläuterungen*, Heidegger is interested in what is left not said, which hence enables the poet to present the mystery. Here Hölderlin speaks of the north-east wind which guides the sailors, the travellers, and the poets towards the south-west, the land opposite to the homeland and thus the locus of the unknown. As already mentioned, the journey of the poet is not a journey aimed at travelling in itself or a conquering of distant land but a homecoming. The poet has always had a homeland from which and to which he can go, but such a homeland can never be fully possessed and thus is not familiar to the poet unless he makes it so. The necessary journey is a voyage that cannot be realised without a conversation with the Other. “This is the law” – writes Heidegger – “by which the poet, by means of the poetic passage away from home to the foreign land, becomes at home in what is proper to him”<sup>634</sup>. This law is not a *Diktat* from the human will or a sporadic feeling of confusion; it is something coming from the homeland itself. It is the homeland that hides itself from the eye of the poet, and in this manner, it remains not fully understandable or definable. The source never is but constantly gives itself. The homeland, if it is the source, cannot fully display itself but must be open to the poet’s gaze. The spirit of the poet, because of its nature, cannot but look at the source for it wants to comprehend the homeland without dominating it. The spirit

<sup>633</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Homecoming / To Kindred Ones, p. 49.

<sup>634</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Remembrance, p. 112.

“takes into its essential will that which essentially grants the state of not being-at-home. That is the foreign, the kind of foreignness that also lets one think of the homeland”<sup>635</sup>. This movement from the homeland to the foreign and from the foreign to the homeland should not be understood as a classical dialectical movement of the inclusion of the other since the spirit which initiates it does not know, define, or represent the other. The other here does not turn into the familiar or the well-known. Only while keeping the other unknown as what it is can the poet ‘know’ it.

In this way, the one who has walked the journey can go back to the homeland and finally feel at home, certain of that founding fact that cannot be dominated and yet, because it is un-conquerable, can always give itself and allow the ‘founding’. In this journey, the spirit ‘valiantly forgets’, similarly to the poet who, on his way back home, forgets the north-east wind because he is finally back home. Through his journey, the poet has come back as one who comes from afar and who has sought what must be followed. This achievement can be accomplished only insofar as the poet keeps the gift of the mystery within his memory, which preserves him in the foreign land. Heidegger writes: “this remaining behind, after having arrived, must, as a return, always think back to, and think of the heavenly fire. Such remembrance in thought, however, cannot be the mere re-presentation of something past. [...] The thinking of ‘what has been’, that is, of what has come into presence, is a remembrance of a particular kind”<sup>636</sup>. The source always belongs to humanity since it is its origin, but in its giving itself to humanity it does not become a human possession. The poetising is therefore that human saying that does not want to appropriate what is said because it is conscious of its finitude.

For Heidegger, Hölderlin represents the fundamental poet, the poet’s poet. But he is not the only poet whom Heidegger discusses. In 1946 Heidegger participated in a conference titled *Why the Poets?* in which he extends his conversation on poetry to Rainer Maria Rilke while keeping Hölderlin the keystone of his elucidations. The title of the conference itself is reminiscent of a verse of Hölderlin’s elegy *Brot und Wein*. For Heidegger, the time prognosticated by Hölderlin is fully expressed by Rilke’s poetry. The time of need, or the time of poverty, was what Heidegger defined as the time of darkness characterised by the absence of both

<sup>635</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Remembrance, p. 116.

<sup>636</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, chapter. Remembrance, p. 119.



the gods who fled and the ones who are yet to come. This time is marked by the absence of the gods, but it is even darker for it is characterised by the oblivion of such deficiency. Thus, there is a lack of both the founding of the Sacred and the need for such founding, and this is the time of the *Abgrund*. The possibility of a new epoch can only come through the recognition of the lack of the Sacred and not via a looking for the old or new gods. In this sense, it is necessary to live this *Abgrund*, this lack of ground for re-discovering the possibility of the *Grund* itself. The poets, who are the ones who dare more than anyone else, begin their journey towards the dimmest darkness of this time and discover the traces left by the old gods, and as priests, they can create the temples for the ones who are coming. Rilke in this sense embodies the desperation of this time as well as the oblivion of the Sacred. The Sacred can only be found in the desolated desert that poetry has become.

This new Heideggerian *Erläuterung* departs from the verses of a poem taken from Rilke's *Sonnets to Orpheus* which compares the human being to animals and plants. But such a comparison can only take place from a common ground which would include every entity: everything is related to nature, which "means the being of beings. It essences as the *vis primitiva activa*"<sup>637</sup>. Nature is thus the being which gathers everything in itself and releases all beings to their own selves. The metaphysical nature of Rilke's poetry thereby begins to emerge. Nature, which is the all-gathering, relates to every other creature in the same manner: nature, by being that being which wills everything, risks every being and thus abandons them to the risk of non-being. Heidegger writes: "so long as Rilke represents Nature as the risk, he is thinking of it metaphysically in terms of the essence of the will. This essence still conceals itself, both in the will to power as in the will as the risk. Will essences as the will to will"<sup>638</sup>. Being, insofar as it is understood as risk, is identified with the will to power, as a will that continuously risks itself for it wills so. In the dimmest of the dark nights of desperate times<sup>639</sup>, Heidegger finds pure subjectivism. Rilke represents the poet of desperate times because he is dominated by the

<sup>637</sup> M. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. by J. Young and K. Haynes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter. Why Poets?, p. 208.

<sup>638</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 209.

<sup>639</sup> Here Heidegger is referring to the poem of Hölderlin *Brot und Wein* and to the line "*und wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit*". See, Hölderlin, *Le Liriche*, p. 525.

categories and the thinking of such times. In hearing the poetic word of Rilke one grasps only the expressions of the most ominous outcomes of metaphysical thinking.

The beings that essence as the will to will are necessarily in danger so long as they are not protected from the risk of non-being. This does not mean that they are neglected by Being – if Nature would neglect them, they would not be there in the first place – but rather that they exist because they are in danger [*Wage*]<sup>640</sup>. Their essence, their entire founding resides in their being-in-danger. All entities are safe in the stability of the risk, in their being-in-danger. “Being, which holds all beings in the balance, therefore constantly attracts beings toward and unto itself, unto itself as the centre. Being, as the risk, holds all beings in this relation of attraction. However, this centre of attractive relation retracts itself from all beings at the same time. In this way, the centre gives beings over to the risk as which they are risked”<sup>641</sup>. In this attracting everything unto and towards itself resides the fundamental relationship that constitutes every being: the pure *Bezug*. Being is and is held in the balance by danger and only because of its attraction [*Zug*]<sup>642</sup> to the centre.

<sup>640</sup> Heidegger here reads the word ‘*Wage*’ in an idiosyncratic manner. He takes the original meaning of the word ‘balance’ and claims that such balance refers to nothing else than a situation that can turn in any moment one way or another. This is why, according to Heidegger, one can say that a tool that is ‘*bewegt*’ (moved) in the sense that it has lost its original balance. Consequently, ‘*Wage*’ can mean something which weighs and tips the balance one way or the other through its moving. What weighs must have a weight, and such weight might lead to unexpected situations. Thus, Heidegger can assert that ‘to risk’ as ‘*wagen*’ means to set in motion a process which can offset the balance ‘*Wage*’ and create a dangerous situation. See, Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 210.

<sup>641</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 210

<sup>642</sup> ‘*Zug*’, similarly to the already discussed word ‘*Wage*’, is defined by Heidegger in a precise and distinct manner. Following the idea that the risk simultaneously preserves the balance, Heidegger believes that in the process of ‘risking something’ that very same thing is cast off into none other than the pull or traction ‘*Zug*’ toward the centre. So, in risking something one is also retrieving ‘*beziehen*’ what is risked. In this sense, the pull – which is a form of risk – concerns all beings since it throws all things while pulling them back to itself.

‘In this sense Heidegger can speak of a proper relation or attraction ‘*Bezug*’ between that which is risked and what is retrieved. Rilke himself uses the word ‘*das Bezug*’ which makes it even more significant for Heidegger. The Rilkean expression ‘the whole *Bezug*’ cannot even be thought if we represent ‘*Bezug*’ as a mere relation. “The gravity of the pure forces, the unheard centre, the ‘pure *Bezug*’, the ‘whole *Bezug*’, ‘full Nature’, ‘life’,

Rilke's poetry depicts a reality fully categorised via the ontological difference between Being and beings which nonetheless allows catching a glimpse of the Open. This notion, common to both Rilke and Heidegger, reveals a difference between their understandings thereof. However, Rilke's Open is a by-product of a metaphysical perspective and is definable as the 'widest compass' within which all entities reside. Rilke's compass is necessarily delimited, closed by borders which keep different beings inside and behave with them in different manners. Rilke's Open is completely different from the opening of the entity that comes to being through its other as seen in both Hölderlin and Heidegger. For Heidegger, the Open<sup>643</sup> can be understood only through its non-being-hidden, through the opening that discloses it and that illuminates it. In this way, Heidegger can counter Rilke's delimiting roundness with the sphericality of an "illuminating globe which does not embrace, but rather itself releases illuminatingly into presencing"<sup>644</sup>. According to Rilke, plants and animals are simply in this world, in the Open, and they let themselves be dominated by the forces within the compass, that is, they let Nature gather and release them. Humanity, because of its particularity which enables it to investigate its founding, stands before the Nature that constitutes it for it wants to define it. In this manner a fundamental metaphysical relationship is established between the two, that one of subject and object, which becomes humanity's new method of dwelling on this Earth. As a compass that gathers and releases everything, the Open is effectively objectified by the consciousness that frames it within the conceptual limits of the human mind.

So, the Open becomes the object of human consciousness but also the

the 'risk' are all the same. All these names speak of beings as such in their entirety because they are framed within the language of metaphysics". See, Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, Why Poets?, chapter. pp. 211-212.

<sup>643</sup> As Mazzoni indicates, a central position of the entire Heideggerian philosophical enterprise consists of stressing the fact that Being manifests simultaneously through the optic and acoustic sphere. See, Mazzoni, p.99. Heidegger himself argues in favour of such hypothesis when he writes: "*Hellen* [to clear], along with *hell* [clear], mean the same as *Hallen* [to resound] in the sense of 'resounding'. In the sense of the [primordial] event of the self-manifestation of being, *Hellen* [to clear] occurs originally as *Hallen* [sounding], as tone. All other beings fall short of this fundamental tone [*Grundton*]" M. Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, trans. by F. Mayr and R. Askay (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 181.

<sup>644</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 226.

object of the human will. For this reason, the being-in-danger of humanity is different from that of plants and animals. Humanity follows Nature, the pure *Bezug*, for it is moved by the risk which wills Nature and poses it as the object of humanity's entire will. The human essence that Rilke defines is the daughter of *techne*, and in this new dimension humanity can impose itself as "the producer who asserts himself and establishes this insurgency as absolute mastery"<sup>645</sup>. In other words, in Rilke's poetical writings, what Heidegger has defined as the world of the *Gestell* can be found. In this world, all entities, even humanity, are not understood in their unconditional founding and, because of this, they lose their essential value and are depreciated into commodities of the world's market. Humanity in the oblivion of the ontological difference is devaluated to the level of all the other things and risks being understood in the same manner as every other representable and controllable object. This threat is inherent in the *Bezug* in which humanity has always found itself. In this new situation, humanity needs protection that can only be given from the source and the Open since these encompass all the things which might threaten humanity. As seen above, no entity is particularly protected, but since they are all contained within the compass they are somehow reassured of their being. However, inasmuch as humanity behaves according to its will to power, it is not protected at all. The original danger, then, is the will to power which turns humanity into an auto-imposing being that is drastically separated from the Open. Humanity, in its *techne*-induced illusion of being able to organise the world according to its will, believes itself to be safe, but as Heidegger notes: "what threatens man in his essence is the opinion that technological production would bring the world into order when it is exactly this ordering that flattens out each *ordo*, that is, each rank, into the uniformity of production and so destroys in advance the realm that is the potential source from which rank and appreciation originate out of being"<sup>646</sup>.

In this sense, it is not merely the totalitarian character of the will to power that constitutes the danger but rather the will to will in a world that sees itself as essentially willing. *Techne*, in its illusory promise of safety, impedes the comprehension of its essence. In this sense, any form of salvation [*Heile*] is forbidden because "the world is being emptied of

<sup>645</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 216.

<sup>646</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 221.

what is whole and heals [*heil-los*]. As a result, not only does the Sacred [*das Heilige*] remain hidden as the path to the godhead, but even for what is whole, the path to the Sacred appears to be extinguished<sup>647</sup>. Humanity must see the threat of the lack of salvation as a threat in itself without falling victim to the charm of the technological. To see such a threat humanity must descend to the *Abgrund* of the desperate times and witness its desperation. Only in the desperate times of the *techne* does the possibility of salvation reside: “but where the danger lies, there also grows that which saves”<sup>648</sup>. By renouncing the charms of *techne* and the opposition towards the Open, humanity can acquire its security within the pure *Bezug*. Heidegger notices that “safe, *securum, sine cura* means: without care. Care has here the nature of deliberate self-assertion along with the ways and by the means of absolute production”<sup>649</sup> that *techne* falsely produces.

What brings humanity to safety is that risk that dares more than life itself and thus brings humanity to the *locus* of its being-without-protection. This place is unreachable from the willing consciousness that aims at objectifying the Open and putting fictional safe barriers in front of humanity’s being in danger. Here humanity can find what constitutes its essence as a conscious entity. The overturning of desperate times must thus come from within human consciousness and lead towards this unreachable place from which it originates. What saves happens inside pure subjectivity. This is why Heidegger writes that “the reversal of consciousness is, therefore, a memory of the immanence of the objects of representation, a making inward into presence within the heart’s space”<sup>650</sup>. This memory of immanence reverses humanity’s essence of self-willing beings into the invisible space of its heart. Here everything is immanently inverted: everything is facing the authentic inside of the consciousness where everything intimately faces each other. In this manner, the interiority of this intimate human space opens the Open itself and brings safety from the *Diktat* of the calculating consciousness.

#### 4.2 Anders’ critical perspective

Anders’ attack against Heidegger is multifaceted but revolves around a series of easily identifiable arguments: 1) Heidegger’s *Kehre* is a mys-

<sup>647</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 221.

<sup>648</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 222.

<sup>649</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 221.

<sup>650</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, pp. 230–31.

tical philosophy in line with Plotinus'; 2) Heidegger's philosophy is a theodicy enwrapped by a false positive-dialectical process; 3) the deification of the poet is a subterfuge for simulating pseudo-activity while simultaneously professing the need for non-action. 4) The elimination of the concept of 'need' in Heidegger is an attempt to exclude the human body. After a brief introduction where he states that Heidegger's new phase "is difficult to define with a single label" [*daß sie mit einem einzigen Etikett schwer bezeichnet werden kann*]<sup>651</sup> Anders asks a series of questions which aim at showing how Heidegger's entire quest for reaching back into Being is problematic from the start. First, he asks: "assuming that 'thinking about ... Being' is our monopoly, why does it define us, or, in other words, why does that define our essence?" [*Selbst unterstellt, das 'Denken an ... das Sein' sei unser Monopol, warum definiert es uns, oder, in einem Wort, warum macht das unser Wesen aus?*]<sup>652</sup>. According to Anders, Heidegger would reply that "since Being hungers for remembrance, it creates a remembrance" [*da das Sein nach Gedenken hungert, schafft es sich ein Gedenkendes*]<sup>653</sup>. Thus, Being needs a 'shepherd of Being' [*Hirte des Seins*] that ventures into remembrance for Being which is so "originally un-evident"<sup>654</sup> that a shepherd must first create it. Second: "is it not an unfortunate mistake of Being to 'occur' and precisely employ that being as a shepherd whose susceptibility to forgetting-Being is so great that the whole story amounts to nothing but a story of his forgetfulness-of-being?" [*Ist es nicht ein bedauerliches Versehen des Seins, als Hirten gerade dasjenige Wesen zu 'ereignen' und anzustellen, dessen Anfälligkeit für Seins-Vergessenheit so groß ist, daß die ganze Geschichte auf nichts anderes hinausläuft als auf eine Geschichte seines Seins-Vergessens?*]<sup>655</sup>. Third: "isn't Heidegger with the determination of the essence of man falling into the trap into which philosophical anthropology has so often fallen: has he not made the philosopher the model of man in general?" [*Ist nicht Heidegger mit der Wesensbestimmung des Menschen in jene Falle gelaufen, in die die philosophische Anthropologie so oft gelaufen ist: hat er nicht den Philosophen zum Modell des Menschen überhaupt gemacht?*]<sup>656</sup>. Fourth:

<sup>651</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 283.

<sup>652</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 288.

<sup>653</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 288.

<sup>654</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 289.

<sup>655</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 289.

<sup>656</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 289.

“assuming that being able to remember Being is *our differentia specifica*; our ‘determination’ in the sense of *horismos*: doesn’t Heidegger’s ‘determination’ immediately assume the meaning of ‘conferred determination’ in a philosophical short circuit?” [*Unterstellt selbst, des Seins gedenken zu können, sei unsere differentia specifica; unsere ‘BeStimmung’ im Sinne des horismos: nimmt Heideggers ‘BeStimmung’ nicht in philosophischem Kurzschluß sofort den Sinn ‘verliehene BeStimmung’ an?*]<sup>657</sup>. And fifth: “isn’t it as hybrid as it is naive to believe that this memory is effectively a protection of Being?” [*Ist es nicht ebenso hybrid wie naiv zu glauben, dieses Andenken sei effektiv eine Behütung des Seins?*]<sup>658</sup>. In short, Heidegger, similarly to Rilke before him, “has the monstrous hubris of believing that he could ‘save’ things through language; [Heidegger is] convinced that Being, in order not to get lost, needs us - and indeed our words”<sup>659</sup>. And yet, Anders writes that “it remains to be seen whether Rilke went as far as Heidegger in believing that the house in which man takes Being is the house in which Being takes itself through man”<sup>660</sup>. The purpose of these questions is to highlight how Heidegger, amid the ongoing process of the degradation of the concept of man as a ‘piece of world’ through which humanity has lost its ‘special role’ in the world through being cosmologically degraded and trivialised, stands in the sharpest contrast against Judeo-Christian anthropology. Nevertheless, through the distinction of the human being as one ‘occurrence’ of Being itself, as keeper or shepherd of Being, Heidegger manages to avoid mentioning that the world was created for humanity. Yet his type of human is certainly no less of a ‘master’ than in any other point in the history of creation.

Thus, it becomes clearer why Being needs humanity; but what about the inverse relationship? Why is Being compulsory? The deadly sin of Western history is, according to Heidegger, the fact that humanity has forgotten, or even suppressed, Being. This suppression is particularly evident when humanity pretends to talk about Being which only results in the former talking about beings, that is, in metaphysics. This Heideggerian hypothesis, writes Anders, needs to be discarded with the following questions: first: “With which right does Heidegger equate the histo-

<sup>657</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 289.

<sup>658</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 289.

<sup>659</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 290.

<sup>660</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 290.

ry of metaphysics with history?" [*Mit welchem Recht setzt Heidegger die Geschichte der Metaphysik mit [...] Geschichte gleich?*]<sup>661</sup> Second: "why is, even assuming that Being is really 'forgotten', this *forgetting* an offence?" [*Warum ist, unterstellt selbst, das Sein sei wirklich 'vergessen', dieses Vergessen ein Vergehen?*]<sup>662</sup>. This second point, in particular, seems to be the most incomprehensible for Anders, since Heidegger himself equates the forgetting of Being as Being's destiny, "as a self-forgetting of Being (as Being's getting lost in astray)"<sup>663</sup> – i.e., as an event beyond our responsibility. Third: "why is Being, or remembering Being, compulsory? Based on which demanding authority? Of Being itself? Or even an instance *epekeina* [beyond] Being?" [*Warum ist Sein, bzw. des Seins zu gedenken, obligatorisch? Auf Grund welcher fordernden Instanz? Des Seins selbst? Oder gar einer Instanz epekeina [jenseits] des Seins?*]<sup>664</sup>. And fourth: "what notion of an ontologically golden age is contained in this idea of refuse or fall?" [*Welche Idee von ontologisch goldenem Zeitalter ist in dieser Idee von Abfall oder Fall enthalten?*]<sup>665</sup>. Anders thinks that Heidegger, in his post-war philosophy, places an immense moral debt on humanity; a debt that ostensibly has to be repaid in an equally immense way, and through a 'recovery of Being', through the memory of Being, through a "memory in which the further fate of the West, indeed the new age, depends. He sets himself up such tremendous moral tasks. This task. In a time of camps and bombs. [The real task] consists in changing beings, not Being; saving human beings, not Being; then everything that happens suddenly becomes for him [...] Being's fate"<sup>666</sup>. The events of the war are Being's fate that no one should oppose; instead, one should think of an apparently much bigger source of guilt, the oblivion of Being that in Heidegger's eyes is far more than a mere act that only changes the world – this 'thinking' "is, *qua actus*, the change of the world"<sup>667</sup>.

Directly connected to Heidegger's sense of moral guilt is, for Anders, his interpretation of 'risk' [*Wagnis*] from Rilke's poetry. Anders does not refute the idea that Rilke's 'it dares us' [*es wagt uns*] requires a philo-

<sup>661</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 299.

<sup>662</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 299.

<sup>663</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 299.

<sup>664</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 299.

<sup>665</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 299.

<sup>666</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 300.

<sup>667</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 300.



sophical interpretation<sup>668</sup>, but he questions the possibility of using it to bring individuation to the individual because the latter is the one ‘daring’. Heidegger interprets it in such a way that Being ‘dares’ to detach itself from itself in the individual: “The question is, of course, whether as a philosopher one can use Rilke’s expressions so easily. Anyone who speaks of ‘daring something’ implies that ‘being’ is consciously exposing itself to a risk that it accepts - a statement that would remain beyond any possible verifiability. In Heidegger’s framework, however, this statement is completely incomprehensible, because being ventures into something that becomes being as a shepherd, i.e., the opposite of ‘danger’. Indeed, what Heidegger means here can only be formulated mythologically”<sup>669</sup>. Anders sees in the approach used by Heidegger a form of positive dialectic which is capable of reinstating what it claims to refute. Thus, for Anders, a striking link emerges between Heidegger’s usage of poetry and Plotinus’ philosophy.

This proximity between Rilke and Plotinus for describing the ontological difference might seem arbitrary at first glance, but it is Heidegger himself who uses a Plotinian image. While discussing Rilke’s poetry, Heidegger writes: “what is the widest compass? Presumably, Rilke is thinking of the Open [...] The widest compass encircles everything that is. To encompass is to unite around all beings, so that it is indeed, in the union that unites, the being of beings”<sup>670</sup>. Furthermore, Heidegger calls the Being of beings “*Ev*, the One that ones, the union that unites”<sup>671</sup>. As previously mentioned, according to Rilke the widest encompass is characterised by a sphericity that encircles and surrounds beings. Heidegger offers a different account for overcoming Rilke’s metaphysical language. He proposes a diverse relationship through which the Being of beings is kept in unity in Being: “this union that unites everywhere in this way permits us to call it the illuminating globe which does not embrace, but rather itself releases illuminatingly into presencing”<sup>672</sup>. Heidegger speaks

<sup>668</sup> “I am the last to deny that his poetry needs a philosophical interpretation, as a co-commentator of the *Duino Elegies*” [*Zu leugnen, daß seine Dichtung philosophischer Deutung bedarf, bin ich, als Mitkommentator der Duineser Elegien der letzte*]. Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 301.

<sup>669</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 301.

<sup>670</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 225.

<sup>671</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 226.

<sup>672</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. Why Poets?, p. 226.

about an ‘Illuminating globe’, that is, the sun, which is used by Plotinus in his theory of the ‘undiminished giving’<sup>673</sup> where the sunlight is not diminished by illuminating but simply continues to shine forth. The Plotinian influence on Heidegger has for Anders at least two consequences: 1) “First, the appeal to Plotinus would make an Occidental ontological monopoly obsolete” [*Erstens würde die Berufung auf Plotin den Anspruch auf ein abendländisches ontologisches Monopol [...] hinfällig machen*<sup>674</sup>]<sup>675</sup>; 2) “Second, if Heidegger would have invoked Plotinus, he would have to overturn his entire historical construction: the apotheosis of the early days, the assertion that the oblivion of Being had already begun with Plato; for the fact that claiming that Plotinus was an early author could not have been made plausible with any violent interpretation of history” [*Zweitens aber hätte Heidegger, wenn er sich auf Plotin berufen hätte, seine ganze Geschichtskonstruktion: die Apotheose der Frühe, die Behauptung, die Seinsvergessenheit habe schon mit Plato angehoben, über den Haufen werfen müssen; denn daß Plotin früh war, hätte er ja durch keine noch so gewaltsame Geschichtsdeutung plausibel machen können*]<sup>676</sup>. In this sense, Anders points to a fundamental issue with the Heideggerian interpretation which claimed to go back to the origin of the Greek thought but simultaneously references back to Plotinus who cannot belong to such origin.

The proximity of Heidegger with Plotinus becomes even more significant when Anders notes that in order “‘to see’ the *Hen*, one should not *diökein* (search, seek out) it, but one must wait, *hesyche menein*, and

<sup>673</sup> Plotinus, *The Enneads*, trans by S. MacKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991). On the theory of ‘undiminished giving’, Wallis writes: “we now come to the point where the need to dematerialise the emanation simile is greatest, the doctrine of ‘undiminished giving’ [...] Here Plotinus’ view of the celestial bodies makes the image more appropriate than may at first appear. For him, as for other Greek thinkers, the sun and stars are everlasting and will continue endlessly radiating heat and light throughout the universe without exhausting their energy (II. 3. 18. 19-22, VI. 4. 10. 22-30, VI. 9. 9. 1-11)”. R.T. Wallis, *Neo-Platonism* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), p. 62.

<sup>674</sup> “As far as Plotinus is concerned, there is much to suggest that he (who, according to Porphyrius’ testimony, was in the east) took over the identification from Persia – the sun-god comes from the Zoroastrian religion” [*Was Plotin betrifft, so spricht ja viel dafür, daß er (der ja nach Porphyrius’ Zeugnis im Osten war) die Identifizierung aus Persien übernommen hat – die Sonnenvergottung ist ja Zoroastrische Religion*]. Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 331.

<sup>675</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 330.

<sup>676</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 331.

prepare for it, *paraskeuasanta heauton*, just as one waits for the rising sun<sup>677</sup>. In this sense, Plotinus and Heidegger use the same differentiation between ‘wilful’ and ‘willing’, whereby the wilful obscures Being, while willing gives it the chance of becoming present<sup>678</sup>. In addition, in the rising of the *Hen* (which corresponds to the sun), Heidegger’s concept of Being is recognisable – because Heidegger identifies Being with *physis* and translates *physis* as ‘*Aufgehen*’. But if the *Hen* ‘goes upwards’ [*auf geht*], doing so, as Plotinus says, as a *parousia* which is present above all else, then the *Hen* is not something that is illuminated among others, but is the light itself in which something could become present at all<sup>679</sup>. In the rising and illuminating sun Plotinus finds the principle that ‘makes’ Being what it is and he calls it “*theos* [God], its making is not meant as ‘making’ or as ‘*creatio*’, but rather as ‘emanation’ - which is ‘creating’ neither in the ‘artificial’ nor in the ‘natural’ sense” [*theos* [Gott], so ist doch dessen Machen nicht als ‘Machen’ und nicht als ‘*creatio*’ gemeint, sondern eben als ‘Emanation’ – die ein ‘Erzeugen’ weder im ‘künstlichen’ noch im ‘natürlichen’ Sinne ist]<sup>680</sup>. Moreover, since for both Plotinus and Heidegger the essence of every being continues to exist in the *arche* from which it originates – just as the radius that originates from the centre borrows the centre’s essence – individuation is almost only an appearance, an emanation of the original *Hen*. Therefore, “what makes the individual Being be is thus the ‘realisation’ of something that actually goes further. Formally quite analogous to Heidegger, the will of the individual is a will that is ‘thrown into individual beings by the basic will’ and stiffens as its own” [*was das einzelne Seiende seiend macht, zum Stande (este), ist also das ‘Zustandekommen’ eines eigentlich Weitergehenden (prosö elthein). Formal ganz analog ist für Heidegger der Wille des Einzelwesens ein vom ‘Grundwillen in die Einzelwesen geworfener’ Wille, der sich als eigener versteift*]<sup>681</sup>.

Together with this Plotinian argument, Anders proposes, in a most vitriolic manner, the additional thesis that Heidegger is a philosopher of non-action. In a section titled *Sein und Atombombe* Anders writes: “anyone who talks about Prometheus in a fire is immoral. At a time when it is

<sup>677</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 331.

<sup>678</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 333.

<sup>679</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 334.

<sup>680</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 334.

<sup>681</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 335.

irrelevant whether we agree or disagree on the unmetaphorical question 'to be or not to be' - at a moment when the judgment about whether there should be a 'us' in the future rests in the hands of certain human powers that decide on actions of eschatological consequence - at this moment the thinker [Heidegger] is content to admonish us to remember Being: then everything will be better. He will say: precisely because in the course of 2,500 years we have lived with a deformed concept of Being - because we, as ambitious masters of beings, have only used beings as a 'frame' - we have got into the situation in which we ourselves become victims of our machinery. But our story - regardless of whether it is about Being or committed by our being innocently guilty, is not a mere story of degenerating metaphysics, and salvation from this situation cannot be carried out by an action which insists alone on evocation - because that combination of remembrance and expectation, which is what Heidegger is talking about, runs out of conjuration. Whether we limit ourselves in such a situation to praying [...] or whether we swear against Being is one and the same thing. Both actions are forms of inactivity - or activity insofar as they leave the decision to others"<sup>682</sup>.

For Anders, Heidegger's call to 'remember Being' is actually an invitation to do nothing. Even when Heidegger refers to Hölderlin's line, "where the danger grows, there also grows the saving power"<sup>683</sup>, he only offers a vague hope about the world as a whole. According to Anders, Heidegger prematurely sprinkles cosmic rumours about the parousia of healing into fear, which should motivate people to take action, but instead makes them completely inactive. Furthermore, Heidegger gives people the false reassurance of being active, as they believe they are engaging in an action of unparalleled significance simply by thinking. The hope that Heidegger awakens is paralyzing and defeatist in its effect. This is because we do not have to wait for what "Being will 'send' us - [after all,] who is 'sending'? We are the ones who have produced this world with its appalling consequences. Hopefully, it is in our hands that we, we humans, do not experience this fate of nothingness. It is not enough just to leave philosophy *modo philosophico* and to turn that leaving into

<sup>682</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 363.

<sup>683</sup> "Only he knows why - presumably because after every night there is a morning" [*Nur er weiß warum - vermutlich weil jeder Nacht ein Morgen folgt*]. See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 364.

a philosophy, as Heidegger does. Because the appeal to our ‘willingness’ to being instead of our will, will suit the evil will or the evil negligence of those in whose hands we are”<sup>684</sup>. Anders then alludes to the passage in *Why the Poets?* where Heidegger writes: “it is not as a particularly deadly machine that the much-discussed atom bomb is deadly. What has long threatened man with death, indeed with the death of his essence, is the absoluteness of his sheer willing in the sense of his deliberate self-assertion in everything”<sup>685</sup>. In response to this, Anders asks: who will deny that the atomic bomb, too, is only the result of human development? And isn’t the alienation that Heidegger finds culpable responsible for far more in concrete terms, as evidenced by all the stories of the development of human labour? Anders writes: “Heidegger dares the bomb, full of contempt against those who ‘discussed so much’ this latest horror, to be explained solely with reference to the ‘degeneration of the essence’ of man through the fate of the ‘world night of the withdrawing of Being’. When someone appears in a burning house with a raised index finger, and in the tone of ‘I always said it’, speaking of the hybrid act of Prometheus – will we not then find this, that is, his going back to the origin peculiar to say the least and push the man aside? The answer to fire is not Prometheus, but water. There are situations when insisting on origins is immoral”<sup>686</sup>. For Anders, Heidegger uses Hölderlin’s words “*wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch*”<sup>687</sup> to avoid giving any directives, his concern being not that “of action in the real framework of a bad reality, but rather that of remembering – of ‘daring to do it’ – the Being from which we have fallen away”<sup>688</sup>. Anders aims at postponing this risk; for him, it is enough “for us that one dares to speak of ‘being ready for the cause’ in the face of the atomic bomb. Everything has its time, including mysticism. But offering a mystical formula in the time of the atomic bomb is cynicism”<sup>689</sup>.

Additional proof of Heidegger’s refusal to act, for Anders, revolves around what he calls the *Genitivtrick*. With this term, Anders refers to Heidegger’s manner of translating objective genitives into subjective

<sup>684</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 364.

<sup>685</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, chapter. *Why Poets?*, p. 221.

<sup>686</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 365.

<sup>687</sup> F. Hölderlin, *Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, trans. by M. Hamburger (London: Anvil Press, 1994), chapter. *Patmos*, pp. 482–83.

<sup>688</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 365.

<sup>689</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 366.

genitives and *vice versa*, which helps him dilate “the difference between the philosophically relevant and the empirical” [*die Differenz zwischen philosophisch Relevantem und Empirischem*]<sup>690</sup>. By interpreting the direct object of an action within a sentence as the subject of said action, Heidegger believes he can overcome the *impasse* of his philosophy. Pointing this out, Anders compares Heidegger to Spinoza, writing that “just as with Spinoza the *amor dei*, the love of God, is at the same time the love through which God, by way of us, loves himself, so with him the preoccupation with Being is a preoccupation through which Being is on the detour via Heidegger, busy with himself. ‘Being’ seems to speak through his thinking: I let him think, therefore I am” [*So wie bei Spinoza der amor dei, die Liebe zu Gott, zugleich die Liebe ist, durch die Gott, auf dem Umweg über uns, sich selbst liebt so ist bei ihm die Beschäftigung mit dem Sein eine Beschäftigung, durch die das Sein sich, auf dem Umweg über H[eidegger], mit sich selbst beschäftigt. Das ‘Sein’ scheint durch sein Denken hindurch zu sprechen: Ich lasse ihn denken, also bin ich*]<sup>691</sup>. This method is similar to the ontological proof of God: the fact that I can think of God proves that He exists since I could not think of Him if He did not exist. Similarly, according to Anders, Heidegger can claim that Being exists because he can think about it. This trick allows Heidegger to reinterpret the things happening and what exists as an action of an agent (Being, the poet, etc.). As an example, Anders cites the sentence: “*es gibt auf der Welt Würmer*” which Heidegger could reinterpret as “*die Welt wurmt sich*”<sup>692</sup>. While Anders agrees on the fact that both indicate the same thing, the issue is that by changing the original sentence nothing is really said concerning the *Welt* or the *Würmer*. This can be applied to every other notion used by Heidegger, which is why for Anders, Heidegger can claim that “everything is an action or a product of the World, the Hen or Being” [*alles (auch das Einmalige) Aktion oder Produkt des hen oder der Welt oder des Seyns*]<sup>693</sup>.

The last objection that Anders raises against Heidegger is specifically related to the concept of need and consequently to that of time. Heidegger, in § 44 of *Being and Time*, examines the conventional view of truth seen as agreement. Whether truth is understood as propositional

<sup>690</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 340.

<sup>691</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 340.

<sup>692</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 340.

<sup>693</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 341.

truth or material truth, in both cases *veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei*. According to this conception, the truth of something consists of the agreement between human intellect and things while the failure to agree is seen as untruth. Heidegger aims to question the validity of this position by finding a more primordial sense of truth which is found in “the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy”<sup>694</sup> and in the Greek word ‘*a-letheia*’ (un-concealment). Heidegger begins by analysing the prototypical example of this agreement theory: “to say that a statement ‘is true’ signifies that it discovers the entity as it is in itself”<sup>695</sup>. In this sense, a statement is supposed to make manifest how things are, and, if it is trustworthy, it should provide evidence of the way things are in the world. But since the statement is taken as evidence of something being the case, then Heidegger is compelled to ask how such a statement can demonstrate itself as true<sup>696</sup>. For instance, the statement: ‘the picture on the wall is crooked’ is verifiable only if a person looks at the picture to see whether or not it is crooked. This implies that things are ‘un-covered’ in statements that ‘disclose’ something through the activity of *Dasein*. Thus, truth understood as confirmation of the agreement between statement and reality rests on the primordial ability of *Dasein* to ‘un-cover’ things. But then truth “has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object)”<sup>697</sup>. “The most primordial ‘truth’ is the *locus* of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that statements can be either true or false—that they may un-cover or cover things up”<sup>698</sup>. Heidegger thereby transforms the theory of agreement between *intellectus et rei* into a theory of *Dasein*’s un-concealment. “There is truth only insofar as *Dasein* is and as long as *Dasein* is”<sup>699</sup>. Does this mean that where there is no *Dasein* there is un-truth? No, it means that *Dasein* has not yet made accessible something. As Heidegger notes, “before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’ [but] it does not follow that they were false”<sup>700</sup>. The un-covering of the primordial theory of *Dasein*’s un-concealment has

<sup>694</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 262.

<sup>695</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 260.

<sup>696</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 259.

<sup>697</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 261.

<sup>698</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 268.

<sup>699</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 269.

<sup>700</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 269.

methodological implications too. As un-concealment, *Dasein* is “in the truth”<sup>701</sup>, but because *Dasein* is also that which ‘hides’ things, it is equiprimordially in ‘un-truth’. Consequently, “entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance”<sup>702</sup>. For Anders, by contrast, this ‘un-covering’ is unthinkable without a ‘counter’ form of concealment insofar as beings can only step out into the clearing for a reason that itself remains inaccessible<sup>703</sup>. Here Anders is simultaneously attempting to save and condemn two different aspects of Heidegger’s conception of truth. On the one hand, Anders aims at defending the *adaequatio*; on the other hand, he tries to propose a positive interpretation of the term *Scheinen*<sup>704</sup>.

Concerning the first point, Anders says that the “*Adaequatio* is so easily seen as a degeneration of truth” [*Adaequatio [...] so ohne weiteres [als] eine Degeneration der Wahrheit zu sehen [ist]*] that Heidegger wants to trace back to a “basic case of truth” [*Grundfall der Wahrheit zurück*], to “a ‘playing oneself’ (as a person or a violin)” [*ein ‘sich einspielen auf’ (z. B. auf einen Menschen oder eine Geige)*]<sup>705</sup>. Thus, Anders says that the model of the *adaequatio*<sup>706</sup> is not a derivative mode of representation of truth, as Heidegger believed, but rather the archetype of the positive relationship between a “needy *Dasein*” [*bedürftigen Dasein*] and the “world that satis-

<sup>701</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 269.

<sup>702</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 264.

<sup>703</sup> Dieter Thomä in the *Nachwort zur Aktualität des Philosophen Günther Anders of Über Heidegger* provides the citations for Anders’ claim. See, Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 423 and M. Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927), p. 32, 212.

<sup>704</sup> Thomä writes: “*Anders’ Kritik setzt nun gewissermaßen am negativen wie am positiven Ende von Heideggers Überlegungen zum Wahrheitsbegriff an: einerseits bei der Abwehr der ‘adaequatio’, andererseits bei der positiven Deutung des ‘Scheinens’*”. Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, pp. 424-25.

<sup>705</sup> Here Anders is adopting the musicological vocabulary of his *Philosophische Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen*. Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 306

<sup>706</sup> “In central parts of his coming to grips with Heidegger, Anders latches on to the latter’s rejection of the concept of *adaequatio*, arguing that the primal scene of truth does not share the eruptive quality of Heidegger’s light-infused moments of ‘shining forth’ and ‘showing’. The true significance of *adaequatio* resides in a deeper aspect of truth: in a pliant, reciprocal relationship between subject and object, similar to what happens when we ‘warm up’ on a violin or get the feel of another person. Or in a remark that reads like the downright reversal of the prenatal fantasy and that harkens back to Anders’s theory of needs, truth is a form of incorporation”. See, Erlmann, pp. 338–39.



fies needs” [*bedarfdeckenden Welt*], that is, the model “of the incorporation and assimilation” [*der Einverleibung und Assimilation*]<sup>707</sup>. “The hungry man who happily spoons his soup and says: ‘this is the truth’, does not speak metaphorically”<sup>708</sup>. Anders wants here to place intentionality or the *Welterschließung* back into the anthropological structure of need that he utilised in his early anthropological philosophy without falling back into a naïve biologism. “In this moment of presence (of what was needed) the passage of time comes to an end, because for the happy there is no hour; and if the talk of the ‘meaning of *Dasein*’ has any meaning, then this does not consist (as with Heidegger) in time; rather in a lack of time: namely in the situation of saturation, restored balance, lack of needs” [*In diesem Augenblick der Präsenz – writes Anders – (dessen, worauf der Bedarf ging) hört der Gang der Zeit auf, denn dem Glücklichen schlägt keine Stunde; und wenn die Rede von ‘Sinn des Daseins’ irgendeinen Sinn hat, so besteht dieser nicht (wie bei H[eidegger]) in Zeit; vielmehr in Unzeitlichkeit: nämlich in der Situation der Sättigung, der restituierten Balance, der Bedürfnislosigkeit*]<sup>709</sup>. Anders re-defines the *adaequatio* as a relationship between humanity and world in which truth, happiness and time are all linked together via the idea of the ‘fulfilment of needs’<sup>710</sup>.

Concerning the second point, Anders addresses the matter of Heideg-

<sup>707</sup> Thomä presents a detailed explanation of Anders’ theory of need and time from Anders’

*Frömmigkeitsphilosophie*, Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, pp. 306, 425.

<sup>708</sup> “*Der Ausgehungerte, der, glücklich seine Suppe auslöffelnd, spricht: ‘das ist das Wahre’, redet nicht metaphorisch*”. See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 294. Thomä suggests that this remark reveals the influence of Anders’ ‘other’ teacher Husserl, who indeed spoke of the ‘ultimate fulfilment’ that the intentional act is supposed to have on the object. “*So sucht Husserl den Punkt, an dem die ‘Intention ihre (...) ‘endgültige und letzte Erfüllung erreicht’, und sieht darin die echte adaequatio rei et intellectus* (E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Bd. II. *Gesammelte Werke*, Den Haag 1984, S. 646 f.)”. Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 476, note 55.

<sup>709</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 294.

<sup>710</sup> Erlmann writes that: “for Anders, truth does not emerge suddenly, in a moment of rupture, as it does for Heidegger. The resolution of our longing for timelessness, according to Anders, is not a question of ontology or of Heidegger’s pseudohistorical phantasm, but of a well-lived life, of the successful handling of time in the satisfaction of our vital needs. If this reading is correct, Anders’s theory of culture is less the product of his emancipation from Heidegger than its medium. And so, the ultimate lesson of Anders’s anthropology of listening is perhaps the idea that it is in the plenitude of presence, in a realm beyond the threshold of sensory immediacy, but also well below the arrogance of reason, that musical situations put a stop to time”. See, Erlmann, p. 339.

ger's interpretation of truth as 'un-concealment'<sup>711</sup>. According to Anders, *a-letheia* should be exemplified through facial expressions because it is precisely in them that the game of revealing a character goes hand in hand with his restraint<sup>712</sup>. Just as Anders emphasises the contribution of man in his interaction with beings, in his rehabilitation of the '*adaequatio*', he now emphasises it even more in his reinterpretation of 'un-concealment'. For Anders, the terms '*Lichtung*', '*Entbergung*', '*Zeigen*', '*Offenbaren*', and '*Scheinen*'<sup>713</sup>, which are so central for Heidegger, are "fundamentally dative" as an 'appearing to someone' and without this fact the problem concerning truth cannot be resolved" [*grundsätzlich dativisch also als ein 'jemandem scheinen' und ohne diese Tatsache ist das Wahrheitsproblem nicht in Griff zu bringen*]<sup>714</sup>. By combining the fundamentally dative character of appearing with the notion of truth, Anders underlines the fact that truth only exists if it has a recipient, a beneficiary. According to Anders, the recipient of truth cannot be an idealised or autoreferential subject, as truth emerges from interactions with 'a counter' as well as from concrete situations. For instance, truth emerges in the interactions of two or more individuals, as in Anders' example of the tennis matches in chapter three, where the people involved continuously adjust what is being said or done to what appears to each one of them. This notion of appearing to someone becomes insufficient if the human – as in Heidegger's case – is only seen as a recipient who must get ready for an event. It is precisely in this examination of Heidegger's concept of truth that the two sides of Anders' thinking – the natural-philosophical and the social-philosophical – come to light insofar as he relies upon both the naturalness of need and the social dimension of the dative structure of truth. This criticism ultimately

<sup>711</sup> According to Thomä, if Heidegger's interpretation of truth is placed alongside Anders' reflections of *adaequatio* and need, then, the latter seems to fall into the perspective of modern subjectivism that the former wants to overcome. But Anders' approach avoids a subjectivistic stance by re-defining Heidegger's interpretation of '*Lichtung*', '*Entbergung*', '*Zeigen*', and '*Scheinen*'. Anders highlights how Heidegger himself is carrying out an anthropomorphic projection in which a vocabulary that comes from human interaction is transferred to something that is supposed to help people to transcend themselves. But this is a failing projection which only ends up back with itself. "The actual 'model' of Heidegger's '*Spekulation*' of the '*Scheinen der physis*' is physiognomy". Anders, *Über Heidegger*, pp. 313, 318, 426.

<sup>712</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 313.

<sup>713</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 383.

<sup>714</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 314.

induces Anders to raise objections to Heidegger's reduced treatment of human action not only because he wilfully demands more possibilities of intervention in practice, but also because Anders thinks that the concepts used by Heidegger have practical implications that he hides<sup>715</sup>.

A crucial consequence of this analysis carried out by Anders has to do with the human experience of time. According to Anders, the theory of temporality and historicity rooted in *Being and Time* as well as Heidegger's late thinking of destiny and the 'Ereignis' culminates in the departure from chronology<sup>716</sup>. For Anders, Heidegger understands history only as the moments of rupture opened by the clearing of truth, as a waiting for the *Ereignis*<sup>717</sup>. Accordingly, Anders speaks of Heideggerian time as a "Paracletal time [...] Moments in which the manifesting of being is caught in flagrant fashion: history breaks out in attacks to a certain extent [...] In fact, for him [Heidegger], history is only the moment of birth" [*parakletuelle(n) Zeit [...] Augenblicke, in dem das Sich-Offenbaren des Seins in flagranti ertappt wird: Geschichte bricht gewissermaßen in Attacken aus*

<sup>715</sup> Thomä writes that "instead of losing the 'ethical' in 'ontology' like Heidegger, Anders wants to uproot it from any ontological ground". Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 427.

<sup>716</sup> In spite of all the differences between the early and the late Heidegger, which Anders emphasises, he encounters a persistent attitude here. Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 357. In this regard is worth noticing that Aversano, Babich, Colombo, Oberschlick, and Thomä are the only scholars who explicitly refute the idea that Anders never discussed Heidegger's post-*Kehre* philosophy (*contra* Portinaro and Scamacca). See, A. Aversano, *L'Uomo è Antiquato: Da 'Pastore Dell'Essere' Diviene 'Pastore Dei Prodotti', Al Tempo Delle Rivoluzioni Industriali. Günther Anders Ed Il Dislivello Prometeico: Uno Studio Di Filosofia Del Diritto, Nella Prospettiva Di Una Ricerca Dell'Ermeneutica Di 'Log* (Cassino: Mondostudio Edizioni, 2016), p. 21; B. Babich, 'O, Superman! Or Being towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, And Media Aesthetics', *Divinatio*, 36.40–100 (2013); D. Colombo, *La Fame divora la Fenomenologia*, in M. Latini and A. Meccariello, *L'uomo e La (Sua) Fine. Saggi Su Günther Anders* (Trieste: Asterios, 2014), p. 41. G. Oberschlick in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 395; Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 426; Pier P. Portinaro, *Il Principio Disperazione: Tre Studi Su Günther Anders* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003); L. Scamacca, 'L'Uomo Nel Mondo Della Tecnica. Un Confronto Tra Heidegger e Anders', (University of Venezia, 2013), p. 8.

<sup>717</sup> As Thomä notes the term 'history' is, for Heidegger, reserved only to those who actively 'work' towards these moments of rupture. Exemplary is the case of the 'negroes' who Heidegger claims have 'no history' while 'Hitler and Mussolini' do. "*Deshalb bleibt 'Geschichte' auch denjenigen vorbehalten, die einem solchen Bruch zuarbeiten; 1934 meint Heidegger, einschlägig seien hier nicht die 'Neger', die 'keine Geschichte' hätten, wohl aber Hitler und Mussolini*". See, Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 427; M. Heidegger, *Logik Als Die Frage Nach Dem Wesen Der Sprache* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998), pp. 81, 83.

[...] *Eigentlich ist bei ihm Geschichte nur der Geburtsaugenblick*]<sup>718</sup>. As previously mentioned, for Anders the meaning of *Dasein* is not, as for Heidegger, in time but rather in untimeliness<sup>719</sup>. Both Anders and Heidegger provide a path to escaping time understood as an endless chronological progression. Anders shares a starting point with Heidegger, which is a quarrel with the notion of an indifferent time, but he draws a completely different conclusion which was already hinted at in Anders' discussion of Heidegger's concept of truth. For Anders, the 'untimely' is assigned to the 'fulfilment' that hides behind the '*adaequatio*': "No hour strikes for the lucky ones" [*Dem Glücklichen schlägt keine Stunde*]<sup>720</sup>. This ordinary observation conceals nothing less than a stab in the heart of Heidegger's thinking. Anders sets up an ethical model of a break with chronology based on achieving one's individual well-being in the pursuit of happiness against Heidegger's ontological model. In other words, Anders is here emphasising how the notion of time ceases to be problematic when a person has achieved her goals. As in the case of a man eating his soup, Anders is interested in concrete situations displaying how satisfying one's needs is associated with the elimination of time, as that temporal frame between the emergence of a need and its satisfaction. Therefore, Anders is not interested in 'waiting' for a new meaningful time; instead, he aims at 'eliminating' time's endless progression in meaningfulness. With the introduction of this ethical model based on the satisfaction of needs, the speculation that the world would have to be reborn for the sake of escaping time becomes invalid as well. Instead, the great longing that is directed towards that 'untimeliness' is taken back into an area that is actually appropriate for it, namely, into life, and into dealing with the time that takes place within it. In other words, the experience of 'untimeliness' becomes dependent on the search for happiness and tranquillity because if you are happy, you have better things to do than thinking about time.

<sup>718</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, pp. 309, 311. According to Thomä the notions of 'temporality' and 'historicity' that Heidegger was attached to throughout his life are nothing more than those 'attacks' of which Anders writes about. See, Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 428.

<sup>719</sup> The anti-historicity was a theme that permeated the entire musicological understanding of Anders.

<sup>720</sup> Anders, *Über Heidegger*, pp. 85, 294.

The theme of happiness<sup>721</sup>, together with the satisfaction of needs, is equally important for demonstrating the different reading of Hölderlin that Anders briefly suggests in parts of his work. Anders contested two things in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin: the silence on the role played by happiness<sup>722</sup> and the literal reading of the poetic words of Hölderlin<sup>723</sup>. While the second point does not require a detailed analysis, the first is much more complicated and refers to both *Über Heidegger* and *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen II*. In the poem *Diotima* Hölderlin writes: "Where we forget need and time,/ and the meagre profit/ never measured with the margin,/ that, that I know, I am there" [*Wo wir Not und Zeit vergessen,/ Und den kärglichen Gewinn/ Nimmer mit der Spanne messen,/ Da, da weiß ich, daß ich bin*]<sup>724</sup>. The line 'wir Not und Zeit vergessen' is strikingly similar to how Anders describes the effect caused by the satisfaction of need; the line also probably lies at the basis of Anders' comment relating to Heidegger's lack of 'Befriedigung oder die Stillung'. In *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen II*<sup>725</sup> Anders expands on the theme of happiness

<sup>721</sup> As seen above in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's *Homecoming / To Kindred Ones*, the poet was seeking the 'joyful'. The difference is that Heidegger links it back to the question of the origin while Anders attaches it to the well-being of humanity. Once again, this difference showcases the distance between Anders and Heidegger's perspective.

<sup>722</sup> "Satisfaction (of needs) or the relieving (from the needs), which the Greeks and later Hölderlin had associated with happiness" [*die Befriedigung oder die Stillung, die die Griechen und später noch Hölderlin mit der Glückseligkeit in eins gesetzt hatten*]. See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 171.

<sup>723</sup> "The brotherhood of thought and poetry, which he had so far only speculatively claimed or tried to authenticate by taking seriously Hölderlin's, Rilke's, Trakl's, is now directly demonstrated" [*Das Verschwistertsein von Denken und Dichten, das er bisher gewissermaßen nur spekulativ behauptet oder durch Ernstnehmen von Dichtungen Hölderlins, Rilkes, Trakls zu beglaubigen gesucht hatte, wird nun direkt vorgemacht*]. See, Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 387. The 'taking seriously' here undoubtedly refers to the already mentioned lines from Hölderlin's poem *Patmos*: "wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch".

<sup>724</sup> Hölderlin, *Le Liriche*, p. 180. According to Natoli, Hölderlin himself in the poem *Diotima* offers the understanding of the notion of eternity. Only in happiness can one claim to "to become one and all" [*wo wir Eins und Alles werden*]. Furthermore, only in happiness one feels at home "that, that I know, I am there" [*Da, da weiß ich, daß ich bin*]. See, Hölderlin, *Le Liriche, Diotima*. poem. pp. 178-81; N. Salvatore, *La Felicità. Saggio Di Teoria Degli Affetti* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2017), p. 81.

<sup>725</sup> Thomä himself reveals that further elaboration of the question of survival can be found in the texts on the 'atomaren Bedrohung' as well as in the those on the *Antiquiertheit des Menschen*. Enriching motifs in this sense can also be found in some other works of Anders, such as *Lieben gestern* and the daringly cheerful large-scale poem *Mariechen*. With this double perspec-

as well as the notion of an a-temporality that presents a place where *wir Not und Zeit vergessen* is linked directly with *techne*<sup>726</sup>. In a chapter titled *Time and Need*<sup>727</sup> Anders describes what he considers to be the ideal existence of humanity: “the ability to achieve all the goals of its actions as if by magic, that is, immediately, without any loss of time. The dream of our time is the elimination of time. The timeless society is the hope of tomorrow”<sup>728</sup>. This ideal is also called ‘Land of Cockaigne’ because in the country of Cockaigne it is custom for roasted turkeys to fly right into the mouths of those who desire them. In the Land of Cockaigne “the time between desire and satisfaction, between yearning and pleasure, did not exist”<sup>729</sup>. Here, too, Anders wants to deduce time from need, saying that “time is the road that leads to having. There is time only because we are needy beings; because we do not have what we must have; because we need to procure for ourselves what is necessary. Time is as empty as we are, as empty as an empty stomach; and time is only ‘filled’ whenever the stomach is full. In other words: it is existence in the mode of not having, that is, in the mode of the act of procuring the *desideratum*”<sup>730</sup>. As in *Über Heidegger*, Anders adds a social (dative) aspect to the satisfaction of need, since, he says, being ‘hounded by necessity’ is not only peculiar to a theoretic individual but to humanity in general and so one is hounded not only by his needs but also by the needs of the other<sup>731</sup>. *Techne*, too, aspires to achieve the status of the Land of Cockaigne but functions quite differently from some presumed ‘magic’ that ships roasted turkeys into the mouths of the hungry. *Techne*, instead, might represent a mediation between the desire and its satisfaction or “even a jungle of mediations which seek to reduce to a minimum those same mediations that do exist, that is, the intermediate time between desire and its satisfaction”<sup>732</sup>. In

tive, Anders finally takes up the original Aristotelian version of the problem: mere ‘life’ versus the ‘good life’. According to Thomä, Anders puts them side by side in their own right, because none of them is able to outdo or monopolise the other. See, Thomä in Anders, *Über Heidegger*, p. 430.

<sup>726</sup> Anders speaks here of the television and of the radio. See, Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 322–25.

<sup>727</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 317–22.

<sup>728</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 317.

<sup>729</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 318.

<sup>730</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 319.

<sup>731</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 320–21.

<sup>732</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 321. This constant and continuous mediation is

this view, *techne* wants, for Anders, to annihilate time itself. But the ideal of the Land of Cockaigne does not represent humanity's current situation which is more complicated and, as Anders points out, stands in a directly dialectical relation to the former. What humanity today recognises as 'worthwhile', that is, something which is 'worth waiting for', is that which has value for some purpose: i.e., the means. But at the same time, a means has value only because it leads to an end or a goal. "We live in the era of the bad conscience of ἐνέργεια and enjoyment, we find ourselves in a disturbingly paradoxical situation. On the one hand, we are impatient because the means and the way they must be employed take time. On the other hand, however, we cannot really bear reaching the goal, the ἐνέργεια, because with this destination it seems that the time that could be employed in using the means to reach a goal is wasted"<sup>733</sup>.

This paradoxicality constitutes humanity's new condition which Anders depicts through the example of a businessman. Anders' businessman flies from New York to Paris as fast as he can so as not to waste time; he also concludes the business that constitutes the reason for his trip as quickly as possible. To save time he will try to reduce the amount of time needed in all aspects of his trip. Finally, he will attempt to do everything as if he were in the Land of Cockaigne, without having to spend time between the desire and its satisfaction. What comes from all this is the opposite of what the businessman intended to obtain. Rather than saving time, the businessman experiences a 'growth' of time, as each action he takes earns him additional free time that makes him feel compelled to occupy it with more activities in order to avoid wasting his hard-earned free time. The abundant amount of time saved between his actions horrify the businessman – he is horrified by the *horror vacui* created, wherein he is impelled to split up this newly created gap into as many activities as possible. The existence of such a busy individual becomes a pointillist existence from which all continuity is banished and in which each passing moment corresponds to a new action that lasts no longer than an instant. The new curse of humanity is not the eternity of time but its inescapable

similar to how M. Lewis describes Heidegger' understanding of technology. He writes: "technology, as Heidegger understands it, is the means used by immanence to promulgate itself to the nth degree". See, M. Lewis, *Heidegger and the Place of Ethics* (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 83.

<sup>733</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 322

punctuality<sup>734</sup>. Therefore, Anders remains faithful to the original motif of the quarrel that Heidegger had with the desolate time, but simultaneously introduces a twist that shifts the whole picture and, hence, everything. The ‘untimely’ is now part of a particularly excellent life, the conditions of which have moved into an ethical dimension. Moreover, Hölderlin becomes the link between Anders’ considerations on time and a-temporality and the tangible reflections concerning the satisfaction of needs.

The collision of Heidegger’s origin of art framework with modern technology – or, rather, the embeddedness of one within the other – provides further context for Anders’ understanding of the role of music in modern society. Heidegger was critical of the increasing thoughtlessness of the modern world and in particular the impacts of this trend on the relationship between human beings and entities<sup>735</sup>. Modern technology is so powerful that it all but determines our relationship to entities, in particular making them more material and better aligned with our interests. Technology ends up ruling the whole earth, represented in the loss of “rootedness” (*Bodenständigkeit*). This becomes even more relevant today, as music is no longer as entangled with and constrained by local culture due to technological advancements in digital music. In particular, Rentmeester emphasised the need to identify and nurture the Heideggerian world-building capacity of music, possibly through Borgmann’s “focal realities”<sup>736</sup>. Focal realities correspond to that which reveals truth about life and contrast the technology-driven device paradigm. Rentmeester suggests that live concerts can serve as a focal reality, as they allow the listener to more closely approach the belonging of being compared to the ‘disposable’ digital music. This is largely achieved through commitment and communal feel<sup>737</sup>, making live concerts reminiscent of Heidegger’s Greek temple<sup>738</sup> but at the same time antithetical to Pio’s aestheticalised ‘mall’<sup>739</sup>. Borgmann’s focal realities in the context of music can be linked

<sup>734</sup> ‘Punctuality’ has here a twofold meaning: the satisfaction of a need lasts a mere instant, but it is also expected to be achieved following a precise and regular schedule. See, Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 325.

<sup>735</sup> Rentmeester, Casey. “Somewhere between Plato and Pinker.” *Heidegger and Music* (2022), p. 243.

<sup>736</sup> Rentmeester, “Somewhere between Plato and Pinker”, p. 245.

<sup>737</sup> Rentmeester, “Somewhere between Plato and Pinker”, p. 246.

<sup>738</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 20.

<sup>739</sup> Pio, Frederik. “Musings of Heidegger”, p. 29.



to Heidegger's 'awakening' (*Erweckung*), or shared being-in-the-world. Heidegger speaks of art as a potential counter-movement (*Gegenbewegung*) to the technology-driven interaction with the modern world<sup>740</sup>. Art offers a possible means for the ontological awakening, where individuals become closer to their being-in-the-world. In this context, participating in a musical ontological 'vortex' (*Wirbel*) has the potential to bring individuals into an authentic community, allowing them to experience who they are<sup>741</sup>.

Anders moves away from being limited to the articulative element of the language in the context of attunement, and instead considers 'active listening' corresponding to musical articulation. As noted by Babich, this correspondence is rooted in Heidegger's own understanding of hearing as an existential possibility that "belongs to talking itself"<sup>742</sup>. Babich goes further and argues that, as long as Heidegger's philosophic expression links poetry with thinking, it has to be "musically accented"<sup>743</sup>. Musical silence here corresponds to the ringing of the same that is said in silence, which can be thought of as attunement attending to language, nature, or philosophy<sup>744</sup>. This view is evocative of Frings, who did not distinguish between audible harmony and the thinking of logos as "gathering"<sup>745</sup>. Indeed, Frings argues that, for the thinker, there is no difference between logos and harmony from a musicological standpoint. He concludes that "it is through absolute music that Be-ing manifests itself to us in Art"<sup>746</sup>.

Anders and his 'active listening', while developed almost as a response to the void left by the Heideggerian understanding of *Stimmung* and listening, can also be directly framed within the context of musical phenomenol-

<sup>740</sup> Pio, Frederik. "Rocking Heidegger: Musical Experience between Technology and Ontology." *Heidegger and Music* (2022), p. 8.

<sup>741</sup> Pio, "Rocking Heidegger", p. 8.

<sup>742</sup> Babich, "Rilke and the "Tone of Death""", p. 61.

<sup>743</sup> Babich, Babette E. *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger*. State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 115.

<sup>744</sup> Babich, *Words in Blood*, p. 116.

<sup>745</sup> Frings, Manfred S. "Harmony and logos: The origin of the musical work of art." *Journal of Musicological Research* 4, no. 3-4 (1983), p. 330.

<sup>746</sup> Frings, "Harmony and logos", p. 330.

ogy, in particular that of Smith<sup>747</sup>, Schutz<sup>748</sup>, and Celibidache<sup>749</sup>. Smith ponders on the historical dynamic of music, or at least insofar it brings forth the characteristics of the modern era. In particular, he agrees with Adorno that classic tonality is not equivalent to natural tonality, which, in particular, “is hardly well-tempered”<sup>750</sup>. More interestingly, Smith notes that there is ‘oppression-by-ignoring’ when it comes to music “outside of the sacred canon”<sup>751</sup>. This becomes relevant for musical phenomenology, or even for Heidegger’s understanding of the origin of art, because there appears to be a gap between what is required for the belonging of being and what individuals have access to in the environment of the modern age. Indeed, Smith writes: “Without out contemporary composers actual culture goes begging”<sup>752</sup>. This thought is echoed in Heidegger and, by extension, in Anders, as both acknowledge that history shapes the way in which the truth can be revealed through artwork. The key disagreement here would be on whether Smith’s “actual culture” is ‘begging’ for great art with *work-being* in the Heideggerian sense, or for the aestheticised “arousal of frenzied feeling” needed for the “rescue of ‘life’”<sup>753</sup> in the modern world. One possible answer would be that this dichotomy itself is ill-posed. As Smith puts it: “phenomenology needs [...] an expansion beyond its preoccupation with the *phenomena*, i.e. those things which appear-in-light and thus are the object of *sight* and insight. Phenomenology must yet develop a more convincing attitude towards things *heard*”<sup>754</sup>. And, similar to Smith, Celibidache insists that such a phenomenology would be rooted in the pure experience and consciousness, rather than logic and science<sup>755</sup>. These ideas find realisa-

<sup>747</sup> Smith, F. Joseph. “Toward a phenomenology of music: A musician’s composition journal.” *Philosophy of Music Education Review* (1995), p. 21.

<sup>748</sup> Schutz, Alfred, and Fred Kersten. “Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music.” (1976), p. 5.

<sup>749</sup> Rusu, Iulian. “From Musical Psychology To Husserlian Phenomenology To Schenkerian Analysis.” *Review of Artistic Education* 23 (2022), p. 47; Marin, Lucia. *Basic Fundamentals of Phenomenology of Music by Sergiu Celibidache as Criteria for the Orchestral Conductor*. University of Kentucky, 2015.

<sup>750</sup> Smith, “Toward a phenomenology of music”, p. 22.

<sup>751</sup> Smith, “Toward a phenomenology of music”, p. 22.

<sup>752</sup> Smith, “Toward a phenomenology of music”, p. 22.

<sup>753</sup> Heidegger, Nietzsche, p.88.

<sup>754</sup> Smith, F. Joseph. *Experiencing of Musical Sound: A Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music*. Routledge, 2019, p. 54.

<sup>755</sup> Zelle, Tom. *Sergiu Celibidache: Analytical Approaches to His Teachings on Phenomenology and Music*. Arizona State University, 1996, p. 86.

tion in Anders' reworked phenomenology, where, as Steege puts it, "we do not have detached consciousness on the one hand and things on the other; rather, we only ever have consciousness *of something*"<sup>756</sup>.

Just as Anders drifts away from Heidegger's restricted understanding of *Stimmung* in the context of music, so does Schutz, albeit implicitly. Schutz notes that "the decision to listen to pure music involves a peculiar attitude on the part of the listener."<sup>757</sup> Listening implies commitment, which has also been noted by Rentmeester in the context of Borgmann's 'focal realities' in the modern age<sup>758</sup>, but Schutz goes further in suggesting that the listener is now "on another plane of consciousness"<sup>759</sup>. Listening requires disengagement from the dimensions of space and time, including acts of daily life – the individual is no longer directed towards objects, but rather guided by music. This view is evocative of Anders' own understanding of *Stimmung* and the musical situation as 'going along' with, or 'being carried away' by, the music, resulting in *Stimmungen sui generis* not necessarily related to any prior mood. Furthermore, Schutz did not consider music as an object of knowledge, being more interested in the listener's response rather than physical or mathematical characterisation of music<sup>760</sup>, which is in line with Anders. However, where Anders' perspective deviates from Schutz is in the negative phenomenological methodology – or, rather, in what such a methodology implies. Schutz characterises what is essential to the musical experience by describing what is not essential<sup>761</sup>. In particular, he dismisses the accidental elements of musical experience, instead focusing on the invariant<sup>762</sup>. Schutz' understanding is rooted in the view of the work of music as an ideal object. In contrast, Anders' musical situation embraces such accidental elements, as they contribute to being-in-music, to the belonging of being and truth revealed through Heideggerian unconcealment. Furthermore, Anders de-

<sup>756</sup> Steege, Benjamin A. "This is not a test: Listening with Günther Anders in the nuclear age." In *Testing Hearing: The Making of Modern Aurality*, pp. 327-348. Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 341.

<sup>757</sup> Schutz and Kersten. "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music", p. 43.

<sup>758</sup> Rentmeester, "Somewhere between Plato and Pinker", p. 246.

<sup>759</sup> Schutz Schutz and Kersten. "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music", p. 43.

<sup>760</sup> Siu, Rhonda Claire. "Rethinking the Body and Space in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of Music." *Human Studies* 39 (2016), p. 533.

<sup>761</sup> Skarda, Christine A. "Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music." *Journal of Musicological Research* 3, no. 1-2 (1979), p. 76.

<sup>762</sup> Skarda, "Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music", p. 78.

parts from the neo-Kantian view of music as an embodiment of some meaning or an idea, instead shifting the perspective to the state of being-in-music<sup>763</sup>.

Babich highlights the similarities between Anders's musical situation and Gadamer's history of effects when it comes to the anthropo-phenomenological context<sup>764</sup>. Anders speaks of a "non-unity" between being-in-music and being-in-the-world, but it is this incompatibility that engenders musical situation. Central to this is the understanding of music for an attuned listener, and phenomenological attunement of hearing. Anders considers the transformation from 'with which' we are to 'in which' we are, which becomes especially relevant for the 'being-there-with-music' state<sup>765</sup>. Babich points out that Anders' attention to music was affected by his instrumental training and "perhaps most intriguingly his attention to what was requisite for hearing music, listening as an attentive participant"<sup>766</sup>. It is this distinction between those for whom music is their life, and those for whom it is not, that underlines Anders' disagreement with Heidegger when it comes to listening and hearing. This is reminiscent of Schutz who noted that deciding to listen requires "a peculiar attitude on the part of the listener"<sup>767</sup>, and of Celibidache who emphasised the need for the conductor to exercise reduction of multiplicity in his consciousness into a single unity<sup>768</sup>, but Anders goes further and stops differentiating between the musician and the audience. However, Anders acknowledges that whether an individual participates in the world of music is a "privilege some were permitted to have and from which others were excluded"<sup>769</sup>.

From the comparison of Heidegger's interpretation and Anders' critique thereof, it is possible to see how essentially similar they are to their earlier pre-war counterparts. Heidegger is elaborating a philosophy

<sup>763</sup> Erlmann, Veit. "Reason and resonance: A history of modern aurality." (2010), p. 321.

<sup>764</sup> Babich, Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology, p. 157.

<sup>765</sup> Anders, G., "On the Phenomenology of Listening", in Steege, Benjamin. *An Unnatural Attitude: Phenomenology in Weimar Musical Thought*. University of Chicago Press, 2021, p.208.

<sup>766</sup> Babich, Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology, p. 161.

<sup>767</sup> Schutz and Kersten, "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music", p. 43.

<sup>768</sup> Marin, Lucia. *Basic Fundamentals of Phenomenology of Music by Sergiu Celibidache as Criteria for the Orchestral Conductor*. University of Kentucky, 2015, p.14.

<sup>769</sup> Babich, "Günther Anders's Epitaph for Aikichi Kuboyama", p. 144.

that tries to redeem humanity from the horrors of the calculating consciousness of *techne*. The problem remains that in this new scenario of the Open, Heidegger is afraid of daring to act upon the current technologically induced alienation and decides to resort to the idea of waiting for the arrival of the new gods while looking back at the source from which this alienation came. Anders, by comparison, proposes a prognostic hermeneutics based upon the idea that when one philosophises, he must look at the empirical fact and at things that are happening. In this sense, Anders believes that what matters is the present with its technical products and how we interrogate them so that we can gain an insight into the consequences of their usage. From this insight, Anders develops his notion of the 'Promethean gap', that is, the discrepancy between the productive ability [*Herstellen*] of humanity and its capacity of imagining [*Vorstellen*] the consequences of its own producing. The expression 'imagining' [*Vorstellen*] loses its very rationale for being, which, as indicated by the prefix [*vor*], characterised the planning anticipation that precedes the material creation of every object.

The innovative element of Anders' critique lies not in refuting human adaptation because this idea damages the 'metaphysical concept' of 'human'. It does not lie in the proclamation of an unmodifiable mode of humanity's being that Anders assumes as the meaning of 'being human', but rather in the suspicion that *techne* is trying to oppose human indeterminacy, its openness to freedom, by binding the former to the latter's *Diktat*. In this sense, while Heidegger believes that *techne* is retroactively creating a false sense of security and therefore is alienating humanity's relations from its origin, Anders claims that *techne*, fuelled by humanity's will to will, is creating a new  $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in which humanity would have no place. Thus, if Heidegger keeps his reflections on a purely theoretical-ontological approach that looks at the past of the origin as a means for pushing forward his thinking, Anders sees humankind's only possibility in the adoption of practical-moral behaviour that focuses on the present and its consequences for the future. As Anders writes: "Technology has actually become the subject of history, alongside which we are merely 'co-historical'"<sup>770</sup>.

<sup>770</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 3.

## Chapter 5: Endzeit or Endgame

### 5.1 The Nature-History dilemma

The post-war philosophies of Adorno and Anders and, in particular, their different approaches toward the notion of ‘catastrophe’<sup>771</sup> evidence differences that have barely been analysed to date. However, before addressing their readings of this notion, it is necessary to undertake two different analyses: first, of Adorno’s distinction between History and Nature as emerging from his interpretation of Hölderlin’s paratactical style; and second, of Adorno’s usage of Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame* as a means of discussing the role played by technology. In regard to the first, it is important to recall that Adorno’s eulogistic approach to Hölderlin’s poetry was also an open attack on the Heideggerian interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry<sup>772</sup>. The distinction Adorno draws between History and Nature thus connects this attack on Heidegger to Anders insofar as Anders, like Ador-

<sup>771</sup> Both Adorno and Anders addressed the importance of the catastrophe (be the holocaust or the atomic bomb) as the quintessence of the post-war global alienation. See, T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2004); Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*; Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*; Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, and Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*.

<sup>772</sup> “*Parataxis* was delivered on 7 June 1963, the 120th anniversary of Hölderlin’s death, at the biennial convention of the Hölderlin Society. Simply by addressing a group of people gathered to commemorate the poet on this symbolic occasion, Adorno automatically adopts the discursive stance of the eulogist; the person considered best qualified to speak well of the deceased, a task which for Adorno extended to speaking ill of those who profane his memory. The first half of the speech was taken up with a sweeping polemic against the reading of the poet advanced by Martin Heidegger, who had himself addressed the Society exactly four years earlier”. See, R. Savage, ‘Adorno’s Philopolemology The Parataxis’ Speech as Example’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 8.3 (2005), 281–95 (p. 286).

no, also problematised the notion of second nature. Moreover, in criticising Heidegger, Adorno clearly has Anders in mind, as he mentions or directly quotes Anders' writings in *Parataxis*, *Negative Dialectic*, *Trying to Understand Endgame*, and *Aesthetic Theory*, thereby demonstrating a thread that links the post-war Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger to both poetry and alienation<sup>773</sup>. Evidently, there is a fundamental relation between Adorno's insight on Nature and History and his study of Beckett's *Endgame*: indeed, the latter text derives from the former insofar as Adorno's notion of natural history described in *Endgame* exposes the active and disastrous interaction between Nature and History<sup>774</sup>. In this way, the debate between Adorno and Anders reveals the catastrophic impact of alienation and how the two tried to reconcile the un-reconcilable as framed against the background of their respective critiques of Heidegger. Only then, that is, through the assessment of the impossibility of reconciliation, will it be possible to demonstrate that, although Adorno and Anders agreed on the need to counter the horrors caused by technologically induced alienation, they advocated for two different types of action. As seen in the previous chapter, Anders sees humanity's only possibility in the adoption of a practical-moral behaviour that, in the specific case of a catastrophe, aims at re-normalising it<sup>775</sup>. Adorno

<sup>773</sup> Adorno knew one of Anders' texts (*On the Pseudo Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy* published in 1948). A proof of this is a letter dated 6th September 1962 in which Adorno asks to Anders about his article, saying: "Dear Anders, the other day I read by pure coincidence that there is a work of yours on the pseudo - concreteness of Heidegger. I myself am at the moment concerned with a text on what I call the *jargon of authenticity*, and in which, as it implies, pseudo-concreteness is an essential category" [*Lieber Anders, neulich las ich durch puren Zufall, dass es eine Arbeit von Ihnen über die Pseudokonkretheit Heideggers gibt. Ich selbst bin in Augenblick mit einem Text über das befasst, was ich den Jargon der Eigentlichkeit genannt habe, und in dem, wie es die Sache mit sich bringt, Pseudokonkretheit eine wesentliche Kategorie ist*]. Anders replies that while on the one hand he is keen to send Adorno a copy, on the other hand, he "does not know what is written in it anymore, and if he wants to endorse today what was written in there". For the letter of Adorno to Anders (06.09.1962) and for Anders' letter to Adorno (10.09.62) see, *Österreichische Literaturarchiv der österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, Wien, (237/04).

<sup>774</sup> Hamm's comment "outside of here, it's death" offers a clear exemplification of the idea of the liquidation of Nature while simultaneously reminding of how humanity manipulated it and led it to its destruction. See, Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 270.

<sup>775</sup> "An event first experienced as real but impossible (the prospect of a forthcoming catastrophe which, however probable it may be, is effectively dismissed as impossible) becomes real and no longer impossible (once the catastrophe occurs, it is 'renormalised', perceived as part of the normal run of things, as always already having been possible)".

proposes instead an aesthetics-based solution which believes that with the death of the ‘Genius’ emerges a moment in which “reconciliation passes out of the medium of the merely spiritual into reality”<sup>776</sup>. Anders’ juxtaposition with Adorno shows how both Adorno’s and Anders’ post-war philosophies were continuations of their attempts to persist with a humanistic approach that simultaneously avoids falling into an anthropocentric trap.

To gain an understanding of Adorno’s conception of the relationship between History and Nature, examining two texts is essential: first, *Parataxis: On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry*, which is both Adorno’s criticism of Heidegger’s<sup>777</sup> interpretation of Hölderlin and equally a significant contribution to the History-Nature debate<sup>778</sup>. Second, it is crucial to examine Adorno’s lectures on history and freedom from 1964–65 in which Adorno discusses Hölderlin’s poem *The Shelter at Hardt*. Adorno’s discussion of *The Shelter at Hardt* is fundamental<sup>779</sup> for understanding his

See, S. Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (London: Verso, 2010), p. 328.

<sup>776</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 149.

<sup>777</sup> In criticising Heidegger, Adorno mentions Anders in four circumstances: the first one is in *Parataxis* itself, the second in *Negative Dialectic*, the third in *Trying to Understand the Endgame*, and the fourth is in *Aesthetic Theory*. In the first two Adorno refers to Anders *Pseudo Concreteness of Heidegger’s Philosophy*, the last two Adorno comments on Anders’ analysis of *Waiting for Godot*. See, T.W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 124; T.W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectic*, p. 75; Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*; and Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 153.

<sup>778</sup> Here is important to notice that the sources for Adorno’s conception of natural-history are Georg Lukács’s *Theory of the Novel* and Benjamin’s *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. By appropriating and elaborating these texts Adorno understands that: “Nature is conceived, in its transitoriness, as History and History is nothing other than the relationship between Nature and Nature’s temporary signification. In other words, nature itself is transitory insofar as it occurs historically”. See, J. Bernstein, J.A. Bernstein, ‘From Tragedy to Iconoclasm: The Changing Status of Hölderlin in Adorno’s Conception of History’, *Epoché*, 15.1 (2010), 137–61 (p. 148). For an address on the influence of Benjamin and Lukács on Adorno’s concept of natural-history see, M. Martinson, *Perseverance without Doctrine: Adorno, Self-Critique, and the Ends of Academic Theology* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 115–27; M. Pensky, ‘Natural History: The Life and Afterlife of a Concept in Adorno’, *Critical Horizons*, 5.1 (2004), 227–58.

<sup>779</sup> As Flodin notes, during the discussion on this specific poem “Adorno refers his students to his earlier discussion of Hölderlin’s poem, even if he does not mention the ‘Parataxis’ essay by name”. See, T.W. Adorno and R. Tiedemann, *Zur Lehre von Der Geschichte Und von Der Freiheit (1964/65)* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 190; C. Flodin, ‘The Eloquence of Something That Has No Language: Adorno on Hölderlin’s Late Poetry’, *Adorno Studies*, 2.1 (2018), 1–27 (p. 5).



notion of ‘natural history’ since it reveals what he takes to be the active link connecting History and Nature<sup>780</sup>.

Adorno, and Hölderlin<sup>781</sup> in his reading, are critical of the modern and disillusioned conception of nature that revolves around the idea that Nature should be understood as a merely external object which lacks any intrinsic value and is only suitable for unrestrained and unlimited exploitation by humanity<sup>782</sup>. This caesura between humanity and Nature is grounded on the metaphysical conception that Nature is a thing to be mastered while humanity is its sole controller. However, this interpretation has allowed and led to an increasing destruction of Nature which is the primary condition for humanity’s own possibility to exist. According to Hölderlin in Adorno’s reading, the distinction between Nature and Humanity is not as clear as metaphysics claims it to be, and he argues that aesthetics is crucial for re-thinking it. Indeed, only aesthetics can re-formulate such a distinction in a manner that does not involve subjugating Nature and reducing it to a mere object under the law of endless human

<sup>780</sup> “*The Shelter at Hardt* is an implicit critique of the notion of nature as the backdrop to human affairs; it is a subtle objection to the image of nature as a wordless inferior that must be left behind in order for humans to become civilized. In the poem, the blooming ground below the trees is instead presented as eloquent, as expressive, offering an alternative to the conventional Enlightenment opposition of a self-determining Hölderlin’s Higher Enlightenment and autonomous humankind versus a dependent and heteronomous nature”. See, C. Flodin, ‘Hölderlin’s Higher Enlightenment’, in *Beyond Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century British and German Aesthetics* (Routledge, 2020), pp. 258–78 (p. 13).

<sup>781</sup> As in the case of the Nature-History debate, Adorno is here deeply influenced by Benjamin’s early essay *Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin*. The poetised is defined there as the “synthetic unity of the intellectual and perceptual orders” of the poem, which, as synthetic unity, forms as much the ‘product’ as the “subject of the investigation”. W. Benjamin and others, *Selected Writings: 1938-1940*, ed. by M.P. Bullock and M.W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 18–19. On this essay and its influence on Adorno’s *Parataxis*, see R. Savage, *The Polemic of the Late Work: Adorno’s Hölderlin* in G. Richter, *Language without Soil* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), pp. 172–94; A. Honold, *Der Leser Walter Benjamin: Bruchstücke Einer Deutschen Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin: Verlag Vorwerk, 2000); P.A. Alt, ‘Das Problem Der Inneren Form: Zur Hölderlin-Rezeption Benjamins Und Adornos’, *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift*, 61.3 (1987), 531–63; T. Schröder, ‘Eschatologie Und Parataxis: Adornos Naturgeschichtliches Motiv’, *Frankfurter Adorno Blätter*, 4 (1995), 78–92, and J. Kreuzer, *Hölderlin: Parataxis* in R. Klein and J. Kreuzer, *Adorno Handbuch Leben-Werk-Wirkung* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2019), pp. 225–34.

<sup>782</sup> In this sense, according to Adorno, the essence of technology corresponds to Heidegger’s will-to-will that manifests itself in the drive to subjugate all beings as a whole.

manipulation<sup>783</sup>. In *The Shelter at Hahrdt*<sup>784</sup>, Nature carries the mark of the past as it bears witness to a historical event: according to a legend, the Duke Ulrich of Württemberg hid from his enemies in the shelter described by Hölderlin. It is exactly this poem that Adorno claims to be the best model available for understanding what he means by the concept of ‘natural history’<sup>785</sup>. Through Hölderlin’s poem, Adorno reveals how one becomes aware of Nature as mediated by and with History. In this sense, *The Shelter at Hahrdt* conveys a critique of the notion of Nature as something static and antithetical to human history. Adorno’s usage of Hölderlin for revealing the intrinsic interconnection between Nature and History is not just a prerogative of the *History and Freedom Lectures*<sup>786</sup>, however, as he focuses on the same issue in *Parataxis* as well.

Why does Adorno attach such weight to Hölderlin’s poem? As Adorno notes in *Parataxis*, in order to understand the meaning of the poem, you have to know that the shelter of which Hölderlin speaks about is the place where Duke Ulrich of Württemberg was alleged to be hiding. The key concept lies in the fact that this place ‘speaks’ of such a historical event. Thus, History turns here into Nature: the traces of Ulrich’s stay at this shelter have been covered by grass and moss, but through the poetical narration of these, Nature is allowed to express it. Nature becomes eloquent insofar as the concepts of which it speaks “are emancipated from that experience instead of merely subsuming it”<sup>787</sup>. As Adorno pointed out in the *Lectures*, this eloquence takes place “only because these pragmatic elements have disappeared, [and] only because the poem has acquired this enigmatic character, has it succeeded in assuming the expression of transience that points beyond itself and constitutes its greatness”<sup>788</sup>.

<sup>783</sup> In *The Shelter at Hahrdt*, Hölderlin describes nature as ‘far from mute’ thus underlying its status of free and active agent. See, F. Hölderlin, *Hymns and Fragments*, trans. by R. Sieburth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 49.

<sup>784</sup> “*The Shelter at Hahrdt* is an implicit critique of the notion of nature as the backdrop to human affairs; it is a subtle objection to the image of nature as a wordless inferior that must be left behind in order for humans to become civilized”. Flodin, Hölderlin’s Higher Enlightenment, p. 12.

<sup>785</sup> T.W. Adorno, *History and Freedom Lectures 1964-1965*, trans. by R. Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 135.

<sup>786</sup> The importance of this poem is demonstrated by Adorno himself who urges his students to read it. See, Adorno, *History and Freedom Lectures 1964-1965*, p. 135.

<sup>787</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 126.

<sup>788</sup> See, Adorno, *History and Freedom Lectures 1964-1965*, p. 135.

Thus, through Hölderlin, Nature transpires as historical and intrinsically transitory<sup>789</sup>. And if Nature can reveal its historical essence, then History might contain Nature as well. Whenever a historical element appears, it refers back to the natural element that passes away within it. In this sense, Nature is absolutely intertwined with History. This epiphany leads to the further realisation that Nature is necessarily more than what humanity considers it to be, that is, the opposite of its making History.

The static essence of nature then depends on its domination which has shaped Nature into a continuous repetition of the same. For Hölderlin, according to Adorno, this sameness is exactly what led Nature to be dominated by humanity. Following this hypothesis, Adorno claims that the domination of Nature must be a real historical process which comprises of two different elements: something to be dominated and something that dominates. In this manner, through an artwork (Hölderlin's poem), Nature's non-identity with its reified construction is finally exposed as a fabrication. And if the conceptualisation of Nature as the element to dominate is false, what does this tell us about humanity understood as the dominating agent? Through this aesthetically gained insight, Adorno discloses a crack within the cultural construction of Nature, through which he postulates the possibility of a Nature beyond such construction. With the notion of 'Nature's transience' Adorno thus challenges simultaneously the relation between Nature and History and that between humanity and Nature. The twofold relevance of Nature's transience makes it fundamental for the idea of natural-history. As Adorno claims in *The Idea of Natural-History*, "the deepest point where history and nature converge lies precisely in this element of transience"<sup>790</sup>. Transience observes the material, physical element in objects or things, their non-identity with concepts, and it also demonstrates the concepts' dependence on these material elements. This kind of transience has a twofold importance: first, it questions the socio-historical reality that through a praxis led to the creation of 'natural-history'. Second, it aims at finding a reconciled notion of Nature from the one that the aforementioned praxis of domination has brutally constructed. It is important to clarify that Adorno's attempt to think a non-dominated Nature is precisely not a Heideggerian attempt

<sup>789</sup> On the transitory essence of Nature see also, Adorno, *The Idea of Natural-History*, in Hullot-Kentor, p. 264.

<sup>790</sup> Adorno, *The Idea of Natural-History*, p. 262.

to re-discover a lost or original Nature but rather an essentially artistic longing for what is ‘not-yet-existing’<sup>791</sup>.

Our nature-dominating society has congealed into second nature, but through philosophical interpretation, it can be exposed as something man-made that has turned into history, and thus something that is possible to transform. Likewise, the dominant notion of nature as something existing for our sake has developed historically and is not a timeless truth, which means that it is possible to revise it. Hölderlin’s poem gives Adorno a change of perspective on nature. For instance, in *The Shelter at Hahrtdt*, Hölderlin depicts nature as more than just what humans define it to be. In this way, Hölderlin’s poem manages to give voice to the speechless, but not therefore completely mute, nature. The poem objects to the image of nature as a speechless minor, as something opposite of humanity *qua* the sole creator of history; the human being is self-determining and autonomous while nature is dependent, static and heteronomous. ‘Nature’ in this view is what must be escaped if one is to come of age and become civilised. This is the view of nature by an Enlightenment that is, for Adorno, therefore not yet enlightened enough. When Adorno discusses *The Shelter at Hahrtdt* in *Parataxis* he elaborates on the possibility of nature expressing itself: “two slabs of rock form the shelter in which the duke hid. The event that, according to the legend, took place there is supposed to speak with the voice of nature, which is therefore called “*nicht gar unmündig*” [“far from mute”]. Surviving, nature becomes an allegory for the destiny that once manifested itself on that spot”<sup>792</sup>.

Adorno’s discussion of nature-history has a twofold significance: first, it is propaedeutic to the continuing debate concerning the meaning of Hölderlin’s poetry; second, it evidences an additional intersection between Adorno and Anders. In a chapter called ‘the acoustic leash’ of *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen vol II*, Anders describes a peculiar phenomenon which not only speaks of second nature but also discusses the singular situation of humanity and *techne*. Anders writes that in 1958 he climbed Mount Washington with two American friends. During the hike, the three companions were unable to leave behind the sound of a melodramatic song rising from the valley below. “The thing here is that this music was inescapable for hours. Why this agitated me, remained incom-

<sup>791</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 132.

<sup>792</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 111.

prehensible to my companions. For them, this circumstance was not only not unpleasant but explicitly delightful. Patently, they enjoyed a certain feeling of security as long as they could still hear the music's transmission and find themselves 'in' it: the feeling of still being 'there' [*da*], down below. Like pilots, who like maintaining reliable contact with their base. They had not yet gone out of range. The acoustic leash, which connected them to the valley, had not yet been broken"<sup>793</sup>.

However, whereas this situation of walking up the slope while surrounded by this music was an unspeakable martyrdom for Anders, for his friends the irritation only began when the music stopped. "Sort of weird", said one of the companions. 'Why weird?', Anders asked him, 'Aren't we finally in the open air?', 'The open air?', repeated the friend shrugging his shoulders. 'I would rather say in a sort of social stratosphere'. And then, suddenly, he said: 'let's get it over with as fast as possible'"<sup>794</sup>. Anders did not immediately understand his friend's words as he did not understand the sudden vigour that his companions applied to their climb. Shortly afterwards, the meaning of the aforementioned words became clear, as well as the reason for the sudden burst of speed in climbing, and suddenly Anders "could hear a new music; no, not just new music, but the same melodramatic song that followed them from the valley below"<sup>795</sup>.

Insofar as one person is listening, writes Anders, she is unfree. To refrain from hearing is harder than to refrain from looking. And this fundamental difficulty is based on the fact that "we have not been endowed with '*Ohrlider*' ['ear-lids'] or, to express it phenomenologically, on the fact that, unlike the visible world, the auditory world can introduce itself to us without our permission, indiscreetly, rudely, without any need for our express consent and, whether we want it or not, it obliges us to participate"<sup>796</sup>. Reminiscent of his early musicological study discussing histor-

<sup>793</sup> The following English translation of Anders' *Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen vol II* and the term 'acoustic leash' are taken from Babich. See, Babich, *Günther Anders' Philosophy of Technology*, p. 182. Babich also shows the connection between the music theme and the reading given by both Adorno and Anders of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*.

<sup>794</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 224. The expression 'let's get it over with as fast as possible' is of fundamental importance here. Anders uses this same expression in the chapter about happiness where he discusses the role played by the ubiquity of the radio in the mediation between humanity's needs and their satisfaction. See, Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 321, 323–24.

<sup>795</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 224–25.

<sup>796</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 223–24.

ical time and musical time, Anders puts forward the idea that whenever one listens, one will not be only at the place where she is. Given the fact that sound is simultaneously where it is generated and where it is heard, it forces the person who hears it to be simultaneously in two places at once. This acoustic condition leads to what Anders calls ‘acoustic submission’, for “if a man is denied the possibility of escaping from his acoustic accessibility and availability, he will soon be deprived of both, that is, he will no longer be capable of the possibility of escaping from accessibility and availability in general. Accessibility and availability will become second nature to him. And finally, he will even participate in cultivating his own enslavement, so that he would feel lost if by some chance they were not accessible”<sup>797</sup>. What Anders means in his example of the hike up Mount Washington is the following, condensed idea: Anders’ American friends enjoyed listening to the song – i.e., radio – while hiking for the simple reason that the music occupied and mediated the time between their need and its satisfaction (reaching the mountain peak), producing happiness and giving them the impression of a-temporality (the being ‘here’ on the mountain and the being ‘there’ in the valley). The interruption of the music meant an interruption in the mediation and thus of happiness which subsequently required Anders’ friends to ‘speed up’ their hike in order to reach again the music and therefore, happiness. As explained in the previous chapter, this is also Anders’ theory of the satisfaction of needs which refers to Hölderlin’s poem *Diotima*<sup>798</sup>, where what matters – what is ‘worth waiting for’

– and what must be achieved as fast as possible is the means and not the end. In the particular scenario concerning the hike up the mountain, the need for music, that is the radio, becomes second nature, for Anders’ American friends equate their submission to the ubiquity of the music to the availability and accessibility of happiness.

Anders claims that the dimension of the acoustic is that of unfreedom since humanity has no way of sheltering itself (Anders’s ear-lids) from hearing. This is a theme discussed by Adorno himself in his *Current of Music* in a chapter titled ‘Space Ubiquity’<sup>799</sup>. Adorno writes that “the

<sup>797</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 224.

<sup>798</sup> F. Hölderlin, *Le Liriche*, trans. by E. Mandrizzato, (Milano: Adelphi, 2014), *Diotima*. poem. p. 180.

<sup>799</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Current of Music* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 80. Babich shows

individual who cannot possibly alter the ubiquity-standardisation of the radio phenomenon transforms it and every pleasure he might get from it into the pleasure of destruction”<sup>800</sup>. This opposition to radio’s ubiquity is achieved with the simple gesture of turning off the radio which creates the “illusion of might and power, but it really means only that the rebel is withdrawing from contact with the very public events he believes he is altering. Of course, they really go on without taking any notice of him”<sup>801</sup>. In this manner the person who turns off the radio believes that she is opposing the ubiquity of the radio but instead she is only getting “the illusionary self-satisfaction that the workings of the mechanism are her own. The pattern is: private person resists ubiquity-standardisation of his radio set; knows this resistance is futile; finally transforms this wish for individual activity into preparedness to obey the laws of his apparatus, but just in this way loses his relation to the object and the content which

how Adorno and Anders “reflect on the musical ‘situation’, both write about ‘listening to’ music, both write about radio in the context of what Adorno names ‘Space Ubiquity’”. See, Babich, *Günther Anders’ Philosophy of Technology*, p. 178. The relevance played by music in this passage is not merely related to the fact that both Adorno and Anders write about it (in his *Current of Music* Adorno is also criticising Anders’ early text *Spooks in Radio*) after the Second World War but also to the role played by music for the *Naturgeschichte* issue. Adorno considers art in general and music in particular to have a crucial role in re-elaborating the notions of ‘Nature’ and ‘History’. Bowie writes: “Adorno gives a further indication of why art offers a way of understanding nature-history when he says that ‘every art contains elements which seem natural, self-evident at the moment of their production. Only in the course of the further development do they become evident as themselves something which has become and which is transient, does what is natural about them become evident as ‘second nature’ Similarly, he maintains with regard to the unreflective idea of first nature: ‘[W]hat we encounter as nature is in truth second nature and not first, and [...] we, in order to give abused and oppressed nature its due, must not allow ourselves to be blinded precisely by that appearance of the natural’. Nature in the formal sense is a manifestation of a historically developed stance towards the physical universe, not something that is simply given [...] In the musical pre-conscious and in the collective unconscious tonality appears, although it is for its part a historical product, to have become something like second nature”. See, Bowie, *Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy*, p. 87. In *Adorno, Schubert, and Mimesis* Molnar and Molnar highlight the importance of Adorno’ early musicological writings for his later discussion on Nature and History too. They write that “at the same time, he believed that the ‘lyrical’ in Schubert’s music, as well as in works by other artists, should be a direct manifestation of ‘objectivity’ (i.e., the ‘mythological’ nature that Adorno would later discuss in ‘The Idea of Natural History’”. See, Molnar and Molnar, *Adorno, Schubert, and Mimesis*, p. 65.

<sup>800</sup> Adorno, *Current of Music*, p. 113.

<sup>801</sup> Adorno, *Current of Music*, p. 113.

he originally sought or pretended to seek<sup>802</sup>. Anders expresses this concept by saying that humanity “no longer understands, desires, or enjoys *ἐνέργεια*, because [it has] transformed it into *εργα*”<sup>803</sup>. In this sense, Anders, like Adorno, describes a situation of voluntary submission to the radio and thus to *techne* for the sake of satisfaction. The example of Mount Washington indicates how the notion of ‘second nature’, Hölderlin, and music are linked together for Anders. Given that the same connection is also made by Adorno, the example provides a basis for juxtaposing Anders to Adorno.

To return to Adorno’s analysis of *The Shelter at Hahrtdt* in *Parataxis*: what matters for Adorno is not a philological approach, because, as Adorno claims, “the idea of an allegorical history of nature, an idea that appears here and that dominates Hölderlin’s late work as a whole, would require philosophical derivation, not philology”<sup>804</sup>. Adorno claims that only the person who knows the material of the poem and “continues to feel the shock of the unexpected name Ulrich, someone who will be troubled by the ‘*nicht gar unmündig*’, which acquires meaning only in the conception of a natural history, and similarly by the construction of a great destiny, ready, among the remains”<sup>805</sup> — only this someone can approach the poem in the right way. Adorno claims that it is the obscure moment in the poem, but not what the poem conveys, that calls for philosophy. Regarding the enigmatic character of the poem, Adorno asserts that Hölderlin’s strange sentence constructions are not deliberate attempts to estrange the reader; rather, they “stem from something objective, the demise of its basic content in expression, the eloquence of something that has no language”<sup>806</sup>. The poem is more than the sum of its parts. That is to say, it is more than the sum of its lines. It has an expressive quality, and this is also what, according to Adorno, enables the poem to let nature speak for itself.

On the one hand, without all the different parts the truth of the poem does not exist, while on the other hand, as Adorno argues, the truth of the poem is “something that transcends this structure, as a structure of

<sup>802</sup> Adorno, *Current of Music*, p. 102.

<sup>803</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 323.

<sup>804</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 111.

<sup>805</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 111.

<sup>806</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 111.



aesthetic semblance: not from outside through a stated philosophical content, but by the configuration of elements that taken together signify more than the structure intends<sup>807</sup>. In this way, the language of the poem is something other than subjective intention: it can point at something more; the poem manages to show that nature is more than dependent and heteronomous. The reference to nature as more than subjectively determined does not take place directly, however. If one approaches *The Shelter at Hahrdt* the same way as one approaches a propositional statement, according to Adorno, one will fail to appreciate the poem as an artwork and consequently, one will also fail to grasp what is important in it. In Hölderlin's poetry, the critique of reality is achieved indirectly and not through any direct appeal to another or better reality. For Adorno, *The Shelter at Hahrdt* does not state that nature is more than an object, or even that it should be. In this sense, the poem only speaks of possible change indirectly or by describing the individual natural object.

In the section on natural beauty in his *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno returns once more to *The Shelter at Hahrdt*. There, he writes: "in this poem, a stand of trees becomes perceived as beautiful, as more beautiful than the others, because it bears, however vaguely, the mark of a past event"<sup>808</sup>. Here, too, it is the connection between transience and beauty that is emphasised by Adorno. The trees of *The Shelter at Hahrdt* are expressive because they are ready and waiting to be interpreted as signs of a historical event (Ulrich passed through them). But it is expressive also because the natural shelter constitutes the very ground, the concrete condition of possibility, for this event. These two 'grounds' cannot be neatly separated, there is no 'pure' nature beyond history and no 'pure' history apart from nature<sup>809</sup>. "In natural beauty, natural and historical elements interact in a musical and kaleidoscopically changing fashion"<sup>810</sup>. The indirectness of Hölderlin's poetry also indicates a resistance against the idea that beautiful art in itself constitutes the reconciliation between humanity and Nature. This conception is also a way of perceiving art's reconciliatory power through mimesis: humans create artworks that are similar to the organisms that nature creates, so art mimics nature's creativity.

<sup>807</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 111.

<sup>808</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 71.

<sup>809</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 71.

<sup>810</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 71.

While Adorno in *Aesthetic Theory* expresses a certain agreement with this view of organic unity<sup>811</sup>, he nevertheless believes that modern art needs to reflect on and problematise this ability in order to avoid deceiving us into thinking that reconciliation is achieved, even if only in art. For this reason, Adorno pursues the idea of fracture, brokenness, or reflection as necessary for art's truth content. Furthermore, in *Parataxis* he claims that Hölderlin's poetry is characterised precisely by such an element of brokenness. By shattering the symbolic unity of the work of art, Hölderlin pointed up the untruth in any reconciliation of the general and the particular within an unreconciled reality<sup>812</sup>. According to Adorno, art is only the plenipotentiary of such reconciliation between universal and particular, subject and object, humanity and nature. Art can neither in itself constitute this reconciliation, nor be a stage in it. Through art and Nature, Adorno claims that Hölderlin manages to give voice to Nature through his self-reflexive wrestling with language and with the inescapable unifying tendency of artworks. It is, therefore, Hölderlin's use of parataxis that Adorno focuses on. According to Adorno, Hölderlin's late poetry "sheds full light on the poetic function of the technique of parataxis"<sup>813</sup> because, in his late hymns, Hölderlin inverts the order of the words within periods. The conventional periodicity that Hölderlin wants to overcome is the syntactic periodicity à la Cicero in which "the subordinate clauses are always simply attached at the end of the main clauses to which they most closely relate"<sup>814</sup>. According to Adorno, Hölderlin avoids the syntactic periodicity because it is pedantic and thus should be sporadically used by a poet. Moreover, Hölderlin's adoption of the technique of the parataxis is related to the "keyword *Zweck* [purpose]"<sup>815</sup>. *Zweck* "names the complicity between the logic of an ordering and manipulating consciousness and the practical"<sup>816</sup> which Hölderlin's poetry refutes. For Adorno the "linguistic synthesis contradicts what Hölderlin wants to express in language"<sup>817</sup>. Hölderlin wants to use language against language. Through his

<sup>811</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 134.

<sup>812</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 154.

<sup>813</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 135.

<sup>814</sup> Hölderlin, *Essays and Letters*, p. 240.

<sup>815</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 135.

<sup>816</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 135.

<sup>817</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 135.

“paratactic revolt against synthesis”<sup>818</sup>, Hölderlin creates “a synthesis of a different kind, language’s crucial self-reflection”<sup>819</sup>, where the unity of language is preserved by relinquishing the ‘violence’ of that linguistic synthesis that Hölderlin avoids. Adorno believes that Hölderlin ‘attacks’ syntax syntactically and therefore invites the structure of the period by means of a poetry that favours short sentences, usually juxtaposing unrelated ideas or themes without a clear correlation (i.e., parataxis).

According to Adorno, Hölderlin’s poetic technique showcases for the first time that the sacrifice of the period leads to the questioning of meaning. The reason behind this questioning resides in the fact that meaning is constructed via the linguistic expression of synthetic unity. Hölderlin’s usage of the paratactical technique deprives the subject from its connection to meaning insofar as it cedes the primacy of meaning to language “along with the legislating subject”. In this manner, language appears to be both conceptual and predicative thus becoming the opposite of subjective expressions. Through Hölderlin’s poetry, the ‘dual character of language’ is revealed, as that generality of concepts which opposes individual expression. Adorno argues that Hölderlin wants to incorporate subjective expression into poetry, but at the same time, Hölderlin also opposes the idea that expressivity is a product of the subject because he believes that language is more than subjectivity. Language is not purely created by subjective *Geist*; it is the prerequisite for *Geist*. Hölderlin’s late poetry critiques poetical language from within – he frees poetic language from conventionality through subjective freedom. The subject, which mistakes itself for something immediate and ultimate, is something utterly mediated. By exposing this mediation, language speaks of the history of the domination of nature. Although poetry longing for full objectivity, poetry cannot achieve it. Hölderlin’s poetry exposes the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity.

In the contradiction which Hölderlin’s poetry lays bare therefore lies the truth content. Hölderlin’s poetry does not attempt to do away with this conflict between subjectivity and objectivity, which it cannot, *qua* poetry, dissolve. At the same time, this self-reflexivity of Hölderlin’s poetry, its admittance of being subjective, man-made, *techne*, is a critique of the domination of nature and remembrance of suppressed nature. “While

<sup>818</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 136.

<sup>819</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 136.

all poetry protests against the domination of nature with its devices, in Hölderlin the protest awakens to self-consciousness<sup>820</sup>. Adorno claims that “as early as the ode *Nature and Art*, Hölderlin takes the side of fallen Nature against a dominating *Logos*”<sup>821</sup>. In this poem, Hölderlin offers a dialectical presentation of the traditional opposition between *physis* and *techne*. According to the myth described in this poem, Zeus defeated his father and enclosed him together with the other Titans in Tartaros. Through such allegorical portraying of the relationship between Nature and Art, Adorno writes, Hölderlin underscores that the Gordian knot of the question does not lie in a strict opposition but rather in affinity. “The domination of the Logos is not negated abstractly but instead recognised in its connection with what is overthrown; the domination of nature as itself part of nature, with its gaze focused on humanness, which wrested itself from the amorphous and ‘barbaric’ only through violence—while the amorphousness is perpetuated in violence”<sup>822</sup>. The poem’s critique of the domination of nature is thus not accomplished through abstract negation but precisely by recognising humankind as part of nature. Despite Humanity’s attempt to dominate Nature, the former cannot put itself above the latter. However, in this process humanity acknowledges that through the violence that it commits against nature it is only perpetuating what humanity wanted to escape in the first place, that is, nature. Thus, humanity and nature remain enmeshed.

“Philosophically, the anamnesis of suppressed nature, in which Hölderlin tries to separate the wild from the peaceful, is” – according to Adorno – “the consciousness of non-identity, which transcends the compulsory identity of the *Logos*”<sup>823</sup>. Again, this remembrance is not about returning to some claimed origin *à la* Heidegger. This means that nature is not an origin, to which we can return, but an Other that we must acknowledge in order not to blindly perpetuate the ‘amorphous and barbaric’. In this connection Adorno conceives Hölderlin’s late poetry as an unmasking of humankind’s arrogance. In the late hymns<sup>824</sup>, subjectivity is

<sup>820</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 140.

<sup>821</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 140.

<sup>822</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 141.

<sup>823</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 141.

<sup>824</sup> The hymns analysed by Adorno in *Parataxis* are: *Patmos, Stimme des Volks, Brot und Wein, Der Einzige, Hälfte des Lebens, Mnemosyne, Am Quell der Donau, Der Archipelagus, and Wie wenn am Feiertage*.

neither the absolute nor the ultimate. Subjectivity commits a violation in setting itself up as absolute when it is immanently compelled to self-positing. This is Hölderlin's construal of hubris. It stems from the sphere of mythic conceptions, that of the equivalence of crime and expiation; but its intent is demythologisation, wherein it rediscovers myth in man's self-deification. According to Adorno, Hölderlin uses the mythic conception of hubris to unmask mankind's relapse into mythology when claiming to have risen completely above nature. Hölderlin also reminds us that there is one thing humanity cannot escape, namely death. "What serves as a sign of the reconciliation of genius, which is no longer hardened and enclosed within itself [...] is that mortality—as opposed to mythic infinity in the bad sense—is attributed to it"<sup>825</sup>. In Hölderlin, only through remembering suppressed nature can poetry manage to point at the possibility of releasing nature and mankind from imprisonment in myth. There is no returning to the old myth; instead, Hölderlin's poetry presupposes the possibility of true reconciliation: "reconciliation is that of the One with the Many: That is peace"<sup>826</sup>.

Rather than an idealist synthesis Hölderlin advocates for an aesthetic synthesis—a unity that is not identity, but which does justice to the heterogeneous, that is Nature. In *Parataxis* Adorno claims that 'real reconciliation' is reconciliation between 'inner and outer', or "in the language of idealism: reconciliation between genius and nature"<sup>827</sup>. The reconciliation between these two concepts is pivotal since, as in Heidegger<sup>828</sup>, Adorno uses the word '*Das Offene*' to signify the Genius<sup>829</sup>. Genius in art is the self-reflection of the Idealistic spirit, in other words, the acknowledging of itself as nature<sup>830</sup>. Furthermore, such Genius "would be consciousness of the non-identical object [...] the spirit of song, in distinction to that of domination" and (a bit further on the page) would also be "spirit itself revealing itself as nature, instead of enchaining nature"<sup>831</sup>. But how does the Genius reconcile

<sup>825</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 149.

<sup>826</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 145.

<sup>827</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 146.

<sup>828</sup> The difference is that Heidegger used Rilke's and not Hölderlin's '*Das Offene*'.

<sup>829</sup> In this case '*Das Offene*' has a variety of meanings: "that which is open and as such familiar, that which is no longer dressed and prepared and thereby alienated". See, Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 146.

<sup>830</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 146.

<sup>831</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, pp. 146-7.

with Nature without falling into the mere domination of *logos* (hubris)? According to Adorno, the Genius is an immense arc “seen as domination of nature entrapped within nature that dies away in the depths [...] drowned out by the sounds of peace”<sup>832</sup>. This is that “which would be different, [that is], peace, reconciliation”<sup>833</sup>. The era of violence is not completely eliminated; rather, it is preserved in memory through echoing in the process of recollection. Reconciliation happens only when the enthrallment to nature comes to an end. Hubris, as opposed to the Genius, would be a circle that in its last moment of domination actively (subjectively) thinks of having overcome the domination of Nature, only to plunge into a new form of uncontrolled domination.

The same line of thought is present in *Aesthetic Theory*: “Art’s spirit is the self-recognition of spirit itself as natural”<sup>834</sup>. It is this kind of reflection that, according to Adorno, “divides Hölderlin from both myth and romanticism”<sup>835</sup>. Hölderlin thinks that reflection is responsible for the separation between nature and spirit, but at the same time, he “puts his trust in the organon of reflection, language”<sup>836</sup>. Hölderlin’s self-reflexive use of language in his late poetry shows that the way to reconciliation is not a backward movement: “In Hölderlin the philosophy of history, which conceived origin and reconciliation in simple opposition to reflection as the state of utter sinfulness, is reversed”<sup>837</sup>. In order not to remain in the dark, humanity has to reflect on, bring into consciousness, and name what is seen as the opposite of reflection, consciousness, and language, namely, the speechless nature. But this naming is not *Logos*; the creation *ex nihilo* through namings is instead a poetic naming reminiscent of *The Shelter at Hahrdt* where the ground ‘is far from mute’. Adorno, through his analysis of Hölderlin’s poetry, demonstrates a deeper understanding of Nature than Heidegger. He recognises two different things: first, Nature has its agency that humanity has continuously denigrated and subjugated to its purpose via the *techne*. Second, a freely reconciled Nature requires humanity’s absence, because only then could Nature, via the History of an absent humanity, be at peace (that is, an anti-anthropocentric reconciliation).

<sup>832</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 148.

<sup>833</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 148.

<sup>834</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 196.

<sup>835</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 147.

<sup>836</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 147.

<sup>837</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature II*, p. 147.

## 5.2 The Endgame or the End-Time?

In *Parataxis* Adorno demonstrated via Hölderlin the inner relation between Nature, History and even humanity itself. In *Trying to Understand Endgame* he draws out this Hölderlinian insight to its ultimate consequences by analysing Beckett's post-catastrophic play in which it is said that "there's no more nature"<sup>838</sup>. In his analysis of this play, Adorno also refers to Anders's *Being without Time: Apropos Beckett's Waiting for Godot*. Anders' counterargument to Adorno's essay is found in *L'Uomo è Antiquato*. In the course of their debate, it can be seen how both Adorno and Anders address alienation in Beckett's characters from a humanistic viewpoint, seeking to reconcile it through human action. The difference lies in the consequences of their respective understandings of reconciliation.

As Adorno points out, *Endgame* represents the final stage of alienation, one in which "there is nothing left that has not been made by human beings, is indistinguishable from an additional catastrophic event caused by human beings, in which nature has been wiped out and after which nothing grows any more"<sup>839</sup>. In this sense, Beckett portrays what a constant re-occurrence of hubris as Adorno defines it via Hölderlin would have caused to the planet Earth: the absolute domination of Nature to the point that Earth is completely destroyed. With the disappearance of the Earth from the triptych Earth-Nature-humanity, what would happen to the remaining two elements of this three-way relationship? Concerning History, Adorno writes that it "is kept outside because it has dried up consciousness' power to conceive it, the power to remember"<sup>840</sup>. The only historical element that can be perceived in this post-atomic world is its unavoidable outcome: decline<sup>841</sup>. Humanity, like the other two terms, is reduced to "what [it] has become"<sup>842</sup>, shattered substantiality and absoluteness. Adorno displays here a scenario where humanity is about to vanish but, since Nature is gone too, there will be no one to remember it and thus, no History to speak of. Reconciliation, like mourning, must

<sup>838</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 245.

<sup>839</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 245.

<sup>840</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 247.

<sup>841</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 247.

<sup>842</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 248.

reflect on the fact that reconciliation is no longer possible<sup>843</sup>. Even though all three terms are swiftly liquidated, Beckett's play, understood as unusable art, still accomplishes its duty insofar as it reveals the falsehood behind humanity's "claim to autonomy and [existence, which have lost their] credibility. But although the prison of individuation is seen to be both prison and illusion art cannot break the spell of a detached subjectivity"<sup>844</sup>. Thus, *Endgame* is far more complex than a mere rejection of universal history would suggest. It interrogates the concept of history by at once emphasising the element of discontinuity or, as Adorno would put it, non-identity, in history and, at the same time, revealing the dialectic between nature and history: exposing history as a second nature that acts, to an extraordinary degree, over the heads of human beings. In this double movement, it plays out the Adornian paradox that 'universal history must be construed and denied'. That is, "*Endgame* takes up a position at the nadir of what the construction of the subject-object laid claim to at the zenith of philosophy: pure identity becomes the identity of what has been annihilated, the identity of subject and object in a state of complete alienation"<sup>845</sup>.

At this point, Adorno claims that the *leitmotiv* on which everything hangs is the possibility that something might change. This movement, or its absence, constitutes the plot. Here Adorno mentions Anders, saying that "the Hegelian dialectic of master and servant, which Günther Anders discussed in relation to Godot, is not 'given form' in accordance with the tenets of traditional aesthetics so much as ridiculed. The servant is no longer capable of taking charge and doing away with domination. The mutilated Clov would scarcely be capable of it, and in any case, according to the historical-philosophical sundial of the play, it is too late for spontaneous action. There is nothing left for Clov to do but wander off into a world that does not exist for these recluses and take the chance that he will die in the process. For he cannot even rely on his freedom to die"<sup>846</sup>. The juxtaposition with Anders is justified here not only by this direct quotation but also by the fact that this text of Anders that Adorno is quoting is primarily a criticism of Heidegger and an analysis of

<sup>843</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 249.

<sup>844</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 249.

<sup>845</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 251.

<sup>846</sup> Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 269.



the post-war alienation caused by technology. Both Adorno and Anders utilise Beckett's plays as a means for underlining how philosophical language, in particular the existentialist one, is defective and too outdated for interpreting the current alienation. In this view the Beckettian plays are absurd not because they are devoid of a sense or scope, but merely "because they put meaning on trial; they unfold its history"<sup>847</sup>. Therefore, depicted in Beckett's works is not the absence of sense, but the loss of meaning. This leads to a play that is devoid of time, hope, and ultimately of the awareness of such a loss of meaning. Adorno's understanding of the Beckettian human is close to the Andersian *Mensch ohne Welt* who can only live a senseless life. Exemplary in this regard is the passage in *Endgame* where Hamm asks Clov to look outside their shelter but all he sees is gray<sup>848</sup>. If Adorno agrees with Anders, then why does he question Anders' critique of *Waiting for Godot*? According to Anders, Beckett's characters have reached a more radical situation than those of Kleist, Kafka or Döblin because Beckett's protagonists have reached the non-world while Kohlhaas, K., and Biberkopf were merely "abstracti: separated and severed"<sup>849</sup> from theirs. In particular, Anders sees in *Waiting for Godot* a scenic representation of a historic moment in which "even the process of making has turned into a form of passivity [and] has taken the form of a purposeless scope or a non-making"<sup>850</sup>. Vladimir and Estragon, who do absolutely nothing, represent millions of people, and in their non-doing, they express the absolute instrumental rationality which, by pursuing itself, corroborates the claim that there is no purpose. Vladimir and Estragon are "creatures that have nothing to do because they have nothing to do with the world"<sup>851</sup>, their actions are "rudimental attempts to produce an ephemeral movement in the mush of time but they are not 'true' activities because they have no other drive than that of trying to set time into motion"<sup>852</sup>. That is, what Vladimir and Estragon call 'activity' is indeed a mere pastime that only aims at 'continuation' in the sense of a

<sup>847</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 153.

<sup>848</sup> "HAMM: Then what is it? CLOV (looking): Gray. (Lowering the telescope, turning towards Hamm, louder.)

Gray! (Pause. Still louder.) GRRAY!" See, Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 247.

<sup>849</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, pp. 230–31.

<sup>850</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, p. 231.

<sup>851</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, p. 232.

<sup>852</sup> Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, p. 211.

plain ‘progression of time’ and nothing else. This ‘end of doing/making’ means, for Anders, the loss of the world – because humanity loses one of the main means for interacting with and experiencing the world –, the paralysis of time, and consequently the end of history. This happens, according to Anders, because of a simple syllogism. First, “time is history”<sup>853</sup>. Second, time “proceeds only insofar as a life chases an opportunity and moves towards something”<sup>854</sup>. Third, and therefore, Estragon and Vladimir do not ‘chase’ anything; therefore, time does not flow. But if time does not flow, then there is no history.

The vicissitudes of Estragon and Vladimir represent, for Anders, “the destiny of the mass men”<sup>855</sup>, since despite their inactivity and the lack of a meaningful existence the mass men want ‘to continue’ to live as such: “they do not even consider their existence as ‘nothingness’ or as a ‘void’”. They are ‘metaphysicians’, that is, they are incapable of abandoning the concept of sense [...] [T]hey are the ‘keepers of the seals’ of the notion of sense in a situation that is manifestly senseless”<sup>856</sup>. Even “those among them that are nihilists want to endure living their lives, namely, not-living them”<sup>857</sup>. But it is not because they think of being able to eliminate the contingency within them and to suddenly transform their lives into a positive project *à la* Heidegger<sup>858</sup>. The reason for their continuous pursuit of their non-lives relies on the fact that mass men “live senselessly, meaning that even deciding to interrupt such a pointless existence is unimaginable due to the paralyzing habit of their ‘non-doing’”<sup>859</sup>. Through his characters, Beckett portrays not “nihilism, but the human incapacity of being nihilistic even in a circumstance which is just hopeless”<sup>860</sup>. Anders argues that Beckett employs the technique of ‘inversion’ or ‘quid pro quo’ in a sophisticated manner, enabling him to narrate the story of a life that no longer recognises any form or principle – a life where life can no longer progress<sup>861</sup>. Beckett’s technique of inversion involves applying the

<sup>853</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 241.

<sup>854</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 236.

<sup>855</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 238.

<sup>856</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 234.

<sup>857</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 232.

<sup>858</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 234.

<sup>859</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 233.

<sup>860</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 234.

<sup>861</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 203.

attributes of the characters in the play to the play itself. Therefore, if the characters in *Waiting for Godot* do not know how to move forward, then, according to Anders, *Waiting for Godot* must become a “broken play”<sup>862</sup> – a play that cannot progress. Only such a play can accurately depict Estragon’s and Vladimir’s lives. Beckett ‘destroys’ *Waiting for Godot* so that this mockery of a work of art could represent a mockery of a life that does not move forward. Through inversion, this play is revealed as a fable that has lost its moral purpose and is thus not a fable anymore.

Nonetheless, according to Anders, this failure constitutes a new purpose of the play/fable of Beckett. It is a *negative* fable that represents the lack of purpose in itself. This meaninglessness becomes even clearer if one pays attention to its characters Vladimir and Estragon, for they are the exact representation of generalised people that are fully abstracted from the world in which they are ‘playing’. They have literally nothing to do in the play and cannot, in any way, find anything meaningful. The meaninglessness of the play makes the play tragic in the sense that the tragic element is the impossibility to display the tragic itself<sup>863</sup>. Throughout the play, Estragon and Vladimir endeavour to find something to do, a pastime to pass the time while they wait. However, in their inverted world, every form of activity is just as suitable for waiting as it is difficult to find<sup>864</sup>. When Beckett makes them play, they play in vain because they are unable to organise their time for it is meaningless. Estragon’s pastime of continuously taking off his shoes reveals, through the mechanism of inversion, that *our* pastimes are meaningless, too. Estragon’s pastime of continuously taking off his shoes reveals, through the mechanism of inversion, that *our* pastimes are meaningless, too. Anders argues that when Estragon takes off his shoe in *Waiting for Godot*, it symbolises the futile attempt of humans to make their lives meaningful in a desperate and spectral reality. However, there is a fundamental distinction for Anders between Estragon/Vladimir and humanity – “the two clowns know that they are playing but we do not. They are the clever ones, we are the fools”<sup>865</sup>. At this point, Anders introduces the antipodes, the antagonists of Vladimir and Estragon: Pozzo and Lucky. In a Hegelian key, Anders sees

<sup>862</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 203.

<sup>863</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 205.

<sup>864</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 213.

<sup>865</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 213.

this new human couple as the antagonists of the first couple with whom they reciprocally contend the possibility of dominating. “They [Pozzo and Lucky] are now the real: because what exists is domination and the struggle for such domination”<sup>866</sup>. The difference between the two couples is even more striking for the fact that Pozzo and Lucky enter the play not as two new meaningless embodiments of inactivity, but as the only ‘real’ active characters. The new couple represents the dialectical opposite of the first one since Pozzo (the master in the Hegelian sense) does not need to pass the time or wait for Godot, while Lucky (the servant) is even more ‘lucky’ given the fact that he has to walk. Because of his position (i.e., servitude), Lucky cannot possess a cynical tone, only a sorrowful one which, according to Anders, “binds the hearts of all men in solidarity and in sadness facilitates their solidarity”<sup>867</sup>. Hence, from the dejected barren soil of Beckett’s play emerges a minuscule form of comfort, a ‘human tone’ that demonstrates that the solution is not in metaphysics but in those who feel love for humanity<sup>868</sup>.

Going back to Adorno’s questioning of the Andersian passage quoted above, a significant difference now emerges between their respective interpretations of Beckett. Both Adorno and Anders tackle the alienation embodied by Beckett’s characters from a humanist perspective since they attempt to reconcile it via human action. A difference between them, however, lies in how they see the possibility of achieving such reconciliation. Adorno, through Hölderlin, envisioned a reconciliation with Nature in a remembrance of humanity after the Endgame, thus underscoring its predominantly aesthetic-theoretical and utopian approach. The Open as theorised by Adorno is his attempt to simultaneously reveal the double role played by Nature and humanity in their relationship with History, which overcomes Heidegger’s waiting for the gods where Nature was still seen through the lenses of hubris. In contrast, Anders sees the End-Time as a tool for active moral action: it is not the end of time but rather an indefinite time wherein humanity’s scepticism and despair are no less profound than Adorno’s. Yet despite this, Anders’ *Endzeit* urges humanity to intervene as if it still had a chance of succeeding. The apocalyptic destruction of Beckett’s *Endgame* is used by Anders to turn the impossible

<sup>866</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 215.

<sup>867</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 217.

<sup>868</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato* Vol. I, p. 217.

into the possible. An event first experienced as real but impossible (the post-apocalyptic destruction in which Hamm and Clov live) becomes real and no longer impossible (once the catastrophe occurs, it is ‘re-normalised’, as if it has always been possible)<sup>869</sup>. This does not mean, as Adorno claims, that Anders can positively invert the negative as in the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave because the *Endzeit* cannot be averted but, at best, only postponed. Anders is aware of the tragedy of Estragon and Vladimir, but he does not surrender, as Heidegger does, to a ‘principle of defeatism’ [*Prinzip Defaitismus*] because Anders understands that it not only concerns the interaction between Nature and humanity. That is, unlike Adorno, Anders does not forget about *techne* and its position as a historical subject.

In *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno claims that *Endgame* is not a play about the atomic bomb but about barren nature. However, Hamm and Clov’s shelter seems to contradict his claim. They survived the unnamed catastrophe of the play by hiding in a shelter – which could be an anti-atomic shelter – while everything around them was reduced to nothingness, “a single Hiroshima, a soil that no longer bears the traces of our past existence”<sup>870</sup>. Moreover, Adorno argues that the play does not talk about the atomic bomb insofar as it “falsifies the historical horror of anonymity by displacing it onto human characters and actions.” However, Adorno overlooks the fact that Hamm and Clov are constantly discussing the death and emptiness that surround their shelter throughout the play<sup>871</sup>. The ‘historical horror’ of the catastrophe is literally surrounding them from the beginning to the end of *Endgame*. By applying Beckett’s technique of inversion, as described by Anders, it is possible to argue that via ‘destroying’ the world of *Endgame*, Beckett is mocking a world that pretends to be alive but is indeed only populated by the corpses of both nature and humanity. Adorno’s blindness before the apocalypse is even clearer when his interpretation of Hamm’s madman is compared with Anders’ portrayal of the biblical Noah in *Endzeit und Zeitenende*. For Adorno, the madman in Hamm’s story, who is used to be dragged

<sup>869</sup> Zizek, p. 328.

<sup>870</sup> G. Anders, *Diario Di Hiroshima e Nagasaki* (Milano: Ghibli, 2014), p. 18.

<sup>871</sup> “HAMM: (violently) Wait till you’re spoken to. (Normal voice.) All is ... all is ... all is what? (Violently.) All is what? CLOV: What all is? In a word. Is that what you want to know? Just a moment. (He turns the telescope on the without, looks, lowers the telescope, turns toward Hamm.) Corpsed“. Adorno, *Notes to Literature I*, p. 245.

around, coincides with the character of Clov, who peers out the window on [Hamm's] command" but does not see anything. Once again, however, Adorno seems 'blinded' here because the madman was far from blind: he knew the end would come and indeed it was for this reason that he did not care about all the things Hamm was telling him to see. Clov is therefore more appropriately conceived as the opposite of the madman, as he tries to see what Hamm, now blind, wants him to see but does not exist anymore. For Anders, meanwhile, the biblical Noah - who is tired of not being taken seriously about his foretelling of the flood - decides to "clothe himself in sackcloth and put ashes on his head. This act was only permitted to someone lamenting the loss of his dear child or his wife. Clothed in the habit of truth, acting sorrowful, he went back to the city, intent on using to his advantage the curiosity, malignity and superstition of its people. Within a short time, he had gathered around him a small crowd, and the questions began to surface. He was asked if someone was dead and who the dead person was. Noah answered them that many were dead and, much to the amusement of those who were listening, that they themselves were dead. Asked when this catastrophe had taken place, he answered: tomorrow. Seizing this moment of attention and disarray, Noah stood up to his full height and began to speak: the day after tomorrow, the flood will be something that will have been. And when the flood will have been, all that is will never have existed. When the flood will have carried away all that is, all that will have been, it will be too late to remember, for there will be no one left. So, there will no longer be any difference between the dead and those who weep for them. If I have come before you, it is to reverse time, it is to weep today for tomorrow's dead. The day after tomorrow, it will be too late. Upon this, he went back home, took his clothes off, removed the ashes covering his face, and went to his workshop. In the evening, a carpenter knocked on his door and said to him: let me help you build an ark, so that this may become false. Later, a roofer joined them and said: it is raining over the mountains, let me help you, so that this may become false"<sup>872</sup>. In Anders' tale, Noah must act like a madman to make those who are 'still blind' able to properly see the imminent catastrophe. As Anders claims in his reading of *Waiting for Godot*, Noah is here utilising the inversion but, far from being the positive

<sup>872</sup> G. Anders, *Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gedanken über die Atomäre Situation* (München: C.H. Beck, 1972).

Hegelian reconciliation that Adorno saw, it will not prevent the catastrophe itself, the flood will take place and will kill those who did not listen.

Juxtaposed in this way, it is evident that both the Adornian and Andersian interpretations are essentially continuations of their respective pre-war concerns. Like in his discussion of the musical situation, Anders pursues a methodological approach grounded on 'looking forward' and 'foreseeing' the arrival of the technological catastrophe just as he previously hearkened to the sound of silence to grasp music's ultimately unreachable meaning. To some extent, Anders' decentralised humanism is also evident because, according to him, *techne* becomes the new subject of history that brings forth an overall decentralisation of humanity. Even Adorno's approach is reminiscent of his early musicology since his historically based description of humanity's post-war alienation still trespasses into a utopian fantasy that Anders, in his anti-historical reading of the looming apocalypse, would never approach because of his insistence on the possibility of practical-moral behaviour that focuses on the present and its consequences for the future. As in Heidegger's case, the problem for both is related to the notion of the 'Open'. Adorno certainly moves away from Heidegger's total defeatist position, but he nevertheless fails to see that the final moments of the Genius' trajectory might merely signify that a new historical subject has emerged and that this new subject will continue to dominate Nature even without humanity's will-to-will. In comparison, the innovative element of Anders' critique lies not in describing a human prevention of the catastrophe or the possibility of a non-domination-based relation with Nature, but in the idea that the disappearance of humanity does not equate to the preservation of Nature. While Adorno believes that the alienation caused by *techne* and fuelled by humanity's will-to-will can end only with the latter's disappearance, Anders asserts that *techne* will also usurp humanity's will-to-will, leading to the annihilation of history.

### **Section 3: Conclusion**





## Chapter 6: Conclusion

The aim of this book was to uncover a trajectory linking the musicological works of Anders with themes from his later philosophy of technology. The uncovering of this trajectory, I argued, also provides a novel standpoint from which we can evaluate Adorno's and Heidegger's analyses of Hölderlin's late hymns in their respective investigations of alienation after WWII. Furthermore, this book aimed to show that in Anders' musicology there therefore exists an original interpretative key that is fruitful for understanding Adorno and Heidegger's works before WWII as musically inspired philosophies. These reflections on music by Adorno and Heidegger in turn contribute to understanding how, along with Anders, there is a conjoined effort to repudiate the ocular-centric paradigm which is prevalent in Husserl's philosophy. Thus, the main goal of this book is to present all these veiled connections between the philosophies of Anders, Adorno, and Heidegger, as well as to offer the innovative standpoint that these ties imply. I am going to briefly retrace my steps here to show how I connected Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger in a musicological and poetical nexus and answered the original question posed in the introduction, that is, what can be learnt from re-discovering Anders' musicological works.

In the first chapter of this study, I delineated the intricate evolution of Anders' philosophy from phenomenology to musicology through comparisons with Heidegger's *Dasein*-philosophy and Plessner's *Ästhetologie*. Through Anders' anti-Husserlian concept of 'situation', I illustrated how his musicology offered a way to challenge the subject/object dichotomy and to argue that it is merely a misunderstanding rooted in a deeper, fundamentally human problem<sup>873</sup>: the dichotomy of contingency

<sup>873</sup> "Adorno hears in Schubert's music something profound: the self-reflexivity of a composer whose music all too well recognises the condition of the modern subject, subjected

and alienation, which music reveals through its transcendental nature. At this point, through comparing Adorno's *Schubert* and the *Franz Schubert: Grand Rondo in A Major for Piano Four-Hands, op. 107* I showed how in Adorno's pre-war works there emerged both a call for a paradigmatic shift centred on the ear and acoustics and an anti-Husserlian attitude against failed breakouts of idealism via idealistic means. The juxtaposition between Adorno and Anders led to an additional discovery concerning Anders' philosophical stance, that is, his 'decentralised humanism'. With this concept, I referred to a philosophical method that analyses reality exclusively from a human perspective without being anthropocentric in the sense that it views humanity as merely one of the entities rather than the only entity inhabiting the cosmos. In chapter two, I first discussed Heidegger's understanding of music from his *Origin of the Work of Art* and then I proceeded to compare it with Anders'. This methodology enabled me to demonstrate Heidegger's anti-Husserlian (anti-psychological) stance towards Husserl's impersonal judgments, which resulted in the introduction of the crucial concept of *Stimmung*. Via *Stimmung* Heidegger introduced the concept of 'attunement' which was vital for his understanding of music and his shift from a Husserlian ocular-centrism to a new 'acousticism'. Heidegger, similarly to Anders, illustrated a musicology centred around the idea that music possessed a certain epiphanic character which intertwined humanity with something deeper and more original, namely, truth and meaning. However, Heidegger and Anders's musicological understanding did not converge in their conclusions. While Heidegger used music as a means to counter humanity's *Geworfenheit* so that he could reiterate humanity's own centrality, Anders used it to reveal that humanity is ultimately free and forced to persistently re-invent itself.

Chapter three examined the philosophical differences between Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger both before and after WWII. It also suggested a new method of interpreting each of their post-war philosophical 'turns' through the notion of '*Stimmung*'. The concept of '*Stimmung*', as discussed by Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger in their works, shows a parallel dialogue between them on the use of emotionality as a means for aesthetic, social, and political analysis. This new interpretation of the 'turns' by Adorno, Anders, and Heidegger offers an alternative to the

and not least subject to his own damaged subjectivity". See, Leppert, p. 62.

common notion of a 'break' instantiated by WWII which focuses on discontinuities rather than continuities in their philosophies.

Chapters four and five are counterparts to chapters one and two. In a reversed manner, I first examined how Anders challenged Heidegger's post-*Kehre* philosophy through his work *Über Heidegger*. Next, I compared Anders' perspective to Adorno's interpretation of Hölderlin and Beckett, and their differing views on Heidegger as they – despite their different perspectives – provide a comprehensive examination of the catastrophic consequences of alienation on humanity. From Anders' criticism of Heidegger there emerged two different interpretations of poetry and Hölderlin, one that sees Hölderlin as the daring poet (Heidegger), the other that sees him as the poet of happiness (Anders). These two perspectives reflect their respective readings of 'time' and its endless chronological progression. While Heidegger sought to escape time through a merely theoretical-ontological procedure that looked at the past of the origin as a means for going forward, Anders saw a solution in practical-moral behaviour concentrated on the present and aimed at postponing the future for as long as possible. Concerning Adorno and Anders, I showed how both Adorno and Anders described, via Hölderlin, a situation of voluntary submission to *techne* for the sake of satisfaction. The extreme consequences of such a situation were voiced in their examination of Beckett's plays which revolved around the loss of meaning and the approaching of a catastrophe. Through Beckett, I argued how Adorno's alternative to human hubris, namely the Genius' arc, remained unsatisfactory in the face of the emergence of the threat of *techne's* domination of Nature. While Adorno believed that the alienation produced by *techne* was driven by humanity's arrogance and that this cruel cycle could only end with humanity's departure, Anders claimed that *techne* would seize that, too, causing the destruction of History and Nature as well.

Following this brief summary of the argument thus far, I can finally attempt to answer the question asked in the introduction: what can be learnt from a re-discovery of Anders' musicological works? I believe that Anders' musicological writings offer an anthropological and philosophical key to re-interpreting the human-*techne* relationship which Anders finalised in *Sprache und Endzeit* [Language and Endtime]. I argue that

Anders' third volume of the *Antiquiertheit des Menschen*<sup>874</sup> does not merely compare two opposing models of language<sup>875</sup>. According to Matassi, in *Sprache und Endzeit* Anders investigated the choice that the modern human has decided not to take: selecting the superlative language that was the constituent of music's own structure<sup>876</sup>. In this sense, Matassi claims, it is possible to assert that Anders had first developed a language of the superlative through music, before he described a comparative language through *techne*, as if there were an inherent opposition between music and *techne*. Anders sketches the difference between the two languages as follows: the comparative language used in technology and advertisement prohibits the use of the term 'the best' for the sake of progress and competition, thereby ensuring a perpetual growth<sup>877</sup>. Superlative language, on the other hand, is the language of the 'wir Not und Zeit vergessen' already described in chapter four, the language of a-temporal happiness which believes in the possibility of achieving *optima*<sup>878</sup>. However, "the existence of definitive *optima* would block the possibility to improvement"<sup>879</sup> and thus would "create a situation in which time would become superfluous"<sup>880</sup>, eliminating competition and the need for improvement.

From his early phenomenological years with Husserl, Anders studied the possibility of articulating a discussion of music which could simulate a language and create a correspondingly adequate form of temporality. This search for a language of music and its temporality became obvious in his definition of music given in *Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen* when he wrote that 'music as man's music', is the transformative

<sup>874</sup> *Sprache und Endzeit* is an essay by "Anders that was published in eight instalments in the Austrian journal FORVM from 1989 to 1991 (the full essay consists of 38 sections). The original essay was planned for inclusion in the third (unrealised) volume of *The Obsolescence of Human Beings*'. See, Anders, 'Language and End Time (Sections I, IV, and V of "Sprache Und Endzeit")', p. 134.

<sup>875</sup> This is the hypothesis proposed by Matassi in his *Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders* which discusses Anders' *Sprache und Endzeit*. See, E. Matassi, 'Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders',

*Micromega*, 2002, pp. 85–96.

<sup>876</sup> Matassi, 'Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders', p. 87.

<sup>877</sup> G. Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', trans. by A. Jappe, *Micromega*, 5 (2002), p. 104.

<sup>878</sup> Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', p. 108.

<sup>879</sup> Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', p. 109.

<sup>880</sup> Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', p. 109. In this a-temporal situation would mean the satisfaction of all needs (the superlatives) and imply the un-restricted happiness that Anders read in Hölderlin's poetry.

art [*Die Kunst der Verwandlung*] of humanity itself<sup>881</sup>. Therefore, Matassi maintains, a philosophy of music could only be given via an anthropology of music, and this explains why Anders decided to dedicate a wide section of his musicology to human hearing<sup>882</sup>. Anders' acoustic philosophy immediately stood out not as a quest for originality or purity, but rather as a study focused in an anthropologic direction, namely on the cultivation and transformation of the human. This transformation is what Anders put in stark contraposition with his later philosophy of technology, displaying what he described as the opposition between a superlative and a comparative language. The antithesis between this acoustic-musical language and the deaf language of technology can be understood as the opposition between the reality of the transformative situation [*Wirklichkeit der Verwandlungssituation*] of humanity and the perpetual assassination of time carried out by *techne*. Anders' musical language was a revelation [*Offenbarung*] in the sense that it co-belonged to humanity but could not be considered under a purely objective frame because the 'actuality of the inner liberation' [*Aktualität der Gelöstheit*] must be understood as a mediation between a 'virtual' singing and hearing<sup>883</sup> as the identity of one's expressing himself and simultaneously fully listening.

As already mentioned, Anders concurrently examines a language and a temporality. Music is the only art form that can alter the structure of time, although it cannot completely detach itself from time. By separating its destructive power from its infinity, music modifies the qualitative structure of time. The eternity experienced through music, which can be grasped in an instant but is equally fugacious, occurs within time rather than outside of it. This idea was put forward by Anders in the central and concluding sections of his *Untersuchungen über musikalische Situationen* where he wrote that "every music is in itself monarchical" [*jede Musik von selbst monarchisch [ist]*]<sup>884</sup>, implying the connection between being-in-the-world and being-in-music; two incommensurable situations that are still related by their complementary relationship. He further stated that the *musikalische Situation* is an enclave<sup>885</sup>. For this reason, the musi-

<sup>881</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 74.

<sup>882</sup> Matassi, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale,' p. 92.

<sup>883</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 100.

<sup>884</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 53.

<sup>885</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, p. 44.

cal time is a 'time' which is suspended, blocked, rhythmic, and cyclically structured which will never be thoroughly assimilated by its historical counterpart. This argument made by the young Anders represented the ideal and premise of his later distinction between superlative and comparative language. In this latter case, the superlative is the alternative to the historical irreversibility of death which is expressed by the aseptic language-non-language of *techne* that is devoid of finality and establishes the irreversibility of its senseless call for progress.

The profound break from the traditional schemes of language and temporality requires a different stance regarding the sense of hearing. Instead of promoting a reality that must be dominated by humanity through a dominant form of rationality, Anders, in his *Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens*, called for the recognition of acoustic phenomena that do not need to be transformed into actual audibility. This meant going beyond the usual attitude of experimental psychology and the ocular-centrism characterising the idea of 'paying attention'<sup>886</sup>. Although Anders had previously established a strict 'compenetration' between philosophy and the anthropology of music to the point that the former could not exist without the latter, this did not mean a subjugation of music under the power of the will *à la* Schopenhauer<sup>887</sup>. Anders' music represented the counterargument to Schopenhauer's metaphysical understanding<sup>888</sup> insofar as the latter, via his 'analogic' approach, ended up producing the nullification of humanity's will itself and the consequential acceptance of a purely passive nihilism rather than the *Aktualität der Gelöstheit*<sup>889</sup>.

<sup>886</sup> See, *Matassi*, 'Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders', p. 92. Such perspective is also found in Heidegger. As Matassi notes, the importance for a shift from ocular-centrism to auditory-centrism in Heidegger is represented by the fact that H. Bessler dedicated his musicological work *Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit* to Heidegger.

<sup>887</sup> Schopenhauer writes that "music never expresses the phenomenon, [...] but the will itself. Therefore, music does not express this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind". See, A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. by E.F.J. Payne, (New York: Dover Publications), p. 261.

<sup>888</sup> Anders, *Musikphilosophische Schriften*, pp. 74–75.

<sup>889</sup> For Schopenhauer music does not provoke emotions in its listener. Hence, the value of music only consists in its aptitude to epitomise Will in its highest degree of objectivation without making the listener experience its stirrings himself. Therefore, the value of music as a form of art is primarily cognitive. See, A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, § 52.

Anders advocated for a new motif, namely, that of ‘hearing as a voyage’ which refuted the predominance of images and rationalisation, thus evoking the words of the Old Testament: “you saw no image – there was only voice”<sup>890</sup>. For Anders, the primacy of rationalisation should be exchanged for the idea of *Gelöstheit* together with the ‘acoustic world’ that carries it through the individuality and specificity of sound. Music does not contemplate any material object, it is a pure possibility, a projection; music has no place, and is always a *nunc* but never a *hic*. The immateriality of music can be conveyed by an expression such as ‘now’ – an expression that is crucial in music and yet is nowhere to be found because as soon as it is uttered, it is always already in the past. This is an example of the mediality that changes humanity that Anders so vehemently advocated in his musicology.

Therefore, according to Matassi, musicological anthropology and philosophy are intertwined in music because music represents the philosophical-anthropological locus where the aura of the listener/musician can be encountered. Seen in this light, Matassi perceives music as the only auratic dimension of modernity<sup>891</sup>. In the musical time, there is the possibility of liberation from the historical time but not the solution to the *techné*’s alienation and oppression. What Anders asks for is, according to Matassi as well as Maletta<sup>892</sup>, a mere swapping of the comparative language of *techné* for the superlative one of music<sup>893</sup>. Since the 1920s, Matassi argues, Anders has argued one thing, namely, the idea that modern art loses its auratic characterisation due to its technological reproduc-

<sup>890</sup> *The Holy Bible, New International Version*, Deuteronomy 4:12, (Grand Rapids: The Zondervan Corporation, 2001), p. 98.

<sup>891</sup> Matassi, ‘Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders’, p. 94. In this context, Matassi takes the term ‘aura’ directly from Walter Benjamin. Matassi writes, “The time of music and listening has an intrinsically redemptive purpose and is redemption itself in an argumentative sequence that was already exalted by Benjamin. If Benjamin’s philosophy can only be found at these two extremes - the plane of the most rigid immanence, original guilt, metaphysics, and the ‘mythical’ on one hand, and the vertical-heterological on the other - then music is the only factor that plays a decisive role, precisely within such dimension. Music is the very possibility of redemption and hope, as reiterated in the famous conclusion of the essay dedicated to Goethe’s *Elective Affinities*”.

<sup>892</sup> R. Maletta, *Segnali dal futuro. Gli ‘stenogrammi filosofici’ di Günther Anders* in G. Anders, *Stenogrammi Filosofici*, (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2022), pp. 135–36. The fact that Maletta aligns herself with Matassi reveals how deep-rooted is the idea that Anders’ philosophy of music is only a counter to technology.

<sup>893</sup> Matassi, ‘Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders’, p. 94.



tion can actually be turned upside-down<sup>894</sup>. In this view Anders provided us with the means for resisting the language of *techne* through that of music. As understood by Matassi and Maletta, the musical situation is meant to promote a new *Gesamtkunstwerk* insofar as it does not surrender its aura but passionately preserves it as “*punctum*, sting, speck, cut [...] as that accident which pricks me”<sup>895</sup>. The distinction between image and sound reinforces the strict division between a way of being-in-language still connected to the concept of aura and another one characterised by the oppressive mode-of-being of *techne*, where there is no sound but only pre-processed images. Matassi argues that in order to regain its individuality, humanity needs to rediscover its language, voice, and music, as they represent the antithesis of the technological expansion of everything human in the form of a worldwide exhibition which cannot be avoided as humanity is its main attraction<sup>896</sup>.

I maintain that Matassi and Maletta’s readings do not do justice to Anders’ *Sprache und Endzeit*. While it is true that Anders describes two forms of language and clearly sides with the superlative counterpart, it is equally true that his conclusion does not end with a mere re-recovery and re-discovery of a lost language<sup>897</sup>. Rather, Anders uses this linguistic gap to further develop his idea of the Promethean gap by stating that “our *conditio humana* does not consist in the fact that our imagination lags behind our technical capability, but that humanity is condemned to overcome its imaginative and emotional *proportio humana*”<sup>898</sup>. This implies that it is not only strictly impossible to bridge our deficiencies but it is also evidently “evil to salute and cultivate this situation without restrictions”<sup>899</sup>. In the Andersian unity between music and humanity, there is a plea not for an aesthetic approach but for a new anthropology which is simulta-

<sup>894</sup> Matassi, ‘Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders’, p. 95.

<sup>895</sup> R. Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. by R. Howard (London: Vintage Books, 2000), p. 26. Following Barthes, the *punctum* is that which aspires to re-conquer a sense of sovereignty from its microcosmos.

<sup>896</sup> Matassi, *Linguaggio, Musica e Tecnica in Günther Anders*, p. 95.

<sup>897</sup> Maletta speaks of Anders’ re-discovery, through music, of an *Ur-Sprache* which could enhance the human imagination against technology. And yet, few paragraphs later she claims that Anders is equally sceptical about music since, as Anders noted himself, it can equally lead to dehumanisation as in the case of jazz music. See, Maletta, *Segnali dal futuro. Gli ‘stenogrammi filosofici’ di Günther Anders*, pp. 134-35.

<sup>898</sup> Anders, ‘Linguaggio e Tempo Finale’, p. 123.

<sup>899</sup> Anders, ‘Linguaggio e Tempo Finale’, p. 124.

neously musicological and philosophical and aims at defending the most vulnerable of human abilities. However, Matassi and Maletta still offer a valuable interpretative element which I argue shows the importance of Anders' early musicology for a better framing of his understanding of technology. Matassi and Maletta rightly see in the superlative language of music the Andersian alternative to *techne*<sup>900</sup> but I would argue that there is something more to this reading.

I believe that in *Sprache und Endzeit* Anders realised that *techne* is not the immediate opposite of music, but its inverted mirror image. Here I mean that until Anders radicalises the Promethean gap (*Sprache und Endzeit*), he saw *techne* as the 'producer' of a specific situation – what I will call the 'technological situation' – which, as the opposite of the musical situation, means that one is forced into this world (historical time) and that technology reveals something without hiding it, namely, the Promethean shame that humanity feels in the face of its own products. From this first reading, Anders deduced the pressing need to counteract the increasing technological capability (*Herstellen*) of humanity with an equal emphasis on human imagination (*Vorstellen*). In *Sprache und Endzeit*, I believe, Anders realised that his reading was inappropriate and thus re-read the technological situation as the mirror image of the musical situation, meaning that *techne* now produced a technological time in which people are abiding by the maxims of machines while still remaining in the medium of time. Furthermore, in its technological silence *techne* offers a revelation, that is, the new human condition of perpetual change of the *proportio umana*. While in his first interpretation Anders could still advocate the need for re-balancing the discrepancy, now he is forced to ultimately accept the incongruity between the human ability to produce and its imagination<sup>901</sup>. Thus, as Anders writes "the shortcoming does not consist in the fact that we have incessantly committed, since

<sup>900</sup> Anders, in his second volume of *Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, countered the time of the musical situation of the musician with that of the worker in the factory that dehumanises himself due to his adopting the mechanical time of the machine. See, Anders, *L'Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, pp. 407–8.

<sup>901</sup> This new realisation resembles Anders' anthropological insight of *Patology of Freedom*, when he saw humanity experiencing the paradoxical situation according to which it discovers that its freedom has unalterable limits which meant that humanity was ultimately un-free before its freedom. See, Anders, *The pathology of freedom: An essay on non-identification*, p. 280.

1945, a mistake or a crime. We committed an omission, in other words, we did *nothing*<sup>902</sup>. In this sense, humanity is to blame not when it feels 'less' than it produces but when, aware of its discrepancy, it nurtures it, "when it *willingly fails* and when it uses its own failing"<sup>903</sup> to maintain its ignorance before its Promethean gap.

Throughout this book I have underscored the significance as well as the innovativeness of Anders' thought, in particular in its correlation with Adorno and Heidegger's. However, it is not devoid of limits and inconsistencies. The championing of superlative language, the bridging of the Promethean gap, and the recognition of the new human proportion all reveal a major source of perplexity, namely, Anders' ethical stance. Anders, by defining the human as completely subjugated to the domination of *techne*, is forced to imagine an ethical project which forces on the singular individual an immense moral task<sup>904</sup>. In a world dominated by *techne* Anders demonstrates a stubborn humanism because, although *techne* is elevated to the status of 'subject of history', Anders' individual must oppose the status quo by proposing new moral paradigms. If responsibility means for Anders consciousness of one's own actions and their consequences, that is *Vorstellen*, then it is impossible for a person to foresee them since she is blinded by *techne* and her Promethean gap, which is caused by the discrepancy between her technical and emotional capabilities<sup>905</sup>. Anders' reflections reveal many subtleties concerning our interactions with technology, and through his call for the enlargement of imagination he anticipated several themes which ultimately merged into an ethic of technology known under the name *Technikfolgenabschätzung* (technology assessment), but the

<sup>902</sup> Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', p. 124.

<sup>903</sup>

Anders, 'Linguaggio e Tempo Finale', p. 124.

<sup>904</sup> "He [Anders] is exclusively focusing on the responsibility of the singular and he mobilises him as the only potential bulwark against the power of the *techne*". See, Lohmann, pp. 308–9.

<sup>905</sup> The extensiveness of this gap is so vast that the notion of 'promethean gap' seems inapplicable to the modern world. Anders himself noted this contradiction when he remarked that: "if the power and the energies that we are capable of releasing from our products are infinite, then our responsibility must be infinite too". See, G. Stern, *Die Atomare Drohung: Radikale Überlegungen* (München: C. H. Beck, 1981), p. 34. As Portinaro suggests, in Anders' case we should not speak of an ethic of responsibility but rather of an ethic of denial which seems to better reflect Anders' later understanding of violence too. See, Portinaro, *Il Principio Disperazione: Tre Studi Su Günther Anders*, p. 104.

solutions he offered remain as fascinating as they are unsatisfactory<sup>906</sup>. Anders considered a ‘thinking of the interaction *ad infinitum*’ demoralising, paralysing, and ultimately useless. In other words, he opposed a form of thinking that “does not know what the ultimate consequence of the consequences of the consequences of the consequences of one’s action will be”<sup>907</sup> because he believed that an individual could always know the ‘real sense’ of his producing when outlined within a framed horizon<sup>908</sup>. However, this positivity contained in such iterative thinking seems, in today’s complex world, highly unlikely to occur unless one only refers, as Anders did, to ‘borderline examples’ [*Grenzfälle*], that is, actions or technological products which will make us think of the “unexpected, unforeseeable, and irrevocable effects”<sup>909</sup> and thus call for their direct opposition. Only in these extreme cases is it justifiable for Anders to call for the ‘strike of the products’ [*Produktstreik*]<sup>910</sup> because the workers and the scientists working on the production, creation, and fabrication of these things are directly linked to destructive forces (atomic bombs, landmines, and other weapons). However, in a typical scenario, it can be difficult to determine the implications or intended uses of a product or invention<sup>911</sup>.

Anders recognised that science, like technology, has a dual nature that makes it susceptible to both positive and negative uses. He referred to certain technological products, such as atomic bombs and atomic energy, as ‘Janus-faced products’ [*Janusköpfige Produkte*]<sup>912</sup> due to their non-univocal scope.

<sup>906</sup> Anders’ “answers to the question on how to bridge the gap or re-establish a superlative language are vague and inadequate”. See, Lohmann, p. 311.

<sup>907</sup> Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 361.

<sup>908</sup> “We have to foresee even what we do not see with our eyes. Today’s imperative sounds like this: Anticipate!”.

<sup>909</sup> See, Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. II*, p. 362.

<sup>909</sup> Stern, *Die atomare Drohung: radikale Überlegungen*, pp. 33–34.

<sup>910</sup> With the notion of ‘*Produktstreik*’, Anders sought to formulate a Hippocratic oath according to which all the people would swear to decline to produce any object before they have examined it and are sure that it will not directly or indirectly have destructive effects. Anders believes that only through this strike is it possible to create a new morality. See, Stern, *Die atomare Drohung: radikale Überlegungen*, p. 160 and Anders, *Günther Anders Antwortet. Interviews Und Erklärungen*, p. 93.

<sup>911</sup> A reason for this difficulty is to be found in the fragmentation of the production chain that Anders masterfully described in his post-war works which has led to the loss of *τέλος* and *εἶδος*. See, Anders, *L’Uomo è Antiquato Vol. I*, p. 274.

<sup>912</sup> Stern, *Die atomare Drohung: radikale Überlegungen*, p. 156.

This ambivalent nature of products, according to Anders, depends, again, on the singular individual and on the usage that he makes of them. Practically speaking, it appears quite debatable to entrust a person with the task of assessing the consequences of scientific research, the technical procedure, or the technological artefact in whose design, invention, or production she is participating. Even the entire scientific community would have issues accomplishing such a gargantuan enterprise. Thus, the efficacy of a *Produktstreik* is seriously limited insofar as we could only ‘eliminate’ singular dangerous or destructive objects but not the knowledge behind their production (their ‘know-how’). Furthermore, as Anders notes, “we are not able to assess the danger factor of activities that at the moment appear harmless [...] the possibility of threatening products will exist as long as technology and science exist”<sup>913</sup>. Therefore, Anders’ attempt to reinvigorate society with new decision-making powers to counteract its loss of subjectivity in respect to history is a problematic solution. Without any element that can demonstrate objective contradictions within the constant production of *techne*, it is difficult to imagine a kind of technology that works in harmony with humanity rather than against it. This ethic of responsibility, arising from human suffering and the search for solidarity, has now acquired the characteristics of an ethic of intentionality and inevitably confronted, in Anders’ later years, the powerlessness and paradoxical consequences of using violence as a means of opposing the status quo<sup>914</sup>.

And yet, Anders’ corpus should not be misunderstood as a variation of the same concept, that is, a continuous critique of technology from different angles. As this book has argued several times, Anders developed a plethora of discussions involving several other themes (music, poetry, nature, etc.). A good example is his *Philosophische Stenogramme* which displays how well Anders could shift from an argument concerning music to one concerning poetry. This text written in 1965 is a collection of stenograms, that is, short and often paratactical aphorismic structures.

<sup>913</sup> Stern, *Die atomare Drohung: radikale Überlegungen*, pp. 157, 160.

<sup>914</sup> “Our resorting to violence must be always, and only, utilised as a means in desperate situations as counter-violence; always and only as a *provisorium*. Because, after all, it only aspires to the situation of non-violence. But as long as the established power will keep exerting violence against us and those who have no power [...] we are *forced*, by this state of necessity, to *renounce* to our repudiation of violence”. See, Anders, *Il MondoDopo l’Uomo. Tecnica e Violenza*.

This work demonstrates how misleading the canonical classification of Anders as a philosopher of technology after the 1950s<sup>915</sup> is since many of his stenograms<sup>916</sup> discuss the musical situation or the activity-passivity of music that Anders discussed in his early musicological work. Among all the stenograms within Anders' text there is one, I consider, that perfectly exhibits the decentralised humanism that I claim emerged from Anders' writing.

In *Bucolic and the Property*, Anders speaks about the noise produced by cowbells and how such noise is normally associated with a feeling of poetic and bucolic pleasure. While this noise has a mere reassuring and functional purpose for the farmer, for the average person it becomes a means of rustic poesy. "But why do we enjoy it?" – writes Anders – "Why don't we demystify it as sheer property-pleasure"<sup>917</sup>? The reason behind this is straightforward: we, who don't own the property in question, find it delightful that what is communicated through the sound of cowbells is not Nature, meaning that it is not something alien to us. The cow (together with the cowbell) has an owner, so there is no need to worry about it as it is part of our homely environment, and it is our property<sup>918</sup>. This analysis is not an attempt to denounce animal farming or animal property but an effort to redefine the concept of 'Nature' as well as that of 'pleasure'. It is not a coincidence that Anders juxtaposes the bucolic noise of the cowbell with the pleasure of listening to spiritual music. In both cases, the pleasure comes from the property of the animals and/or the slaves. What Anders demonstrates here, I think, is the will to include in his philosophy the notion of the 'Other' – not merely as co-participant to the historical reality of (white) humanity, but rather as something/one ultimately unintelligible and unreachable; hence, as something deserving its own undiminishable status of agent or subject.

This acknowledgement of the Other or the concept of 'Otherness' was already presented by Anders in his *Über das Naturtreffen*<sup>919</sup>. In this

<sup>915</sup> Portinaro and Liessmann belong to the scholars who disseminated this reading. See, Konrad P. Liessmann, *Günther Anders*; Portinaro, *Il Principio Disperazione: Tre Studi Su Günther Anders*.

<sup>916</sup> For example, the stenograms *Summoning the Unknown* and *Overwhelming*. See, Anders, *Stenogrammi Filosofici*, pp. 105–6, 126.

<sup>917</sup> Anders, *Stenogrammi Filosofici*, p. 36.

<sup>918</sup> Anders, *Stenogrammi Filosofici*, p. 36.

<sup>919</sup> G. Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, in *Über Das Haben. Sieben Kapitel Zur Ontologie Der*

early writing, Anders wanted to address two different things: first, the ‘phenomenal profundity’ of Nature; second, the manner in which humanity encounters Nature. In order to do so, Anders offers two simple examples – as discussed in chapter two – fruits and animals. Anders believes that the first example, which is crucial as it has more consequences<sup>920</sup>, aims to solve the contradiction that arises when considering entities that grow naturally and were not made by or for humans, yet seem to be more closely related to humanity than any man-made object. This example is intended to demonstrate how, through the practice of consuming fruits, fruit manifests its quality of natural entity, for our eating it reveals its irreducible ‘phenomenal profundity’ which is what links fruit with the concept of its ‘naturalness’. “Fruit reveals itself in its essence (i.e. in food) as something completely different from anything man-made: it tastes as it is, or better, its phenomenal essence differs fundamentally from any combined food” [*Obst gibt sich im Umgang (d.h. im Essen) als etwas, das toto coelo von jedem Hergestellten verschieden ist: es smeckt, wie es ist, oder besser, seine Phänomenalität unterscheidet sich grundsätzlich von jeder kombinierten Speise*]<sup>921</sup>. The difference between a fruit and a man-made alimentary product consists in the fact that the former has a ‘flavor in itself’, while the latter has a ‘flavor of something’. They are two different *modi* of the evidence of taste which cannot be described with a quantitative difference in ‘sweetness’ or ‘bitterness’, rather with a diverse degree of ‘insipidness’ [*Fade*] which stands for a diverse degree of phenomenal profundity. This ‘insipidness’ is what determines if we find ourselves before an artificial/man-made or natural flavor, it determines the actual properties of the object we are eating. It is this ‘profundity of the flavor’ that reveals the quality and the “genuine properties” [*echte Eigenschaften*]<sup>922</sup> of something which is able to qualify by itself.

The second example that Anders provided revolves around the human-animal interaction. According to Anders, there exists a reciprocal and particular ‘background knowledge’ [*Vorwissen*]<sup>923</sup> between people and animals which does not aim at reaching a certain level of objectivity – the ordinary ‘understanding something’ [*etwas verstehen*]<sup>924</sup> – but rather, a sift-

*Erkenntnis* (Bonn: F.Cohen Verlag, 1928), pp. 43–70.

<sup>920</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 49.

<sup>921</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 47.

<sup>922</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 47.

<sup>923</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>924</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

ing of oneself through a simultaneous inspection of one's being and one's capabilities, through which one can change oneself and become what one is. This type of understanding postulated by Anders "an agreeing/going along" [*sich-verstehen-mit*]<sup>925</sup> with the animals is grounded on both a form of a-posteriori knowledge – "we interact with animals with the expectation of how they will react" [*Wir verkehren mit den Tieren in der Voraussicht, wie sie reagieren werden*]<sup>926</sup> – and a-priori understanding – "this interaction is by no means solely based on experience" [*dieser Verkehr durchaus nicht lediglich auf Erfahrung aufgebaut*]<sup>927</sup> – which permits, for example, an owner of a horse to interact with his animal with the right tone and posture. The communication between the two (owner and horse) is not one-directional because it is built upon a continuous and reciprocal exchange of 'words' between the two from which it emerges a mutual comprehension and construction of a 'shared world' "so that both have the same object [...] as 'mine'" [*daß beide einen und denselben Gegenstand [...] als 'meinen' haben*]<sup>928</sup>. This heightened type of comprehension displays a "togetherness (between us and a natural being and vice versa)" [*Zusammen (von uns mit einem Naturwesen und umgekehrt)*]<sup>929</sup> which, according to Anders, demonstrates "that the horizon of the human world is not exhausted by the human world, that man lives by himself in a world which coincides, if only in parts, with the circles of other beings; less in quantitative terms, that his environment has a common sub-layer with the myriad of other environments" [*daß der Horizont der menschlichen Welt nicht erschöpft wird durch die Menschen-Welt, daß der Mensch von sich aus in einer Welt lebt, die sich, wenn auch nur in Ausschnitten, mit den Kreisen anderer Wesen deckt; weniger quantitativ ausgedrückt, daß seine Umwelt eine gemeinsame Unterschicht mit der Unzahl anderer Umwelten besitzt*]<sup>930</sup>. Despite implying different forms of praxis, both examples refute, for Anders, the Fichtian idea<sup>931</sup> according to which there exists between people and Nature an ab-

<sup>925</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>926</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>927</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>928</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>929</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 52.

<sup>930</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 53.

<sup>931</sup> "Fichte is right: Man stands freely towards nature. Fichte is wrong: for man is not free through self-assertion in opposition, but through the recognition of others" [*Fichte hat recht: frei steht der Mensch zur Natur. Fichte hat unrecht: denn frei ist er nicht durch Selbst-*



solute extraneity. What determines the essence of Nature is not only its extraneity but also its closeness with the human world in which Nature often infiltrates. The extraneity and closeness of Nature cannot be calculated in a quantitative manner according to the methods that would only relativise their proximity or distance. The fracture that separates these two essences of Nature cannot be simplified or absolutised a posteriori by any theoretical operation: they are two different relations of being which must be understood in their dialectical co-presence while ignoring the principle of non-contradiction<sup>932</sup>. This new category that preserves the fracture between Nature's closeness and distance is called, by Anders, *Heimtücke*. It is typified by the example of the domestic dog which gives itself to his owner to appear obedient and familiar [*heimisch*] and simultaneously insidious [*tückisch*]. In his idiosyncratic re-elaboration of this word, Anders wants to underscore its oxymoronic meaning which stems from the adjacency of the prefix *heim-*, identifying something familiar such as one's home, and the noun *Tücke* – referring to a danger or an evil desire. Therefore, *Heimtücke* indicates the simultaneous reaction that Nature has with humanity: a disclosing as much as a hiding<sup>933</sup>.

The result of this early treaty on Nature by Anders was that of showing how in humanity's dealings with the world Nature emerged in all its independent character. In *Bucolic and the Property*, Anders confirms this independent character of Nature by re-advocating the importance of the distance between Nature and humanity. This is because in subjugating Nature under the human notion of 'property', we are depriving Nature of its fundamental 'philosophical profundity', eliminating its *Heimtücke*. The decentralised humanism is here expressed by Anders' methodological approach to Nature, in the sense that he clearly knows that he cannot speak for Nature without putting his yoke on it via an anthropocentric view, yet nonetheless cannot stay still and nurture an ignorant idea of a *proportio naturalis*. In this sense, Nature must be seen as something *Anderes* without falling in the Fichtian prejudice of separating humanity from Nature because, eventually, humanity is a Nature *sui generis*.

*stbestätigung im Gegenwurf, sondern durch die Anerkenntnis des Anderen*]. Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 70.

<sup>932</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 55.

<sup>933</sup> Stern, *Über das Naturtreffen*, p. 55.

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*Reihweise legen sie sich hin:  
Belegschaft, Ware, Mehrgewinn,  
Bis daß im Dunkel nichts verbleibt,  
Als nur das Mühlrad, das noch treibt,*

*Der Kolben, der im alten Schwung  
Die Nacht teilt und die Dämmerung  
Und nichts Lebend'ges Bleibt, als nur  
Das Weiterfließen der Natur*

*G. Anders, Die molussische Katakombe, p. 112*

Günther Anders is a thinker whose contributions are often overlooked in favour of his contemporaries, especially Adorno and Heidegger. This book seeks to fill this gap by exploring the profound connections between Anders' early musicological works and his later philosophical ideas.

Through detailed analysis, this study reveals how Anders' musicology influenced his broader philosophical outlook, offering new insights into his interactions with Adorno and Heidegger. It traces Anders' intellectual journey from phenomenology to musicology.

By rediscovering Anders' musicological works, this book underscores the innovative aspects of his thought, emphasizing their relevance in contemporary discussions on music, anthropology, and technology. Whether you are a scholar or an interested reader, this book offers a nuanced understanding of Anders' contributions and their significance in 20th-century philosophy.

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